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Scholars have largely read Aquinas’ critique of Averroes on the issue of will and 
moral responsibility in a positive light. They tend to accept Aquinas’ account of Averroes’ 
theory and its shortcomings, failing to read Averroes’ theory in its own right or take a 
critical eye to Aquinas’ understanding of Averroes. This dissertation will provide that 
critical eye by addressing four key issues associated with the location and function of the 
will: (A) the nature of the Intellects as both separate and “in the soul,” (B) the notion that 
the Intellects are “form for us,” (C) the relationship between the individual human being 
and the intelligibles in act, and (D) the location and function of the will. 
In addressing these four issues several questions will be raised and answered. First, 
it will be necessary to examine whether Aristotle, on whom both medieval thinkers rely 
for their disparate understandings of will and intellect, has a faculty of will in his system 
and what role the intellect plays in moral decision making. Next, we must determine what 
Averroes and Aquinas positions are on these issues and how they relate to that of 
Aristotle. Finally, the two philosophers must be brought into dialogue with one another as 
we determine the strength and cogency of Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes’ view of the will 
and the intellects. Is it coherent? 
Through the course of this examination it will be demonstrated that Aristotle did 
not have a faculty of will in his philosophy and that the understanding of will attributed to 
him by Averroes and Aquinas actually has its roots in Stoic, Neoplatonist, and Peripatetic 
philosophy. It will also be demonstrated that, despite the view of many contemporary 
scholars of Aquinas, Aquinas’ particular critiques of Averroes regarding the will are not 
tenable. Despite this, we will see that the nature of the intellects and, more importantly, 
the intelligibles in act is central to moral agency for Averroes; here, Aquinas’ criticisms 
are more convincing.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. General Introduction
The question of moral agency and moral responsibility has been important for
philosophers through the ages. It has often been connected, particularly during the Middle 
Ages, with issues of philosophical psychology and the nature of the soul. Aquinas was 
one important voice in the medieval discussion regarding moral responsibility and the 
role of intellect and will. Often this discussion took place within a larger philosophical 
context where Aquinas tried to explain his own view in relation to Aristotle and against 
his predecessors, notably Averroes. 
One of Aquinas’ most clear and concise condemnations of Averroes’ philosophical 
psychology and its perceived impact on moral responsibility can be found in in his late 
work On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists. Here Aquinas argues that the 
intellects must be in the human soul and multiplied according to the number of 
individuals, rather than being the separate shared entities of the Averroist system. Among 
Aquinas’ many arguments in this work is one in which he appeals directly to the problem 
of the will and moral responsibility:
According to this position [that the Intellects are separate 
and shared], the principles of moral philosophy would be 
destroyed; for what is in us would be taken away. For 
something is not in us except through the will; and this 
indeed is called voluntary because it is in us. But the will is 
in the intellect1, as is clear from the statement of Aristotle in 
1. Aquinas is here referencing to De Anima 3.9 (432b5-6), where Aristotle explain that “wish is found in the 
calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational” (p. 687 in Jonathan Barnes’ The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, Vol. 1, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). It should be noted that this statement is key 
source of disagreement for Aquinas and Averroes, influencing how both philosophers understand the 
2Book III of the De Anima […]
If, therefore, the intellect does not belong to this man in 
such a way that it is truly one with him, but is united to him 
only through phantasms or as mover, the will will not be in 
this man, but in the separate intellect. And so this man will 
not be the master of his act, nor will any act of his be 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. This is to destroy the 
principles of moral philosophy.2
This passage highlights several important elements regarding Aquinas’ theory and the 
way he sees that theory in relation to the work of both Aristotle and Averroes. In this text 
Aquinas clearly links the will and the intellect and uses this link as an argument for why 
the intellects must be in the human being and multiplied according to the number of 
individuals, rather than being separate, shared entities. If the will is a rational appetite, 
location of the will and its relation to the intellect. This is discussed in some detail later in the dissertation.
2. Aquinas, On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists [deUnitate], translated by Beatrice H. 
Zedler (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), Ch. III, sec. 81-82, p. 56-57. “Adhuc, secundum 
istorum positionem destruuntur moralis philosophie principia: subtrahitur enim quod est in nobis. Non enim 
est aliquid in nobis nisi per uoluntatem; unde et hoc ipsum uoluntarium dicitur, quod in nobis est. Voluntas 
autem in intellectu est, ut patet per dictum Aristotilis in De anima, et per hoc quod in substantiis separatis 
est intellectus et uoluntas; et per hoc etiam quod contingit per uoluntatem aliquid in uniuersali amare uel 
odire, sicut odimus latronum genus, ut Aristotiles dicit in sua Rhetorica. Si igitur intellectus non est aliquid 
huius hominis ut sit uere unum cum eo, sed unitur ei solum per fantasmata uel sicut motor, non erit in hoc 
homine uoluntas, sed in intellectu separato. Et ita hic homo non erit dominus sui actus, nec aliquis eius 
actus erit laudabilis uel uituperabilis: quod est diuellere principia moralis philosophie.” (De Unitate 
Intellectus, in Opera Omnia, Vol. 43, Leonine Edition. (Santa Sabina and Rome: Editori Di San Tommaso, 
1976), Ch. 3, ln. 336-354, p. 306). 
A few paragraphs later he takes up this idea again: “Now it is clear that the intellect is that which 
is the principle agent in man, and that it uses all the powers of the soul and the members of the body as if 
they were organs. And on this account Aristotle said subtly that man is intellect ‘or is principally this.’ If, 
therefore, there is one intellect for all, it follows of necessity that there be one who understands and 
consequently one who wills and one who uses according to the choice of his will all those things by which 
men are diverse from one another. And from this it further follows that there would be no difference among 
men in respect to the free choice of the will, but it [the choice] would be the same for all, if the intellect in 
which alone would reside pre-eminence and dominion over the use of all [powers] is one and undivided in 
all. This is clearly false and impossible. For it is opposed to what is evident and destroys the whole of moral 
science and everything which relates to the civil intercourse which is natural to man, as Aristotle says” (Ch. 
IV, sec. 89, p. 60-61). “Manifestum est autem quod intellectus est id quod est principale in homine, et quod 
utitur omnibus potentiis anime et membris corporis tamquam organis; et propter hoc Aristotiles subtiliter 
dixit quod homo est intellectus <<uel maxime >>. Si igitur sit unus intellectus omnium, ex necessitate 
sequitur quod sit unus intelligens, et per consequens unus uolens et unus utens pro sue uoluntatis arbitrio 
omnibus illis secundum que homines diuersificantur ad inuicem. Et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod nulla 
differentia sit inter homines quantum ad liberam uoluntatis electionem, sed eadem sit omnium, si 
intellectus, apud quem solum residet principalitas et dominium utendi omnibus aliis, est unus et indiuisus in 
omnibus. Quod est manifeste falsum et impossibile: repugnat enim hiis que apparent, et destruit totam 
scientiam moralem et omnia que pertinent ad conuersationem ciuilem, que est hominibus naturalis, ut 
Aristotiles dicit” (Ch. 4, ln 76-95, p. 308).
3part of the intellects, the separation of the intellects from the individual human being 
would result not only in epistemological issues but also in moral ones: individuals cannot 
be held morally responsible for their actions if the locus of that action is separate from 
them. Aquinas sees this as a strong argument against Averroes’ position regarding the 
intellects and he seems to think that Averroes’ view of the will is the same as to his own. 
In addition, Aquinas claims that his view is in line with the view of Aristotle, even citing 
Aristotle’s De Anima directly in reference to the relationship between the intellects and 
the will.3
1.2 The Issues
Scholars have largely read Aquinas’ critique of Averroes here and elsewhere in a
positive light. They tend to accept Aquinas’ account of Averroes’ theory and its 
shortcomings, failing to read Averroes’ theory in its own right or take a critical eye to 
Aquinas’ understanding of Averroes. However, it is certainly the case that Averroes 
thought through and addressed the problems Aquinas points out and that he has clear 
reasons for developing his theories of the Intellects and human will as he does; this is 
evident when we examine not only the texts to which Aquinas had access but also some 
of Averroes’ earlier works, such as the Middle Commentary on the De Anima, which 
provides a different account of the material intellect than that in the Long Commentary. 
Thus, these claims of Aquinas (and their acceptance by scholars) form a basis for this 
dissertation since they raise a number of important issues regarding the relationship that 
exists among the views of Aquinas, Averroes, and Aristotle. I shall address these issues 
3. This is, again, a reference to the key passage in De Anima 3.9.
4one by one before turning to an account of the organization of the dissertation.
1.2.1 Does Aristotle have a faculty of will in his system? What is his view of the 
intellects?
Both Averroes and Aquinas take for granted that Aristotle’s philosophical
psychology includes a faculty of will and both claim to be following his view of the will. 
Averroes insists that Aristotle held that the will was a power of the cogitative faculty 
located in the perishable human brain; Aquinas, on the other hand, quoted Aristotle as 
saying that it was a power of the intellect, and so for Aquinas an immaterial power 
located in the imperishable human soul. However, neither the Nicomachean Ethics nor 
the De Anima is clear when it comes to the will and there are a number of scholars who 
argue that the notion of will is a much later invention. Since the supposedly Aristotelian 
notion of will is a key element in both Averroes and Aquinas, an effort must be made to 
discover the truth. This question is one which scholars have examined, with mixed 
results. Some scholars, such as Irwin and Nielsen4 hold that Aristotle did have a notion of 
will in his moral theory and that this notion informed later thinkers. For example, Irwin’s 
project in “Who Discovered the Will?” is to show that the concept of will existed in 
Ancient Greek thought. Although he admits that Aristotle is perhaps not the best example 
of will in Greek philosophy he says we must start there precisely because Aquinas saw 
the concept in Aristotle. He even goes so far as to say we can answer the question ‘does 
Aristotle have a concept of will’ by backtracking from Aquinas: “If Aquinas has a 
4. T. H. Irwin, “Who Discovered the Will?” in Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics (1992), pp. 453-455; 
Karen M. Nielsen “The Will—Origins of the Notion in Aristotle’s Thought,” in Antiquorum Philosophia, 
(2012) found at http://works.bepress.com/karennielsen/16. 
5concept of the will, then we can try to answer our original question about whether 
Aristotle has a concept of the will, by answering a more precise question. If Aquinas 
interprets Aristotle, correctly, then Aristotle has a concept of the will. If, on the other 
hand, we believe that Aristotle has no concept of the will, then we must show where 
Aquinas’s interpretation of him is wrong.”5 In examining these questions Irwin points out 
that Aquinas’ two primary claims about Aristotle on the will were that (1) the Aristotelian 
concept of wish (boulēsis) was a concept of will (and thus properly translated as 
voluntas), and (2) that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action were about the role of will. 
While Irwin explains that Aquinas’ exegesis of Aristotle is wrong in some places he 
argues that a proper understanding of Aristotle strengthens the view that Aristotle had a 
concept of will rather than calling it into doubt.6 Others, such as Kahn, Sorabji, and 
Frede,7 argue that although Aristotle’s concepts of wish, deliberation, and decision may 
be said to form a foundation upon which the concept of will developed, a fully fledged 
faculty of will did not exist in Aristotle. Kahn, for example, explains that, although there 
is no concept of will in Aristotle, his larger psychological framework is essential to a 
fully realized concept of the will which is developed by Aquinas through an integration of 
Aristotle’s psychological framework and Augustine’s discussion of free choice of the 
will.8 There is also Gauthier’s famous assertion that the will does not exist in Aristotle’s 
5. Irwin, “Who Discovered the Will?” p. 456.
6. Ibid., p. 457.
7. Charles Kahn, “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine” in The Question of Eclecticism, edited 
by John M. Dillon and A.A. Long (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 1988); Richard 
Sorabji, “The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor” in The Will and Human Action: 
From Antiquity to the Present Day, edited by Thomas Pink and M.W.F. Stone (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2004); Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A.A. 
Long (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2011).
8. Kahn, “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 238.
6psychology.9 Since both Averroes and Aquinas take the existence of such a faculty in 
Aristotle for granted, it is important to examine this question in some detail.
As with the question of the will, there is some disagreement between Averroes 
and Aquinas as to how Aristotle should be interpreted regarding the nature of the 
intellects and human reason. Averroes holds that both the Agent Intellect and Material 
Intellect are separate entities shared by all human beings; Aquinas insists they must both 
be in the human soul as powers multiplied according to the number of individuals. They 
both explicitly claim Aristotle as support for their positions, relying on Aristotle’s 
famously brief account in De Anima 3.5. Here again scholars have examined Aristotle 
and tried to determine his actual view with mixed results. Some claim that Aquinas is 
correct in his assessment of Aristotle. However, several important scholars of Aristotle 
suggest that he can best be understood as holding that the active intellectual element is 
one and shared (although deeply connected to the individual while ‘in’ the human being) 
while the passive element is fully individuated.10
1.2.2 Are either Averroes or Aquinas following Aristotle regarding the will or the 
intellects? 
The above two questions are about Aristotle’s own views; we must also ask who
9. “Dans la psychologie d'Aristote la volonté n'existe pas […] le souhait n’est pas un acte de «volonté».” 
René Antoine Gauthier and Jean Yves Jolif, L’Éthique a Nicomaque: Introduction, Traduction, et 
Commentaire (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1970), p. 218.
10. Joseph Owens “The Self in Aristotle” Review of Metaphysics 41 (June 1988), pp. 707-722; Joseph 
Owens, “Aristotle and Aquinas” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by Norman Kretzman 
and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 38-59; John M. Rist, “Notes on 
Aristotle De Anima 3.5 Classical Philology, 61.1 (Jan. 1966) 8-20; John M. Rist, “Aristotle: The Value of 
Man and the Origin of Morality” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4.1 (Sept. 1975) 1-21.
7is more correct in his assessment of those views—Averroes or Aquinas. Part of answering 
this question will include an account of who, if not Aristotle, can be said to be the true 
inspiration of the views of the will on the part of these two medieval thinkers. Regarding 
the will, this entails an examination of the historical development of the concept of will 
and its associated concepts of deliberation and choice in later Greek sources and into the 
Latin and Arabic traditions. Of particular interest is the development of these ideas in the 
Stoic tradition and the ways in which Arabic and Latin medieval thinkers (such as Al-
Farabi, Avicenna, and Augustine) discussed the issue and often attributed their views to 
Aristotle. 
When it comes to the question of the intellect, where Aristotle’s view is even 
more unclear due to the brevity of his account, attention must again be paid to the 
historical development of this notion and the influence of thinkers such as Avicenna and 
Themistius. Such an examination will help us to understand how Averroes and Aquinas 
are situated within the larger historical tradition and what Aristotelian and non-
Aristotelian influences there may have been for their understanding of the moral and 
intellectual life of the human being. Here, again there is some disagreement. There are 
scholars11 who insist that Aquinas can be said to be faithful to Aristotle, particularly about 
the intellects, while others accounts of Aristotle suggest that Averroes’ understanding is 
closer to Aristotle, although not perfectly so.
1.2.3 What is Averroes’ position and what motivates this position? Is it coherent? 
11. Edward Mahoney, “Aquinas’ Critique of Averroes’ Doctrine of the Unity of the Intellect” in Thomas 
Aquinas and His Legacy edited by David Gallagher (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press, 
1994), pp. 83-106; Ralph McInerny, “Aristotle and Thomas: Père Gauthier” in Aquinas on Human Action:A 
Theory of Practice (The Catholic University Press: Washington, D.C., 1992), pp. 161-177. 
8In addition to examining the place both thinkers hold in the larger historical
landscape, it is necessary to examine the actual views of Averroes and Aquinas regarding 
the natures of the will and the intellects, their relation to one another, and their relation to 
the human being as such. This is especially true when it comes to Averroes since his view 
is often read only in light of Aquinas’ own ideas and critiques. A proper examination of 
Averroes’ views must include not only those texts to which Aquinas had access but a 
more wide ranging selection where nuances and changes can be examined. This will 
allow for a more complete picture of Averroes’ position on the Intellects and the will, 
including the motivation for his views and their internal consistence and cogency. While 
special attention will be paid to the Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima as a 
representation of Averroes’ final position, it is also important to consider his earlier 
commentaries on the De Anima and his commentaries on Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics in order to understand Averroes’ overall position on moral action 
and philosophical psychology and how his views developed over time. Although the heart 
of the dissertation will examine Averroes in light of Aquinas’ critiques, it will also 
address some issues with the internal consistency of Averroes’ views which require an 
understanding of Averroes apart from Aquinas; a full picture of how Averroes integrates 
his views regarding the Intellects, the will, and the intelligibles in act is necessary to 
make this possible. In recent decades scholars have paid more attention to Averroes’ own 
ideas as they exist on their own or within a larger historical context, but this has not yet 
become common enough to warrant our foregoing such an examination of primary texts 
here.
9A similar account of Aquinas’ views is also necessary. While our primary concern 
when it comes to Aquinas is with his critiques of Averroes, these cannot be fully 
understood apart from his own views of the issues at hand. Of course, much more has 
been done here in the scholarship than has been done with Averroes.
1.2.4. Does Averroes’ view hold up against the critiques of Aquinas? 
Finally, we arrive at the central question of the dissertation. As we saw with the
above passage from Aquinas’ On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists, 
Aquinas’ critique regarding Averroes’ position is made in a rather direct and matter-of-
fact manner. He simply states that Averroes’ position regarding the intellects has 
ramifications on the notion of will and, thus, on the notion of moral responsibility which 
are unacceptable. Although this particular argument focuses on the will and moral 
responsibility, most of Aquinas’ arguments against Averroes deal with his understanding 
of the Intellects and the problems that Aquinas sees arising from Averroes’ insistence that 
the individual human being can be a knower when both Intellects are separate and shared 
by all human beings. Of particular concern to Aquinas is the role that phantasms play in 
connecting the individual to the separate Intellects in his understanding of Averroes. He 
makes arguments along these lines of thought against Averroes not only in On the Unity 
of the Intellects but also in the Commentary on the Sentences, Summa Contra 
Gentiles,Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, and Summa Theologiae, among other 
works.
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Scholars have largely held that Aquinas’ critiques are accurate and convincing, 
paying little attention to Averroes beyond the presentation his ideas receive in Aquinas.12 
Mahoney, for example, traces the development of Aquinas’ critique from the Sentences 
through to the more famous account in On the Unity of the Intellects. The main objective 
of his article is to show that Aquinas noted problems with Averroes’ views even in his 
earliest writings and that his critique developed overtime and was strengthened but did 
not change. Throughout the article Mahoney explains the critiques of Aquinas in positive 
terms (with the single exception of noting that Aquinas’ “claim that Averroes maintained 
‘intelligibles species’ is surely doubtful”13). He explains that Aquinas strengthens his 
critique over the course of his works and that in On the Unity of the Intellects he “deftly 
points to the weak point in the psychology found in Averroes’ long commentary on the 
De anima.”14 At the end of the article he notes that Aquinas’ ability to use new Latin 
translations of Themistius for his work in On the Unity of the Intellect made the resulting 
critique “even more formidable.”15 Further, McInerny provides a positive discussion of 
Aquinas critiques in “Averroes or Aquinas?,”16 one of the “interpretive essays” attached 
to his translation of On the Unity of the Intellects. He focuses primarily on the 
interpretation by Aquinas and on Aquinas’ critique of Averroes’ use of Aristotle, arguing 
for Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle over Averroes’. However, we must look more 
12. Mahoney, “Aquinas’ Critique of Averroes’ Doctrine of the Unity of the Intellect,” Ralph McInerny, 
Aquinas Against the Averroists: On There Being Only One Intellect ( Indiana: Perdue University Press, 
1993), and Alain de Libera, L’Unitaté de L’intellect: Commentaire du De unitate intellectus contra 
averroistas de Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2004) provide important examples 
of scholars who explained Aquinas’ arguments in detail and viewed them favorably, although there is a 
wealth of scholarly work on Aquinas which at best explains Aquinas’ position without calling into question 
the strength of his critiques let alone the depth of his understanding of Averroes’ view. 
13. Mahoney, “Aquinas’ Critique of Averroes’ Doctrine of the Unity of the Intellect,”p. 85. 
14. Ibid., p. 97.
15. Ibid., p. 106.
16. McInerny, Aquinas Against the Averroists: On There Being Only One Intellect, pp. 188-196.
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closely to determine whether all of Aquinas’ criticisms are sound. In doing so it will 
become evident that things cannot be as simple as Aquinas suggests—if they were, surely 
Averroes would have noted the potential issues with his views. This is especially true 
when it comes to the two most facile of Aquinas critiques: that placing the will outside of 
the human individual would destroy moral responsibility while placing the Intellects 
outside of the individual would make it impossible to call the human individual a knower. 
Since Averroes presses on with his views, even shifting them to a more radical 
understanding of the separate Intellects (by making the Material Intellect separate in the 
Long Commentary when it had not been so in the Middle Commentary on the De Anima), 
we must assume that he thought he had done enough to address these potential issues,17 
maintaining the human being’s identity as both rational and moral agent. So, rather than 
simply accepting Aquinas’ views and critique of Averroes, we must give Averroes his 
due. It is true that in recent years scholars have been paying more attention to Averroes as 
a distinct figure from Aquinas; they have also been arguing for Averroes’ position against 
Aquinas in some areas.18 However, not enough has been done in this regard. Most 
importantly, no treatment of the particular issue the will (and the Intellects as they are 
17. Indeed, Averroes’ shows in his Long Commentary on the De Anima [LCDA] the willingness to 
reconsider his position even further if objections arise, saying, in the midst of a discussion of the Intellects 
and their relation to the human soul: “I ask my brothers seeing this exposition to write down their doubts 
and perhaps in that way what is true regarding this will be found out, if I have not yet found [it]. If I have 
found [it], as I suppose, then it will be clarified through those questions. For truth, as Aristotle says, is 
fitting and gives testimony to itself in every way,” (Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, 
translated by Richard C. Taylor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), Book 3, comment 5, p.315). “Et 
tunc rogo fratres videntes hoc scriptum scribere suas dubitationes, et forte per illud invenietur verum in 
hoc, si nondum inveni. Et si inveni, ut fingo, tunc declaribitur per illas questiones. Veritas enim, ut dicit 
Aristoteles, convenit et testatur sibi omni modo” (Averroes Cordobensis Commentarium Magnum in 
Aristotelis De Anima Libros, edited by F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 
1953), p. 399, ln. 365-369). This demonstrates that, although he thinks he has, with careful thought 
discovered the truth of these matters (even correcting his earlier views), he is receptive to further thinking. 
18. Richard Taylor, Deborah Black, and Carlos Bazan are some of the key figures working in this area.
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associate with the will) as it exists in Averroes against Aquinas’ critiques has been 
undertaken.
1.3 Methodology
In order to sufficiently address the above questions we must work systematically to 
develop an understanding of the relevant texts and historical contexts necessary to fully 
address the issues at hand. Although the ultimate focus of the dissertation is Averroes and 
the ability of his theory to hold against the critiques of Aquinas, there are several 
elements which must be addressed first. Thus, the dissertation is organized as follows.
1.3.1 Aristotle and Other Influences
Despite the drastic differences in their theories both Averroes and Aquinas appeal to
the works of Aristotle, particularly his De Anima and his Nicomachean Ethics, when 
arguing for their conceptions of moral action and the roles that intellect and will play in 
this process. They both claim to be following Aristotle in their views regarding the nature 
and placement of the intellects, the importance of internal sense powers, and the 
existence, nature, and location of the will. In order to determine whether either medieval 
thinker can be rightly called Aristotelian it is essential to examine Aristotle’s account of 
these issues. To do this I will offer, in Chapter 2, a discussion of key passages in both the 
Nicomachean Ethics and the De Anima of Aristotle and consider the developments of the 
concept of will in later Greek thought. This examination will include a brief account of 
Aristotle’s view of the nature of intellect and its relationship to the individual. It will also 
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include a close analysis of the notions of will/wish, choice/decision, and deliberation 
(boulēsis, prohairesis, and bouleusis) in the Aristotelian context. Important to this 
examination is the question of whether these notions exist in Aristotle, as some19 suggest 
and Aquinas and Averroes suppose, or whether they are later developments20 which were 
then anachronistically attributed to Aristotle in the tradition. Part of this examination 
includes a discussion of Stoic, Peripatetic, and Platonist sources which include the same 
terminology (boulēsis, prohairesis, and bouleusis) in a different context, as well as 
medieval Arabic sources who influenced Averroes and Arabic and Latin thinkers who 
influenced Aquinas. 
This examination will provide essential background as we move on to address the 
ideas of Averroes and Aquinas in this area; both Averroes and Aquinas think that Aristotle 
had a conception of will and a related conception of choice. We must ask whether either 
of them can rightly be said to be following Aristotle in this matter; furthermore, we must 
examine other possible sources for the development of the notion of will and the 
surrounding concepts. By examining the Aristotelian texts along with later sources we 
will be able to make a determination not only regarding what Aristotle himself had to say 
but also, and more importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, whether Averroes or 
Aquinas can be said to be Aristotelian in the ways that they each claim to be. 
This examination of Aristotle will allow us to address the question of whether or 
not Aristotle can be said to have a notion of the will21 as it is understood by Averroes and 
19. See Irwin, “Who Discovered the Will?” pp. 453-473. 
20. See Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, and Thomas Pink and M.W.F. Stone, 
The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day. (New York and London: Routledge), 2004.
21. Despite the fact that some argue not only that Aristotle had a notion of will but that Aquinas is 
following Aristotle quite well in his account of the will; see, notably, Irwin, cited above.
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Aquinas. It will also allow for an examination of the accuracy of their understanding of 
other relevant aspects of Aristotle’s moral philosophy, such as the practical syllogism. 
Furthermore, Joseph Owens argues that Aristotle has a complex view of the relationship 
between the individual human being and the separate immortal intellect22 and that this 
creates a specific and potentially problematic view of the self in Aristotle.23 While there 
are definite similarities in terminology between Aristotle and Aquinas along with ways in 
which Aquinas’ thought can been seen as an extension of Aristotelian thought in some 
areas, it is also clear that there are key differences.24 There are also areas where Aristotle’s 
views are more clearly reflected in the philosophy of Averroes; this is particularly true 
when it comes to their respective notions of the intellects and their relationship to the 
individual human being. This is, perhaps, most clearly seen in Averroes’ notion that the 
Agent Intellect is both separate substance and existing in the human being as ‘form for 
us.’25
1.3.2 Reading Averroes and Aquinas on their own terms
The primary task of the dissertation is to analyze the nature and soundness of 
Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes. Aquinas offers particularly harsh criticisms of Averroes’ 
views regarding the nature of the intellects and their relationship to individual human 
22. Owens, “The Self in Aristotle.” 
23. Owens, “The Self in Aristotle,” especially pp. 717-719. Also see Rist, “Aristotle: The Value of Man and 
the Origin of Morality,” for a discussion of the what constitutes the human being in Aristotle, particularly as 
it relates to reason.
24. Owens, “Aristotle and Aquinas.”
25. See Richard C. Taylor, “The Agent Intellect as ‘form for us’ and Averroes’s Critique of al-Farabi” in 
Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, 5 (2005) and “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal 
Cause in the Soul According to Aquinas and Averroes” in The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul: Reflections of 
Platonic Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions, edited by Maha Elkaisy-Friemuth and John M. Dillon 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009).
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beings. Many of these critiques rest on Aquinas’ understanding of Averroes’ use of 
phantasms as a means of connecting the separate Intellects to the individual human being. 
Additionally, he thinks that Averroes’ system is incompatible with moral agency and 
responsibility, as seen in the above quotation from On the Unity of the Intellect. While a 
proper assessment of these critiques requires an understanding of Aristotle and other 
potential sources, it also requires a careful reading of both Averroes and Aquinas in their 
own rights. Before the strength of Aquinas’ critiques can be assessed we must develop a 
thorough understanding of each philosopher’s theory on its own. For this reason Chapters 
3 and 4 will provide detailed accounts of Averroes and Aquinas’ views, respectively, 
focusing on their concepts of will, choice, the mechanism of moral decision making and 
action, and the role of the intellects in this process. These chapters will not question the 
validity of either view but will, instead, present the views as clearly and completely as 
possible.
It is especially important to offer a complete and detailed account of Averroes’ view 
for two reasons. First, while Averroes is often read only in light of Aquinas’ theory and 
critique, it is methodologically and historically preferable to examine his ideas in their 
own rights before allowing Aquinas to influence our understanding. Such an examination 
requires not only a look at Averroes’ final position as it appears in the Long Commentary 
on Aristotle’s De Anima, but also an appraisal of the evolution of his position. And 
second, it is essential to a proper evaluation of that critique that we have first developed 
an understanding not only of what Aquinas takes Averroes to be saying but also what 
Averroes is actually saying. This means referencing not only those works to which 
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Aquinas had access, but as many of the relevant texts of Averroes as possible. Thus, 
Chapter 3 will consist in a close examination of key texts of Averroes, culminating in a 
statement of his final position regarding the mechanism of moral decision making and 
action.
Similarly, it is important to offer an account of Aquinas’ position and its 
development, including the critiques of Averroes he uses in developing that position for a 
few reasons. First, as with any historical account, it is important to carefully reconstruct, 
as well as possible, the authentic view of the philosopher in question; this includes the 
relationship this view has to its predecessors. Second, it is important to understand 
Aquinas’ critiques of evaluations both as they relate to his own theory and as they relate 
to his understanding of Averroes; an analysis of the success of his criticisms requires an 
understanding of how Aquinas views Averroes’ theory as well as an understanding of the 
theory itself. Thus, Chapter 4 presents an account of Aquinas’ position regarding the 
mechanism of moral decision making and action as it appears in a number of important 
texts. It includes a presentation of Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes as they fit into his 
account of his own view without addressing whether those criticisms are fair and 
accurate.
1.3.3 Assessing Aquinas’ critique
After examining the views of Averroes and Aquinas independently we will finally 
be able to address the cogency and accuracy of Aquinas’ criticisms of Averroes. There are 
four main issues which need to be addressed to develop a complete picture of Aquinas’ 
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relevant critiques. These four issues are: (A) the nature of the Intellects as both separate 
and “in the soul,” (B) the notion that the Intellects are “form for us,” (C) the relationship 
between the individual human being and the intelligibles in act, and (D) the location and 
function of the will. In Chapter 5 each of these issues is addressed systematically. For 
each issue the two philosophers will be placed in dialogue as each of their views is 
considered before Aquinas’ critiques are presented and assessed in light of the actual view 
of Averroes and in light of Aquinas’ own wider understanding of these issues.
The first 3 issues, A, B, and C, deal with the nature of the Intellects and their 
relation to the individual and to individual knowledge attainment. Aquinas argues that it 
is not possible to maintain that the Intellects can be separate entities shared by all human 
beings while also being “in” the individual human being has her form, subject to her will. 
He argues against Averroes’ understanding of phantasms and of a robust cogitative power 
as a means to bridge the gap between the individual and the separate Intellects. 
Principally, Aquinas thinks that it is not possible to maintain that the individual human 
being is a knower in Averroes’ system. Related to this issue of the placement of the 
intellects are questions about the nature and function of the intelligibles in act. The role of 
intelligibles in explaining Averroes ad Aquinas’ philosophical psychology, must be 
considered in detail. Aquinas argues that Averroes’ understanding of the intelligibles does 
not allow for individual knowledge in the way that Averroes thinks. Aquinas also claims 
that they are markedly unAristotelian, bordering on Platonism. This chapter will address 
these claims and determine their cogency.
The fourth issue addressed in Chapter 5 is the location and function of the will. 
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Both philosophers try to develop an understanding of the will which fits within their 
larger system; their success in this regard must be considered. Aquinas’ critiques here will 
be presented in detail; they revolve around his understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between the intellects and the individual (the focus of the earlier issues) and 
the claim that the will is located in the intellect. Here again Aquinas claims that Averroes’ 
view is both untenable and unAristotelian. But, we must ask, is this so, or is Averroes’ 
view of the will simply different from the way that Aquinas understands it? These 
questions will be addressed in detail. Answering these questions will allow us to develop 
some insight into the coherence of Averroes’ overall account of moral responsibility. 
1.4 Conclusion
Finally, Chapter 6 will return to the questions raised here and summarize the 
answers reached throughout the 4 intervening chapters. Revisiting the claims of the 
scholars which have been highlighted above in light of what has been uncovered through 
the dissertation by way of careful examination of primary texts will allow for clear 
conclusions to be drawn. This will help to fill the lacuna which currently exists in the 
scholarship in this area by demonstrating what the real issues are in regards to the nature 
of Averroes’ account of moral agency and how these issues, missed by scholars up to this 
point, must be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 2
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF WILL 
BEFORE AVERROES AND AQUINAS
2.1 Introduction
Before discussing how Averroes and Aquinas develop their ideas regarding 
reason, the will, and human moral agency it is important to come to an understanding of 
these ideas within the greater historical context. Averroes and Aquinas were both 
influenced by the Aristotelian tradition which was interpreted as including a notion of 
will. Gaining an understanding of how these ideas--particularly the idea of the will--have 
developed over time will allow us to see how Averroes and Aquinas both fit into this 
larger picture. In particular, we will see how both medieval philosophers see themselves 
as in line with the Aristotelian position while also drawing from other later sources. 
There is some debate about when a concept of will emerged in philosophy and 
what that concept entails even today. Pink and Stone point out in the Introduction to their 
book The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day that even today 
there is no consensus “about what might count as a clear case of willing [reflecting] a 
fundamental lack of clarity about just what the notions of ‘will’ and ‘willing’ legitimately 
involve” beyond the general claim that it “refer[s] to the source of a drive that expresses 
itself in human action if nowhere else.”26 The concept includes a variety of features such 
as desire, choice, decision/deliberation, volition, freedom, voluntariness, responsibility, 
26 Thomas Pink and M.W.F. Stone, “Introduction” in The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the 
Present Day, edited by Thomas Pink and M.W.F. Stone (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), p. 1. 
This claim is also made by Richard Sorabji in his chapter “The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus 
the Confessor,” p. 7, and by Charles Kahn in “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 235. 
Michael Frede traces the history of the notion of free will from Aristotle through the Greek tradition and 
into Augustine throughout his work A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought.
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intentions, and ‘will-power.’27 It is also up for debate when the notion of will can be said 
to have emerged or been discovered with some pointing towards Augustine and others 
claiming it can be located, in some form, as early as Plato.28
What can be said with some degree of certainly is that Aristotle did not have a 
clear notion of will as a single faculty; however, he did discuss several abilities or 
faculties, such as prohairesis and boulēsis, which later came to be included in the faculty 
of will. What started with Aristotle was continually developed throughout Greek thought 
until the first clear notion of a will becomes evident in Stoicism. This notion of will can 
be seen as splitting into several branches, including an Arabic language and a Christian 
branch.29 The views of Arabic language authors such as Al-Farabi and Avicenna is 
reflected in the work of Averroes. Aquinas was greatly influenced by Christian authors, 
particularly Augustine, who used the Greek ideas and combined them with traditional 
Christian ideas; it is these Stoic/Augustinian views of the will, which, in part, led Aquinas 
to some of his critiques of the Averroist position.
27 Sorabji, “The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor,” pp. 7-8, discusses clusters of 
functions associated with will; Sorabji provides a more robust account of these clusters of ideas and traces 
the history of these elements of the will from Plato through to Augustine in Emotion and Peace of Mind : 
From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 319-340. Kahn, 
“Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” pp. 235-236, discusses four perspectives on the concept 
of will, its content and emergence. A. W. Price in “Aristotle, the Stoics and the will” in The Will and 
Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, edited by Thomas Pink and M.W.F. Stone (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 29-30, discusses volitions and intentions as part of a more 
contemporary approach to will. Irwin, “Who Discovered the Will?” pp. 453-455, discusses the issue with a 
special focus on whether the Greeks can be said to have a notion of will. Frede also devotes much time 
throughout A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought to an examination of what many of these 
terms mean in the various historical and philosophical contexts in which they appear and what, if anything, 
they have to do with the will.
28 This is indeed the concern of Frede’s, Sorabji’s, Price’s, Kahn’s, and Irwin’s investigations.
29 It should be noted that this discussion of will was also taken up by authors in the Byzantine context. 
While this dissertation leaves that branch of thought untouched it is important to realize that the problem of 
the will stretches beyond the Arab and Western Christian contexts which are the focus here.
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This chapter will examine the development of the idea of will in some detail. It 
will start with the Aristotelian ideas of boulēsis and prohairesis, and related idea of 
voluntariness. It will then offer a brief account of how these ideas were used and 
transformed by later Greek philosophers with particular attention toward the Stoic and 
Platonist views of the will and its freedom. From the Greek tradition the chapter will 
move to a consideration of how the Christian and Arabic traditions were informed by this 
Greek tradition, making use of the works of Augustine, Al-Farabi, and Avicenna. This 
examination will result in an understanding of the history of the notion of willing and 
related ideas, leaving us in a position to move on to the works of Averroes and Aquinas to 
examine how they continued within this tradition and broke away from it in important 
ways. 
2.2 Aristotle and His Interpreters
While Aristotle did not have a single faculty called the will, or indeed a strong 
notion of willing at all, his discussion of deliberation (bouleusis), decision (prohairesis30), 
and wish (boulēsis) in the Nicomachean Ethics and the De Anima provide many of the 
features that later became associated with the faculty of the will. It is here that we must 
start our examination. First, I will offer a discussion of some key Aristotelian texts and 
then I will discuss how these have been interpreted.
2.2.1 The Texts of Aristotle 
30 This term is translated sometimes as choice rather than decision. The notion of choice is perhaps 
increasingly applied to the term as it is used by philosophers after Aristotle but I will generally speak of 
prohairesis as decision in the Aristotelian context since, as we shall see, it does not quite fit with our 
modern notion of choice.
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Famously, Aristotle offers a concise statement regarding the parts of the soul 
responsible for thought and knowledge in De Anima 3.5. He notes that “thought, as we 
have described it, is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another 
which is what it is by virtue of making all things.”31 Before this statement Aristotle 
discusses how mind or intellect has no nature of its own before it knows; for this reason it 
cannot be “blended with the body” and cannot “actually [be] any real thing.”32 Rather 
than being actually some thing, it is potentially all things. One can actually be said to 
know when one is able to call one’s knowledge to mind at will--“When thought has 
become each thing in the way in which a man who knows is said to do so [...] he is now 
able to exercise the power on his own initiative [di’autou].”33 These statements seem to 
be about what in Aquinas came to be called the possible intellect—that receptive power 
which “becomes all things” — and to give a brief account of what it actually means for 
the individual to have knowledge.34 We will see later on that this idea that knowledge is 
indicated, at least in part, by one’s ability to make use of it or call it to mind at will is 
centrally important to the views of both Averroes and Aquinas.35 
31 Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. 3 Ch. 4, 430a14-15.
32 Ibid., Bk. 3 Ch. 4, 429a24-25.
33 Ibid., Bk. 3 Ch. 4, 429b6-8.
34 A more detailed account of how knowledge attainment is achieved can be found in Aristotle, De Anima, 
Bk. 3 Ch. 7, Metaphysics, Bk. 1 Ch. 1, and Posterior Analytics, Bk. 2 Ch. 19. From these sources a picture 
of knowledge attainment emerges by which one begins with sense perception and arrives at understanding 
of universals. The general process presented in Aristotle is shared by both Averroes and Aquinas although 
the particulars vary substantially and significantly.
35 It should be noted that Aristotle does not use the terms “agent intellect” and “possible intellect” in De 
Anima (although, in some translations, such as that used by Myles Burnyeat in his 2008 lecture “Aristotle’s 
Divine Intellect,” he does use the term ‘passive intellect’ in Bk. 3 Ch. 5 [see Myles F. Burnyeat, Aristotle’s 
Divine Intellect (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008), p. 40]). Thus, something must said about 
how these terms describe what Aristotle is doing in De Anima. It is clear from the text presented that there 
is an intellectual element that is related to potentiality and one that is related to actuality. It also seems from 
what Aristotle says that these are two distinct faculties or powers--as opposed to being two ways of 
considering the same faculty. This separation becomes especially clear when we distinguish between 
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Once a person has knowledge he/she can begin to use that knowledge to make 
practical judgments and decisions by bringing the knowledge to bear in particular 
situations. Aristotle offers an example of this kind of decision making in De Anima 3.7 
when he gives the example of the beacon of fire signaling an enemy. An individual sees 
an advancing flame. He is aware not only of the sensory evidence but also of the “forms 
in the images”36--that advancing fire signals the enemy--which go beyond the bare 
sensibles. Using this data the person “calculates and deliberates what is to come by 
reference to what is present; and when it makes a pronouncement, as in the case of 
sensation it pronounces the object to be pleasant or painful, it this case it avoids or 
pursues; and so generally in cases of action.”37 He notes soon after this that “wish is to be 
found in the calculative part [of the soul]”38 and that “[local] movement [i.e. the 
‘thinking’ and ‘intellect.’ The distinction between these terms and the result this has on our understanding 
of Aristotle was the subject of Burnyeat’s lecture. He notes that nous/noein, which he translates as 
“intellect” and “understanding” (pp. 18-19), is different from dianoia, translated as ‘thought’(p. 18) or 
“ordinary thinking” (p. 35). Drawing on Aristotle’s notions of first and second potentiality and actuality 
Burnyeat notes that while there is a sense in which dianoia is a kind of nous--the stage of second 
potentiality/first actuality whereby human beings qua human being have the potential for true intellectual 
knowledge of all things--nous in the fullest sense--the sense identified with the agent intellect--is different 
(p. 35) (for his detailed discussion of the levels of potentiality and actuality as they related to nous see pp. 
19-28). By carefully distinguishing thinking from intellect Burnyeat is able to point out, using De Anima 
Bk. 3 Ch. 4, that for Aristotle it is the human capacity for thinking and judging, dianoia or “first potentiality 
nous” (p. 35) which gives us the potential to know or understand (pp. 33-37). He seems to be talking here 
about the potential intellect, the part of the soul which “becomes all things.” Burnyeat distinguishes this 
from “second potentiality nous” (p. 35), when we actually attain full knowledge of essences and use them 
in further thought (pp. 27-28). This contemplation is the result of our connection to the agent intellect, the 
true Intellect which allows us to understand by making the intelligible forms intelligible to us. Burnyeat 
associates this with the active part of the intellect in De Anima 3.5 and with God (following, he thinks, 
Aristotle’s view as expressed in both De Anima and the Metaphysics); true nous is thus the Agent Intellect 
but we also have our own intellect in so far as we come to understand with the help of this Intellect (pp. 
40-43). While identifying the Agent Intellect with God is controversial, certainly Burnyeat’s account helps 
to shed light on the complexities of Aristotle’s view of the intellects regarding both their function and their 
relationship to the human being; this makes the differences between Averroes and Aquinas’ views of the 
separability and function of the intellects more understandable.
36 Aristotle, De Anima Bk. 3 Ch. 7, 431b2.
37 Ibid, Bk. 3 Ch. 7, 431b8-10
38 Ibid., Bk. 3 Ch. 9, 432b5-6. In discussing this passage Sorabji points out that the result is that Aristotle 
makes boulēsis distinct from reason and yet still related to it, in so far as it a rational desire for the (real or 
apparent) good (8). Aristotle further notes at De Anima 3.10, 433a24, that when action is “according to 
calculation it is also according to wish.”
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movement of action] is always for an end and is accompanied by imagination or by 
appetite”39 All of this is then connected with an end (the real or apparent good) and with 
devising a means to that end: “thought [imagination...] calculates means to an end. i.e. 
practical thought [...] while appetite is in every form of it relative to an end; for that 
which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of practical thought; and that which his last 
in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action.”40
We can take what has been said so far in De Anima and connect it to Aristotle’s 
discussion of wish and deliberation in Book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Here Aristotle 
notes that moral actions are a subset of voluntary actions which are particular to human 
beings. They are actions which are not only done by the individual without coercion and 
with knowledge of the particulars (the criteria of voluntary action and general)41 but also 
involve deliberation (bouleusis) and decision (prohairesis), which distinctively belong to 
human beings because they involve “reason and thought”42 We deliberate and, as result of 
this deliberation, make decisions about “what is up to us, i.e. about the actions we can do 
[…] each group of human beings deliberates about the actions they can do,”43 not about 
eternal things or impossible things, nor about things which cannot be changed, such as 
the principles of science, nor about ends (which are the realm of wish). Deliberation and 
decision are necessarily connected in that they are about the same thing: “What we 
39 Ibid., Bk. 3 Ch. 7, 432b15-16
40 Ibid., Bk. 3 Ch. 10, 433a14-18.
41 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1985), Bk. 3 Ch. 1 1111a22-24. 
42 Ibid., Bk. 3 Ch. 2, 1112a16. While he is speaking here about prohairesis in particular it is clear that the 
entire deliberative process involves reason.
43 Ibid., Bk. 3 Ch. 3, 1112a31-34. Here Aristotle is talking particularly about deliberation. However, earlier 
he makes a similar statement regarding decision: “in general what we decide to do would seem to be what 
is up to us” (3.2, 1111b30).
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deliberate about is the same as what we decide to do, except that by the time we decide to 
do it, it is often definite; for what we decide to do is what we have judged [to be right] as 
a result of deliberation.”44 This discussion of deliberation and decision makes it clear that 
it is this ability to consider and decide from among (equally) possible options that makes 
an action not simply voluntary but moral; morality only makes sense when we can praise 
or blame a person for his/her actions and we can only do this if he/she could have decided 
differently.45
While decision and deliberation are concerned with means there is also a faculty 
that is concerned with ends46: wish (boulēsis).47 Wish is for the (real or apparent) good.48 
It is with the object of wish--the end--in place that we can begin to deliberate about and 
decide upon means by which to reach that end.49 Thus, we have some end in mind, 
something we deem to be good. We wish for that end; this wishing is not simply desiring 
but has a calculative element, as we saw from De Anima. This calculative element, which 
is akin to reasoning, leads us to think about the means by which we may attain this end. 
We deliberate about possible ways to achieve it based upon available information using 
practical reason. Finally, we make a decision (prohairesis) about the means we will 
44 Ibid., Bk. 3 Ch. 3., 1113a3-5.
45 Indeed, in his explanation of the Greek term prohairesis or “deliberate choice” F.E. Peters notes that “it 
is precisely this that brings human actions (praxeis) within the realm of morality.” F.E. Peters, Greek 
Philosophical Terms, A Historical Lexicon (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 163.
46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3 Ch. 2, 1111b20-30; 3.4, 1113a15.
47 Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical Lexicon, p. 106, links boulēsis with “rational desire,”. 
This is supported by the way that Aristotle’ discusses wish as not merely desire or appetite but as 
necessarily linked to deliberation and decision. This makes the transition from the notion of wish to the 
notion of will in its various forms a bit more clear in so far as it demonstrates that boulēsis is not simply 
about appetite but about desire for ends which are rationally considered and rationally desired. Aristotle 
notes that wish and desire are both appetites but that wish, unlike desire, moves a person “according to 
calculation” (Aristotle, De Anima Bk. 3 Ch. 10, 433a24).
48 Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. 3 Ch. 10, 1113a15-1113b1 offers a discussion of how wish is related to both the 
absolute good and the apparent good for the individual.
49Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Bk. 3 Ch. 5, 1113b2-5.
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pursue and we take action in order to bring about the means and, as a result, the desired 
ends. 
This work of practical reason, whereby one determines what course of action one 
should take, is played out in the practical syllogism, the conclusion of which is action. 
This syllogism helps us to see the link between deliberation and action, between universal 
and particular knowledge, and between reason and the deliberative process. Aristotle 
offers and account of the practical syllogism in both the De Anima and the Nicomachean 
Ethics. In the De Anima the discussion appears within a discussion of imagination, desire, 
and appetite as it is found in non-rational and rational animals. In the course of this 
discussion he states that,
The faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest. 
Since the one premiss or judgement is universal and the 
other deals with the particular (for the first tells us such and 
such a kind of man should do such a kind of act, and the 
second that this is an act of the kind meant, and a person of 
the type intended), it is the latter opinion that really 
originates movement, not the universal; or rather it is both, 
but the one does so while it remains in a state more like 
rest, which the other partakes in movement.50
50 Aristotle, De Anima Bk. 3 Ch. 11, 434a16-20. To see this text within the greater context here I present 
De Anima Bk. 3 Ch. 11, 434a5-20:
“sensitive imagination, as we have said, is found in all animals, deliberative imagination only in 
those that are calculative: for whether this or that shall be enacted is already a task requiring calculation; 
and there must be a single standard to measure by, for that is pursued which is greater. It follows that what 
acts in this way must be able to make a unity out of several images.
[...]Hence appetite contains no deliberative element. Sometimes it overpowers wish and sets it in 
movement; at times wish acts thus upon appetite, like a ball, appetite overcoming appetite, i.e. in the 
condition of moral weakness (though by nature the higher faculty is always more authoritative and gives 
rise to movement). Thus three modes of movement are possible.
The faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest. Since the one premiss or judgement is 
universal and the other deals with the particular (for the first tells us such and such a kind of man should do 
such a kind of act, and the second that this is an act of the kind meant, and a person of the type intended), it 
is the latter opinion that really originates movement, not the universal; or rather it is both, but the one does 
so while it remains in a state more like rest, which the other partakes in movement.”
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In the Nicomachean Ethics the practical syllogism appears, in the form of an example, 
within the context of a discussion of incontinence (akrasia). Here Aristotle is trying to 
explain how the incontinent man relates to his knowledge. He says,
Further, we may also look at the cause in the following 
way, referring to [human] nature. One belief (a) is 
universal; the other (b) is about particulars, and because 
they are particulars perception controls them. And the cases 
where these two beliefs result in (c) one belief, it is 
necessary in purely theoretical beliefs for the soul to affirm 
what has been concluded, and in beliefs about production 
(d) to act at once on what has been concluded. 
If, e.g. (a) everything sweet must be tasted, and (b) 
this, some one particular thing, is sweet, it is necessary (d) 
for someone who is able and unhindered also to act on this 
at the same time.51
We see in both of these texts an account of action which makes use of both universal and 
particular knowledge to explain human action. Aristotle explains that universal 
knowledge is a necessary precondition for action but that action is directly motivated by 
the particular knowledge of the situation; we act because the particulars of the situation 
are in accord with the universal. The necessity of the universal and the calculation 
involved in determining whether the particulars conform to it are what make actions of 
this kind (including moral actions) only possible for humans; animals do not have access 
51 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Bk. 7 Ch. 3, 1147a24-35. Aristotle goes on to explain that sometimes 
knowledge and appetite are in conflict at Nicomachean Ethics 7.3 1147a36-1147b5: “Suppose, then, that 
someone has (a) the universal belief, and it hinders him from tasting; he has (b) the second belief, that 
everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet, and this belief (b) is active; and he also has appetite. Hence, 
the belief (c) tells him to avoid this, but appetite leads him on, since it is capable of moving each of the 
[bodily] parts.
The result, then, is that in a way reason and belief make him act incontinently. The belief (b) is 
contrary to correct reason (a), but only coincidentally, not in itself. For, it is the appetite, not the belief, that 
is contrary [in itself to correct reason].
Hence, beasts are not incontinent, because they have no universal supposition, but [only] 
appearance and memory of particulars.”
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to the universals and so they act based upon the appetites and desires which arise from 
their encounter with the particulars. Humans have the ability to use the syllogism to act 
rationally rather than being swayed by appetite (but of course, as Aristotle points out, it is 
possible for appetite to overtake our rational capacity, leading to incontinent actions).52
Here Aristotle uses food related examples but we can also use his beacon of fire 
example from earlier. A man knows that advancing beacons of fire signal enemies 
approaching and that a good soldier ought to alert his superiors to the approach (universal 
premise); the man sees an advancing beacon of fire and knows himself to be a soldier 
(particular premise); thus, the man alerts his superiors about the approaching enemy 
(conclusion, which is an action). This and Aristotle’s examples demonstrate the way in 
which universal and particular knowledge work together in the practical syllogism to 
produce an action. It shows the movement from deliberation about a situation to action 
based upon that deliberation. It should also be noted that there is already a wished for end 
(e.g. to be a good soldier) at work and that the syllogism acts as a kind of deliberation 
about the means to achieve this end in the particular situation at hand. Thus, the practical 
52 Ibid., Bk. 7 Ch. 3. It must be noted that there is some debate regarding how one should interpret the 
practical syllogism, especially as it relates to incontinence (akrasia). The generally accepted account of 
akrasia in Aristotle is that there are two types--one resulting from impetuosity and one from weakness. The 
impetuously akratic person acts upon her passions without first going through the process of deliberation; 
the one who is akratic due to weakness does deliberate and decide, but acts contrary to their reasoned 
choice because their passions overwhelm them and result in a weakened intellectual acuity (see Kraut, 
Richard, "Aristotle's Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/aristotle-ethics/> for a 
general discussion of this view and some other interpretations of Aristotle’s view). It is the latter type which 
is of most interest to us. For more detailed accounts of how Aristotle’s view of akrasia may be interpreted, 
particularly as it compares to the Socratic rejection of the possibility of akrasia, see John McDowell, 
“Incontinence and Practical Wisdom” in The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2009) pp. 59–76 and Pierre Destrée, “Aristotle on the Causes of Akrasia” In 
Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée (eds.), Akrasia in Greek Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2007) pp. 
139–166. Also see Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian 
Temptation, especially pp. 310-313.
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syllogism can be seen as an explanation of the process of wish, deliberation, and decision 
which is the hallmark of moral agency and responsibility.
2.2.2 Interpretations of Aristotle
Now that the relevant texts from the De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics have 
been laid out and explained in some detail something should be said about how these 
texts are interpreted by scholars, particularly as it concerns the idea of will as it is 
understood today. As mentioned above there is debate about whether Aristotle had a 
notion of will in a real sense. While some see Aristotle as advocating for a will53 most 
agree that Aristotle’s concepts of wish (boulēsis) and decision (prohairesis) together with 
his more general notion of the voluntary can be seen as presenting an early example of 
some key aspects of what was to become the will.
54 
Kahn explains that Aristotle, following Plato, identifies three types of desire: 
boulēsis, “rational desire for what is good or beneficial,” epithumia, sensual desire, and 
thumos, anger.55 He notes that boulēsis’s function as a rational desire places it in an 
ambiguous position as being part of the desiderative part of the soul while also being 
53 See Irwin, “Who Discovered the Will?” and Nielsen, “The Will—Origins of the Notion in Aristotle’s 
Thought;” Nielsen specifically argues against Frede’s view of Aristotle, insisting that, although it cannot be 
translated as ‘will,’ Aristotle’s notion of prohairesis fulfills the requisite role of the will in Aristotle’s moral 
philosophy. She argues that Frede’s concept of ‘will’ is not sufficiently broad to allow for conceptions of 
will which may be significantly different from those of the Stoics or later thinkers. 
54 And some insist there is absolutely no concept of will in Aristotle, as Gauthier famously did in 
L’Éthique a Nicomaque: Introduction, Traduction, et Commentaire: “Dans la psychologie d'Aristote la 
volonté n'existe pas […] le souhait n’est pas un acte de «volonté»” (p. 218).
55 Kahn, “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 239. Also see Sorabji, “The concept of the 
will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor,” pp. 6 and 9. Frede points out that the different kinds of desire 
are necessary given the tripartite division of the soul posited by both Plato and Aristotle; each part of the 
soul must have its own form of desire particular to its abilities and motivations (Frede, A Free Will: Origins 
of the Notion in Ancient Thought, pp. 21-22)
30
intimately connected to reason.56 Frede further explains boulēsis and its relation to both 
reason and the good; he notes that it is “a form of desire which is specific to reason. It is 
the form in which reason desires something.”57 
However, boulēsis on its own is not enough to account for deliberate action; it 
must be accompanied by prohairesis, the “rational choice or decision involving some 
deliberation as to the best manner of achieving one’s goal.”58 Prohairesis is based on 
boulēsis and intimately connected with it; it is also more rational than boulēsis because it 
involves rationally deliberating about and deciding upon means to achieve the end (the 
result of boulēsis).59 It may be said that prohairesis is exemplified by the practical 
syllogism--the rational consideration of a particular situations relationship to a universal, 
resulting in action. As we saw above with the discussion of the practical syllogism, 
reason is employed to determine what action is best in a given situation with reference to 
56 Kahn, “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 239. Sorabji explains that sometimes 
Aristotle calls it rational while at other times he separates it from reason (“The concept of the will from 
Plato to Maximus the Confessor,” p. 8)
57 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, p. 20. He goes to explain that “if reason 
recognizes, or believes itself to recognize, something good, it wills or desires it. If reason believes itself to 
see a course of action which would allow us to attain this presumed good, it thinks that it is a good thing, 
other things being equal, to take this course of action. And, if it thinks that it is a good thing to do 
something it wills or desires to do it. Thus, it is assumed that there is such a thing as desire for reason and 
hence also that reason by itself suffices to motivate us to do something […] reason, just as it is attracted by 
truth, is also attracted by, and attached to, the good and tries to attain it” (pp. 20-21). Thus, Frede 
emphasizes that boulēsis is not only a rational desire but, being thus connected to reason and to the good, it 
is enough to motivate us to action when some (real or apparent) good and a means to attain it are 
apprehended by our rational capacity.
58 Kahn, “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 239
59 Sorabji, “The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor,” p. 11. Bobzien also gives an 
account of this relationship among decision (which she calls ‘choice’), wish (which she calls ‘wanting’) 
and deliberation. She explains that one’s “wanting,” or wish, provides a starting point for deliberation 
(95-96)—one can only begin to deliberate about means once the goal is set. This deliberation ends in choice 
and choice “is the efficient cause and origin of action” (96). She goes on to explain that although not every 
choice leads to action and not every action is chosen, virtue is necessarily tied up with choice: “the 
activities of virtue are actions that are in accordance with choice. The only way in which virtues can be 
realized in action is via choice and realization of the intermediate in action” (98). See Susanne Bobzien, 
“Choice and Moral Responsibility (NE iii 1-5)” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, edited by Ronald Polansky (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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the particular conditions at hand and the universal (which we may relate to the wished for 
end) which is known (and/or desired).60 It can be said that the major term of the syllogism 
is the universal which the individual already has knowledge of and has adopted as an end; 
the middle term is the object decided upon (prohairesis) through deliberation (bouleusis) 
which is determined to be in line with the universal; and the conclusion is the statement 
of the action one must take.61
What has been said here should not, however, lead us to believe that Aristotle 
views decision (prohairesis) the same way we view it today (as more or less analogous to 
choice); in particular, Aristotle does not conceive of decision as the freedom to select or 
choose from among various equally possible options. Rather, as Frede explains, we 
decide upon what seems to conform to our rational desire to achieve the good; then we 
may either live up to this decision (when we act according to our rational desires) or we 
may not (when we act according to our nonrational desires).62 Frede claims that despite 
the differences between boulēsis and prohairesis (in particular the fact that we can will 
anything but only make decisions about what is “up to us” (eph’ hēmin)) prohairesis can 
be seen as a special form of willing (boulēsis) because of its connection to the rational 
60 Sorabji hints at this when he relates it to Aristotle’s dietary policy of eating dry foods (“The concept of 
the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor,” p. 11). Kahn also discusses this connection, noting that 
prohairesis “marks the point of confluence between our desire for a goal and two rational judgments: first, 
our judgment that the goal is a good one, and second, our judgment that this action is the best way to pursue 
it” (“Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 240). While neither explicitly mentions the 
practical syllogism is clear that it is the point of reference for both authors. 
61 Bobzien, “Choice and Moral Responsibility (NE iii 1-5),” pp. 89-90.
62 Frede explains that this is what Aristotle means by akrasia. It is a case of “act[ing] agains one’s choice 
(prohairesis) rather than [a case] in which one chooses to act against reason. (A Free Will: Origins of the 
Notion in Ancient Thought, p. 23). Such cases to do not involve rational consideration of options and a 
decision to choose some kind of temporary pleasure over a more rational option; rather, they are a matter of 
being swept away by one’s desires such that one temporarily ceases to reason and thus acts contrary to 
reason and in accord with one’s unchosen appetitive desires instead. See note 52 above for other sources on 
this topic.
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capacity (deciding, like willing, is based upon our conception of the good and how to 
attain it). Thus, we wish for some end we see as good and we decide upon means which 
we reason will help us to attain that end. If we have trained ourselves properly we follow 
those decisions; if we have not, our rational capacity may become overwhelmed by our 
nonrational desires and we may act contrary to the decisions we have made.63
What we have seen from this examination of Aristotle is the emergence of some 
of the key elements of moral decision making which, for Averroes and Aquinas, came 
together to form the general concept of will. Aristotle represents one of several starting 
points for the development of the idea of will, although he cannot be said unequivocally 
to have had a notion of will himself. We must now examine how these fledgling notions 
of boulēsis and prohairesis became part of the later Greek traditions of the Stoics and 
Platonists.
2.3 The Greek Tradition After Aristotle
The Greek tradition continued on as philosophers struggled with these problems 
of moral responsibility and the relationship between reason and desire. It eventually 
reached past the Greeks and into the Christian and Arab language traditions. Here we will 
focus on those elements of the Greek moral tradition which modified these Aristotelian 
63 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, pp. 22-24; pp. 26-29. Frede points out, in 
particular, that “choosing is just a special form of willing […] But choices are not explained in terms of a 
will but in terms of the attachment of reason to the good, however it might be conceived of, and the 
exercise of reason’s cognitive abilities to determine how in this situation the good might be attained” (p. 
27). He goes on to further clarify the role of choice in selecting not every action but a set of actions 
rationally determined to lead to the good, which may then be followed (when one acts rationally) or not 
(when one acts on the basis of appetitive desire), and the lack of a notion of freedom attached to choice, by 
noting that the wise and virtuous person has no choice but to act the way he does because he is never 
overcome by his nonrational desires (p. 29). Also see Bobzien, “Choice and Moral Responsibility (NE iii 
1-5),” pp.96-97 and 101-104 for a general account of the relationship between choice and action and for an 
explanation of how the moral process is carried out for the various types of Aristotelian agents.
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ideas and which, with Aristotle himself, were widely used in Medieval considerations of 
these issues.
2.3.1 The Stoics
The notions of boulēsis and prohairesis which we have discussed in relation to 
Aristotle also became a focus of Stoic philosophy. However, they were developed to fit 
within the Stoic conception of the soul and human rationality. The Stoics also added to 
these a particular notion of freedom (eleutheria). One major difference in the 
philosophies of Aristotle and the Stoics which impacted the Stoic view of willing was the 
Stoic insistence on a unified human soul which they identified with reason, as opposed to 
the tripartite soul found in the earlier philosophers.64 This outlook on the soul means that 
the Stoics do not divide desires or actions into rational and nonrational the way that 
Aristotle did. This allows the Stoics to insist that the soul itself is reason and that “there is 
no nonrational part of our souls to generate nonrational desires which would constitute a 
motivation for us to act quite independent of any beliefs we have and could even 
overpower reason and make us act against our beliefs. The way we behave is completely 
determined by our beliefs.”65 Indeed, the Stoics see all passions (including desire) as 
cognitive.66 While we may have appetites which are irrational this does not mean that 
64 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, p. 31-32. Frede goes on to explain that 
human beings, like animals, are born with a nonrational soul but that it becomes rational as we develop and 
that this constitutes “a complete transformation of our innate and nonrational soul into a rational soul, a 
reason or a mind” (p. 35; see pp. 32-36 for the account of how the human soul relates to plant and animal 
souls)
65 Ibid., p. 32
66 For example, Plutarch notes that the Stoics “say that passion is no different from reason” in On Moral 
Virtue 446F-447A (LS 412, SVF 3.459) in A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 
1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). References of Stoic primary texts will include the 
author and text information followed by the page number in Long and Sedley (LS) and the SVF or other 
34
these are non-rational. For example, appetite is seen as an “irrational stretching [desire], 
or pursuit of an expected good”67 while wishing is “a well-reasoned stretching [desire].”68 
Clearly, this is quite different from the Aristotelian model which claims it is possible to 
act against our choices when we are overcome by our nonrational desires.
Related to this notion of the rational soul are the Stoic ideas of impressions and 
assent, and the inner life. The Stoics noted that both animals and humans have “impulsive 
impressions” but that for humans these impressions become rational in that they are 
assented to by reason and they also come from reason in so far as they are the result of 
the habits, beliefs and attitudes particular to the mind of an individual. This means that 
how one reacts to an impression and the ‘character’ or ‘coloring’ of the impression will 
be the result of the set of beliefs one has developed around the topic of the impression.69 
A person’s reaction to his impressions” is one of the few things that the Stoics saw as part 
of what was “up to us (eph’hēmin).70 Frede points out that an action is up to us, in the 
early Stoic view, “if its getting done is a matter of our giving assent to the corresponding 
impulsive impression,”71 such that my crossing the street is up to me in that I can assent 
or refuse to assent to the impression that it is good to cross the street. Later this view 
narrowed to include only the assent and not the action as part of what is considered up to 
us because, after all, external forces may thwart my will to cross the street successfully. 
additional reference when available.
67 Andronicus, On passions I (LS 411, SVF 3.391)
68 Diogenes Laertius 7.115 (LS 412, SVF 3.431)
69 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, pp. 36-39. Also see Susanne Bobzien 
“Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics” in Aristotle and After edited by Richard 
Sorabji (London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 1997), 
pp. 76-77 for a discussion of impulsive impressions in the work of the the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus.
70 For example, Epictetus says in his Discourses that “the one thing which the gods have placed in our 
power is the one of supreme importance, the correct use of impressions” (LS 391).
71 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, p. 45. 
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This means that the assent is up to me but the action and its success are not; “we can will 
to cross the street, but we cannot choose or decide to cross the street.”72 This means that 
our willing and choosing is about our assent to impression and not about action (although 
giving or withholding assent does lead to actions which are in accord with how we 
choose to handle the impressions we receive). Frede goes on to explain that given this 
context choosing (prohairesis) to give assent constitutes a willing and this willing leads 
to actions; thus, the Stoic notion of the will is connected with prohairesis rather than 
boulēsis because the relevant mental activity is one of choosing whether or not to assent 
to an impression rather than wishing for something.73 
Something should be said here about what the Stoics say about causes and fate as 
it relates to this issue of assent. In general, “the Stoics [describe fate as] a sequence of 
causes, that is, an inescapable ordering and interconnexion”74 It “is a certain everlasting 
ordering of the whole” which is “inviolable.”75 This view is understandable given the 
view that “there are two things in nature from which everything is produced--cause and 
matter”and that causes can be further broken down into various types of causes which act 
72 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
73 Ibid., pp. 45-48 for his extended discussion of the relationship between choosing, willing, and assenting. 
He ends the section by noting that “With Stoicism, then, we get for the first time a notion of the will as an 
ability of the mind or of reason to make choices and decisions” (p. 48). Also see Bobzien “Stoic 
Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics,” pp. 73-76 and pp. 79-82 for her discussion of what 
is ‘up to us’ and the relevance of assent in the work of Chrysippus and Epictetus which are in line with 
what has been said in this paragraph.
74. Aetius 1.28.4 (LS 336, SVF 2.917)
75. Gellius, 7.2.3 (LS 336, SVF 2.1000); here Gellius is refering to the view of Chrysippus in particular. 
Also see Alexander, On fate 191, 30-192, 28 (LS 337-338, SVF 2.945). Plutarch note that for Chrysippus 
“fate [is] an invincible, unblockable and inflexible cause” (On Stoic self-contradictions 1056B-C (LS 339, 
SVF 2.997))
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upon matter to shape and direct it in various ways.76 This means that fate is, in important 
ways, a term of physics, simply explaining how the world is governed.77 
This view of fate does not mean that action is useless or that humans are not 
responsible for their actions. Cicero points out that one’s actions are as fated as the 
outcome of those actions; for example, one may be fated to go the doctor for treatment of 
an illness as part of one’s fate to recover from the illness.78 For some Stoics this view of 
fate was so strong that it had the force of necessity. But, others claimed that “there are 
voluntary motions of the our minds, free from all fate.” Cicero points to Chrysippus as 
attempting to advocating for a kind of middle position, but ultimately falling closer to the 
former view.79 
Cicero uses the example of assent to demonstrate Chrysippus’ claims. Chrysippus 
wants to move away from necessity while maintaining causal-determinism; he wants to 
claim that everything has a cause without doing away with moral responsibility. This 
leads him to distinguish between “complete and primary causes” and “auxiliary and 
proximate causes.”80 He goes on to claim that acts of assent are caused by proximate, not 
76. Seneca, Letters 65.2, (LS 334). Also see Galen, On sustaining causes 1.1-2.4, LS 334-335, and Clement 
8.9.33.1-9 (LS 336, SVF 2.351) for a discussion of how some Stoics classify and explain causes; they offer 
accounts of a myriad of causes including complete/sustaining causes, preliminary causes, joint-causes, 
auxiliary causes, antecedent causes, etc.. The main point to understand from this is that for the Stoics 
everything is part of the vast causal network which governs the world.
77. See Cicero On divination 1.125-6 (LS 337, SVF 2.921) and Stobaeus 1.79, 1-12 (LS 337, SVF 2.913).
78. Cicero Of fate 28-30 (LS 339)
79. Cicero On fate 39-43 (LS 386-387, SVF 2.974)
80 Cicero, On fate 39-43 (LS 389, SVF 2.974). Something should be said here about how these different 
causes are defined. Long an Sedley offer an account of them in their discussion of causation and fate. Here 
they explain that a “complete/sustaining cause” is one which will sustains its effect as long as the cause 
lasts, once it is initiated by some proximate cause; a proximate cause is that which initiates the activity of 
the complete cause. They explain that Crysippus uses these designations in regards to human action to 
explain how moral responsibility can be maintained alongside determinism (resulting in a kind of 
compatibilism). For Chrysippus ones moral character is the complete cause of one’s actions while the 
external impression to which one gives or withholds assent (as result of one’s character) is the proximate 
cause (Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 341-342)
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primary causes and so they can remain in our control; assent is prompted, or caused, by 
an impression but this does not mean the assent is necessitated, since the impression is 
not a complete cause.81 The impression offers the stimulus or trigger82 for assent but the 
act of assent is, itself, still “in our power [...and] move[s] through its own force and 
nature.”83 Thus, human beings can retain some kind of freedom despite the causal-
determinist nature of reality.84 This means that human beings can still be held morally 
responsible for their actions; this is because moral responsibility is based on the 
opportunity rather that possibility to do otherwise. Given one’s character and the external 
circumstances it was not possible for one to act differently; however, this does not mean 
that the opportunity to act differently was not present (even one could not take advantage 
of it).85 Thus, for Chrysippus moral responsibility and choice is maintained even within a 
causally-determined world; “we deliberate and make decisions because it is the means 
my which many of our actions are fated to come about”86 and these decisions are caused 
not only, or even primarily, by external factors or impressions but by our internal 
character and dispositions which leads us act as we do.
81Cicero, On fate 39-43 (LS 386-388, SVF 2.974). Long and Sedley explain that this leads to the argument 
that everything in a particular “world cycle” is planned and set in motion at the start and so everything, 
landmark event and small ‘choice’ alike, is predetermined; there is a long causal chain in which each action 
plays a role, caused by something before and causing something after (The Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 
343)
82Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 393.
83 Cicero, On fate 39-43 (LS 388, SVF 2.974).
84 Gellius, 7.2.6-13 (LS 388, SVF 2.1000)
85 Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, pp. 392-393. This view, Long and Sedley explain, allows 
for a distinction between fate and necessity; our actions may be fated, but they are not necessitated. Also 
see Diogenianus (Eusebius, Evangelical preparation 6.8.25-9) (LS 389; SVF 2.998), and Alexander, On 
fate, 181,13-182, 20 (LS 389-390; SVF 2.979). 
86. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 392; also see pp. 341-342
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Furthermore, the Stoics maintained that only the wise person had freedom 
(eleutheria), although what is up to us applied to everyone (since everyone assents to or 
withholds assent from their rational impressions).87 This is because eleutheria depends 
not primarily on external factors but on the condition of one’s soul and particularly on its 
relationship to knowledge of the good. The wiser person “is master of is emotions [… 
and] cannot be bribed or blackmailed into actions which he does not want to perform.”88 
Eleutheria is primarily a virtuous state of mind and is not concerned with actions as much 
as with the ability to understand what is up to us and to align one’s desires with these 
things such that one is never thwarted in ones desires and plans by circumstances beyond 
one’s control.89 Bobzien points out that this view of freedom does not remove moral 
responsibly from those who are not sage and so are not free; this is because of the 
distinction between freedom and what is up to us.90
Frede gives a more detailed account of this unique view of freedom and its 
relationship to the will. He notes, like Bobzien, that eleutheria is reserved for the wise 
while everyone else is enslaved by their desires for and attachments to things which are 
87 Bobzien, “Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics, p. 79; pp. 84-85. Also, Frede A 
Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought pp. 66-88. See Sextus Empiricus Against the professors 
7.151-7 (LS 255), Anonymous Stoic treatise (Herculaneum papyrus 1020) col. 4, col. 1 (LS 255, SVF 
2.131), Plutarch On Stoic self-contradictions 1056E-F (LS 255, SVF 2.993), Stobaeus 2.73, 16-74, 3 (LS 
256, SVF 3.112), and Stobaeus 2.66, 14-67, 4 (LS 379-380, SVF 3.560). Here they explain that the Stoic 
wise man never opines or supposes but only has knowledge. As a result the “wise men are incapable of 
being deceived and of erring” (Anonymous Stoic treatise (Herculaneum papyrus 1020) col. 4, col. 1 (LS 
255, SVF 2.131)) but rather “does everything well [as a] consequence of his accomplishing everything in 
accordance with right reason ad in accordance with virtue” (Stobaeus 2.66, 14-67, 4 (LS 379-380, SVF 
3.560)).
88 Bobzien, “Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics,” p. 79.
89 Ibid., p. 84-85. See Stobaeus 2.155,5-17 (LS 419, SVF 3.564, 632) and Gellius 19.1.17-18 (Epictetus fr. 
9) (LS 419) for a discussion of the good or wise man handles passion and desire.
90 Bobzien, “Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics,”, p. 79; p. 85
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not up to us.91 Frede goes on to explain how this view of freedom fits within the causal 
determinist framework of Stoicism and how it leads to the development of the idea of 
free will. As may be suspected from what has been said already about the Stoic view of 
the world, freedom is not about choosing anything one wants but rather it is the result of 
aligning one’s desires with the good properly understood. Human beings have a natural 
attachment to the good and a desire to understand the good and work for the good; 
freedom is a matter of being “solely motivated by [the] correct understanding of the good 
and [the] attachment to it.92 Furthermore, human beings are constructed by God to have a 
natural ability to acquire the truth.93 When this natural capacity for understanding the 
good and the truth is fulfilled, the wise person is led to act with regard to his impressions 
based on this understanding, rather than being forced by his desires to act in certain ways; 
the wise free person could not have acted other than he did but, because he is responsible 
for his beliefs and desires and it is these beliefs and desires which lead him in his actions, 
he is still free.94 The good is such that it always aligns with the will of God and thus one’s 
own will will be to do what God wills because it is understood to be good; this does not, 
however, mean that one is forced to will the way one does by God, but only that one’s 
will and God’s will will always be aligned if the good is properly understood.95 This 
91 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, pp. 66-67. See Diogenes Laertius 7.121-2 
(LS 431-432): “Only he [the wise man] is free, but the inferior are slaves. For freedom is the power of 
autonomous actions, but slavery is the lack of autonomous action.”
92 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, p. 79
93 Ibid., p. 84
94 Ibid., pp. 79-83. Frede explains that the will of the enslaved person is forced to assent by the impression 
he receives by virtue of the unnatural and unreasonable desires and beliefs he has, while the free person is 
not forced by the impression but is led his understanding of the good to assent or withhold assent as is 
appropriate (p. 82). Thus, “the free man could not, given this understanding and insight, choose otherwise, 
except by sacrificing his rationality, which is not prepared to do” (p. 83).
95 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
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ability to act of one’s own initiative in pursuit of the good, rather than being forced to act 
is what was understood by the Stoics as a “free will.”96 
Now that Stoic views of choice and freedom have been examined something must 
be briefly said about moral action itself. The Stoic conception of the good is that is is 
something beneficial or virtuous; virtue “is a disposition of the commanding-faculty.”97 
Once comes to understand the good naturally through reason.98 Epictetus explains that “it 
is [the soul’s] nature to be moved appetitively towards the good, with aversion towards 
the bad […] Once the good appears it immediately moves the soul towards itself, while 
the bad repels the soul from itself.” 99 this does not, as it might seem, indicate some kind 
of nonrational, animalistic movement towards the good; in fact, only humans and gods 
are capable of attaining or recognizing the good since “there is no good except where 
there is a place for reason.”100 This makes sense once we recall that even the appetites are 
a matter of reason for human beings, according to the Stoics. In the monist view of the 
soul there is only a rational faculty, which an individual can use well or poorly. Only the 
wise person is able to fulfill the natural human capacity for understanding and virtue and 
act accordingly. From this we can see that for the Stoics moral action is a matter of living 
up to only nature as rational being. 
96 Ibid., pp. 74-75. Frede points out that while the term used here, autexousion, is often translated as 
“having free will” this is not quite right. He explains that it “refers to the freedom of the person to act as he 
sees fit in pursuit of the good” rather than being forced to act in some way.
97 Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 371. The Stoics also refer to virtue as a ‘tenor” a state 
which does not allow for degrees; that is to say, one is either virtuous or not. (see pp. 372, 377, and 380 for 
some Stoic texts and pp. 376 and 383 for some discussion of this idea by Long and Sedley.)
98 Ibid., pp. 368-370.
99 Ibid., pp. 370-371. Also, p. 381: “all men have natural tendencies to virtue.”
100 Ibid., p. 371.
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Finally, from what has been said above and from additional information about the 
passions we also have some notion of the Stoic view of akrasia or weakness of will. 
Many have claimed that the Stoic system cannot adequately explain akrasia and that this 
is a problem for the system. This claim rests on the Stoic view of the soul as a unified 
rational, rather than divided soul with rational and non rational elements; this view of the 
soul entails the claim that the passions are also ‘rational’ in some sense, being judgments 
(Chrysippus) or caused by judgments (Zeno and Cleanthes).; appetite and desire are not 
separate from reason.101 If akrasia necessarily includes conflict between reason and 
appetite/desire the Stoic model is at a loss; this is a problem if we are to grant, as many 
do, that akrasia is a reality of human experience. 
However, some scholars have argued that the Stoic framework can adequately 
explain akrasia. These solutions hinge on the Stoic notion of assent to impressions, 
discussed above. Joyce explains three possible Stoic explanations of akrasia: the 
oscillation model, the appeal to impulses model and simultaneous assent model. The 
oscillation model, attributed to Plutarch, explains that for Stoics akrasia is a matter of 
assenting first to one thing and then to another from moment to moment; this would mean 
that there is no actual conflict and any particular time between reason and action. 102 The 
appeal to impulse model takes seriously that akrasia includes a conflict in which one 
101 Richard Joyce, “Early Stoicism and Akrasia” in Phronesis Vol XL/3, 1995, p. 318; Justin Gosling “The 
Stoics and ἀκρασία” in Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, 20.2 (1987), p. 192; Galen, 
On Hippocrates; and Plato’s doctrines 4.3.2-5 (LS 414, Posidonius fr. 34).
 How one should view the passions in Stoicism is a complicated issue which I will not fully address here. In 
any case, several fragments indicated that the passions were regarded as ”irrational,” (Andronicus On 
passions 1 (LS 411, SVF 3.391) or “disobedient to reason” (Stobaeus 2.88, 8-90, 6 (LS 410, SVF 3.378, 
389)), or “reason turned aside” (Galen, On Hippocrates; and Plato’s doctrines .2.10-18 (LS 413-414, SVF 
3.462)), etc.. The many fragments offered by Long and Sedley in “65 The Passions” in The Hellenistic 
Philosophers, pp. 410-419 show the variety of ways the Stoics viewed the passions.
102 Joyce, “Early Stoicism and Akrasia,” pp. 325-326. Also Gosling, “The Stoics and ἀκρασία,” p. 189 
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reason that X is better while doing Y. It accounts for this conflict by explaining that one 
may initial assent to an impression that Y is best and that this leads to an impulse, or 
action towards Y which is so strong that one’s subsequent assent to X and rejection of Y 
is not enough to counter that impulse and stop the action. For example, one may have the 
impression that the chocolate bar on the table would be good to eat, assent to that 
impression, and begin the action of unwrapping the chocolate to eat it. Upon further 
consideration one may assent to the impression one should not eat the chocolate because 
one is diabetic; however, the action of eating the bar which one began under the first 
impression may be too strong for the impulse resulting form the second impression to 
stop.103 Here akrasia is a matter of not having full control over one’s physical actions 
rather than an issue of internal conflict between reason and appetite. Finally, in the 
simultaneous assent model, which Joyce supports, one assents to multiple, even 
contradictory, impressions simultaneously and experiences impulses as a result of these 
impressions. In this case the ‘strongest’ impulse will override the weaker and result in 
action. Joyce argues that although this could not happen for the Stoic sage it is possible 
for the average person who must struggle to keep her rationality in line with the will of 
God.104 
I will not adjudicate here which view is more in line with Stoic philosophy or 
which, if any, of these models any particular Stoic ascribed too. However, I think this 
account at least offers some insight into akrasia within a Stoic framework. It also serves 
103 Joyce, “Early Stoicism and Akrasia,” pp. 327-328. Also see Gosling “The Stoics and ἀκρασία,” pp. 
189-190. Both authors site Chrysippus’ example of the runner and the example of Medea.
104 Joyce, “Early Stoicism and Akrasia,” pp. 328-330. Also see Stobaeus 2.155,5-17 (LS 419, SVF 3.564, 
632), 
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to highlight how the Stoic view differs from the Aristotelian view of akrasia, which, as 
explained above, is described in terms of action contrary to one’s rational decisions due 
to one’s appetites.105
2.3.2 The Platonists and Peripatetics106
From what has been said so far we can see how the Stoics took what Aristotle 
(and Plato) had said about the ideas of boulēsis, prohairesis, and the voluntary or “up to 
us” and transformed them in important ways as they tried to fit these ideas into their 
world view and notions of the human soul. The Stoic view was not, however, universally 
accepted; Platonists and Peripatetics who disagreed with the Stoic conception of the soul 
as united to reason and with their causal-determinist world view working the Stoic ideas 
of assent, choice, and will into their own systems, further transforming them from their 
Aristotelian roots.
105 Gosling offers a brief comparison of the Stoic and Aristotelian views in “The Stoics and ἀκρασία” pp. 
198-199. 
106 I will note here that I have left Plotinus out of the following discussion. Partly, this is due to constrains 
of space, but, more importantly, it is the result of keeping a strict focus on the human being. In Ennead 
VI.8, “On Free Will and the Will of The One,” Plotinus offers a discussion of willing which is largely 
focused on the divine will and discusses human willing in the context of understanding the will of The One. 
However, I will say a few things about Plotinus’s view of human willing and freedom here. In defining 
freedom and relate it to voluntary action Plotinus says” “we think of our free at as one which we execute of 
our own choice, in no servitude to chance or necessity or overmastering passion, nothing thwarting our 
will; the voluntary is conceived as an event amenable to will and occurring or not as our will dictates. 
Everything will be voluntary that is produced under no compulsion and with knowledge; our free act is 
what we are masters to perform” (VI.8.1 of Plotinus, The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna 
(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1956), p. 596). He goes on to questions whether one can b e said to 
have freedom when one is swayed by appetite, “fancy,” nature, etc.. He concludes that we are free, 
principally in so far as we live by Intellectual-Principle rather than bodily principles (I.8.2, p. 597), arguing 
that “our freedom of act, or self-disposal, must be referred not to the doing, not to the external thing done 
but to the inner activity, to the Intellection, to virtue’s own vision” (I.8.6, p.599). Thus, Plotinus seems to 
think that human willing and human freedom is a matter of intellect or reason in so far as it is directed 
towards The Good and unimpeded or unswayed by bodily hinderances. For an account of how Plotinus 
views on the will one may see John R. Crocker, “The Freedom of Man in Plotinus,” in The Modern 
Schoolman: A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy, 34 (1956); the notion of akrasia in Plotinus and it’s 
relation to the accounts of earlier Greek thinkers is discussed in Lloyd P. Gerson, “Plotinus on Weakness of 
the Will: The Neoplatonic Synthesis” in Weakness of Will From Plato to the Present, edited by Tobias 
Hoffmann (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), pp. 42-57.
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Platonists and Peripatetics retained the tripartite view of the soul, claiming that it 
had appetitive, spirited, and rational elements and corresponding desires.107 They 
combined this with the Stoic notions of impressions and assent, claiming that each part of 
the soul has its own set of impressions related to its particular kinds of desires. Assent to 
these various impressions, however, was still a matter of reason. Thus, Platonists and 
Peripatetics explained akrasia differently than either Aristotle or the Stoics; it was a 
matter of reason’s assenting to an impression of the spirited or appetitive part of the soul 
rather than to a rational impression.108 This new structure led to a view of reason as 
having a dual nature: on the one hand reason forms its own impressions of what is good 
and, on the other, it assents to or withholds assent from all of the impressions which are 
presented to it. This led, Frede claims, to the splitting of reason into a cognitive art and a 
willing part.109
One key figure in the Peripatetic tradition was Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose 
work on Aristotle was particularly important to both the Arabic and Latin language 
writers of the Middle Ages. Of special importance for our purposes is what Alexander 
says about deliberation and choice as proof against the determinist framework.
In de Fato, or On Fate, Alexander points out that the power of deliberation 
(boulēsis) is a natural power of the human being and that nature would not give humans 
such a power in vain. Deliberation allows humans to examine the world and “judge of the 
107 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. p. 51.
108 Ibid., pp. 51-52. It should be recalled that Stoics claimed all impressions were rational impressions 
since the soul was fully rational and Aristotle explained akrasia as a matter of failing to live up to choices 
one had already made.
109 Ibid., pp. 52-53
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appearances that impinge on him concerning certain things as deserving to be chosen.”110 
He points out that we deliberate about things “because we will gain some advantage from 
deliberating,”111 namely, because it can help us in making choices. If we were not able to 
choose, everything being causally determined, deliberation would be useless; but, nature 
would not provide us with a useless power. This power to deliberate and to be the cause 
of one’s actions which is part of the nature of the human being as a rational being.112
Alexander goes on to connect deliberation to choice (prohairesis), which is what 
“depends on us […] that over which we have control both to do it and not to do it.”113 He 
further defines choice as “the peculiar activity of man […the] impulse with desire 
towards that has been preferred as a result of deliberation.”114 Again, it seems obvious that 
human beings exercise choice and that we could not have a choice about those things 
which are necessary or determined. The judgment we level at ourselves and others 
regarding decision making further supports the fact that not everything is determined. 
Some things are in our power to deliberate about and choose; if this were not the case it 
would make no sense that nature has given us this ability and inclination towards 
judgment.115 This shows, then, that we are, for some things and sometimes, the cause of 
our own actions; we deliberate, choose, and act without the push of some outside cause 
110 Alexander of Aphrodisias de Fato, in Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate, translated by R.W. Sharples 
(London: Duckworth, 1983), Ch. XI, p. 55.
111 Alexander, de Fato, Ch. XI, p.56.
112 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima libri mantissa in Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate, translated by 
R.W. Sharples (London: Duckworth, 1983), Mantissa XXIII, pp. 97-98; see Alexander of Aphrodisias 
Quaestones III.13 in Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate, translated by R.W. Sharples (London: Duckworth, 
1983), pp.118-119 for a further account of the relationship between deliberation and rationality. Frede also 
gives an account of how rationality plays a role in determining what is “up to us” (to eph’ hēmin) for 
Alexander in A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, p. 95.
113 Alexander, de Fato, Ch. XII, p. 57.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., pp.57-58.
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which determines our actions. In fact, this ability is part of what it is is to be human: “For 
man is the beginning and cause of the actions that come about through him, and this is 
what being is for a man.”116 
Alexander further explains how choice “depends on us” in his De Anima libri 
mantissa. Here he explains that some choices are the result of nature or habit while others 
are contrary to what nature and habit would dictate, as when we choose to have a second 
candy bar despite our usual habit of healthy eating, because of “weakness or slackness of 
mortal nature;”117 these are things which truly “depend on us” because they have no other 
cause and the opposite is possible.118 
Frede points out that a key feature of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ views is that, 
although they are Aristotelian in many respects, they also represent a shift away from the 
Aristotelian views. Particularly, Alexander situates praise and blame with choice in a way 
Aristotle does not (in part, of course, because he does not have the relevant view of 
choice). In particular, as we saw above, Alexander emphasizes the importance of being 
able to choose differently, of the opposite of one’s action being possible; an action 
depends on us precisely when the opposite action could have been chosen.119 Frede 
explains that for Aristotle praise and blame are given based upon how one is doing given 
the context of one’s actions, not on whether one could have done differently; a child is 
praised for his choice to refrain from hitting his sister not because he could have hit her 
116 Ibid., p. 63).
117 Alexander, De Anima libri mantissa, Mantissa XXII, p. 95.
118 Alexander, de Fato, Ch. XII, pp. 57-58; De Anima libri mantissa, Mantissa XXII, pp. 94-96. It should 
be noted that many of the important passages from these primary texts can also be found in Richard 
Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD: A Sourcebook, Vol. 1 and 2 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005).
119 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, pp. 97-98.
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but because it was a meritorious decision given his age and the circumstances. For 
Alexander, on the other hand, it is essential that the child could have done differently but 
chose the right action; the choice meritorious, not because of the context the child 
inhabits but because it was the right decision and the child could have done the 
opposite.120 Frede claims that Alexander’s notion is “the ancestor of the notion that to 
have free will is to be able, in the very same circumstances, to choose between doing A 
and doing B,”121 something akin to some modern notions of free will. Thus, Alexander’s 
ideas represent an important step in the development of the concepts of free will, choice, 
and deliberation. Although I will not go into detail here it can also be noted that 
Alexander’s importance is further demonstrated in the examination of Alexander’s 
influence on the Arabic-Islamic tradition of free will offered by Luis Xavier Lopez-
Farjeat in “Determinism and Free Will in Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Arabic 
Tradition”122 where he examines Alexander’s influence on the Ash’arīte tradition and on 
the critique of that tradition by Averroes.
Along with this new view of the soul and its attitude towards impressions 
Platonists and Peripatetics developed a distinct understanding of freedom, choice, and 
what is “up to us.” For example, as we have seen, Frede explains that Alexander of 
Aphrodisias makes a distinction between “What we do of our own accord” and “what we 
do because it is up to us” which corresponds in some respects to the Aristotelian 
distinction between the voluntary and the chosen while bringing in some Stoic ideas;123 
120 Ibid., pp. 98-100.
121 Ibid., p. 100.
122 Luis Xavier Lopez-Farjeat in “Determinism and Free Will in Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Arabic 
Tradition” in Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. 81 (2008), pp. 161-177.
123 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, p. 57.
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this distinction is meant to explain the difference between unforced assent and 
considered, critical assent. This leads to the notion of boulēsis, now associated with the 
notion of will, as giving assent to either rational or irrational impressions.124 It also lead to 
new developments in the ideas of choice and freedom. Platonists and Peripatetics 
reasoned that choice had to involve not only the ability to choose or fail to choose, as we 
saw in Aristotle’s account of prohairesis, but the ability to choose to do or not do 
something. We have choice only when we are not compelled or forced into action or 
assent by impressions or our beliefs or desires. Furthermore, we have freedom of choice 
when the opposite choice is also possible.125 Although this new theory has many 
problems, as Frede points out, it is significant that it is the first instance in which choice 
is about having options.126
2.4 Augustine on the will and its freedom127
Following in the tradition which started with Aristotle (or perhaps even with 
124 Ibid., p. 58; p. 63.
125 Ibid., pp. 94-97.
126 Ibid., pp. 97-100. Frede argues that a major problem with this notion of freedom is that it seems to 
suggest that freedom is a sign of weakness since Alexander still maintains that the virtuous person could 
not act other than he does; the suggestion is that freedom only exists for non-virtuous people since only that 
have options which could be viewed as equally possible. Frede explains that the problem arrises out of a 
misunderstanding of praise and blame.
127 It should be noted that Augustine is, of course, not the only one to discuss the issue of will in the 
Christian tradition; nor is he the only one of which Aquinas is aware. However, he is certainly a major 
influence on Aquinas’ theory of the will and he is often credited, erroneously, as we have seen, with being 
the first to develop a concept of the will. For these reasons, and for the sake of space, Augustine is the only 
representative of the medieval Christian tradition I discuss, aside from Aquinas himself. It should also be 
noted that a complete account of Christian, or even Augustinian, notions of will would include a theological 
account and references to Biblical notions of willing. But, this is not meant to be a compete account of the 
issue of will in the Christian tradition. Rather, it is narrowly focused on the philosophical notion of will and 
it’s development and transmission from ancient Greek into the accounts of Averroes and Aquinas. To this 
end, only major elements of Augustine’s most prominent philosophical works on will which clearly reflect 
the influence of Neoplatonist and Stoic thinkers are discussed.
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Plato) and carried through the Stoics and other thinkers, Augustine of Hippo128 developed 
a strong notion of will which was both strongly aligned with the earlier Greek tradition 
and also firmly imbedded within the Christian context. There are a number of important 
texts where Augustine discusses his notion of the will and its freedom. Some key texts in 
the discussion of the problem of will and moral responsibility are found in De Libero 
Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will), Confessions, and De Trinitate. In this section of the 
chapter a close examine of these texts of Augustine will be undertaken, followed by a 
discussion of how they may be viewed from within the larger tradition of Aristotelian and 
later Greek sources. From this we will see how Augustine makes extensive use of later 
Platonist notions of freedom and choice which themselves were heavily influenced by 
Stoic ideas, as was demonstrated above.
2.4.1 The Texts
While De libero arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will) is centered around the 
problem of evil, it also offers some insight into how Augustine views the will and its 
relationship to both the intellect and to moral action. Early on in their discussion of evil, 
Augustine and Evodius agree that learning or understanding is always good--in fact, 
Evodius declares that understanding is so good that “[no] human trait could be better.”129 
128 Kahn, “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 255. Also see Gerd Van Riel, “Augustine's 
Will, an Aristotelian Notion? On the Antecedents of Augustine's Doctrine of the Will,” in Augustinian 
Studies 38.1 (2007). For a general account of will in Augustine see Marianne Djuth, “Will” in Augustine 
Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1999) pp. 881–885.
129 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, translated by Thomas Williams. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1993), Bk. I, sec. 1, p. 2. This work is referenced using book and chapter. All 
translations are from this source, unless otherwise stated. The Latin text is from: Augustine, De libero 
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This statement is made in the context of trying to identify the cause of evil (particularly 
whether human beings learn to do evil); however, it also demonstrates Augustine’s view 
that understanding--reasoning--is an essential feature of the human being. Augustine 
further develops this idea that reason is central to the human being when he notes that 
reason or understanding is what “human beings have in virtue of which they are 
superior”130 to animals and that the life of understanding is the best kind of life.131 In order 
to attain this most human kind of life one must be well-ordered, with reason (also called 
‘mind’ or ‘spirit’) ruling over one’s other faculties. It is only when a person is in such a 
state that she can attain wisdom and so live rightly and be happy. In order to become well 
ordered and allow reason to rule one must simply will it.132 Augustine says that it is only 
through an act of the will itself that the will can turn away from the eternal, 
unchangeable, immutable truths which are its objects and towards what is bad or evil;133 
arbitrio [lib.arb.] in Saint Augustine: Opera Omnia-Corpus Augustinianum Gissense, edited by Cornelius 
Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1995), http://library.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=augustine_la/
augustine_la.00.xml;chunk.id=div.augustine_la.pmpreface.1;toc.depth=2;toc.id=div.augustine_la.pmprefac
e.1;hit.rank=0;brand=default; the reference numbers used for this work correspond to those on the online 
edition and do not correspond to the numbering system of the English translation. 
“E. Prorsus ego duas esse disciplinas puto: unam per quam bene facere, aliam per quam male facere 
discimus. Sed cum quaereres, utrum disciplina bonum esset, ipsius boni amor intentionem meam rapuit, ut 
illam disciplinam intuerer, quae bene faciendi est, ex quo bonum esse respondi; nunc autem admoneor esse 
aliam, quam procul dubio malum esse confirmo et cuius auctorem requiro.
 A. Saltem intellegentiam nonnisi bonum putas?
 E. Istam plane ita bonam puto, ut non uideam quid in homine possit esse praestantius, nec ullo modo 
dixerim aliquam intellegentiam malam esse posse” (lib. arb. 1, 3)
130 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Bk. I sec. 7, p. 12; lib. arb. 1,16: “A. Bene sane. Sed item dic 
mihi, cum manifestum sit uiribus ceterisque officiis corporis a plurimis bestiis hominem facile superari, 
quaenam res sit, qua homo excellit, ut ei nulla bestiarum, ipse autem multis imperare possit? An forte ipsa 
est, quae ratio uel intellegentia dici solet?
E. Non inuenio aliud, quandoquidem in animo est id quod beluis antecellimus; quae si exanimes essent, 
dicerem nos eo praestare, quod animum habemus. Nunc uero cum et illa sint animalia, id quod eorum 
animis non inest ut subdantur nobis, inest autem nostris ut eis meliores simus, quoniam neque nihil neque 
paruum aliquid esse cuiuis apparet, quid aliud rectius quam rationem uocauerim?”
131 Ibid., Bk. I sec. 7, p. 13; lib. arb. 1,16. Understanding is the “most valuable” characteristic of human 
beings because it is one which human beings have and lower creatures do not. 
132 Ibid, Bk. I sec. 8-10, pp. 14-17; lib. arb. 1,18-1,21
133 Ibid., Bk. II, sec. 8, p. 46; lib. arb., 2.20-21. Here he discusses number as an example of the kind of 
unchangeable truth which cannot be arrived at through the bodily senses and the existence of which serves 
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he argues that it is not possible for what is weak (material objects of desire) to corrupt 
what is stronger (the mind/soul/spirit) and that what is superior would not corrupt the 
well ordered soul since to do so would make it, in fact, inferior; thus, “only its own will 
and free choice can make the mind a companion to cupidity.”134 So, one achieves a good 
will along with a well ordered soul, by willing it (which it to say by desiring eternal 
rather than temporal things).135
Willing to have a good will is perhaps not quite as easy as it sounds. After all, if it 
were really that simple, everyone would have a good will and refrain from doing evil. 
Augustine explains that while everyone wants to be happy, and happiness is tied to the 
goodness of the will and the virtues which accompany a good will, not everyone desires 
to live rightly; living rightly (being well ordered) is necessary in order to have a good 
will.136 This is because many people are ruled not by reason but by their inordinate 
desires. When a person is ruled by reason she understands that it is most important to 
follow the eternal law and cleave to what is eternal and unchangeable rather than to 
as a proof of God’s existence. We can also look to his discussions of the eternal law by which one should 
not love anything which can be lost easily or against one’s will, to which we should all cleave, forsaking 
inordinate desire (libido) (Bk. I, sec. 6, p. 11; lib. arb. 1,15)
134 Ibid., Bk. I, sec. 11, p. 17; lib. arb. 1,21: “Ergo relinquitur ut, quoniam regnanti menti conpotique 
uirtutis quidquid par aut praelatum est non eam facit seruam libidinis propter iustitiam, quidquid autem 
inferius non possit hoc facere propter infirmitatem, sicut ea quae inter nos constiterunt docent, nulla res alia 
mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat quam propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium.”
135 Ibid., Bk. I, sec. 12, p. 19; lib. arb. 1,26. Augustine notes, in the Confessions, that even in a more 
general way the will and the power to act are one and the same. “For as soon as I had the will, I would have 
had a wholehearted will. At this point the power to act is identical with the will. The willing itself was 
performative of the action” (Confessions, translated by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), Bk.VIII, Ch. viii, sec. 20, p. 147). All translations are from this source, unless otherwise stated. The 
Latin text is from: Confessiones [conf.] in Saint Augustine: Opera Omnia-Corpus Augustinianum Gissense, 
edited by Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1995), http://library.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=augustine_la/
augustine_la.00.xml;chunk.id=div.augustine_la.pmpreface.1;toc.depth=2;toc.id=div.augustine_la.pmprefac
e.1;hit.rank=0;brand=default
 “ut uellem, possem, quia mox, ut uellem, utique uellem. ibi enim facultas ea, quae uoluntas, et ipsum uelle 
iam facere erat” (conf. 8, 20)
136 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Bk. I, sec. 14, p. 23-4; lib. arb., 1,30. See Bk. I, sec. 13, pp. 
20-21; lib. arb. 1,26-1,27 for a discussion of the virtues which accompany the good will.
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desires for things which one can lose easily or against one’s will.137 Augustine claims that 
even preserving one by reason but by their inordinate desires. When a person is ruled by 
reason she understands that it is most important to follow the eternal law and because one 
is valuing one’s body (which can be lost easily or against one’s will) over one’s soul 
(which cannot be lost). Later Augustine equates the pursuit of temporal things and the 
neglect of eternal things with evil doing and claims this is the result of a free choice of 
the will:
 Augustine: [...I] ask whether evildoing is anything other 
than neglecting eternal things, which the mind perceives 
and enjoys by means of itself and which it cannot lose if it 
loves them; and instead pursuing temporal things--which 
are perceived by means of the body , the least valuable part 
of a human being, and which can never be certain--as if 
they were great and marvelous things. It seems to be that all 
evil deeds--that is, all sins--fall into this one category [...]
Evodius: [...] our argument showed that we do evil by the 
free choice of the will138
This account of evil doing and the freedom of human beings to commit evil through an 
act of the will demonstrates the great weight that Augustine places on both the will and 
reason in explaining human action. He clearly thinks that human beings are moral agents 
137 Ibid., Bk. I sec. 3-Bk. I, sec. 6, pp. 5-11; lib. arb., 1,6- 1,15, offers a long discussion of inordinate 
desire and the eternal and temporal laws. Here Augustine explains that the temporal law follows the eternal 
law in an incomplete way and so it leaves open many opportunities for a person to follow the law but still 
indulge inordinate desires (which include, for example, a desire to preserve or defend the body from 
attack).
138 Ibid., Bk. I, sec. 16, p. 27; lib. arb., 1, 34-35: “A: Referamus nos, si placet, ad questionem in exordio 
sermonis huius propositam et uideamus utrum soluta sit. Nam quaerere institueramus quid sit male facere, 
et propter hoc omnia quae dicta sunt diximus. Quocirca licet nunc animaduertere et considerare utrum 
sit aliud male facere quam neglectis rebus aeternis, quibus per se ipsam mens fruitur et per se ipsam 
percipit et quae amans amittere non potest, temporalia et quaeque per corpus, partem hominis uilissimam, 
sentiuntur et numquam esse certa possunt quasi magna et miranda sectari. Nam hoc uno genere omnia 
malefacta, id est peccata, mihi uidentur includi. […]
E: […] et illud simul mihi uidere iam uideor absolutum atque compertum, quod post illam quaestionem, 
quid sit male facere, deinceps quaerere institueramus, unde male facimus. nisi enim fallor, ut ratio tractata 
monstrauit, id facimus ex libero uoluntatis arbitrio.”
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who make decisions about their actions and so have responsibility for them. Furthermore, 
this decision making is the result of both one’s ability to reason and one’s will. A well 
ordered person will be ruled by reason and reason will lead her to will not only to be 
happy but to live rightly, following the eternal law.139
Although we have a good picture of Augustine’s view regarding the work of the 
will in moral action and its relationship to reason, not much has been said about what 
exactly the will is. In fact, in De Libro Arbitrio Augustine says little about exactly what 
the will is or how he knows that we have one. Before their discussion of the good will in 
Book One Augustine asks Evodius whether we have a will and Evodius responds that “it 
can’t be denied that we have a will;”140 neither expands upon this claim. Later, in Book 
Two’s discussion of why God gave human beings a will at all, since it leads to evildoing, 
Augustine claims that while free will is the source of evildoing it is also the source of our 
doing good. As such, it was right for God to give human beings free will (and presumably 
to give human beings the will at all) because “human beings could not live rightly 
without it.”141 He goes on the say that since both sin and goodness require the will, so 
does God’s justice—it would not be just to punish evil or reward goodness if a person had 
139 Augustine also makes this claim that evil doing is the result of the will in the Confessions: “the free 
choice of the will is the reason why we do wrong an suffer your just judgment” (Bk. VII, Ch. iii, sec. 5, p. 
113). “Et intendebam, ut cernerem quod audiebam, liberum uoluntatis arbitrium causam esse, ut male 
faceremus et rectum iudicium tuum ut pateremur” (Conf. 7, 5).
140 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Bk. I, sec. 12, p. 19; lib. arb., 1,25: “negari non potest habere 
nos uoluntatem.”
141 Ibid., Bk. II, sec. 1, p. 30; lib. arb. 2, 3: ”quoniam sine ills homo recte non potest uiuere.”
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not been free in her actions.142 At the end of Book Two Augustine calls the will an 
intermediate good, because, while it is not evil in itself, it can be used to sin.143 
In Book Three Augustine and Evodius discuss the issue of divine foreknowledge 
and its compatibility with what has been argued about out ability to be good and happy 
by willing it; if God has knowledge of everything I will do it would seem that they are 
done out of necessity rather than because of my willing them (for certainly I could not not 
have done differently since God already knows what I will do). Evodias also questions 
whether he is truly able to will to be happy and whether, if he is capable of making 
himself happy by willing it, this makes God’s help unnecessary.144 Augustine explains that 
the difficulty we now have in willing to be happy is the result not of a defect in out nature 
142 Ibid., Bk. II, sec. 2, p. 30; lib. arb. 2,3: “A: plane si haec ita sunt, soluta quaestio est quam proposuisti. 
si enim homo aliquod bonum est et non posset, nisi cum uellet, recte facere, debuit habere liberam 
uoluntatem, sine qua recte facere non posset. non enim quia per illa etiam peccatur, ad hoc eam deum 
dedisse credendum est. satis ergo causae est cur dari debuerit, quoniam sine illa homo recte non potest 
uiuere. ad hoc autem datam uel hinc intellegi potest, quia si quis ea usus fuerit ad peccandum, diuinitus in 
eum uindicatur. quod iniuste fieret, si non solum ut recte uiueretur, sed etiam ut peccaretur, libera esset 
uoluntas data. quomodo enim iuste uindicaretur in eum, qui ad hanc rem usus esset uoluntate, ad quam rem 
data est? nunc uero deus cum peccantem punit, quid aliud tibi uidetur dicere nisi: cur non ad eam rem usus 
es libera uoluntate, ad quam tibi eam dedi? hoc est ad recte faciendum?deinde illud bonum, quo 
commendatur ipsa iustitia in damnandis peccatis recteque factis honorandis, quomodo esset, si homo 
careret libero uoluntatis arbitrio? non enim aut peccatum esset aut recte factum quod non fieret 
uoluntate. ac per hoc et poena iniusta esset et praemium, si homo uoluntatem liberam non haberet. debuit 
autem et in supplicio et in praemio esse iustitia, quoniam hoc unum est bonorum quae sunt ex deo. debuit 
igitur deus dare homini liberam uoluntatem.”
143 Ibid., Bk. II, sec. 19, pp. 67-68. lib. arb. 2,50-53. “[A:] ista ergo magna bona sunt. sed meminisse te 
oportet non solum magna sed etiam minima bona non esse posse nisi ab illo a quo sunt omnia bona, hoc est 
deo. id enim superior disputatio persuasit cui totiens sunt; species autem quorumlibet corporum, sine 
quibus recte uiui potest, minima bona sunt; potentiae uero animi, sine quibus recte uiui non potest, media 
bona sunt. uirtutibus nemo male utitur; ceteris autem bonis, id est mediis et minimis, non solum bene sed 
etiam male quisque uti potest. et ideo uirtute nemo male utitur quia opus uirtutis est bonus usus istorum 
quibus etiam non bene uti possumus. nemo autem bene utendo male utitur. quare abundantia et magnitudo 
bonitatis dei non solum magna sed etiam media et minima bona esse praestitit. magis laudanda est bonitas 
eius in magnis quam in mediis et magis in mediis quam in minimis bonis, sed magis in omnibus quam si 
non omnia tribuisset.
[…] ita fit ut neque illa bona quae a peccantibus adpetuntur ullo modo mala sint neque ipsa uoluntas libera, 
quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus, sed malum sit auersio eius ab 
incommutabili bono et conuersio ad mutabilia bona; quae tamen auersio atque conuersio quoniam non 
cogitur, sed est uoluntaria, digna et iusta eam miseriae poena subsequitur.”
144 Ibid., Bk. III, sec. 1-3, pp. 70-77; lib. arb., 3,1-3,8.
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as such but rather is a punishment for our participation in original sin; as human beings 
we are all responsible for the choice of Adam and Eve to willingly disobey God;145 as a 
result we are given the punishments of “ignorance and difficulty” which corrupts our 
wills and reduces our freedom. This ignorance and difficulty results in a lack of freedom 
and this is a just punishment for our original act of willing to sin:
 
Because of our ignorance we lack the free choice of the 
will to choose to act rightly, or that even when we do see 
what is right and will to do it, we cannot do it because of 
the resistance of carnal habit, which develops almost 
naturally because of the unruliness of our moral 
inheritance. It is indeed the most just penalty for sin that we 
should lose what we were unwilling to use well, since we 
could have used it well without the slightest difficulty if 
only we had willed to do so; thus, we who knew what was 
right but did not do it lost the knowledge of what is right, 
and we who had power but not the will to act rightly lost 
the power even when we have the will.146
Human nature at the start was such that we had knowledge of what was right and a free 
will with which to choose do act according to our reason. However, the act of original sin 
was a free choice by the first human beings to go against this understanding and will to 
act wrongly. The punishment for this act was that we lost both our freedom and our 
145 Ibid., Bk. III sec. 19-20, pp. 107-111; lib. arb., 3,53-3,58. Augustine offers extensive discussion in 
Book Three of how the sin of Adam and Eve was possible given that they were created with knowledge of 
what was right but I will not address this here as the specifics of his arguments are not directly relevant to 
our discussion. Also, see Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, pp. 164-167.
146 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Bk. III, sec. 18, p. 106; lib. arb., 3,52:  “[A:] nec mirandum est 
quod uel ignorando non habet arbitrium liberum uoluntatis ad eligendum quod recte faciat, uel resistente 
carnali consuetudine, quae uiolentia mortalis successionis quodammodo naturaliter inoleuit, uideat 
quid recte faciendum sit et uelit nec possit implere. illa est enim peccati poena iustissima, ut amittat quisque 
quod bene uti noluit cum sine ulla posset difficultate si uellet; id est autem ut qui sciens recte non facit 
amittat scire quid rectum sit, et qui recte facere cum posset noluit amittat posse cum uelit.”
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understanding. Thus, the previous discussion of our free will was not meant as an account 
of our present state but of the “the will with which human beings were created.”147 
Something still must be said about what exactly the will is and its relationship to 
reason and to the body. Augustine locates the will with reason (or the mind) rather than 
with some other faculty of the soul.148 For example, in the Confessions, when discussing 
the difference between the mind’s commanding the body and commanding itself, 
Augustine says that “the mind orders the mind to will. The recipient of the order is 
itself.”149 Clearly, then he is equating the mind (reason) and the will. He goes on to say 
that there is a way in which we can be said to have two wills; one which is responsible 
for the actions we command of ourselves and follow and one which is responsible for the 
other actions, which are not commanded. He calls this a “morbid condition of the 
mind”150 in which our willing is incomplete (a condition that can be related to the 
improper ordering of the soul and the punishment for our original sin discussed above).151 
147 Ibid., Bk. III, sec. 18, p. 107; lib. arb., 3,52: “[A:] cum autem de libera uoluntate recte faciendi 
loquimur, de illa scilicet in qua homo factus est loquimur.”
148 Aquinas follows Augustine in his placement of the will with the intellect and his insistence that both 
are immaterial, as we shall see in Chapter 4.
149 Augustine, Confessions, Bk. VIII, Ch. ix, sec.. 21, p. 147; Conf. 8,21. Sorabji points to this connection 
of the will with the rational soul as one of the ways that Augustine is moving beyond the tradition.
150 Ibid.,, Bk. VIII, Ch. ix, sec. 21, p. 148; Conf.8, 21.
151 Ibid., Bk. VIII, Ch. ix, sec. 21, pp. 147-148; Conf. 8,21:
“Imperat animus corpori, et paretur statim: imperat animus sibi, et resistitur. imperat animus, ut moueatur 
manus, et tanta est facilitas, ut uix a seruitio discernatur imperium: et animus animus est, manus autem 
corpus est. imperat animus, ut uelit animus, nec alter est nec facit tamen. unde hoc monstrum? et quare 
istuc? imperat, inquam, ut uelit, qui non imperaret, nisi uellet, et non facit quod imperat. sed non ex toto 
uult: non ergo ex toto imperat. nam in tantum imperat, in quantum uult, et in tantum non fit quod imperat, 
in quantum non uult, quoniam uoluntas imperat, ut sit uoluntas, nec alia, sed ipsa. non itaque plena imperat; 
ideo non est, quod imperat. nam si plena esset, nec imperaret, ut esset, quia iam esset. non igitur monstrum 
partim uelle, partim nolle, sed aegritudo animi est, quia non totus assurgit ueritate subleuatus, consuetudine 
praegrauatus. et ideo sunt duae uoluntates, quia una earum tota non est et hoc adest alteri, quod deest 
alteri.”
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This idea is important because it shows that for Augustine all of our actions are willed 
(and so voluntary and worthy of praise or blame) in some respect.152 
This connection of mind and will is further expressed in De Trinitate where 
Augustine is discussing the desire of the mind to know itself and what it may find while 
seeking this self-knowledge. Augustine explains that a careful examination of the mind 
by itself will result in its realizing that it has memory, understanding, and will (velle).153 
He goes on to say that 
Since these three, memory, understanding, and will, are, 
therefore, not three lives but one life, not three minds but 
one mind, it follows that they are certainly not three 
substances, but one substance. For when we speak of 
memory as life, mind, and substance, we speak of it in 
respect to itself; but when we speak of it simply as memory, 
we speak of it in relation to something else. We may also 
say the same of the understanding and the will; for they are 
called understanding and will with relation to something 
else, yet each in respect to itself is life, mind, and essence. 
Therefore, these three are one in that they are one life, one 
mind, and one essence. And whatever else they are called in 
respect to themselves, they are spoken of together, not in 
the plural but in the singular. 154
152 Sorabji, “The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor,” p. 19. Also, see Kahn, 
“Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 259 for a more extended discussion of this passage; 
in particular Kahn points out that for Augustine the human being must rely “upon the will of the Creator.” 
Kahn notes that this relationship between human will and divine will is foundational to the theory of 
Augustine and other medieval “voluntarists” (p. 235)
153 Augustine, The Trinity in On the Trinity Books 8-15, edited by Gareth B. Matthews, translated by 
Stephen McKenna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) Bk. 10, Ch. 10, sec. 13, pp. 54-55; Bk. 
10, Ch. 11, sec. 17-18, pp. 57-58. All translations are from this source, unless otherwise stated. The Latin 
text is from: Augustine, De trinitate [trin.] in Saint Augustine: Opera Omnia-Corpus Augustinianum 
Gissense, edited by Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1995), http://library.nlx.com/xtf/view?
docId=augustine_la/
augustine_la.00.xml;chunk.id=div.augustine_la.pmpreface.1;toc.depth=2;toc.id=div.augustine_la.pmprefac
e.1;hit.rank=0;brand=default; the reference numbers used for this work correspond to those on the online 
edition and do not correspond to the numbering system of the English translation. trin., 10,13; trin. 
10,17-18.
154 Ibid., Bk. 10, Ch. 11, sec. 18, p. 58; trin. 10,18: “haec igitur tria, memoria, intellegentia, 
uoluntas, quoniam non sunt tres uitae sed una uita, nec tres mentes sed una mens, consequenter utique nec 
tres substantiae sunt sed una substantia. memoria quippe quod uita et mens et substantia dicitur ad se ipsam 
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Here Augustine is clearly explaining that the will, understanding, and memory are 
elements which make up the mind or rational soul. He goes on to demonstrate the 
interconnectedness of the three elements, making clear that there is a way in which they 
are distinct and a way in which they are all the same, as mind. Regarding the will in 
particular he says that “My will also comprehends my whole understanding and my 
whole memory, if only I make use of the whole of what I understand and remember.”155 
Here the claim is that the will, being in a sense the same thing as the understanding and 
the memory--that is, being mind-- has access to understanding and memory when it wills. 
This makes his claim that we will even what we seem to not want more clear; the 
interconnectedness of will, understanding, and memory means that when we move 
towards some action as a result of our understanding of it we are doing this from will as 
from understanding, whether we consciously will it or not.
2.4.2 Interpretations of Augustine’s View
Although some of what is said by Augustine above is indeed unique, it is also 
clearly reliant upon the Greek tradition in important ways, as I shall point out below. 
Augustine is often viewed as a largely unique and thus monumental figure when it comes 
to his view of the will; some people even suggest that Augustine was the first philosopher 
dicitur; quod u et de uoluntate dixerim, et intellegentia quippe et uoluntas ad aliquid dicitur. uita est autem 
unaquaeque ad se ipsam et mens et essentia. quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum quo una uita, una mens, una 
essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur etiam simul, non pluraliter sed singularite dicuntur.” 
155 Ibid.,Bk. 10, Ch. 11, sec. 18, p. 59; trin. 10,18: “uoluntas etiam mea totam intellegentiam totamque 
memoriam meam capit dum toto utor quod intellego et memini.”
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to include a clear notion of the will in his theory.156 However, as we saw above various 
notions of willing, derived from the Aristotelian ideas of boulēsis and prohairesis were 
being developed long before Augustine. Indeed, Augustine is heavily indebted to these 
developments and his work can be seen to be a mixture of Stoic and Platonist views 
adapted to the Christian tradition Augustine is working within. Frede points out that 
Augustine’s view represents a Christian Platonist view with heavy Stoic undertones; he 
claims that Augustine is working with a largely Stoic notion of the will and freedom 
embedded in a Platonist world view and modified by Christian notions of the importance 
of and need for grace.157
Augustine’s notion of will is one in which the will is involved in every act of 
cognition. This is in line with the more complex Stoic view (generally not used by 
Platonists) whereby the will is responsible for all of our choices regarding whether or not 
we will assent to impressions. In some situations the choice to give assent, although 
involving will, is not an instance of willing but of believing, since we will to do and not 
just to believe (we will to assent but what we assent to is a matter of choice and is a 
belief). This connection, thought somewhat obscured by Augustine’s conflation of willing 
and choosing under the term velle, is present in Augustine and is Stoic.158 
156 For example, Sorabj notes that while the concept of will and it’s associated terminology developed 
over time it had its “full flowering” with Augustine (“The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the 
Confessor,” p. 6)
157 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. p. 155. Frede points out that there are 
those who argue that Augustine offers a radically new position—perhaps one that is even contrary to Stoic 
and Platonist views—in which will and cognition are separated and willing become involved in cognition 
rather than being merely a function of cognition; he argues against this (p. 157). There are also those who 
argue for a more middle ground approach, such as Gerd Van Riel’s in “Augustine's Will, an Aristotelian 
Notion? On the Antecedents of Augustine's Doctrine of the Will,” where he argues that Augustine draws 
from a variety of Neoplatonic, Stoic, and Biblical sources while developing a unique concept of will.
158 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, pp. 158-159. Rist points out that voluntas 
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Of central importance to the discussion is Augustine’s world view. He thinks that 
the world is full of evil and that this evil is the result of our own free choice. As was 
explained above, Augustine claims that human beings naturally have free choice but that 
this freedom is diminished in our present state because of original sin. Frede explains in 
more detail what we saw from Augustine’s discussion of our share in this sin in Book 3 of 
De libero arbitrio; the act of Adam and Eve was done not just by the two individuals but 
collectively by humanity. Thus, we are all responsible for it and rightly punished.159 In 
order to makes sense of how we can be responsible for this action Augustine must claim 
that the evil was done by a wise and virtuous person (it would make no sense to punish 
someone for doing something if they lacked the relevant understanding and moral 
standing to do differently); this is another similarity between the views of Augustine and 
those of the Greek tradition, which insisted that only the wise were free while everyone 
else was a slave to their impressions, beliefs, and desires. Even in our present state, for 
both the Greeks and for Augustine, we are responsible for our actions and choices 
(although they are not now free) because we are responsible for the kind of person we are 
now and thus for what we now do.160 
encompasses at least some of the content of the Greek prohairesis. He goes on to say that by Augustine’s 
time prohairesis had come to be be associated in some sense with moral character. See John Rist, 
Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 186-188. Rist 
also claims that one of the transformative elements in Augustine’s view is the association of will with love 
and thus we will or choose based upon what we love (God or worldly things) (p. 188).
159 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, p. 164. One may also see Ann A. Pang-
White, "The Fall of Humanity: Weakness of Will and Moral Responsibility in the Later Augustine" in 
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9 (2000) and John Rist, “Augustine on Free Will and Predestination” in 
Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays edited by R.A. Markus (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972) 
pp.218–252.
160 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, pp. 165-167. Also see pp. 66-88 for 
Frede’s discussion of free will in the Stoics, as discussed above.
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The component which separates Augustine’s view from the Stoic and Platonist 
views is that the only way for us to be delivered from this state of ‘ignorance and 
difficulty’ we have put ourselves in is through divine grace. We can work to will rightly 
and to attain the good will but we will never, in our fallen state, fully attain such a will 
without grace.161 This results in the feeling of having two wills which Augustine 
described in the Confessions. The Stoics, as we saw, also denied the possibility of 
freedom once we have become enslaved by our initial act of free choice to prioritize our 
desires; however, Augustine’s solution to this--grace--is what is unique to him as a result 
of his Christian context. The need for grace is so complete that: 
even if we manage to will the right thing in our fallen state, 
this is so only by divine grace because God set things up in 
such a way that we will or want the right thing. In this 
sense, also for Augustine, both the doing and the willing are 
God’s. Thus God can set things up in such a way that some 
of us will be led to will to have a good will, to will to free 
ourselves of our enslavement and to succeed in our 
struggles.162
This suggests that, after our original sin, our goodness and our freedom are up to God. 
We made the original choice to turn from God to worldly things and as result we 
abdicated our free will. Now, we can with practice and struggle work towards regaining 
our initial state (and we can will to do so) but the success and strength of that willing is 
161 Frede explains that “we are not even able without divine grace to will to have a good will once we are 
enslaved, thought nothing is so much in our power as our will.” (p. 169)
162 Ibid., p. 170. It is also worth noting that this seems similar to the Stoic notion that we can have some 
kind of responsibility even within the causal-deterministic world view; we are responsible for our original 
state and for things which are ‘up to us’ even though nothing happens that was not fated.
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dependent upon the grace of God. Even if we are granted grace, our willing rightly is still 
a struggle because our nature is still flawed as result of the fall.163
2.5 The Arabic Tradition
We have seen how the notions of boulēsis and prohairesis developed from 
Aristotle through the later Greek traditions into stronger notions of will and freedom of 
choice. We have also seen how that Greek tradition was important to the development of 
the Christian notion of the will and its free choice in the work of Augustine. Now we will 
turn to an examination of how these ideas were approached in the Arabic tradition. We 
will see that the Arabic exposure to these ideas differed from the exposure of Augustine, 
especially as it regards their view of Aristotle. The translations of Aristotle’s work which 
were available in the Arabic tradition imported some of the ideas developed later by the 
Stoics, Peripatetics, and Platonists. The result was that many important philosophers 
writing in Arabic came to think that Aristotle himself had notions of the will and choice; 
this led some philosophers to consider this issue somewhat settled and to move on to 
examine the still troubling problems of Intellect rather than focusing on the faculty of 
will.
In this section this issue of translation and its results will be explored. First I will 
examine the Arabic texts of Aristotle’s De Anima and Nicomachean Ethics, 
demonstrating that the Arabic terms used carried meanings which were closer to the more 
developed notions of will and choice found in the later Greek tradition than to Aristotle’s 
163 Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized, pp. 171; 179. Rist points out that given this view human 
beings are, essentially is a state of akrasia all the time (p. 184)
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ideas of wishing (boulēsis) and decision (prohairesis). Then I will look at how this issue 
of translation impacted the work of two important Arabic influences on Averroes (and 
thus Aquinas), Al-Farabi and Avicenna.
2.5.1 Translating Aristotle into Arabic
As we saw in the discussion above Aristotle explains his notions of bouleusis 
(deliberation), prohairesis (decision) and boulēsis (wish) in Book 3 of the the 
Nicomachean Ethics. An examination of these ideas in the Aristotelian context revealed 
that for Aristotle prohairesis and boulēsis are notions where are quite distinct from not 
only what we think of as choice and will today but also differ from the later Stoic, 
Platonist, and Peripatetic views. Aristotle did not see these as united within a single 
faculty, nor did he claim that our deliberations and decisions were free in the way that 
later writers did. In particular it is important to remember that prohairesis did not have 
the meaning of choice (as a free decision from among options) and boulēsis did not have 
the stronger meaning of willing that they came to have. This difference between the 
Aristotelian and the later Greek notions, however, is not born out consistently in the 
Arabic translations. 
The discussion of prohairesis in 3.2 of the Nicomachean Ethics is rendered 
throughout using the Arabic word ikhtiyar (choice). Whereas the Greek prohairesis has 
the connotation of decision in a more broad sense, the Arabic term is more closely 
associated with choice and with the will.164 This terminology would suggest to a reader 
164 The closest entry in Lane’s Lexicon notes that ikhtiyar is “of, or relating to, the will or choice.” Edward 
William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon Part 3, (Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1968), p. 831. It might also 
be noted that occasionally prohairesis is even translated as irādah, a term usually used for the will; see The 
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that Aristotle had a view of prohairesis that was closer to the Platonist view that 
prohairesis was about choosing such that one could do one thing or another as one willed. 
Meanwhile, boulēsis was translated by several different terms, ḥub, hawan, and 
irādah.165 In the discussion of the relationship between prohairesis and boulēsis the term 
used is huwan. The brief discussion of wish at De Anima 3.10, 433a22-25, is translated 
using a different word which is the word usually reserved as a translation of bouleusis or 
deliberation.
2.5.2 Al-Farabi166
In On the Perfect State Al-Farabi discusses a wide range of topics including 
human rationality. It is within the context of his discussion of reason and the relationship 
of the Active and Passive Intellects (which he also calls the material intellect) that he 
gives a brief account of the difference between will and choice. In particular Al-Farabi 
discusses the importance and impact of the “first intelligibles” on the human being. He 
says these intelligible are common to all human beings and include “(a) the principles of 
the productive skills, (b) the principles by which one becomes aware of good and evil 
man’s actions, [and] (c) the principles which are used for knowing the existents which are 
not the objects of man’s actions.”167 Upon attaining these intelligibles one develops a 
Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, eds. Anna A. Akasoy and Alexander Fidora (Leiden: Brill, 
2005), p. 606.
165 Akasoy and Fidora, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 595-596.
166 Although I address not only the conception of will but also the notion of intellect and knowledge 
attainment for most of the other philosophers in this dissertation I limit my treatment of Al-Farabi only to 
his brief accounts of will. This is because I use Al-Farabi not to offer another account of the issues at hand 
but primarily to make some of the terminological issues surrounding the problem of the will clear. For a 
treatment of Al-Farabi’s ideas regarding intellect see Chapter 3 of Herbert A. Davidson’s Alfarabi, 
Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
167 Al-Farabi, On the Perfect State, translated by Richard Walzer, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), Bk. IV, 
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natural inclination towards “examination, deliberation, practical thought and a desire to 
find out things.”168 This inclination is explained to be of two types: first, there is an 
inclination towards “the apprehended object in general […which is] the outcome of 
sensing or imagining” and second there is an inclination which results from “deliberation 
or rational thought.”169 The first Al-Farabi calls will (irādah) and ascribes to both humans 
and nonrational animals; the second he calls an “an ‘act of choice’” (ikhtiyar) and 
ascribes to humans alone.170
Al-Farabi goes on to give an account of the rational faculty, divided into 
theoretical and practical reason, and its relation to the lower faculties including the 
appetitive and the sensitive faculties. He says that it is necessary that all of these work 
together to lead one to act in ways which will result in the good. He notes that sensation, 
imagination, and deliberation on their own do not cause action; they must be 
accompanied by a desire for the object of sensation, imagination, and deliberation. He 
seems to assert that this desire is a kind of willing as “‘will’ is an ‘inclination’ in the 
appetitive faculty towards that which has been apprehended.”171 When this inclination is 
accompanied by reason and an understanding of the good it leads to good actions.
Ch. 13, sec. 3 (pp. 203-205). Walzer provides facing-page Arabic which I will provide here when 
appropriate:
 واﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت اﻷول اَﻟﻤﺸﻨﺮﻛﺔ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ أﺻﻨﺎف، ﺻﻨﻒ أواﺋﻞ اﻟﻤﮭﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ، وﺻﻨﻒ أواﺋﻞ ﯾﻮﻗﻒ ﺑﮭﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﻤﯿﻞ واﻟﻘﺒﯿﺢ ﻓﻤﺎ ﺷﺄﻧﮫ أن ﯾﻌﻤﻠﮫ  
اﻹﻧﺴﺎن، وﺻﻨﻒ أواﺋﻞ ﺗُﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ أن ﺗُﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﮭﺎ اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدات اﻟﺘﻰ ﻟﯿﺲ ﺷﺄﻧﮭﺎ أن ﯾﻔﻌﻠﮭﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن  
168 Ibid., p. 205
169 Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. 13, sec. 4 p. 205
170 Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. 13, sec. 4 p. 205:
 ﻓﻌﻨﺪ ﻣﺎ ﺗﺤﺼﻞ ھﺬه اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن ﯾﺤﺪث ﻟﮫ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ ﺗﺄّﻣﻞ ورّوﯾﺔ وﻓﻜﺮوﺗﺸّﻮق إﻟﻰ اﻻﺳﺘﻨﺒﺎط وﻧﺰوع اﻟﻰ ﺑﻌُﺺ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻘﻠﮫ أوﻻ وﺷﻮق إﻟﯿﮫ  
وإﻟﻰ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺴﺘﻨﺒﻄﮫ أوﻛﺎ اھﮫ ﻟﮫ. واﻟﻨﺰوع إﻟﻰ ﻣﺎأدرﻛﮫ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻤﻠﺔ ھﻮاﻹرادة، ﻓﺈن ﻛﺎن ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻦ إﺣﺴﺎس أوﺗﺨﯿﻞ ّﺳﺤﻰ ﺑﺎﻻﺳﻢ اﻟﻌﺎمّ  
وھﻮاﻹرادة، وإن ﻛﺎن ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻦ روﯾﺔ أوﻋﻦ ﻧﻄﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻤﻠﺔ ّﺳﺤﻰ اﻻﺧﺘﯿﺎروھﺬا ﯾﻮﺟﺪ ﻓﻲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺧﺎّﺻﺔ، وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﺰوع ﻋﻦ إﺣﺴﺎس أو ﯾﺨﯿّﻞ ﻓﮭﻮ  
أﯾﻀﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺳﺄﺋﺮ اﻟﺤﯿﻮان  
171 Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. 13, sec. 7 p. 209:
. ﻓﺈن اﻷﺣﺴﺎس واﻟﺘّﺨﯿﻞ واﻟﺮّوﯾﺔ ﻟﯿﺴﺖ ﻛﺎﻓﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ أن ﻧّﻔﻌﻞ دون أن ﯾﻘﺘﺮن إﻟﻰ ذﻟﻚ ﺗّﺸﻮق إﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ أُّﺣﺲ أوﺗُُﺨﯿّﻞ أوُرّوي ﻓﯿﮫ أوُﻋﻠﻢ، ﻷن اﻹرادة  
ھﻲ أن ﯾُﻨﺰع ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﺰوﻋﯿﺔ إاى ﻣﺎ أُدرك  
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This account, though brief, should sound somewhat familiar given what we have 
already said about the views of the Greeks on prohairesis and boulēsis. As we saw, the 
Stoics and the Platonists and Peripatetics emphasized the notion of choice over that of 
will (although they did not seem to suggest that all animals had a will). Al-Farabi seems 
to be suggesting here that human action is the result of deliberating about something 
which is an object of desire (or wish) and then choosing an appropriate course of action. 
This harkens back, in some sense, to the Stoic and later Greek notion of impressions and 
assent. All animals have impressions but humans use reason to analyze the beliefs and 
desires they have surrounding these impressions and then choose to assent or withhold 
assent to the impression.172
While there are clear indications of the tradition in this work of Al-Farabi what is 
also interesting is that the issue takes up very little space within the larger discussion of 
the human soul and intellectual faculties. This indicates, perhaps, that the problem was 
seen as less of a focus than it had been for the Greeks. Al-Farabi seems to prioritize the 
problem of the intellects and knowledge attainment, taking the notions of choice and the 
will as already clear. Indeed, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione Al-
Farabi goes so far as to say that choice and will are part of our “primordial nature” and 
thus are not in need of further examination. He claims that while many commentators 
read Aristotle as examining whether “possibility” is part of our nature he considers this 
issue already settled for Aristotle: 
172 In his commentary on this section (p. 407-413) Walzer indeed makes reference to the Stoic and 
Peripatetic schools, and particularly to the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias. He focuses on the notion of 
responsibility and contrasts it to the Stoic idea of fate and causal determinism (although, as we saw above, 
the Stoics did not see their determinist views and abrogating human responsibility).
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The fact is that we know right from the beginning, from our 
primordial nature, that many things have a possibility of 
occurring and of not occurring, above all, those we know to 
be left to our choice [ikhtiyar] and will [irādah]… It is not, 
therefore, the existence of possibility which should be 
made the subject of inquiry; for our primordial nature 
makes it clear to us that we have the possibility (of acting 
one way or another) in voluntary matters, where the choice 
is left to us.173
We can see, then, that Al-Farabi takes the notions of will and choice for granted; they are 
concepts which do not need further explanation, let alone argumentation. Thus, it is 
understandable that he, and those philosophers who followed him, would focus more on 
the problem of Intellect, which they considered far from settled, than on will, which they 
considered a clearly “natural” phenomenon.
Following this discussion of the need for ‘possibility’ Al-Farabi discusses 
necessity. He points out that one problem with the idea that something is “necessary in 
itself” is that it must entail the elimination of “free will [and] deliberation [irādah and 
ikhtiyar]” and the downfall of religion, both of which he considered absurd.174 This leads 
Al-Farabi to claim that there are different kinds of necessity and that some forms of 
173 Al-Farabi, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, in Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short 
Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, translated by F. W. Zimmermann (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), pp. 77-78. All translations are from this edition. The Arabic text is found in Alfarabi’s 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias (De Interpretatione), edited by Wilhelm Kutsch and Stanley 
Marrow (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1960); when sighting this text I provide page and line numbers. 
p. 83, ln. 13-25:
ﻧَﻞ ﻧﺤﻦ ﻣﻦ اول اﻣﺮﻧﺎ رﻣﺒﺎ ﻓُﻄُِﺮﻧﺎ ﻋﻠﯿﮫ. ﻧﻌﻠﻢ ان ﻛﺜﯿﺮا ﻣﻦ اﻻﻣﻮر ﻣﻤﻜﻨﺔ ان ﺗﻜﻮن وان ﻻ ﺗﻜﻮن واول ﺷﻲ ھﻮ اﻟﺬي ﯾَُﻌﻠﻢ اﻧﮫ اﻟﻰ اﺧﺘﯿﺎرﻧﺎ  
وارادﺗﻨﺎ ]…[ ﻓﻠﺬﻟﻚ ﻟﯿﺲ ﯾﻨﺒﻐﻲ ان ﻧﺠﻌﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻓﻄﺮﻧﺎ ﻋﻠﯿﮫ ﻣﻦ ﺑَﯿﺎن وُﺟﻮد اﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﻟﻨﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺷﯿﺎ اﻻرادﯾﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺧﺘﯿﺎرھَﺎ اﻟﯿﻨﺎ َﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ          
174 Al-Farabi, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, p. 93; Alfarabi’s Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Peri Hermeneias (De Interpretatione) p. 98, ln. 11-19.
< ﻓﺎذا اﺧﺬﻧﺎ ذﻟﻚ ﻋﺎد اﻟﺸﻚ اﻟﺬي ذﻛﺮه ارﺳﻄﺰطﺎﻟﯿﺲ وھﻮ ان ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺻﺎدﻗﺎ اﻧﮫ ﺳﯿَﻜﻮن ﻓﻼ ﻣﯿﻜﻦ ان ﻻ ﯾﻜﻮن. ﻓﯿﻜﻮن وﺟﻮد ﻣﺎ ﯾﻮَﺟﺪ ﻓﻲ  
اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﻣﺘﻰ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻘﻮل ﻋﻠﯿﮫ ﻗﺒﻞ ذﻟَﻚ ﺻﺎدﻗﺎ ﺿﺮوري اﻟﻮﺟﻮد. ﻓﺘﻌﻮد اﻻﺷﯿﺎ ُﻛﻠﮭﺎ ﻓﺘﻜﻮن ﺿﺮورﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﺴﮭﺎ. ﻓﺘﺼﯿﺮ اﻟﺸﯿﺎ ﻣﻤﻜﻨﺔ ﻣﺠﺴﺐ  
ﻋﻠﻤﻨﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ. ﻓﺘﺮﺗﻔﻊ اﻻرادة واﻟﺮوﯾّﺔ وﺳﺎَﯾﺮ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻻﺷﯿﺎ اﻟﺘﻲ ذﻛﺮھَﺎ ارﺳﻄﻮطﺎﻟﯿﺲ. وﯾﻠﺰم ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻠﻞ ﻛﻠﮭﺎ ان ﻻ ﯾﻜﻮن اﻻﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﺨﺘﺎرا ﻟﻔﻌﻞ )٥٤  
ظ( ﺷﻲ اﺻﻼ. ﻓﯿﻜﻮن ﻣﺎ ﯾﻠﺤﻘﮫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﺎب ﻓﻲ اﻟُﺪﻧﯿﺎ واﻻﺧﺮة ﻻ ﻋﻦ ﺷﻲ ﻣﻨﮫ ﻛﺎﯾﻦ ﺑﺎرادﺗﮫ وﻻ ﺑﺎﺧﺘﯿﺎره. ﻓﯿﻜﻮن ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻲ اﻟﺬي ھﻮ اﻟﻤﺜﯿﺐ  
واَﻟﻤﻌﺎﻗﺐ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻋﺎدل ﻓﻲ ﻓﻌﻠﮫ. وھﺬه اﯾﻀﺎ ﻛﻠﮭﺎ ﺷﻨﻌﺔ وُﻣﺴﺘﻨﻜﺮة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻠﻞ ﻛﻠﮭﺎ وﺿﺎرة ان ﯾﻌﺘﻘﺪ اﻟﻨﺎس ذﻟﻚ ﺟﺪا ًﺟﺪاً .> 
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necessity, particularly logical necessity, can allow for free will and deliberation.175 Again, 
these statements, which are only indirectly about will and decision, take for granted that 
will and deliberation are a given.176
From this discussion of Al-Farabi we can see that the concepts of will and 
decision (’irādah and ikhtiyar) were not given the kind of deep consideration that the 
Greeks after Aristotle gave them. Indeed, Al-Farabi seems to think that they were settled 
even for Aristotle.177 This demonstrates that even at this early stage commentators were 
reading a concept of will into Aristotle; this was certainly the case for Averroes and 
Aquinas who both think they are following Aristotle in their views of the will. Not only 
did Al-Farabi accept that Aristotle thought about and discussed these issues, he also saw 
them as largely solved. He considered the fact of the will and of choice to be part of our 
175 Al-Farabi, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, pp. 93-94; Alfarabi’s Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias (De Interpretatione) p. 98, ln. 11- p. 99, ln. 8 
176 It is interesting and telling that neither of these discussions of irādah and ikhtiyar are directly on the 
subject of will. They are about necessity and possibility; will and decision are mentioned in passing. 
Another telling reference is made further on in the text, during a discussion of the powers of the soul 
associated with reason. Al-Farabi acknowledges that there is debate about whether will (’irādah) is “a form 
of reason” or only “connected to reason” but he dismisses this problem, saying it “should be disregarded” 
since in either case there are a complex array of powers involved when dealing with possible actions 
(Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, p. 175; Alfarabi’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Peri 
Hermeneias (De Interpretatione) p. 181, ln 21-27.): “Of the powers by which bodies act or are acted upon 
some are part of the (faculty) of reason or connected with reason, others are neither. I say ‘part of reason or 
connected with reason’ because, on the one hand many people believe that it is, in the first place, reason by 
which man acts rather than by any other faculty; for they think that will is a form of reason, while others 
hold that will is not a form of reason but something else, (i.e.) another faculty, (albeit) connected with 
reason. But in the present context, this problem should be disregarded, no matter whether those powers by 
which man does his voluntary acts are a form of reason or (only) connected with reason. It is because of the 
whole complex of powers involved that we say of a think that it is ‘possible’ for it to act in a certain way or 
to be acted upon”
واﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﯿﻰ ﺑﮭﺎ ﺗﻔَﻌﻞ اﻻﺟَﺴﺎم او ﺗﻨﻔﻌﻞ، ﻣﻨﮭﺎ ﻣﺎ ھﻲ ﻧﻄﻖ او ﻣﻘﺮوﻧﺔ ﺑﻨﻄﻖ، وﻣﻨﮭَﺎ َﻣﺎ ﻟﯿَﺴﺖ ھﻲ ﺑﻨﻄﻖ وﻻ ﻣﻘﺮوﻧﺔ ﺑﻨﻄﻖ..َواﻧﻤﺎ ﻗﻠﺖ ﻧﻄﻖ او  
ﻣﻘﺮوﻧﺔ ﺑﻨﻄﻖ، ﻻن ﻛﺜﯿﺮا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺎس ﯾﺮى ان اﻟﻨﻄﻖ اوﻻ ھﻮ اﻟﺬي ﺑﮫ ﯾﻔَﻌﻞ اﻻﻧﺴﺎن، ﻻ ﺑﻘﻮة اﺧﺮى. ﻓﺎﻧﮭﻢ ﯾﺮون ان اﻻرادة ھﻲ ﻧﻄﻖ َﻣﺎ.  
واﺧﺮون ﯾﺮون ان اﻻرادة ﻟﯿَﺴﺖ ھﻲ ﺑﻨﻄﻖ، وﻟﻜﻨﮭﺎ ﺷﻲ اﺧﺮ وﻗﻮة اﺧﺮى ﻣﻘﺮوﻧﺔ ﺑﻨﻄﻖ. وھَﺎھﻨﺎ ﻟﯿﺲ ﯾﻨﺒﻐﻲ ان ﯾﺒﺎﻟﻲ اﻻﻧﺴﺎن ﻛﯿﻒ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن،  
ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺘﻲ ﯾﻔَﻌﻞ ﺑﮭﺎ اﻻﻧﺴﺎن اﻓﻌﺎﻟﮫ اﻻرادﯾﺔ ﻧﻄﻘﺎ، او ﻣﻘﺮوﻧﺔ ﺑﻨﻄﻖ. وَﺟﻤﯿﻊ ھﺬه اﻟﻘﻮى ﺑﮭﺎ ﯾﻘﺎل ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﻲ اﻧﮫ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ان ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ﻛﺬى او  
ان ﯾﻨﻔﻌﻞ  
Here we have a direct dismissal of the problem along with a claim that the details around the power of will 
are not particularly important given that it is clear that the will does exist (since voluntary actions exist).
177 Al-Farabi, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, p. 93; Alfarabi’s Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Peri Hermeneias (De Interpretatione) p. 98, ln. 11-19, offers the most direct reference to Aristotle in 
connection with these terms.
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“primordial nature” and did not see much need to quibble over details (such as whether 
the will was part of the rational faculty or merely connected to it).
2.5.3 Avicenna
Although Avicenna does not offer much discussion of moral agency or will, his 
extensive discussion of knowledge attainment and the nature of the soul offers an 
interpretation of Aristotle which served as a standard against which Averroes reacted. 
Further, it is important not only for our later understanding of Averroes and Aquinas’s 
view of the soul and knowledge but also of the will, insofar as their interpretations of the 
function of the will are intertwined with their views of body/soul relationship and the role 
of knowledge in moral deliberation and action. Thus, it is necessary to examine 
Avicenna’s account of the soul and its relationship to the body and the agent intellect.
Regarding the human soul Avicenna states that it “is neither a body nor something 
that subsists as a form in any body.”178 His claim here is that if the intellectual soul—the 
178 Avicenna, De Anima of the Kitāb Al-Shifā’,Bk.V, Ch. I. “Haec anima [...] non est corpus nec forma 
existens in corpore.” (Van Riet, Vol. 2, p. 81) (Rahman, p. 209)
He expands upon this idea in Bk V Ch. 2, saying: “One thing about which there can be no doubt is that the 
human is a thing and a certain substance that encounters the intelligibles through reception. We say next 
that the substance, which is the receptacle of the intelligibles, [210] is neither a body nor something that 
subsists in a body in the sense of being a faculty in it or a form belonging to it in some way. If the 
receptacle of the intelligibles is a body or a particular magnitude, then the part of it that the intelligible form 
inheres in is either (1) a single, indivisible thing, or (2) a divisible thing, where the indivisible part of the 
body is unquestionably a limit akin to a point.” (McGinnis p. 188)
 “Id de quo nulla est dubitatio hoc est: quod in homine est aliqua substantia quae apprehendit intelligibilia 
recipiendo. Dicemus ergo quod substantia quae est subiectum intelligibilium non est corpus, nec habens 
esse propter corpus ullo modo eo quod est virtus in eo aut forma eius: si enim subiectum intelligibilium 
esset corpus aut aliqua ex mensuris, necesse esset ut aut forma intellecta subsisteret per se sola in aliquo 
illius indivisibili aut in aliquo eius divisibili: illud autem corporis quod non dividitur est extremitas 
punctalis sine dubio.” (Van Riet, Vol. 2, pp. 81-82)
إن ﻣﻤﺎ ﻻ ﺷﻚ ﻓﯿﮫ أن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻓﯿﮫ ﺷﺊ وﺟﻮھﺮ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺘﻠﻘﻰ ﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺒﻮل، ﻓﻨﻘﻮل إن اﻟﺠﻮھﺮ اﻟﺬى ھﻮ ﻣﺤﻞ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﻟﯿﺲ ﺑﺠﺴﻢ وﻻ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﻓﻲ  
ﺟﺴﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﮫ ﻗﻮة ﻓﯿﮫ أو ﺻﻮرة ﻟﮫ ﺑﻮﺟﮫ، ﻓﺈﻧﮫ إن ﻛﺎن ﻣﺤﻞ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﺟﺴﻤﺎ أو ﻣﻘﺪارا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻘﺎدﯾﺮ ﻓﺈﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن إﻧﻤﺎ ﺗﺤﻞ ﻣﻨﮫ ﺷﯿﺌﺎ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻤﺎ،  
واﻟﺸﺊ اﻟﺬى ﻻ ﯾﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﺴﻢ ھﻮ طﺮف ﻧﻘﻄﻰ ﻻ ﻣﺤﺎﻟﺔ . 
(Rahman pp. 209-210)
 This will be an important point to discuss in relation to the views of Averroes and Aquinas since 
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soul which receives intelligibles—was a part of the body or a faculty of a body its 
corporeality would interfere with the nature of the intelligibles as universal and 
indivisible. But if they were received in some divisible thing then the intelligibles would 
likewise be divided with the body they adhere in.179 This dualism is emphasized by Jari 
Kaukua in his dissertation “Avicenna on Subjectivity : A Philosophical Study.” Kaukua 
calls Avicenna “one of the most full-blown dualists in the history of western 
philosophy”180 for his strong assertions that the human soul or intellect is independent 
from the human body. Despite asserting this independence Avicenna, according to 
Kaukua, does claim the body and soul maintain a strong and necessary connection with 
one another. The body needs the soul to live and the soul needs the body to ‘come to be.’ 
The first part of this statement seems fairly unremarkable and follows Aristotle. However, 
the second claim--that the individual soul’s existence relies on or requires the body--is 
not Aristotelian, as such. Kaukua explains that the individual soul comes to be, emanating 
from the active intellect, whenever a suitable body comes to be from the human 
reproductive process.181 This view of the soul and body relationship makes sense given 
Avicenna’s view that the human being is a rational soul which uses a body as a tool. 
they make different claims about the soul’s being both a subsistent form and the form of the body or “form 
for us,” as Averroes says.
Selections from this work are found in three sources since the work is available in English, Latin and 
Arabic. English is from “Selections on Psychology from The Cure, ‘The Soul,’” in Classical Arabic 
Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources, edited and translated by John McGinnis and David C. Reisman, 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2007). Latin is from Avicenna Latinus: Liber De Anima 
Seu Sextus De Naturalibus, edited and translated by Simone Van Riet, ed.. 2 volumes. (Louvain-Leiden: E. 
Peeters-E.J. Brill. 1968-1972). Arabic is from Avicenna’s De Anima, Being the Psychological Part of the 
Kitāb Al-Shifā, edited by F. Rahman, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). When referencing the text I 
will provide Book and Chapter as well as the page numbers where the selection can be found for each 
edition.
179 Avicenna, V.2, McGinnis, pp. 189-190; Van Riet, Vol. 2, pp. 84-88 (Vol2); Rahman, pp.211-213.
180 Jari Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity : A Philosophical Study (Jyvaskyla: University of Jyvaskyla, 
2007), p. 19.
181 Ibid., p. 20. Kaukua quotes Avicenna’s claim from Najat De. an. that “the soul comes into existence 
whenever a body does so fit to be used by it.”
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Thus, it would not make sense for the will (or any human faculty) to be located outside of 
the soul; as we will see, Aquinas is close to Avicenna in this regard, arguing that the will 
must be located in the rational soul, not in the body.
The soul, then, is in a kind of middle position; it requires a suitable body to come 
into being (although it is not caused by that body) and it maintains an intimate connection 
with that body; it comes to be from the active intellect and so it also maintains a 
connection to the active intellect.182 The connection of the soul to both the body and the 
active intellect is demonstrated in the knowledge attainment process in which the 
sensitive faculties rely on the body and the intellectual faculties rely on the active 
intellect.183 While we use sensation and the lower faculties in our attainment of 
intelligibles, they are the result of the intellectual faculty’s ability to abstract away from 
particularities such as “delimited quantity, place, [and] position.” Once this abstraction 
has happened, the form exists only as a concept in the intellect; as a concept, rather than 
an external thing, it cannot have bodily characteristics, such as divisibility, and “so it 
cannot be in a body.”184
182 Ibid., pp. 20-24. 
183 Ibid., pp. 24-26. A more detailed account of this process is forthcoming.
184 Avicenna, V.2, McGinnis, p. 191. “Quod possumus etiam probare alia demonstratione, dicentes quod 
virtus intellectiva abatrahit inteIligibilia a quantitate designata et ab ubi et a situ et a ceteris omnibus quae 
praediximus. Debemus autem considerare essentiam huius formae denudatae a situ, quomodo est nuda ab 
eo, scilicet si hoc ait comparatione rei a qua sumpta est, aut comparatione eius rei quae assumpsit, videlicet, 
esse huius formae intellectae denudatae a situ, si est ita in esse extrinseco aut est ita in esse formantis in 
substantia agenti. Impossibile est autem dici quod habeat esse sic in esse extrinseco: restat ergo dici non 
esse separatam a situ et ubi, nisi cum habet esse in intellectu; et quod, cum habet esse in intellectu, non est 
habens situm nec potest innui nec separatim ostendi nec dividitur nec habet aliquid eorum quae sunt 
huiusmodi: ergo impossibile est eam esse in corpore.” (Van Riet, Vol. 2, p. 89)
< وﻟﻨﺎ أن ﻧﺒﺮھﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ ھﺬا ﺑﺒﺮھﺎن آﺧﺮ، ﻓﻨﻘﻮل إن اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻌﻘﻠﯿﺔ ھﻮ ذا ﯾﺠﺮد اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﻋﻦ اﻟّﻜﻢ اﻟﻤﺤﺪود واﻷﯾﻦ واﻟﻮﺿﻊ وﺳﺎﺋﺮ ﻣﺎ ﻗﯿﻞ ﻣﻦ  
ﻗﺒﻞ، ﻓﯿﺠﺐ أن ﻧﻨﻈﺮ ﻓﻲ ذات ھﺬه اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻤﺠﺮدة ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ﻛﯿﻒ ھﻰ ﻣﺠﺮدة ھﻨﮫ أﺑﺎﻟﻘﯿﺎس إﻟﻰ اﻟﺸﺊ اﻟﻤﺄﺧﻮذ ﻋﻨﮫ أو ﺑﺎﻟﻘﯿﺎس إﻟﻰ اﻟﺸﺊ  
اﻵﺧﺬ، أﻋﻨﻰ أن وﺟﻮد ھﺬه اﻟﺤﻘﯿﻘﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺠﺮدة ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ھﻞ ھﻮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻰ أو ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻤﺘﺴﻮر ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻮھﺮ اﻟﻌﺎﻗﻞ،  
وﻣﺤﺎل أن ﻧﻘﻮل إﻧﮭﻞ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻰ، ﻓﺒﻘﻰ أن ﻧﻘﻮل إﻧﮭﺎ إﻧﻤﺎ ھﻲ ﻣﻔﺮﻗﺔ ﻟﻠﻮﺿﻊ واﻷﯾﻦ ﻋﻨﺪ وﺟﻮدھﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ، ﻓﺈذا وﺟﺪت ﻓﻲ  
اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻟﻢ ﺗﻜﻦ ذات وﺿﻊ وﺑﺤﯿﺚ ﯾﻘﻊ إﻟﯿﮭﺎ إﺷﺎرة ﺗﺠﺰؤ واﻧﻘﺴﺎم أو ﺷﺊ ﻣﻤﺎ أﺷﺒﮫ ھﺬا اﻟﻤﻌﻨﻰ، ﻓﻼ ﯾﻤﻜﻦ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻓﻲ ﺟﺴﻢ ،>(Rahman, p. 
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While the intellectual faculties are not bodily, that is not to say that they are 
completely unassociated with the lower faculties. Indeed, the theoretical intellect makes 
use of the practical intellect and the lower faculties which inform its activity. It is the 
estimative faculty which abstracts the connotational attributes from the particulars stored 
in the imagery (and resulting from sensation), allowing the knower to gain knowledge of 
universals from particulars. Furthermore, the soul makes use of experience and 
particulars when it does the work of separating and combining various principles. It also 
uses the lower faculties, such as the imagery, when there is a need to form images of 
things to be considered, goals or activities to be performed, etc.185 Thus, there are many 
instances where the intellect makes use of the lower faculties to further its work of 
conceptualization of universal, intelligible forms. However, Avicenna also notes that once 
the soul reaches a certain level of perfection the lower faculties become unnecessary and 
it is able to carry out its activities on its own.186 This process is important to the moral 
agency of the human being insofar as knowledge is necessary for correct moral action 
and insofar as part of the perfection going on is a moral perfection through cultivation of 
the body and the sensitive faculties, such as estimation.187
214) 
185 Avicenna, V.3, McGinnis, pp.192-193; Van Riet, Vol. 2, pp. 102-103; Rahman, p. 222.
186 Avicenna, V.3, McGinnis, p. 193; Van Riet, Vol. 2, p. 105; Rahman, p. 223.
187 Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity : A Philosophical Study, pp. 24-26. Kaukua writes that “proper 
functioning of the capacity of agency amounts to a good governance over the body, or more precisely a 
cultivation of the body, which at first is simply a rather refined animal organism, to a specifically human 
body. This entails the perfection of bodily dispositions in both moral and cognitive terms [...] The 
fulfillment of the capacity of cognition or contemplation amounts to the immaterial human intellect’s 
becoming informed by the immaterial intelligible forms” (p. 24). While this passage highlights the ultimate 
importance of the intellect--indeed Kaukua goes on to note that the acquired intellect is the ultimate 
perfection of man and that both the body and the soul work towards this end until the body becomes a 
hinderance rather than a help (p. 25; 26)—it also hints at the importance of morality and cultivating a 
morally responsible self. The development and cultivation of a moral self, a mostly bodily task, is a 
necessary step towards human perfection. As such, it is important for us to uncover exactly what such 
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While there are a number of lower faculties shared by humans and animals 
(sensation, the common sense, the imagery, the imaginative/cogitative faculty, the 
estimative faculty, and memory), the human being also has faculties which are specific to 
it and which are necessary if the human being is to carry out his/her unique action, which 
is “to conceptualize the universal connotational attributes (ma’na) belonging to the 
intellect that are abstracted completely of all matter [...] to arrive at knowledge of things 
that are unknown by assenting to them when conceptualizing things that are known to the 
intellect.”188 These uniquely human faculties are the practical and theoretical intellects. 
The theoretical intellect is responsible for determining truth and falsehood189 and 
for attaining the universal forms which guide the practical intellect in its work.190 It 
receives these universal, immaterial forms either directly, if they are already immaterial, 
or through abstraction from matter. The theoretical faculty is called “intellect” in a variety 
of ways depending upon the relationship it has to the forms it is to know.191
moral cultivation looks like and how it relates to both the more bodily functions and the more 
contemplative or intellectual.
188 Avicenna, V.1. McGinnis,186.“Quae autem est magis propria ex proprietatibus hominis, haec est 
scilicet formare intentiones universales intelligibiles omnino abstractas a materia, sicut iam declaravimus, 
et procedere ad sciendum incognita ex cognitis intelligibilibus credendo et formando. Haec autem actiones 
et dispositiones praedictae sunt ex his quae sunt hominis, sed plures ex illis sunt propriae hominis; quamvis 
illarum quaedam sint corporales, sed habent esse in corpore hominis causa animae humanae, quam non 
habent cetera animalia.” (Van Riet Vol. 2, p. 76). 
< وأﺧﺺ اﻟﺨﻮاص ﺑﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﻰ اﻟﻜﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﻘﺎﯾﺔ ااﻟﻤﺠﺮدة ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﺎدة ﻛﻞ اﻟﺘﺠﺮﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺣﻜﯿﻨﺎه وﺑﯿﻨﺎه، واﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ إﻟﻰ ﻣﻌﻮﻗﺔ  
اﻟﻤﺠﮭﻮﻻت ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻘﺎ وﺗﺼﻮرا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻌﻘﺎﯾﺔ، ﻓﮭﺬه اﻷﻓﻌﺎل واﻷﺣﻮال اﻟﻤﺬﻛﻮرة ھﻲ ﻣﻤﺎ ﯾﻮﺟﺪ ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن، وﺟﻠﮭﺎ ﯾﺨﺘﺺ ﺑﮫ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن، وإن  
ﻛﺎن ﺑﻌﻀﮭﺎ ﺑﺪﻧﯿﺎ وﻟﻜﻨﮫ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﺒﺪن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﺘﻰ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻨﻰ اﯾﺴﺖ ﻟﺴﺎﺋﺮ اﻟﺤﯿﻮان ،>(Rahman, p. 206) 
189 Avicenna, V.1, McGinnis, p. 87; Van Riet, Vol. 2, p. 77; Rahman, p, 207.
190 Avicenna, I.5, McGinnis, p. 184. “Sed virtus cotemplativa est virtus quae solet informari a forma 
universali nuda a materia” (Van Riet, Vol. 1, p 94). < وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ﻓﮭﻰ ﻗﻮة ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄﻧﮭﺎ أن ﺗﻨﻄﺒﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻜﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺠﺮدة  
ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﺎدة ،> (Rahman, p. 48). In V.1 (McGinnis, pp.186-187; Van Riet, Vol. 2, 78; Rahman, p. 207) Avicenna 
notes that the theoretical intellect is concerned with premises of deductive reasoning and with scientific 
investigation.
191 A discussion of stages of intellection and the various intellectual faculties can be found in Avicenna, 
I.5, McGinnis, p. 184-186;Van Riet, Vol. 1, pp. 96-102; Rahman, pp. 49-52. Also, Avicenna, V.1 
(McGinnis, pp. 187-188;Van Riet, ) offers an extremely concise account of these various stages of intellect 
which corresponds to the earlier more detailed account. Also see Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity: A 
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The practical intellect is responsible for moving the body “to perform particular 
actions determined by reflecting on what is required by customary opinions specific to 
[those actions].”192 It is related to action and to determining the “good and evil in 
particular things.”193 It relates to the appetitive,194 imaginative/cogitative, and estimative 
powers as well as acting in a purely intellectual way. As it relates to the appetitive power 
the practical intellect is what creates in the human being feelings of shame, pride, 
happiness, sadness, etc. which spur him/her to act in a certain way. It determines “what is 
right, wrong, and permissible.”195
The practical intellect joins with the imaginative and estimative powers of the 
soul in order to find ways to handle the trials of the natural world and bend it to human 
needs. When the practical intellect is related to itself (or to the theoretical faculty) it gives 
Philosophical Study, p. 34 where he lists and briefly describes these intellectual faculties.
192 Avicenna, I.5, McGinnis, p. 183. “Vis autem activa est vis quae est principium movens corpus hominis 
ad actiones singulas quae sunt propriae cogitationis, secundum quod intentionibus convenit ad placitum 
quae appropriantur ei.” (Van Riet, Vol. 1, p. 90)
>ﻓﺎﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ھﻰ ﻣﺒﺪأ ﻣﺤﺮك ﻟﺒﺪن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن إﻟﻰ اﻷﻓﺎﻋﯿﻞ اﻟﺠﺰﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﺨﺎﺿﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺮوﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻘﺘﻀﻰ آراء ﺗﺨﺼﮭﺎ اﺻﻄﻼﺣﯿﺔ،< )Rahman, p. 45(
 Avicenna, V.1 also points towards the practical intellects use of “commonly held premises, commonly 
accepted premises, premises based on assumptions” and experience (as opposed to universal knowledge or 
scientific principles) and contrasts this with the more universal character of the theoretical intellect 
(McGinnis, pp. 186-18).
“Ergo prima virtus humanae animae est virtus quae comparatur contemplationi et vocatur intellectus 
contemplativus, qui est iudex veri et falsi de universalibus; haec autem virtus activa est de bono et malo in 
particularibus; ille est iudex de necessario et possibili et impossibi; haec autem activa de honesto et 
inhonesto et licito. Principia autem contemplativi sunt ex propositionibus per se notis; principia vero activi 
sunt ex probabilibus et ex auctoritatibus et ex famosis; experimenta autem debilia quae sunt ex opinionibus 
sunt aliud ab experimentis certis” (Van Riet, Vol 2, pp. 78-79)
< ﻓﺎﻟﻘﻮة اﻷوﻟﻰ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻗﻮة ﺗﻨﺴﺐ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻓﯿﻘﺎل ﻋﻘﻞ ﻧﻈﺮى، وھﺬه اﻟﺸﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻗﻮة ﺗﻨﺴﺐ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻓﯿﻘﺎل ﻋﻘﻞ ﻋﻤﻠﻰ، وﺗﻠﻚ ﻟﻠﺼﺪق  
واﻟﻜﺬب وھﺬه ﻟﻠﺨﯿﺮ واﻟﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺰﺋﯿﺎت ، وﺗﻠﻚ ﻟﻠﻮاﺟﺐ واﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ واﻟﻤﻤﺘﻨﻊ، وھﺬه ﻟﻠﻘﺒﯿﺢ واﻟﺠﻤﯿﻞ واﻟﻤﺒﺎح، و ﻣﺒﺎدى ﺗﻠﻚ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﺎت اﻷوﻟﯿﺔ  
وﻣﺒﺎدى ھﺬه ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺸﮭﻮرات واﻟﻤﻘﺒﻮﻻت واﻟﻤﻈﺒﻮﺑﺎت وﻻﺗﺠﺮﺑﯿﺎت اﻟﻮاھﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻈﻨﻮﻧﺎت ﻏﯿﺮ اﻟﺘﺠﺮﺑﯿﺎت اﻟﻮﺛﯿﻘﺔ، وﻟﻜﻞ واﺣﺪة ﻣﻦ  
ھﺎﺗﯿﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﺗﯿﻦ رأى وظﻦ ،> (Rahman, p. 207) 
193 Avicenna, V.1. McGinnis, p. 187; Van Riet, vol 2, p. 78; Rahman, p, 207.
194 Avicenna says that the appetitive faculty is the faculty which causes motion. It is broken down into two 
subcategories-- appetitive and irascible. The appetitive faculty prompts an animal to draw close to things 
that it considers (through imagination or estimation, not any intellectual thought process) desirable; the 
irascible power spurs the animal to flee from that which it deems harmful. I.5, McGinnis, p.180; Van Riet, 
Vol. 1, pp. 82-83, Rahman, p. 41.
195 Avicenna, V.1, McGinnis, p. 187; Van Riet, Vol. 2, p. 78; Rahman, p. 207.
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rise to commonly held moral opinions, such as the opinion that lying is bad.196 
Furthermore, it is the practical intellect which is responsible for our moral decisions and 
actions. It uses the universal knowledge resulting from its relationship with the 
theoretical intellect, as well as the knowledge it gains from its relation to the particular 
world through the lower faculties to allow the human being to reflect “on particular 
things with regard to what he should do, what he should avoid, what is beneficial and 
harmful, what is right and wrong, and what is good and evil.”197
196 Avicenna, I.5, McGinnis, p. 183. “Respectus autem quem habet comparatione sui ad se est modus qui 
generat in ea actionem et intellectum contemplantem, et hae sunt intentiones quae pendent ex actionibus et 
divulgantur famose, sicut hoc quod mentiri turpe est et iniuriare turpe est, non quasi probata et quicquid 
simile est huic de propsitionibus quarum differentia a per se notis primis scilicet intelligibilibus definita est 
in libris logicis, quamvis cum probatae fuerint, fient etiam per se notae, sicut iam didicisti in eisdem 
libris” (Van Riet, Vol. 1, pp. 91-92).
< واﻋﺘﺒﺎرھﺎ اﻟﺬى ﺑﺤﺴﺐ اﻟﻘﯿﺎس إﻟﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﮭﺎ ھﻮ اﻟﻘﺒﯿﻞ اﻟﺬى ﺗﺘﻮﻟﺪ ﻗﯿﮫ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻰ واﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮى اﻵراء اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻷﻋﻤﺎل وﺗﺴﺘﻔﯿﺾ  
ذاﺋﻌﺔ ﻣﺸﮭﻮرة ﻣﺜﻞ أن اﻟﻜﺬب ﻗﺒﯿﺢ واﻟﻈﻠﻢ ﻗﺒﯿﺢ ﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺒﯿﻞ اﻟﺘﺒﺮھﻦ وﻣﺎ أﺷﺒﮫ ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺤﺪوردة اﻻﻧﻔﺼﺎل ﻋﻦ اﻷوﻟﯿﺎت اﻟﻌﻘﻠﯿﺔ  
اﻟﻤﺤﻀﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛﺘﺐ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻖ وإن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ إذا ﺑﺮھﻦ ﻋﻠﯿﮭﺎ ﺻﺎرت ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻠﯿﺔ أﯾﻀﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻛﺘﺐ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻖ ،> (Rahman, p. 46)
197 Avicenna, V.1, McGinnis, p. 186.Van Riet, Vol. 2, pp. 77-78. “Homo ergo habet virtutem quae propria 
est conceptionum universalium et aliam quae propriaest ad cogitandum de rebus singularibus, de eo quod 
debet fieri et dimitti et quod prodest et obest et quod est honestum et inhonestum et quodest bonum et 
malum. Et hoc fit ad modum syllogismi aut considerationis verae aut falsae, cuius finis est dare sententiam 
de re particuari futura ex rebus possibilibus: de necessariis etenim et impossibilibus non cogitant an habeant 
esse an non; de praeterito etiam non cogitant an habeat esse quia est praeteritum. Et cum haec virtus 
iudicaverit, sequetur eius iudicium motus virtutum desiderativarum ad movendum corpus, sicut sequeretur 
illud iudicia aliarum virtutum in animalibus, et haec virtus transsumit ex virtute iudicante de universalibus: 
inde enim transsumit maximus propositiones ad id quod cogitat et concludit de particularibus” (Van Riet, 
Vol. 2, pp. 77-78).
 ﻓﻜﻮن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن إذن ﻗﻮة ﺗﺨﻨﺺ ﺑﺎﻵراء اﻟﻜﺎﯾﺔ وﻗﻮة أﺧﺮى ﺗﺨﺘﺺ ﺑﺎﻟﺮوﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﺠﺰﺋﯿﺔ ﻓﯿﻤﺎ ﯾﻨﺒﻐﻰ أن ﯾﻔﻌﻞ وﯾﺘﺮك ﻣﻤﺎ ﯾﻨﻔﻊ وﯾﻀّﺮ  
وﺳﻤﺎ ھﻮ ﺟﻤﯿﻞ وﻗﺒﯿﺢ وﺧﯿﺮ وﺷﺮ، و ﯾﻜﻮن ذﻟﻚ ﺑﻀﺮب ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﯿﺎس واﻟﺘﺄﻣﻞ ﺻﺤﯿﺢ أو ﺳﻘﯿﻢ ﻏﺎﯾﺘﮫ أﻧﮫ ﻧﻮﻗﻊ رأﯾﺎ ﻓﻲ أﻣﺮ ﺟﺰﺋﻰ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﻣﻦ  
اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﻤﻤﻜﻨﺔ ﻷن اﻟﻮاﺟﺒﺎت أو اﻟﻤﻤﺘﻨﻌﺎت ﻻ ﯾﺮوى ﻓﯿﮭﺎ ﻟﺘﻮﺟﺪ أو ﺗﻌﺪم، وﻣﺎ ﻣﻀﻰ أﯾﻀﺎ ﻻ ﯾﺮوى ﻓﻲ إﯾﺠﺎده ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﮫ ﻣﺎض، ﻓﺈذا ﺣﻜﻤﺖ ھﺬه  
اﻟﻘﻮة ﺗﺒﻊ ﺣﻜﻤﮭﺎ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻹﺟﻤﺎﻋﯿﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﻚ اﻟﺒﺪن ﻛﻤﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﺘﺒﻊ أﺣﻜﺎم ﻗﻮى أﺧﺮى ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﯿﻮاﻧﺎت، وﺗﻜﻮن ھﺬه اﻟﻘﻮة اﺳﺘﻤﺪادھﺎ ﻣﻦ  
اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺘﻰ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻜﻠﯿﺎت، ﻓﻤﻦ ھﻨﺎك ﺗﺄﺧﺬ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﺒﺮى ﻓﯿﻤﺎ ﺗﺮوى وﺗﻨﺘﺞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺰﺋﯿﺎت  (Rahman, p. 207).
  It is worth noting here that this statement seems to cover all the elements of what one may consider when 
deciding upon the moral worth and appropriateness of an action--whether it is right, whether it is good, 
what its relationship is to relevant universal concepts. Avicenna goes on to say that these deliberations are 
made through syllogistic reasoning and that this kind of reasoning--and by extension the use of the practical 
intellect in general--only applies to “future particular contingent[s]” (i.e. to things which could be 
otherwise, or things which the human being has some control over) since we cannot deliberate about what 
is inevitable or impossible, or what has already come to pass. Once one has arrived at a decision regarding 
an action the “faculty of resolve” sets the body in motion so that the actions required can be carried out. 
Avicenna notes that this faculty of resolve “extends out of the faculty for the universal” Thus, this account 
seems to provide a basic and as yet undeveloped account of moral reasoning from knowledge of particulars 
through deliberation and choice (with the help of universal concepts) and on to action which is similar to 
what Aristotle describes in the third books of both the De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics. 
  Furthermore, the practical intellect seems to be connected to what Kaukua terms the “capacity of 
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From these various functions of the practical intellect we can see that it is the 
element of the human being that is responsible for the use of human emotion, industry, 
advancement, and most importantly for our purposes, morality. Indeed Avicenna says that 
if we are to achieve moral excellence the practical intellect must rule over the other 
faculties while itself being under the guidance of the theoretical faculty.198 If the soul is 
agency” (Avicenna on Subjectivity: A Philosophical Study, p. 24). This capacity is responsible for proper 
governing and perfection of the body in such a way as to make bodily dispositions useful to the humans 
moral and cognitive success. Even the reference to agency in the name assigned to this capacity leads one 
to think about the issues of moral agency and responsibility which are central to this dissertation. While I 
do not think Kaukua’s “capacity of agency” is meant to be equated with the practical intellect--indeed 
Kaukua’s dissertation is focused on the faculties of the soul (especially those concerned with knowledge) 
and their relationship to self-awareness and subjectivity in broad terms--I think that it does at least hint at 
the practical, moral, elements of human thought which Avicenna explains using the practical intellect.
198 He says the practical intellect should not be “affected by [the other faculties] but rather they by it [...] 
so that they are kept in check below it” (Avicenna, I.5, McGinnis, p. 183). “Opertet autem ut haec virtus 
imperet ceteris vitutibus corporis, sicut opertet pro iudicio alterius virtutis quam postea nominabimus, ita ut 
haec non patiatur ab illis ullo modo, sed ipsae patiantur ab ea et sint omnino substratae sub ea, ne forte 
contingant in ea affectiones post se trahentes eam , provenientes ex rebus naturalibus, quae vocantur 
perversi mores, quia opertet ut ipsa non sit passibilis ullo modo nec tractabilis, sed imperans, et tunc habet 
mores optimos.
Possibile est autem ut mores comparentur viribus etiam corporalibus; sed cum illa fuerit 
dominans, habebit affectionem efficientem, et ex intellectu habebit affectionem patientem; nominemus 
autem omnem affectionem morem; erit igitur unum propter quod contingunt mores in hoc, et in illud 
contingunt mores propter hoc aliud; si autem ipsa fuerit victa, habebit affectionem passibilem et similiter 
affectionem activam non extraneam; quae etiam erunt duae actiones et duo mores, et mos quidem erit unus, 
sed habebit duas comparationes. Mores autem qui in nobis sunt non comparantur huic virtuti nisi quia 
anima humana, sicut postea scies, est una substantia, habens compoarationem ad duo, quorum unum est 
supra eam et alterum infra eam, sed secundum unumquodque istorum habet virtutem per quam ordinatur 
habitus qui est inter ipsam et illud. Haec autem virtus activa est illa virtus quam habet anima propter 
debitum quod debet ei quod est infra eam, scilicet corpus, ad regendum illud; sed virtus contemplativa est 
illa virtus quam habet anima propter debitum quod debet ei quod est supra eam, ut patiatur ab eo et 
proficiat per illud et recipiat ex illo; tamquam anima nostra habeat duas facies, faciem scilicet deorsum ad 
corpus, quam oportet nullatenus recipere aliquam affectionem generis debiti naturae corporis, et aliam 
faciem sursum, versus principia altissima, quam oportet semper recipere aliquid ab eo quod est illic et affici 
ab illo. Ex eo autem quod est infra eam, generantur mores, sed ex eo quod est supera eam, generantur 
sapientiae; et haec est virtus activa” Van Riet, Vol. 1, pp. 92-94).
< وھﺬه اﻟﻘﻮة ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﺗﺘﺴﻠﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ ﻗﻮى اﻟﺒﺪن ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺴﺐ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﺒﮫ أﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﻘﻮة اﻷﺧﺮى اﻟﺘﻰ ﻧﺬﻛﺮھﺎ ﺣﺘﻰ ﻻ ﺗﻨﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻨﮭﺎ أﻟﺒﺘﺔ ﺑﻞ ﺗﻨﻔﻌﻞ  
ﺗﻠﻚ ﻋﻨﮭﺎ و ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﻘﻤﻮﻋﺔ دوﻧﮭﺎ ﻟﺌﻼ ﺗﺤﺪث ﻓﯿﮭﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺒﺪن ھﯿﺌﺂت اﻧﻘﯿﺎدﯾﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺎدة ﻣﻦ اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺔ وھﻰ اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺴﻤﻰ أﺧﻼﻗﺎ رذﯾﻠﯿﺔ، ﺑﻞ  
ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻠﺔ أﻟﺒﺘﺔ وﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻨﻘﺎدة ﺑﻞ ﻣﺘﺴﻠﻄﺔ ﻓﺘﻜﻮن ﻟﮭﺎ أﺧﻼق ﻓﻀﯿﻠﯿﺔ وﻗﺪ ﯾﺠﻮز أن ﺗﻨﺴﺐ اﻷﺧﻼق إﻟﻰ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺒﺪﻧﯿﺔ أﯾﻀﺎ، وﻟﻜﻦ  
إن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ھﻰ اﻟﻐﺎﻟﺒﺔ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻟﮭﺎ ھﯿﺌﺔ ﻓﻌﻠﯿﺔ وﻟﮭﺬا اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﻨﻔﻌﺎﻟﯿﺔ، وﻟﺘﺴﻢ ﻛﻞ ھﯿﺌﺔ ﺧﻠﻘﺎ، ﻓﯿﻜﻮن ﺷﺊ واﺣﺪ ﯾﺤﺪث ﻣﻨﮫ ﺧﻠﻖ ﻓﻲ ھﺬا وﺧﻠﻖ ﻓﻲ  
ذﻟﻚ، وإن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ھﻲ اﻟﻤﻐﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻟﮭﺎ ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻧﻔﻌﺎﻟﯿﺔ وﻟﺬﻟﻚ ھﯿﺌﺔ ﻓﻌﻠﯿﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻏﯿﺒﺔ، ﻓﯿﻜﻮن ذﻟﻚ أﯾﻀﺎ ھﯿﺌﺘﯿﻦ وﺧﻠﻘﯿﻦ، أو ﯾﻜﻮن اﻟﺨﻠﻖ واﺣﺪا ﻟﮫ  
ﻧﺴﺒﺘﺎن، وإﻧﮭﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻷﺧﻼق اﻟﺘﻰ ﻓﯿﻨﺎ ﻣﻨﺴﻮﺑﺔ إﻟﻰ ھﺬه اﻟﻘﻮة ﻷن اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﯾﻈﮭﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺟﻮھﺮ واﺣﺪ وﻟﮫ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ وﻗﯿﺎس إﻟﻰ ﺟﻨﺒﺘﯿﻦ،  
ﺟﻨﺒﺔ ھﻰ ﺗﺤﺘﮫ وﺟﻨﺒﮫ ھﻰ ﻓﻮﻗﮫ، وﻟﮫ ﺑﺤﺴﺐ ﻛﻞ ﺟﻨﺒﮫ ﻗﻮة ﺑﮭﺎ ﺗﻨﺘﻈﻢ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﯿﻨﮫ وﺑﯿﻦ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﺠﻨﺒﺔ ﻓﮭﺬه اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ ھﻰ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺘﻰ ﻟﮫ ﻷﺟﻞ  
اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺘﻰ اﻟﻰ اﻟﺠﻨﺒﺔ اﻟﺘﻰ دوﻧﮫ وھﻮ اﻟﺒﺪن وﺳﯿﺎﺳﺘﮫ وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ﻓﮭﻰ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺘﻰ ﻟﮫ ﻷﺟﻞ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺠﻨﺒﺔ اﻟﺘﻰ ﻓﻮﻗﮫ ﻟﯿﻨﻔﻌﻞ وﯾﺴﺘﻔﯿﺪ  
ﻣﻨﮭﺎ وﯾﻘﺒﻞ ﻋﻨﮭﺎ، ﻓﻜﺄن ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﻣﻨﺎ وﺟﮭﯿﻦ، وﺟﮫ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺒﺪن وﯾﺠﺐ أن ﯾﻜﻮن ھﺬا اﻟﻮﺟﮫ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ أﻟﺒﺘﺔ أﺛﺮا ﻣﻦ ﺟﻨﺲ ﻣﻘﺘﻀﻰ طﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﻟﺒﺪن،  
ووﺟﮫ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﻨﺎدى اﻟﻌﺎﻟﯿﺔ وﯾﺠﺐ أن ﯾﻜﻮن ھﺬا اﻟﻮﺟﮫ داﺋﻢ اﻟﻘﺒﻮل ﻋﻤﻞ ھﻨﺎك واﻟﺘﺄﺛﺮھﻨﮫ، ﻓﻤﻦ اﻟﺠﮭﺔ اﻟﺴﻔﻠﯿﺔ ﺗﺘﻮﻟﺪ اﻷﺧﻼق وﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﮭﺔ اﻟﻔﻮﻗﺎﻧﯿﺔ  
ﺗﺘﻮﻟﺪ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم، ﻓﮭﺬه ھﻰ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻌﻠﯿﺔ ،> (Rahman, pp. 46-47)
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not properly ordered in this way one will fall into vice since the various faculties will act 
without intellectual guidance. But, if the practical intellect is in control it will be able, 
with the help of the theoretical intellect, to act upon the other faculties and direct the 
moral temperament of the individual towards moral excellence. The practical intellect 
needs the body and the lower faculties199 but it cannot be ruled by them. Avicenna notes 
that the practical intellect must be guided by the theoretical intellect. It serves as a kind of 
middle man of the soul whereby it is connected to the bodily faculties below it and the 
theoretical faculty above it, providing a link between the bodily and the purely 
intellectual.200 Indeed Avicenna notes that the “the connection with the body is for the 
sake of perfecting, purifying, and cleansing the theoretical intellect, and the practical 
intellect manages that connection.”201 The soul uses the body to perform external actions 
and to start the knowledge attainment process (since the lower faculties make use of the 
body) but these actions are not its ultimate goal.
199 Avicenna, V.1, McGinnis, p. 187; Van Riet, Vol. 2, p. 80; Rahman, p. 208.
200 Avicenna, I.5 McGinnis, p. 183; Van Riet, Vol. 1, pp. 92-94; Rahman, pp. 46-47.
201 Avicenna, I.5, McGinnis, 185. “Deinde intellectus efficiens deservit his omnibus: obligatio enim 
animae cum corpore, sicut postea adhuc declaribitur, est propter hoc ut perficiatur intellectus 
comtemplativus et santificetur et mundetur; intellectus autem efficiens est rector illius colligationis animae 
cum corpore” (Van Riet, Vol. 1, pp. 99-100).
>ﺛﻢ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻰ ﯾﺨﺪم ﺟﻤﯿﻊ ھﺬا ﻷن اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺒﺪﻧﯿﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﯿﺘﻀﺢ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻷﺟﻞ ﺗﻜﻤﯿﻞ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮى وﺗﺰ ﻛﯿﺘﮫ وﺗﻄﮭﯿﺮه،< )Rahman, p. 50(.
This alludes to the fact, noted later (McGinnis, 187; Van Riet, 80 vol2)) that the theoretical 
intellect uses the body and the lower faculties for some things (presumably because the knowledge 
attainment process begins with sensation and makes use of all the faculties mentioned thus far) but that it 
can also be self-sufficient. “Intellectus vero activus eget corpore et virtutibus corporalibus ad omnes 
actiones suas; contemplativus autem intellectus eget corpore et virtutibus eius sed nec semper nec omni 
modo; sufficit enim ipse sibi per seipsum” (Van Riet, Vol. 2, p. 80)
>واﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻰ ﯾﺤﺘﺎج ﻓﻲ أﻓﻌﺎﻟﮫ ﻛﻠﮭﺎ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺒﺪن وإى اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺒﺪﻧﯿﺔ، وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮى ﻓﺈن ﻟﮫ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﻣﺎ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺒﺪن وإﻟﻰ ﻗﻮاه ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ داﺋﻤﺎ وﻣﻦ 
ﻛﻞ وﺟﮫ ﺑﻞ ﻗﺪ ﯾﺴﺘﻔﻨﻰ ﺑﺬاﺗﮫ،< )Rahman, p. 208(
This view of the relationship between the practical and theoretical intellects can be seen in 
Kaukua’s discussion of the “capacity of agency” and the “capacity of cognition.” As mentioned above the 
“capacity of agency” is responsible for the proper cultivation of the body such that it can assist in the 
cogitative process. The “capacity of cognition or contemplation” is the actual intellectual ability of the 
human being; this includes the reception of the immaterial intelligible forms but the human intellect and the 
creation of the acquired intellect. This activity represents, for Avicenna, the perfection of the human being. 
(Avicenna on Subjectivity : A Philosophical Study, p. 24-25)
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From what has been said here, particularly about the practical intellect, a picture 
of moral responsibility begins to emerge. Avicenna explains that the practical intellect is 
the faculty which deals with action, including moral action. He also explains that it relies 
upon the theoretical intellect for knowledge (of universals) that is necessary in making an 
assessment of what is to be done in a practical situation. This sounds very much like what 
Aristotle explains through the use of the practical syllogism. Universal knowledge forms 
the first premise of the syllogism and is necessary for a proper assessment of 
circumstances. However, it is the second premise, the one dealing with the particular, 
practical information at hand, which spurs one to action. Similarly, Avicenna explains that 
theoretical knowledge is necessary and is taken into account by the practical intellect; 
however, this knowledge is used not on its own but as an aid in assessing a particular 
circumstance and it is the particular, practical matters at hand which spur one to act in a 
certain way.
In addition to what has been said about about how intellect and practical reason is 
involved in moral decision making something can and should be said about the will. As 
mentioned, Avicenna does not devote much time to the will itself (perhaps reflecting a 
shift in focus between the Greek tradition and the Arabic tradition); however, he does 
offer some discussion of it in the “irādah” of the Ta’aliqat, within the context of a 
discussion of the will of the Necessary Existent.
Ruffus points out that Avicenna contrasts human volition to divine volition by 
claiming that human beings normally will things only “for the sake of some appetite or 
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pleasure” and not for some notion of the good. Even when there is something higher that 
the human will is directed towards it is the concept of the material or sensible object of 
desire and not the good.202 This concept may have attached to it the idea that the thing is 
“excellent or beneficial” and thus has some good attached to it, although it is not intrinsic 
to it.203 This leads Avicenna to claim that human will can be from imagination, opinion, or 
knowing something is desirable, because these forms of volition are focused upon a 
desired end.”204 Eventually Avicenna explains that a human being can will based on 
causal knowledge when the concept one has a of a thing includes the knowledge that it is 
good in itself.205 
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has traced the concepts of will/wish and decision/choice from 
Aristotle through the Arabic language and Christian traditions in an effort to lay the 
groundwork necessary for a fruitful discussion of the positions of Averroes and Aquinas 
in the chapters to come. We will see that both Averroes and Aquinas take for granted that 
Aristotle has developed concepts of will and choice. It was demonstrated early in this 
chapter that Aristotle does not, in fact, have these concepts; he has some notions if 
wishing, deliberation, and deciding but he does not equate any of these with a particular 
faculty of will. This discrepancy made it important to see when the concept of the will as 
a particular faculty was divided and how it came to be associated with Aristotle.
202 This makes human volition different from the volition of the Necessary Existent, which only wills for 
the sake of some “essential good.” Anthony Ruffus, Explaining Volition in the Ta’aliqat: Avicenna’s View of 
Free Will. Thesis completed May 2011, p. 18.
203 Ruffus, p. 19.
204 Ibid., p. 19.
205 Ibid., p. 19.
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First, the chapter explored Aristotle’s De Anima and Nicomachean Ethics, 
examining in detail what Aristotle’s views of voluntary actions were. It was shown that 
Aristotle had a clear notion of voluntary action and that he identifies moral actions as a 
subject of voluntary actions only possible for human beings. These moral actions involve 
deliberation and decision, regarding means to attain wished for ends. This was explained 
in both texts using the practical syllogism, whereby one takes into account both universal 
and particular knowledge to make a decision regarding a particular action, whether it is to 
be done or not. The practical syllogism can be seen as an account of the moral process of 
moving from wish to deliberation and, finally, to decision; it is also clearly not related to 
willing or choice as these terms came to be understood; in particular, as Frede points out, 
desire (both rational and irrational) plays a large part in Aristotle’s views and in some 
places can lead to voluntary actions which override our rational ‘choices.’
In Aristotle, then, we have the emergence of several key elements of moral 
decision making but we do not have a notion of will or choice. It was not until the Stoic 
philosophers revisited the concepts of prohairesis and boulēsis that strong concepts of 
choice and the free will. We saw that the Stoics viewed the human soul as completely 
rational and so did not distinguish between rational and nonrational desires in the way 
Aristotle did and thus they left no room for acting contrary to our ration choices. For the 
Stoics one of the few things that are “up to us” is our ability to choose to assent to our 
impressions; this choose to assent or not constitutes a willing and this willing leads to 
actions. The Stoics saw the important activity, then, to be the choosing, not the willing 
(which was simply entailed in the choosing). The Stoics also tied these concepts of 
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choice and will to their notion of freedom; they claimed that despite causal determinism 
wise human beings maintained their ability to be free by aligning their desires with the 
good and so choosing the good. These unique notions of assent and impressions along 
with the concepts of choice, freedom, and will were further explored by the Platonists and 
Peripatetics who developed the idea that freedom of choice entailed the ability to choose 
from among options which were all possible.
Augustine was heavily influenced by these Stoic and Platonist ideas and he 
incorporated them into his particular view of Christianity. While the Stoics and Platonists 
focused on choice Augustine emphasized the will and explained that it was a rational 
faculty. Augustine saw choice as an action of the will. He explained that the will was a 
necessary faculty if we were to explain free choice and God’s justice. For Augustine, as 
for the Stoics, the will is involved in every act of cognition. Furthermore, Augustine 
comes to conflate the concepts of willing and choosing/deciding which had, until this 
time, been distinct, in the term velle. While his ideas are clearly heavily influenced by his 
Greek predecessors Augustine offers his own addition to the concept by bringing in 
theological notions of grace; he claims that original sin keeps the human will from 
functioning as it should but that God can intervene through grace and help us to achieve 
more control over our will, bringing it more in line with reason and our rational 
apprehension of the good. These Augustinian notions became deeply influential to 
Aquinas.
The Greek tradition did not only enter the Christian tradition but was also deeply 
important to the Arab philosophical tradition as well. While Augustine took the Greek 
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views and incorporated them into Christianity in very purposeful ways the Arabs, for 
example Al-Farabi and Avicenna, adopted the notions of prohairesis and boulēsis (irādah 
and ikhtiyar) into their philosophy without addressing the issues as explicitly. As we saw, 
Al-Farabi discusses the concepts in passing and thinks that they are already present in a 
clear sense in Aristotle. Avicenna, likewise, spends much more time discussing the 
practical intellect and its role in moral agency than he does discussing the faculties of will 
or choice particularly. Thus, when Averroes goes on to offer his own commentaries on 
Aristotle and his own views about these faculties he is already embedded in a 
philosophical culture which sees them as Aristotelian.
All of this serves as important background for the discussion of Averroes and 
Aquinas which will account for the next two chapters. Having seem how the notions of 
wish/will, deliberation, and choice/decision developed along with how they were related 
to reason and the practical intellect we are in a better position to understand why Averroes 
and Aquinas make the philosophical claims they do and how they view these claims in 
relation to the work of Aristotle.
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CHAPTER 3
 AVERROES
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the development of the notion will and the 
associated ideas of decision/choice, deliberation, and freedom. We saw that, while there 
was no faculty of will in Aristotle’s theory, there were notions of wish, decision, and 
deliberation which were developed into a notion of will by later thinkers. In particular, 
later Greek writers, especially the Stoics, developed a notion of freedom which they tied 
to Aristotle’s ideas of prohairesis and boulēsis to create a notion of a free will as a 
distinct faculty of the human soul. This notion became such a common element that free 
will (the notion that human beings have will (irādah) and choice (ikhtiyār)) was taken for 
granted as a foundational principle of human psychology by philosophers such as Al-
Farabi. This, along with the enigmatic ways in which Aristotle addresses these issues, led 
some such as Averroes to claim that Aristotle had developed such notions in his own 
work. Averroes then used this as a foundation from which to build his own ideas about 
the faculty of the will and its relation to other human faculties—particularly the 
cogitative power and the intellects.
The development of these ideas in Averroes’ philosophy is the focus of the present 
chapter. Here I will proceed by focusing on the faculty of will, a cogitative faculty, and its 
role, along with choice and deliberation, in the moral process. I will examine how 
Averroes views the will and its ability to function for the individual as she goes about 
practical decision making and action as well as how Averroes uses the separate 
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Intellects206 to support the functioning of the will. We will see that Averroes believes he 
can maintain that human beings have moral responsibility despite the fact that they share 
not only the Agent Intellect but also the Material Intellect; this is possible because of his 
insistence that the will is a cogitative power--a brain power--which is not shared among 
individuals. Several key commentaries, including the Epitome on the Republic, the 
Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Middle and Long Commentary 
on the De Anima, will be used here to trace the development of Averroes’ view. Special 
attention will be given to the Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, as a 
presentation of Averroes’ final position and as a text deeply familiar to Aquinas.
Before continuing it should be noted that this chapter will make little mention of 
Aquinas, despite the fact that a major goal of this dissertation is to examine how his 
views of the will, the intellects and moral responsibility are related to those of Averroes. 
This is because in order for us to have a full understanding of the ways in which Aquinas’ 
view differs from that of Averroes and of the salience and effectiveness of Aquinas’ 
critiques we must first understand what Averroes himself is saying.
3.2 The Texts207
206 Throughout this chapter I use capitalization to highlight when the Intellect(s) being discussed are 
separate entities shared by all human beings. In the earlier texts the material intellect is not separate and so 
I do not capitalize it or the term ‘intellects’ when referring to it and the Agent Intellect together. But, later 
both the Material and Agent Intellects are viewed as separate entities, and I note this by capitalizing terms.
207 I would like to point out an early work of Averroes which I will not be discussing at length but in 
which Averroes does make a few interesting and relevant points about the cogitative power: the Epitome of 
the Parva Naturalia. Here Averroes offers some brief discussion of the cogitative power and its relation to 
the other internal powers. He explains that that cogitative power is only found in human beings, since they 
alone possess the intellectual faculty, and that the cogitative power is a “spiritual” power which “requires 
the aid of the information furnished by these other faculties [the common sense and 
imagination]” (Averroes, Epitome of the Parva Naturalia, translated by Harry Blumberg (Cambridge: 
Mediaeval Academy of America, 1961), pp. 33-34). This hints at the multifaceted role the cogitative power 
has in Averroes’ later works, as we shall see. One might also see pp. 48-49 and notes 22, 23 of Bk 2 ch 2 
and 15 and 72 of Bk 2 Ch 3 for more information.
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3.2.1 Commentary on Plato’s Republic: The Theoretical/Practical divide and the the 
cogitative faculty208
Before examining the notion of will that emerges in Averroes’ work it is important 
to give a brief account of the general landscape of practical and theoretical sciences as 
Averroes sees it and how the category of moral action, to which the faculty of will is 
essential, fits into the overall view of knowledge and psychology. Here Averroes’ 
commentary on the Republic209 is especially enlightening. Averroes sees the Republic as a 
work concerning the practical arts which should be read along side the Aristotelian works 
about the theoretical and practical arts. Indeed, much of what Averroes says about will 
and action in his commentary on the Republic is said within this greater framework of 
relating the practical to the theoretical and is placed in a strongly Aristotelian context.
208 Although it is generally accepted that his Commentary on the Republic is a later work I place it first here 
in order to start with a more general discussion of the practical and the theoretical before moving on to the 
more specific discussions found in the other Commentaries.
209 The Arabic text is lost. This English translation is from the Hebrew and represents a further effort at 
translating the text which was first translated into English by E. I. J. Rosenthal (as Lerner explain in his 
introduction to Averroes on Plato’s Republic, translated by Ralph Lerner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1974), p. viii). In addition to the Hebrew manuscripts there is also a Latin manuscript from the 16th 
century; I do not present the Latin text here, relying instead on Lerner’s translation, because it would not 
have been available to Aquinas. See Rosenthal’s Introduction in Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s 
Republic, translated by E. I. J. Rosenthal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1956, pp. 1-8 for a 
discussion of the Hebrew and Latin manuscripts.
It should perhaps be noted that although I am here discussion Averroes’ commentary on Plato’s 
Republic I have not said much on Plato’s ideas themselves. Instead, I rely on Aristotle and, in Chapter 2, on 
later Greek philosophers whose ideas were generally attributed to Aristotle by medieval thinkers. This is 
because Plato did not factor into the accounts of Averroes and Aquinas as much as did Aristotle; indeed, as I 
say here, even Averroes’ commentary on Plato is heavily influenced by his Aristotelianism. However, if one 
wishes to examine Plato’s views and interpretations of them, there are, of course, sources one can look to. A 
particularly good account, with a great deal of bibliographic content, is Gabriela Soxana Carsone’s 
“Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mind?” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XX, 
edited by David Sedley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 107-148; Carsone provides a detailed 
account of Plato’s understanding of akrasia as he discusses it in the Protagoras and the Republic along 
with other texts. She argues against the commonly held view that there is a distinction between the Socratic 
and non-Socratic dialogues on this matter, showing that Plato is consistently against the possibility of 
akrasia or weakness of will.
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From the very start Averroes makes it clear that the purpose of this treatise is to 
extract from the dialectic of the Republic those “scientific arguments” which may shed 
light upon “practical science [...whose subject is] volitional things, the doing of which is 
within our power, and the principle of these things is will and choice [... and whose end] 
is action alone.”210 The language Averroes employs in these first few pages is highly 
Aristotelian and Averroes points out that the first part of practical science is addressed in 
the Nicomachean Ethics while the second part is addressed in Aristotle’s Governance 
[Politics] and in Plato’s Republic. He goes on to offer a brief account of the first part of 
the practical science before moving on to discuss the Republic, noting that there are four 
kinds of human perfections--”theoretical virtues, cogitative virtues, moral virtues, and 
[proficiency in the] practical [arts]”211--and that all are for the sake of the theoretical. 
Furthermore, human beings, by their nature, need help in cultivating these virtues, and 
thus they are political beings. Being political allows human beings not only to be more 
secure in terms of their basic needs but also to pursue one art and do it well. In this way 
Averroes points to Plato’s notion that it is perhaps impossible and certainly not best for a 
person to pursue more than one art and hope to attain some sort of perfection with regard 
to that art.212 Averroes goes on to explain that in this context virtue, or justice, for the 
individual consists in each part of the soul fulfilling its function appropriately and that 
210 Averroes, Averroes on Plato’s Republic, pp. 3-4. Averroes goes on to distinguish two parts of practical 
science, one which deals with general rules and one which is more particular and more practical: “In the 
first part the habits and volitional actions and conduct are treated generally, and here is made known their 
relation to each other and which of these habits is for the sake of the others. In the second part is made 
known how these habits are established in the souls, which habit is ordered to which other habit so that the 
resulting action from the intended habit may become as perfect as can be, and which habit hinders which 
other habit. In general, this part supplies those matters, taken in their generality, that admit of being 
actualized.” (4) Averroes goes on to state that the end of the knowledge of what constitutes a virtue in a 
particular instance is “that one should act, not that he should know” (9).
211 Ibid., p. 5
212 Ibid., pp. 5-6
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justice in the city is similar; the Republic uses the model of the city to explain soul.213 
This discussion of practical sciences and actions and their relationship to the theoretical 
sciences is in the background as Averroes continues to discuss how volition and will work 
both in general and for individuals.
After this brief introduction to the work and to his view of how the idea of virtue 
and practical art, action, and volition are located within the larger theoretical framework, 
Averroes moves on to discuss Plato’s text more directly. For example, he notes that the 
head of the guardians in Plato’s state should be the most virtuous and disciplined and the 
most concerned for the well being of the citizens. Such a person will “not depart from his 
opinion against his will;”214 that is to say, he should be steadfast in his opinions when they 
are correct and not change them our of fear, coercion, deception, etc. Averroes goes on to 
explain that human perfections do not exist in nature beyond dispositions and that 
perfection of those dispositions is not a natural occurrence but the result of “will and 
skillfulness” such that choice and will are the efficient cause of one’s possession of the 
practical science or practical virtues.215 The emphasis here is on the fact that practical 
philosophy--that is, action (including moral action)-- is the result of one’s own will and 
the choices that one makes to carry out the willed-for end, rather than being some totally 
natural occurrence outside of the individual’s control. 
The will has no connection as such to the existence of the theoretical sciences and 
these sciences are not primarily or essentially “disposed toward action.”216 However, 
213 Ibid. pp. 7-8
214 Ibid. p. 34
215 Ibid., p. 83
216 Ibid., p. 88
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since the end of the human being is to achieve intelligible existence as much as possible 
and this kind of existence is “acquired by the will,” the theoretical sciences do have some 
connection to volition and have primacy over other objects of volition.217 Here Averroes is 
establishing the connection between the theoretical and the practical in the human being. 
Theoretical knowledge is necessary and useful for action in that it is a precondition for 
practical knowledge. This seems particularly important given Averroes’ mature views 
about the separate Intellects. Despite this reliance of the practical on the theoretical for 
existence, it is not the case that the function of the practical arts is, primarily, to further 
the theoretical (i.e. the purpose is not “good and excellent discernment”218) with the 
actions being secondary. Rather, Averroes asserts that “the truth is that the intelligibles of 
these [arts] were established at first only with a view to activity; if one perceives anything 
by them, it is by accident.”219 So, while the practical arts rely on the theoretical they are 
not focused on furthering theoretical science or attaining theoretical knowledge. This 
makes sense when we think about how we view moral action. The focus of our will, 
deliberation, and choice is almost entirely on the action and the practical end to which the 
action aims; we rarely consider how a moral action will impact our general knowledge. It 
certainly is the case that sometimes our practical actions lead to more knowledge or 
understanding (for example, it is conceivable that an action can lead us to some further 
217 Ibid., p. 89. “its lordship over the volitional things consists in the primacy of intelligible existence over 
[sensible] existence, and in its giving the volitional beings their principles on which their existence 
depends-this by way of the intelligible existence giving the sensible existence what it depends on. It has 
already been made clear that this is not by way of the intelligible's serving the sensible; rather it [sc., the 
sensible] is something that follows on it [sc., the intelligible] and is necessitated by it. This being so, the 
theoretical sciences are indeed useful for action and necessary for action in the way in which it is said of 
intelligible existence that it is necessary for sensible existence.” Averroes goes on to say that “it may be 
seen from this treatise that the practical arts--be they faculties, or rulings or ministerial arts--exist only 
because of the theoretical sciences” (p. 89)
218 Ibid., p. 89
219 Ibid., p. 90
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insight about the Good), yet, this does not seem to be the focus. This is particularly 
important given that the end of human action is knowledge attainment and perfection of 
the human being as knower.
Averroes moves on from this discussion of theoretical virtue to address cogitative 
and moral virtues. He asserts that these are “for the sake of theoretical intelligibles.”220 He 
also makes a connection between the cogitative and the moral virtues which is 
particularly interesting and important, given what he will say about the role of cogitation 
(the faculty connected to the will) in moral action. He notes that appetite and desire are of 
two kinds: one stems from imagination and is found in all animals, and one stems from 
cogitation and thought and is distinctive of human beings.221 He continues to expand upon 
the particularly human kind of desire, stating that 
the moral virtues are nothing other than that this part of us 
is aroused toward that which cogitation judges ought to 
come into being, to the extent that it judges and at the time 
that it judges. It is evident that this activity belongs to 
nothing other than the theoretical part of the soul. This 
being so, it is [only] this part that acquires virtue from the 
cogitative part. The cogitative part, then, is more truly 
elevated; it is [more] noble and more choiceworthy. Also 
many of the animals have a share in this [moral] part—such 
as the modesty to be found in the lion— but it is human 
only by virtue of thought and cogitation, and whatever is 
the cause of something’s being of a certain character 
possesses that character to a higher degree. It can also be 
seen now from the case of these virtues that through them 
man serves others [...] But, as for theoretical science, why it 
is clear from its character that a man is not disposed toward 
it that he might serve others. Moreover, these virtues are 
more apt to be hylic than the theoretical sciences and more 
220 Ibid., p. 90. Later he notes that “this kind [of perfection--i.e.], the moral, is laid down [in relation to] 
theoretical perfection as a preparatory rank, without which the attainment of the end is impossible.” and 
that all four classes of human perfections are “for the sake of theoretical perfection” (p. 92).
221 Ibid., p. 90. 
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apt to be in need of the body for their continued 
existence.222
This passage highlights, indirectly, several aspects of Averroes’ philosophy concerning 
the psychology surrounding practical science and moral action which he will directly 
address in his commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Here he notes that the cogitative 
power is that by which we judge what is morally virtuous and that this power is linked in 
some way to the theoretical part of the soul.223 He also emphasizes the practical and 
physical aspect of moral actions, explaining that the moral virtues are likely to require the 
body for their existence; we may perhaps read into this claim, that the cogitative faculry, 
which is responsible or moral judgments, has a more ‘hylic’ nature as well. These 
remarks are supported by what Averroes says in other works about the location of the 
will--the faculty of moral judgment and choice--in the cogitative power, the location of 
the cogitative power in the brain224, and the relationship between this bodily power and 
the non-physical, theoretical Intellects.
222 Ibid., p. 91
223 It should also be noted that he indicates in various places throughout the commentary, particularly in 
“The First Treatise,” that the cogitative faculty and cogitative virtue is concerned with experience and with 
actualizing in a physical way what is understood theoretically. For example, he describes the cogitative 
faculty in general as something which one (in his discussion a physician) “acquires through experience” (p. 
33); furthermore, in describing medicine as a practical art he says that “the physician will only be complete 
when, together with knowledge of the immutable universals of the art, there is realized in him through 
experience the cogitative virtue—[the virtue] through which he can actualize them [sc., the universals] in 
matter.” (p. 9-10). He discusses the “political cogitative faculty—i.e. the experiential faculty that gauges 
[these] general things so that they come to exist in matter in actuality” (p. 45) when discussing the number 
of guardians necessary in Plato’s city. Finally, when discussing the organization of the soul in relation to the 
organization of the city Averroes notes that “the cogitative part rules over the other faculties[i.e. the spirited 
and appetitive parts] and the other faculties are in submission to it” (p. 54) and that “the wise individual is 
only he in whom the cogitative part forever rules over the other parts, [as] is the case [in] the city” (p. 55); 
it might help to note that it seems for Plato in the Republic that the ‘cogitative part’ is more akin to reason 
or intellect than Averroes makes it seem here (since he contrasts it with the appetitive and spirited part and 
does not seem to include another part that would account for intellectual operations that go beyond what 
Averroes would include in cogitation). In any case, this discussion of cogitation does highlight its place for 
Averroes as a kind of middle ground between the physical and intellectual--between the body, of which it is 
a part, and the Intellects, to which it relates and with which it allows the individual to conjoin when desired.
224 It is important to note that Aristotle locates the cogitative power (and other rational faculties) in the 
heart, not the brain.
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Even in the present commentary Averroes begins to make these associations more 
clear when he discusses the relationship between the individual and the “theoretical 
part” (the Intellects) and the theoretical sciences. He claims that “the theoretical part does 
not exist in us from the outset in its ultimate perfection and in actuality, its existence in us 
is only potential” and that “it is for us to bring into being and to perfect the perfection and 
actuality that are of this character--i.e. it comes to pass through choice and will since 
there is no sufficiency in nature to bring it about.”225 Here Averroes is noting that there is 
a connection between our will—and the cogitative power of which it is a part—and the 
theoretical power.
Before moving on to a discussion of Averroes’ Commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics something more should said about how the theoretical and practical intellects 
interact in Averroes’ view. To begin, Averroes points out in a general fashion that having 
knowledge of first principles can help in practical matters;226 he goes on to say that the 
guardians will possess “two kinds of knowledge simultaneously—i.e. the theoretical and 
the practical”227 and that is what it means to be wise228 and to attain “ultimate 
perfection.”229 In a more detailed account of the relationship Averroes explains that it is 
the theoretical sciences which supply the intention and the practical arts by which one 
attains that intention;230 thus, both are necessary for action since one must have intention 
or goal in mind before one chooses a course of action. Although we do not have much 
detail in what is said here it is important to note that these types of statements are 
225 Averoes, Averroes on Plato’s Republic, p. 93
226 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
227 Ibid., p. 50
228 Ibid., p. 50.
229 Ibid., p. 72.
230 Ibid., p. 87
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reminiscent of Aristotle’s practical syllogism.231 These statements make clear that 
practical actions, which include moral actions, involve not only practical intellect but also 
theoretical intellect; human beings require some universal knowledge and some 
theoretical end towards which to aim and against which to judge the practical knowledge 
they attain and determine what actions they should or should not perform.
What we have seen so far in Averroes’ discussion of the Republic provides some 
foundational considerations of Averroes’ account of moral action as a part of practical 
science and its relationship to theoretical science. He makes it clear that willing and 
choosing are related to experience and to the cogitative power while also explaining that 
the cogitative power (and all practical virtues) are ultimately connected to the theoretical 
arts and the theoretical part of the human being. Averroes is clearly drawing from 
Aristotelian sources in his account and so it is no surprise that his views are made more 
clear when he comments directly upon the works of Aristotle, particularly on Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics and De Anima. Thus, to expand the picture of Averroes’ view we 
must move on to consider these texts.
3.2.2 Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics: The will and the deliberative process
Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics represents a 
paraphrasing of the Aristotelian text, with Averroes making relatively few additions.232 It 
231 See Chapter 2, pp. 26-27 above.
232 Of course, this is not unusual since Averroes’ middle commentaries are paraphrasing while his long 
commentaries are more substantive. There is no long commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. This does 
not, however, diminish the value of the text as it does still provide insight into how Averroes read and 
understood Aristotle text. It is also worth noting here that, as with the commentary on the Republic, 
Averroes’ commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is available only in Hebrew and Latin. I have provided 
references to the Latin as needed.
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does, however, offer a good foundation for seeing how Averroes more directly addresses 
the issue of moral action and decision making. As explained in Chapter 2, Aristotle 
begins his direct treatment of the character of actions in Book 3; Averroes follows 
Aristotle’s text, discussing the voluntary and the involuntary. Averroes breaks the 
discussion of Nicomachean Ethics 3.1 into several chapters exploring the nature of 
voluntary and involuntary action. He explains that there are three categories of actions: 
voluntary, forced involuntary (often called mixed actions), and involuntary through 
ignorance. 233 He follows Aristotle in claiming that both voluntary and mixed actions 
(which are more similar to voluntary than involuntary actions) are worthy of praise and 
blame in a way truly involuntary actions are not. The most important category of actions 
for our purposes is the voluntary since voluntary actions are the result of principles which 
are in the agent, such as deliberation, decision/choice and wish.234
After discussing these kinds of actions and identifying what constitutes voluntary 
action Averroes moves on to consider the internal principles which allow for human 
voluntary action (moral action). He begins with choice (electione).235 He notes, following 
233 “voluntarium et involuntarium et quod involuntarium duplex violentum, scilicet et quod propter 
ignorantiam.” (Bk. 3 Ch. 1) Averroes, Commentum Averrois super libros Ethicorum ad Nicomachum 
Aristotelis, translated by Hermannus Alemannus, edited by Nicoletus Vernia, 1483. http://dare.uni-koeln.de/
dare-cgi/vaporlinks.pas?darevurl=leftBoxContent%3A%3DonLoadedChunkSync%3A%3D%2Fdare-
cgi%2Ftext_chunk.pas%3Ftxt%3DFT201%26type%3Dsubdivision%26n%3D1%26side%3Dleft%2Cright
BoxContent%3A%3DonLoadedWitnessTable%3A%3D%2Fdare-
cgi%2Fwitness_table.pas%3Faw%3DAW82%26trad%3Dlat1%26side%3Dright%26type%3Dfulltext. All 
English translations of this text are my own.
234 Ibid., Bk. 3, Ch. 3. “Quando igitur dicatur de eo, quod fit coactae aut inscienter, quoniam fit 
inspontaneae palam est, quoniam hoc, quod agitur sponte est, cuius agendi principium est in agente ipsum 
et agens ipsum scit particularia in quibus fit actio.”
235 It is important to point out here some issue of language. As was made clear in Chapter 2 Aristotle’s 
terms prohairesis and boulēsis should not be translated as choice or will. However, I use these terms here 
(along with the more appropriate decision and wish) to reflect the Latin terms used. While we cannot know 
the original Arabic terms the Latin translation lends further support to the argument made in Chapter 2 that 
Aristotle’s views were mixed with those of later Greeks and this mixture was reflected in the terminology 
used by such early writers as Augustine and Al-Farabi.
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Aristotle, that choice (decision in Aristotle) is voluntary (spontanei) but is not the same 
things as the voluntary (intentio spontanei). He goes on to distinguish choice from 
appetite (concupiscentiam), anger (iram), opinion (opinionem), and wish (velle). In 
particular, he notes that choice is not will because choice can never be about impossibles 
while will may be.236 Using Aristotle’s examples Averroes points out that we cannot 
choose to be immortal, nor can we choose the winner of a competition, but we can wish 
or will for (volitum) these things. We wish for ends and choose means which may lead to 
those ends. Later he expands upon this notion of wish and its relation to ends, explaining 
that we wish for the good. Even when something is actually bad it may seem good to us 
and so become an object of our will. A good person always wills the truth (the good 
itself) but a bad person may will something that is only the apparent good.237 This notion 
236 Averroes, Commentum Averrois super libros Ethicorum ad Nicomachum Aristotelis Bk. 3, Ch. 5. “Et 
etiam non est electio velle quamvis videatur ei esse propinque eo, quod electio non est impossibilium, velle 
autem est. Si enim dixerit quid quod impossibilia eliguntur stultius reputabitur, velle vero invenitur circa 
res impossibiles. Verbi gratia vellemus immortales esse. Et velle etiam rerum est, quarum operatio non est 
in nobis, ut athletam vincere aut hypocritam. Et nullus quidem eligit huiusmodi res, immo res eas eligit 
quarum in se videt actionem et adhuc velle quidem maxime finis est. Eligentia autem non est nisi eorum, 
quae ducunt ad finem. Verbi gratia sanari volumus, eligimus autem per quae sanamur et felices esse 
vellemus et asserimus nos velle, non est autem dicendum eligere nos fieri felices”
237 (Ibid., Bk. 3, Ch. 7 “Et sequitur dicentes quod volitum sit bonum, ut non sit volitum nisi id, quod est 
bonum per se et rectum. Quando enim fuerit quid ex volitis erit bonum, hoc autem est inconveniens. 
Forsitan enim accidit multis velle eos hoc, quod est malum et ipsum videtur bonum dicentes vero volitum 
esse hoc quod videtur bonum sequitur hic non esse aliquid volitum per naturam. Sed erit illud, quod volet 
unusquisque hominum secundum quod sibi visum fuerit, donec velint aliquid et eius contrarium homines, 
intendo quod velit rem unam eandem unus. Et contraria eius alter, immo iam volet vir unus idem duo 
contraria in horis diversis. Si ergo sic se habuerit res, non erit aliquid volitum per naturam. Et hoc iterum 
est inconveniens. Si igitur non fuerint persuasivae hae duae opiniones oportet, ut dicamus, quoniam bonum 
illud, quod est bonum per se est simpliciter volitum et secundum veritatem. Et unusquisque hominum vult 
ipsum secundum quod ei videtur. Bonus igitur vult bonum illud, quod est bonum in veritate, malus vero 
illud, de quo contingit, ut videatur ei, quod sit bonum. Et hoc, quoniam perceptio vel apprehensio, quam 
habet bonus vel virtuosus de bono et iudicium eius de ipso similatur iudicio sanorum sentientibus de rebus 
sensibilibus, iudicium vero mali de ipso similatur iudicio infirmorum. Et illi, qui sunt in dispositiones 
sanitatis discernunt sapores rerum qui sunt eis in veritate, intendo quod ipsi iudicant de dulci, quoniam 
dulce. Et de illo, quod est amarum, quoniam amarum. Illi autem, qui sunt infirmi faciunt huius diversum, 
intendo quod iudicant de dulci, quoniam amarum. Et similiter contingit eis in vocibus gravibus et acutis et 
odoribus et reliquis sensibilibus. Et quando sic est bonus, ergo est ille, qui iudicat de unaquaque rerum 
iudicium sanum. Et videtur ei verum in unaquaque earum, eo quod in unaquaque dispositionum sunt res 
venustae et res delectabiles, non secundum quod imaginatur de ipsis. [18] Dixit: Et dignum est, ut sit bono 
magna praecellentia super alterum in eo quod iudicet de vero et in dimissione eius, quod dimittit 
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of willing the good (either real or apparent) highlights the connection established in the 
commentary on the Republic that our practical thoughts and actions are always related to 
things which are theoretical. Our actions revolve, in some fashion, around the notion of 
the Good as a universal which is in itself the object of reason rather than action. We know 
the Good to a greater or lesser degree and then we act in accord with that knowledge. 
How this knowledge is possible will be addressed later in the discussion of the Intellects.
In addition to discussing these notions of choice and will, Averroes, following 
Aristotle, discusses the notion of deliberation. Deliberation (consilium), along with 
choice and will, is an essential component in the process of moral action. Like choice, 
deliberation is only about means, which are in our power. We deliberate only about things 
which are in our power to do.238 The object of choice is the result of previous 
deliberation;239 the difference is that when it is the object of deliberation it is not yet 
decided upon, but once it is chosen it is determinate.240
From this discussion of choice, will, and deliberation a picture of moral decision 
making and action begins to emerge. We wish for some (good) end; upon setting this goal 
we deliberate about means to attain that end (these means being whatever set of things is 
within our power to do); finally, we determine the action or set of actions which will lead 
unusquisque ex rebus. Etenim ipse existit tamquam regula et mensura rebus, per quam iudicatur de ipsis. Et 
verisimile est, quod error in hoc accidens multis hominum non accidat nisi delectationis causa eo quod 
ipsae videntur bonae et non sunt ita et volunt delectabile quasi bonum. Et a tristi fugiunt quasi a malo.”
238 Ibid., Bk. 3, Ch. 6, “Consiliamur autem de rebus, quarum actio in nobis est et currit per manus 
nostras.”
239 Ibid., Bk. 3, Ch. 5 “sed electum est, ut quandoque hoc sit praeconsiliatum.”
240 Ibid., Bk. 3, Ch. 6, “Et res quidem consiliabilis et eligibilis una est intentio determinata et consiliabilis 
intentio indeterminata. Et est quidem eligibile determinatum eo quod est res in quam assensum est ad 
faciendum ipsam propter iudicium consilii super ipsam, quoniam bona. Et propter hoc unusquisque 
hominum cessat ab inquisitione et consiliatione quando in se ipsum reduxerit principium ad id quod vidit in 
illa re et haec est res, quae eligitur, intendo illud, de quo iudicatum est ipsum esse bonum.”
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us to our desired end and we choose to undertake it.241 This language of deliberation and 
choice seems to be naturally connected to the discussion of theoretical and practical 
sciences or arts discussed above. While it all falls firmly into the category of practical art 
and is all the work of the cogitative faculty, it is clear from what as been said so far that 
these practical intellectual activities may be related to the more theoretical activities of 
the the Intellects themselves. The workings of the cogitative power become even more 
clear in Averroes’ Commentaries on the De Anima, as does the cogitative power’s 
relationship to the Intellects and so to knowledge of what may be called theoretical 
intelligibles (following what we have seen above in the Republic commentary).
This picture of the process of practical decision making and the relationship 
between universal and particular knowledge is highlighted by Averroes, following 
Aristotle, in the practical syllogism. Here Averroes uses Aristotle’s example of sweet 
food. We have the universal idea that sweet things should be tasted; we then encounter 
some particular things which we know to be sweet. Given the universal knowledge that 
sweet things should be tasted and the particular knowledge that sweet thing lies in from 
of us, we are are spurred to action and taste the sweet thing; we use our universal 
understanding to inform our actions in regards to particulars we encounter. The situation 
may be more complicated if our knowledge and our appetites do not coincide, as when 
we know we should not taste sweet things but we have an appetite for the sweet thing in 
front of us, and sometimes our actions do not coincide with our knowledge (we act on 
241 This process is highlighted in Averroes’ statement of Aristotle’s view: “Cum ergo si finis volitum est et 
omne quod ducit ad finem consiliabile et electum, tunc actiones, quae sunt in his sunt fientes sponte et per 
electionem, operationes autem virtutis in his fiunt, intendo in actionibus electionis et spontaneis” (Ibid., Bk. 
3, Ch. 8). 
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appetite, not on reason). However, even in this case the link between universal and 
particular knowledge and the role they both play in action is clear.242
3.2.3 Commentaries on the De Anima: The cogitative power and the Intellects
3.2.3.1 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima
As we have seen, Averroes offers an account of the key elements of the process of 
(moral) action in the Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, explaining not 
only will but also deliberation and choice. This process of moving from willing an end to 
deliberating about and choosing means by which to attain that end is the process of moral 
action and it is by the results of this process one may be judged morally. In so far as each 
individual is responsible for his own moral process he can be held morally responsible. 
He gives an account of how the individual is responsible for this process in his 
commentaries on the De Anima, explaining the various intellectual faculties and their 
242 Ibid., Bk 7, Ch. 5, “Et forsitan patebit haec intentio etiam, quando perscrutatum fuerit de hoc ex ipsis 
quae dicta sunt in scientia naturali. Illic enim iam demonstratum fuit, quod apprehensio quae est rationis est 
universalis et quae est phantasiae est particularis, id est in particularibus quorum melius est motivum eo 
quod bonum. Et peius monitum eo quod delectabile solum. Duae ergo opiniones sibi contradicentes sunt 
naturaliter quando ergo conveniunt ambae opiniones in re aliqua, intendo opinionem universalem, quae est 
ex parte intellectus et particularem, quae est ex parte concupiscentiae tunc oportet quod dicatur quoniam 
comprehensio conclusionis ex istis duabus opinionibus est secundum fortunam eo quod earum convenientia 
per fortunam est et oportet ut sit actio statim sequens comprehensionem conclusionis, ut si apud nos fuerit 
opinio quoniam expedit ut gustetur omne dulce et cognoscamus per sensum quod hoc dulce statim 
gustabimus ipsum dummodo non sit aliquid prohibens. Quando vero fuerit opinio universalis prohibens 
gustationem, ut sciamus quod omne dulce movet choleram et sit apprehensio huius ad quod innuitur fiens 
per sensum quoniam dulce movens ad ipsum tunc motio rationis erit hic contraria motioni concupiscentiae, 
quae si vicerit erit non continentia cum existentia scientiae, erit igitur non continentia interdum cum ratione 
quando fuerit ratio conveniens concupiscentiae. Et interdum non erit quando fuerit adversans ei. Et non 
continentia, quae est contraria per se opinioni sane est illa, quae fit ex parte concupiscentiae solum. Illa 
vero, quae fit ex parte ambarum simul, intendo rationem et concupiscentiam non est contraria rationi sane 
per se sed per accidens. [15] Dixit: Et propter hoc quod incontinentia fit quando concupiscentia contraria 
fuerit opinioni universali non dicemus quod fere habeant incontinentiam, quando non sit eis apprehensio 
universalis. Et est quidem eis apprehensio particularis et est phantasia et memoria.”
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relationship to the human being and to the will. We will begin with an examination of the 
Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima.243
Averroes posits the existence of a number of intellectual powers, particularly the 
agent and material intellects and the cogitative power. In the Middle Commentary’s 
section on the rational faculty Averroes discusses “part of the soul whereby we have 
apprehensions, which is called intellect and comprehension.”244 He first considers the 
more passive element of this intellect which has the capacity to “think all things,” 
concluding that this faculty, the “hylic [material] intellect,” cannot be mixed with the 
body because it must retain the ability to receive all intelligible forms without 
impediment and without changing the intelligibles.245 From this Averroes concludes that 
the potential intellect is “nothing other than a disposition only” and that it is a separate 
substance and is related to the human being in so far as that separate substance is related 
243 It should be noted that Averroes wrote three commentaries on the De Anima, a short, middle and long. I 
will make reference to only the Middle Commentary (which is largely a paraphrase of Aristotle) and the 
Long Commentary (which supplies more of Averroes’ critical commentary and unique philosophical work). 
Aquinas, however, only had access to the Long Commentary in Latin translation, as indicated by Taylor in 
his “Introduction,” in Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, translated by Richard C. Taylor 
(New Haven:Yale University Press, 2009), pp. xcvii.
244 Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima [MCDA], translated by Alfred L. Ivry (Utah: 
Brigham Young University Press, 2002), p. 108, اﻟﺠﺰء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﺬى ﺑﮫ ﻧﺪرك اﻹدراك اﻟﻤﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻘﻼ و ﻓﮭﻤﺎ
245 Ibid., p. 109. “ The hylic intellect, if it is to think all things--that is, receive the forms of all things--
cannot be mixed with any one form; that is, it cannot be mixed with the subject in which it is found, as the 
other material faculties are.
If the rational faculty were mixed with any form, then one of two things would occur: either the 
form of the subject with which it was mixed would impede the forms this faculty would receive, or it would 
change them--that is, it would change the form being received. Were this so, the forms of things would not 
exist in the intellect as they really are--that is, the forms existing in the intellect would be changed into 
forms different from the actual forms. If, therefore, the nature of the intellect is to receive the forms of 
things which have retained their natures, it is necessary that it be a faculty unmixed with any form 
whatsoever.”
>وذﻟﻚ أن ھﺬه اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﮭﯿﻮﻻﻧﻰ إن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻌﻘﻞ اﻷﺷﯿﺎء ﻛﻠﮭﺎ أى ﺗﻘﺒﻞ ﺻﻮر ﻷﺷﯿﺎء ﻛﻠﮭﺎ ﻓﻘﺪ ﯾﺠﺐ أﻻﺗﻜﻮن ھﺬه ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻄﺔ ﻟﺼﻮرة 
ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر، أى ﻻ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻄﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﺬى ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻓﯿﮫ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﮭﯿﻮﻻﻧﯿﺔ.
وذﻟﻚ أﻧﮫ ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻄﺔ ﻟﺼﻮرة ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر ﻟﻠﺰم ﻓﯿﮭﺎ أﺣﺪ أﻣﺮﯾﻦ: إﻣﺎأن ﺗﻌﻮق ﺻﻮرة اﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﺘﻰ اﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻄﺔ ﻟﮭﺎ اﻟﺼﻮر 
اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﻘﺒﻠﮭﺎ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻘﻮة، وإﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻐﯿﺮھﺎ أﻋﻨﻰ أن ﺗﻐﯿﺮ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻮﻟﺔ. وﻟﻮ ﻛﺎن ذﻟﻚ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻟﻜﺎﻧﺖ ﺻﻮر اﻷﺷﯿﺎء ﻻ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻨﮭﮭﺎ 
أﻋﻨﻰ أﻧﮫ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﺘﻐﯿﺮ ﺻﻮر اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدات ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ إﻟﻰ ﺻﻮر ھﻰ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺻﻮر اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدات. ﻓﺈن ﻛﺎن اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﻦ طﺒﯿﻌﺘﮫ أن ﯾﻘﺒﻞ ﺻﻮر اﻷﺷﯿﺎء 
ﻣﺤﻔﻮظﮫ اﻟﻄﺒﺎﺋﻊ ﻓﻘﺪ ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻗﻮة ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺠﺎﻟﻄﺔ ﻟﺼﻮرة ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر أﺻﻼ.< 
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to the human being.246 He explains that “the hylic intellect is something composed of the 
disposition found in us and of an intellect conjoined to this disposition. As conjoined to 
the disposition, it is a disposed intellect, not an intellect in act; though as not conjoined to 
this disposition, it is an intellect in act; while, in itself, this intellect is the Agent 
Intellect.”247 We see here the beginning of an account of the complex relationship that 
must exist between the individual human being--the subject who has the disposition to 
know--and the intellects which think and receive intelligibles. The account given of the 
“hylic” intellect begins to hint at Averroes’ views of the Agent Intellect as well. 
He takes up the issue of the Agent Intellect directly after presenting his account of 
Aristotle’s famous passage in De Anima 3.5248 He explains that the Agent Intellect is that 
246 Ibid., p. 111. “It became apparent that in one sense, the intellect is a disposition free of material forms, 
as Alexander said; and, in another sense, it is a separate substance attired with this disposition—that is, this 
disposition found in man is attached to this separate substance by virtue of the latter’s conjunction with 
man.”
> وإذا وﻓﯿﺖ ھﺬه اﻷﻗﺎوﯾﻞ ﻗﺴﻄﮭﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻜﻮك ظﮭﺮ أن اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ھﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ اﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﻣﺠﺮد ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﮭﯿﻮﻻﻧﯿﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﯾﻘﻮﻟﮫ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪر، وھﻮ ﻣﻦ 
ﺟﮭﺔ ﺟﻮھﺮ ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻣﺘﻠﺒﺲ ﺑﮭﺬا اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد. أﻋﻨﻰ أن ھﺬا اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ھﻮ ﺷﺊ ﻟﺤﻖ ھﺬا اﻟﺠﻮھﺮ اﻟﻤﻔﺎرق ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ اﺗﺼﺎﻟﮫ 
ﺑﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن،<
247 Ibid., p. 111.
>ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺒﯿﻦ إذا أن اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﮭﯿﻮﻻﻧﻰ ھﻮ ﺷﺊ ﻣﺮﻛﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻠﺴﺘﻌﺪاد اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﯿﻨﺎ و ﻣﻦ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ ﺑﮭﺬا اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد: ھﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺎ ھﻮ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ ﺑﮫ 
ﻋﻘﻞ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﻻ ﻋﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ، و ھﻮ ﻋﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻟﯿﺲ ھﻮ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ ﺑﮭﺬا اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد،< 
It might be helpful to note that while Averroes seems to be discussing the agent and material intellects as 
separate faculties (particularly in the Long Commentary it has been argued that he really sees them as the 
passive and active states of “essentially the same being” ( Alfred Ivry “Averroes’ Middle and Long 
Commentaries on the De Anima” in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, V.5 Is. 1 (1995), p. 78). Taylor, 
however, disagrees with Ivry’s interpretation, explaining that the material and agent intellect are not the 
same being and that Averroes’ account of the material intellect changes —it goes from being in the 
individual as disposition to being a separate substance—while his view of the agent intellect remains an 
“eternal, separately existing substance” throughout his work (although its role in other aspects of creation 
does change). (Taylor, “Introduction”, pp. xix-xxi).
248 Averroes, MCDA, pp. 115-116. “He said: That which concerns the intellect has to correspond to 
physical entities. In every genus of generated physical entities, we find one thing which corresponds to the 
recipient and another to the agent. The former is that which is potentially all the things found in that genus, 
the latter that which actualizes them, its relation in nature being like that of art to matter. Accordingly, these 
two differentia—namely, agent and a passive intellect—have to exist in the intellect, and thus there will be 
an intellect in us which is intellect with respect to [its ability to]receive every intelligible, and an intellect in 
us with respect to [its ability to] actualize every intelligible.”
>ﻗﺎل: وﻟﻤﺎ ﻛﺎن اﻷﻣﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﯾﺠﺮى ﻣﺠﺮى اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺔ، وذﻟﻚ أﻧﮫ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻧﺠﺪ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻨﺲ ﺟﻨﺲ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺔ اﻟﺤﺪﺛﺔ ﺷﯿﺌﺎ 
ﯾﺠﺮى ﻣﺠﺮى اﻟﻘﺎﺑﻞ وﺷﯿﺌﺎ ﯾﺠﺮى ﻣﺠﺮى اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ، أﻣﺎ اﻟﺬى ﯾﺠﺮى ﻣﺠﺮى اﻟﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻓﮭﻮ اﻟﺸﺊ اﻟﺬى ھﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺟﻤﯿﻊ اﻷﺷﯿﺎء اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدة ﻓﻰ ذﻟﻚ 
اﻟﺠﻨﺲ، وأﻣﺎ اﻟﺬى ﯾﺠﺮى ﻣﺠﺮى اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻓﮭﻮ اﻟﺬى ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ﻛﻞ ﺷﺊ ﻓﻰ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺠﻨﺲ، وھﺬا ھﻮ اﻟﺸﺊ اﻟﺬى ﺣﺎل ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ ﻛﺤﺎل اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ 
اﻟﮭﯿﻮﻟﻰ، ﻓﻘﺪ ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﯾﻮﺟﺪ ﻓﻰ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ھﺬان اﻟﻔﺼﻼن أﻋﻨﻰ ﻋﻘﻼ ﻓﻌﺎﻻ وﻋﻘﻼ ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻼ، ﻓﯿﻜﻮن ﻓﯿﻨﺎ ﻋﻘﻞ ھﻮ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ أﻧﮫ ﯾﻘﺒﻞ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل و 
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faculty which is able to “actualize every intelligible [...] and bring them forth”249 giving 
the material intellect the ability to receive these intelligibles. The Agent Intellect is both a 
separate substance and a “form for us.”250 It is in the human being but is still an 
ontologically distinct substance, completely unmixed with our material self and faculties 
and yet under the control of the will.251 Here, then, Averroes is pointing out the unique 
relationship which exists between the individual and the separate Agent Intellect. 252
Having offered an account of the rational faculty of the human being Averroes 
moves on in the next section to a discussion of the appetitive faculty, that part of the soul 
which is responsible for motion.253 Of particular interest for our purposes in this section is 
what Averroes says about the cogitative power and the workings of the practical intellect. 
During a discussion of how the faculties of the soul should be enumerated, Averroes 
notes that “the principle expression of [the part of the soul which is concerned with desire 
and which causes motion], which is called choice, occurs in the cogitative faculty, while 
ﻓﯿﻨﺎ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ أﻧﮫ ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل.<
249 Ibid., p. 116. < ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ھﺬا اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ھﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت و اﻟﺨﻠﻖ ﻟﮭﺎ >
250 Ibid., p. 116. < ﺻﻮة ﻟﻨﺎ > He also calls the agent intellect “our final form.”
251 Ibid., p. 116. “It is clear that, in one respect, this intellect is an agent and, in another, it is a form for us, 
since the generation of intelligibles is a product of our will. When we want to think something, we do so, 
our thinking it being nothing other than, first, bringing the intelligible forth and, second, receiving it. The 
individual intentions in the imaginative faculty are they that stand in relation to the intellect as potential 
colors do to light. That is, this intellect renders them actual intelligibles after their having been intelligible 
in potentiality. It is clear from the nature of this intellect--which in one respect, is form for us and, in 
another, is the agent for the intelligibles--that it is always superior to that which is acted upon, and the 
principle is superior to the matter. The intelligent and intelligible aspects of this intellect are essentially the 
same thing, since it does not think anything external to its essence. There must be an Agent Intellect here, 
since that which actualizes the intellect has to be an intellect, the agent endowing only that which resembles 
what is in its substance.”
>وﺑﯿﻦ أن ھﺬا ھﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ ﻓﺎﻋﻞ وﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ ﺻﻮرة ﻟﻨﺎ إذ ﻛﺎن ﺗﻮﻟﯿﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت إﻟﻰ ﻣﺸﯿﺌﺘﻨﺎ، وذﻟﻚ أﻧﮫ ﻣﺘﻰ ﺷﺌﻨﺎ أن ﻧﻌﻘﻞ ﺷﯿﺌﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻘﻠﻨﺎه، وﻟﯿﺲ 
ﻋﻘﻠﻨﺎ أﯾﺎه ﺷﯿﺌﺎ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮل أوﻻ و ﻗﺒﻮﻟﮫ ﺛﺎﻧﯿﺎ. واﻟﺸﺊ اﻟﺬى ﯾﺘﻨﺰل ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﻨﺰﻟﺔ اﻷﻟﻮان اﻟﺘﻰ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﻮء ھﻰ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﻰ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﯿﺔ 
اﻟﺘﻰ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺨﯿﺎﻟﯿﺔ، أﻋﻨﻰ أن ھﺬا اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﯾﺼﯿﺮھﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﺑﻌﺪ أن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة. وھﺬا اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﺬى ھﻮ ﺻﻮرة ﻟﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ و ﻓﻌﺎل 
ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﻣﻦ ﺟﮭﺔ ﺑﯿﻦ ﻣﻦ أﻣﺮه أﻧﮫ ﻣﻔﺎرق وأﻧﮫ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻛﺎﺋﻦ وﻻ ﻓﺎﺳﺪ وذﻟﻚ أن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﯾﺠﺐ أﺑﺪا أن ﯾﻜﻮن أﺷﺮف ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻔﻌﻮل واﻟﻤﺒﺪآ أﺷﺮف 
ﻣﻦ اﻟﮭﯿﻮﻟﻰ. وﻣﺬا اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ھﻮ اﻟﺬى اﻟﻌﻘﻞ واﻟﻤﻌﻘﻮل ﻣﻨﮫ ﺷﺊ واﺣﺪ ﺑﺬاﺗﮫ إذ ﻛﺎن ﻻ ﯾﻌﻘﻞ ﺷﯿﺌﺎ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ ﻋﻦ ذاﺗﮫ. وإﻧﻤﺎ ﻛﺎن واﺟﻨﺎ أن ﯾﻜﻮن ھﺎھﻨﺎ 
ﻋﻘﻞ ﻓﻌﺎل ﻷن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻟﻠﻌﻘﻞ ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﯾﻜﻮن ﻋﻘﻼ إذ ﻛﺎن ﻻ ﯾﻌﻄﻰ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ إﻻ ﺷﺒﯿﮫ ﻣﺎ ﻓﻰ ﺟﻮھﺮه.< 
252 Averroes does not go into detail here about how this is the case but more can be said once we examine 
the very different doctrine of the LCDA and recall what has already been said about the will.
253 Averroes,MCDA, p. 123
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the passionate and desiderative faculties are elsewhere than in the cogitative faculty.”254 
He goes on to discuss motion (both locomotion and action more generally) and what 
faculty is responsible for motion in human beings. He notes that “speculative intellect” 
cannot be responsible for motion because it “does not contemplate that which is to be 
sought or that from which one flees,”255 nor can the appetitive part be the primary 
motivation. Thus, it is “both together: desire with knowledge or with imagination” which 
result in motion.256 When desire is accompanied by knowledge or intellect in this way it is 
called will and choice and it is the result of the desiderative part of the soul; this faculty 
allows one to pursue the universal/pure or practical/apparent good and to avoid the real or 
apparent bad.257 It is only the human being who is able to recognize the nuances and 
possible contrariety that can exist among myriad goods and to deliberate and make 
choices regarding these goods, using the desiderative part of the soul.258 The desiderative 
part of the soul is corporeal and so is related to the body259 and it functions by pushing 
and pulling the animal;260 human beings have the added ability to deliberate so they are 
254 Ibid., p. 124. < وذﻟﻚ أن اﻟﺮﺋﯿﺲ ﻣﻦ ھﺬا اﻟﺠﺮء وھﻮ اﻟﺬى ﯾﺴﻤﻰ اﺧﺘﯿﺎرا ﯾﻮﺟﺪ ﻓﻰ اﻟﻐﯿﺮ اﻟﻔﻜﺮ ،> 
Ivry points out in note 4 that Averroes has substituted choice (ikhtiyar) here for will (the proper translation 
of Aristotle’s boulēsis, wish). He suggests this is because the two are closely connected. This also 
highlights the emphasis placed on the deliberative element of the process for Averroes.
255 Ibid., p. 125.< وﻻ أﯾﻀﺎ ﻧﻘﺪر أن ﻧﻘﻮل إن ھﺬه اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ ھﻰ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮى، و ذﻟﻚ أن اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮى ﻟﯿﺲ ﯾﻨﻈﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﮭﻮب و ﻻ  
اﻟﮭﺮور ﻣﻨﮫ .>
256 Ibid., p. 126. < وﻻ ﻧﻘﺪر أن ﻧﻘﻮل إن اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ ھﺬه اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﺰء اﻟﺸﮭﻮاﻧﻰ، وذﻟﻚ أﻧﺎ ﻗﺪ ﻧﺸﺘﮭﻰ أﺷﯿﺎء ﻛﺜﯿﺮة وﻻ ﻧﺘﺤﺮك إﻟﯿﮭﺎ إذا  
ﻛﺎن اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﯾﺮى ﺧﻼف ذﻟﻚ. وإذا ﻛﺎن ھﺬا ھﻜﺬا ﻓﻈﻠﮭﺮ أﻧﮭﺎ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻷﻣﻮﯾﻦ ﻣﻌﺎ، اﻟﺸﮭﻮة ﻣﻊ اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻢ أو اﻟﺸﮭﻮة ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﺨﯿﻞ .>
257 Averroes notes that “the desiderative part of the soul and the faculty responsible for fleeing are one and 
the same, though they differ in being;” < واﻟﻤﺘﺸﻮق ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ واﻟﮭﺎرب ھﻤﺎ ﺷﺊ واﺣﺪ ﺑﻌﯿﻨﮫ وﻟﻜﻨﮭﻤﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺎن .>(Ibid., 
p. 120). He also differentiates here between the sensory faculties which (along with the desiderative part of 
the soul) apprehend pleasant and harmful and the intellect, which only seeks the good qua good. Clearly he 
is making the distinction between what may be pleasant (an apparent good) and what the intellect knows to 
be good (the good itself); the desiderative power has the ability to choose between a variety of goods or 
apparent goods (pleasant things) and a disregard the knowledge on may have, though intellect, of the actual 
good (perhaps because it is not pleasant at the time).
258 Ibid., pp. 126-128
259 Here Averroes associates it with the heart (following Aristotle) but later, in the LCDA, he locates it in 
the brain, following later developments.
260 Averroes, MCDA, p. 130
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not simply at the mercy of imagination or desire.261 From what has been said here it 
begins to become clear that, for Averroes, practical, moral action is the result of several 
faculties working in conjunction. It is not enough to have desire, or knowledge, or 
imagination, alone; rather, all of these things play a part in the process which results in 
action. This is most easily seen in Averroes’ account of the practical syllogism. 
Examining how Averroes explains Aristotle’s practical syllogism can further 
explain how he interprets the relationship between universal and particular knowledge 
and the faculties responsible for these types of knowledge. First, Averroes’ points out that 
deliberation is the work of the cogitative power (and not the intellect itself), explaining, 
Deliberation, however, is found only in a rational animal, 
since preference for one object of the imagination over 
other perceived and imagined things is due to the activity of 
the cogitative faculty. This, since the faculty which 
apprehends the preferred effect must be the same which 
apprehends many things—that is, many objects of the 
imagination simultaneously—and has to discern between 
them in order to apprehend that which is the preferred and 
best, just as the contemplative intellect apprehends the most 
important of many objects.262 
This passage highlights the distinction between the material cogitative power and the 
immaterial power of the “contemplative’ or theoretical intellect. The intellect cannot be 
responsible for deliberating about several things in the same category because it knows 
only the universal concept, not the distinguishing characteristics of particulars. Given the 
261 Ibid., p. 130.
262 Ibid., p. 130. < وﻻﻛﻦ ﻧﻘﻮل إﻧﮫ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﺪ ﺗﺘﺤﺮك ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺤﺪودة وﻻ ﻣﺤﺼﻠﺔ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﯾﻮﺟﺪ ﻟﮭﺎ ﺗﺨﯿﻞ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺤﺼﻞ وﻻ ﻣﺤﺪود،  
واﻟﺘﺨﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﺼﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻰ اﻟﺤﯿﻮاﻧﺎت اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻠﺔ. ﻓﺄﻣﺎ اﻟﺮأى ﻓﻠﯿﺲ ﯾﻮﺟﺪ إﻻ ﻓﻰ اﻟﺤﯿﻮان اﻟﻨﺎطﻖ، وذﻟﻚ أن إﯾﺜﺎر ﺷﺊ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺷﯿﺎء اﻟﻤﺘﺨﯿﻠﺔ دون  
ﻏﯿﺮه ﻣﻦ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﺤﺴﻮﺳﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺨﯿﺎة ھﻮ ﻣﻦ ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻔﻜﺮ. وذﻟﻚ أﻧﮫ ﻗﺪ ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﯾﻜﻮن اﻟﺬى ﯾﺪرك اﻵﺛﺮ ﻗﻮة واﺣﺪة ﺗﺪرك أﺷﯿﺎء ﻛﺜﯿﺮة ﻣﻌﺎ،  
أﻋﻨﻰ ﻣﺘﺨﯿﻼت ﻛﺜﯿﺮة وﺗﻘﺎﯾﺲ ﺑﯿﻨﮭﺎ ﺣﺘﻰ ﺗﺪرك اﻵﺛﺮ ﻣﻨﮭﺎ واﻷﻓﻀﻞ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﯾﺪرك اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮى ﻣﻦ اﻷﺷﯿﺎء اﻟﻜﺜﯿﺮة أﻋﻈﻤﮭﺎ. وھﺬا ھﻮ اﻟﺴﺒﺐ ﻓﻰ  
أن ﻛﺎن اﻟﺤﯿﻮان اﻟﻨﺎطﻖ ﻟﮫ ظﻦ، ﻓﺈﻧﮫ ﻻ ظﻦ وﻻ رأى ﻟﻤﻦ ﻟﯿﺲ ﻋﻨﺪه ﻣﻘﺎﯾﺴﺔ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻷﺷﯿﺎء .>
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universal concept already present, the cogitative faculty can then deliberate about which 
particular best fits the concept and is thus the ‘preferred’ option. 
This is further explained by Averroes’ account of the practical syllogism itself:
The faculty which apprehends something universal is not 
moved by it, since that faculty belongs solely to cognition 
and the apprehension of universals and not to motion. 
However, while that which is universal does not attract 
motion, the faculty which apprehends particulars as such 
does move, in that it is moved. The faculty which 
apprehends universals in practical things is one which 
determines that, every time this sort of attribute occurs, it 
behooves one to act or avoid action, while the particular 
faculty is that which determines that a given object has this 
attribute (that on which the intellect has passed judgment), 
at which time motion occurs to this particular [faculty] 
from the object of because of it. This being the case, it is 
clear that the particular causes motion, whereas we can say 
either that the universal has no motion of its own or that 
motion belongs to both: the universal in that it is stationary, 
the particular in that it is moved.263
This text follows Aristotle in explaining both the necessity of universal knowledge and 
practical limitations of the intellect. One cannot act without knowledge of the universal 
because it is this knowledge which helps one to decide whether something is worthy of 
action or not. If one does not have this general framework—that some attribute in general 
should spur one to action—one will not act once one encounters some particular thing 
with that attribute. Once one encounters a particular object which has the attribute, one 
can decide, via the practical intellect/cogitative power, how to act towards that object. 
263 Ibid., p. 131.
>ﻓﺄﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺪرك اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﻜﻠﻰ ﻓﺈﻧﮭﺎ ﻻ ﺗﺘﺤﺮك ﻋﻨﮫ ﻷن ھﺬه اﻟﻘﻮة إﻧﻤﺎ ھﻰ ﻟﻠﻌﻠﻢ وﻹدراك اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﻜﻠﻰ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻻ ﺑﺤﺮﻛﺔ. واﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﻜﻠﻰ ﻟﯿﺲ 
إﻟﯿﮫ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺪرك اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﺠﺰﺋﯿﺎت ﻓﮭﺬه ھﻰ ﻟﻠﺠﺰﺋﯿﺎت وھﺬه ﺗﺤﺮك ﻓﻘﻂ ﺑﺄن ﺗﺘﺤﺮك. و ذﻟﻚ أن اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺪرك اﻟﻜﻠﯿﺎت ﻓﻲ 
اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ ھﻰ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺤﻜﻢ ﺑﺄن ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن ﺑﺼﻔﺔ ﻛﺬا ﻓﯿﻨﺒﻐﻰ أن ﯾﻔﻌﻞ أو ﯾﺘﺠﻨﺐ، واﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺠﺰﺋﯿﺔ ھﻰ اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺤﻜﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ھﺬا اﻟﻤﺸﺎر 
إﻟﯿﮫ ھﻮ ﺑﮭﺬه اﻟﺼﻔﺔ اﻟﺘﻰ ﺣﻜﻢ ﺑﮭﺎ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ، ﻓﺘﻘﻊ ﺣﯿﻨﺌﺬ إﻟﻰ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻨﮫ أو ﻋﻨﮫ. وإذا ﻛﺎن ھﺬا ھﻜﺬا ﻓﺒﯿﻦ أن اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﺠﺰﺋﻰ ﯾﺤﺮك، وأﻣﺎ 
اﻟﻜﻰ ﻓﺈﻣﺎ أن ﻧﻘﻮل إﻧﮫ ﻟﯿﺲ ﻟﮫ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺪﺗﮫ أو ﻧﻘﻮل إن اﻟﺘﺤﺮﯾﻚ ﻟﮭﻤﺎ ﺟﻤﯿﻌﺎ ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻜﻠﻰ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ أﻧﮫ ﺳﺎﻛﻦ واﻟﺠﺰﺋﻰ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ أﻧﮫ ﯾﺘﺤﺮك.< 
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Thus, the particular object provokes movement because of the way it embodies attributes 
understood by the intellect.
From this Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima we have established 
Averroes’ early position on the nature of the intellects and the cogitative power. Here he 
explains that the Agent Intellect is a separate substance whose function is to actualize 
potential intelligibles, making them knowable. The material intellect, on the other hand is 
a disposition of the human being; it is immaterial (in that it is not mixed with the matter 
of the body) but it is still individuated according to number in the case of each human 
being. It provides a link between the individual human being’s soul and the separate 
Agent Intellect. The cogitative power is a brain power which has some of the 
responsibility for choice but does not house the desiderative power. This view of the 
material intellect and the cogitative power will be radically altered by Averroes in his 
Long Commentary, as shall be explained below. 
 
3.2.3.2 Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle
Averroes takes what he has said in the Middle Commentary about the the 
intellects, cogitation, and other issues and offers a new account in the Long Commentary. 
The focus of our examination will be the cogitative power, which is given a number of 
new powers due to its role as the closest thing to intellect existing in the individual 
human being once the Material Intellect is taken as a fully separate Intellect.264 Here 
264 Although, as I mention, the focus of the discussion on the Long Commentary will be on the cogitative 
power and the will it must be noted that an important shift regarding the view of the Intellects takes place 
between the Middle and Long Commentaries on the De Anima. As we saw above, the Middle Commentary 
explains that there is a single separate Agent Intellect but individuated material intellects which are 
“dispositions” Here in the Long Commentary Averroes finds that the dispositional view he held earlier is 
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Averroes explains that, according to his reading of the De Anima 3.9, it is the cogitative 
power that is responsible for willing. This section of De Anima is quoted in the Long 
Commentary as stating that “what governs exists in the cogitative part.”265 Averroes 
explains that this “governing power” is the desiderative power which “exists only in the 
rational soul (he meant this when he said in the cogitative part).”266 The desiderative 
power, the power that is responsible for wishing, desiring, or willing, is thus related to the 
rational part of the human being but is not in the separate Intellects. Since the cogitative 
power, as we will see, is the part of the human being which is closest to the Intellects and 
is “a kind of reason,”267 it makes sense to conclude that the will is in the cogitative power. 
Locating the will in the cogitative power in the human being (in the brain) allows 
Averroes to insist that both knowledge attainment and moral decision making are under 
the control of the individual human being despite the Intellects being separate and one for 
all. It is the cogitative power that allows individuals to make use of the Intellects and it is 
the cogitative power which brings the resulting knowledge to bear on particular 
situations. Thus, knowledge attainment, deliberation, and choice are “up to us” and done 
“by our will.”268
not sufficient and so he argues that both the Material and Agent Intellects must be single, separate entities 
shared by all human beings. To represent this shift in perspective and the new status of the Material 
Intellect the terms Material Intellect and Intellect in general are capitalized.
265 Averroes, LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 42, p. 408. “Principale enim exisit in parte cogitativa” (p. 510.) In 
the corresponding passage in the MCDA Averroes specifically mentions choice (ikhtiyar) at this point, but 
here there is mention of either choice or will (irādah).
266 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 42, p. 408. “Virtus enim principalis non existit nisi in anima rationali (et hoc 
intendebat cum dixit in parte cogitativa)” (p. 510)
267 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 20, p. 359. “Ista enim virtus est aliqua ratio” (p. 449). He also notes here that 
without the cogitative and imaginative powers the Material Intellect “understands nothing,” making the 
connection between knowledge and cogitation even more clear. In so far as the will is part of the cogitative 
power its relationship to the Intellects and so to knowledge is, thus, also established.
268 Averroes’ addresses the issue of will and of what is done by our will in several places in the Long 
Commentary. In some of these areas he is directly addressing selections from Aristotle which include the 
notion of wish or voluntary action; these passages use the voluntas or some conjugation of velle, indicating 
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Motion, as we saw from Aristotle and from Averroes’ discussion in the Middle 
Commentary, is always towards an end and is accompanied by imagination or appetite. 
Averroes explains in the Long Commentary that regarding action it is desire and the 
activity of the cogitative power or imagination which causes one to move towards a 
desired object. He notes that “the intellect in virtue of which there is activity [...] is the 
cogitative practical [intellect]”269 and this intellect is focused upon action. Here Averroes 
is using the term intellect analogously to denote that part of the rational soul responsible 
for the deliberative process which spurs one to action—the cogitative power. This makes 
sense given Averroes’ position on the relationship of practical and theoretical intellects—
particular and universal knowledge—in the practical syllogism, which will be discussed 
below. Since the practical intellect “will desire in virtue of knowledge and will move in 
virtue of desire, it is necessary that the intellect itself be a cause of motion insofar as it is 
what desires, not insofar as it is what apprehends, and not insofar as desire is a power 
different from the intellect which is also a cause of motion.”270 Thus, while it is the 
practical intellect (i.e., the cogitative power) which moves the person to action, it does 
this not merely or principally as intellect—although knowledge in some sense, at least 
that Averroes was working from a translation of Aristotle which erroneously (as we say in Chapter 2) 
included the notion of will. These passages include: Bk. 1, comment 18, p. 22, Bk. 1, comment 89, p. 99 (p. 
120 in Latin text includes the world velle), Bk. 2, comment 28, pp. 134-5, Bk. 2, comment 153, pp. 277-8 
(p. 363 in the Latin text, where we find voluerimus in the reference to Aristotle), Bk. 3, comment 18 pp. 
351-2, Bk. 3, comment 5 p. 307, Bk. 3, comment 36 p. 391, Bk. 3, comment 36 pp. 395-6, Bk. 3, comment 
36, p. 399, Bk. 3, comment 50, pp.415-16 (voluntas appears in the reference to the text of Aristotle in Latin, 
p. 518), Bk. 3, comment 57, pp. 427-8.
269 Averroes, LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 49, p. 414. “intellectus per quem agitur [..] est cogitativus 
operativus” (p. 517).
270 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 49, p. 415. “et intellectus, quando comprehendit aliquid, disiderabit per 
scientiam et movebit per desiderium, necesse est ut ipse intellectus sit movens secundum qod est 
disiderans, non secundum quod est comprehendens, neque secundum quod desiderium est alia virtus ab 
intellectu que est etiam movens” (p. 518)
This is, again, a kind of equivocation regarding the term intellect; Averroes is following Aristotle here. 
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knowledge of the particular desired thing, must be involved—but as a desiring thing. This 
means that it is what desires (i.e. the will) and not intellect or imagination per se which 
moves the person; this is because one is not moved by either of these things in the 
absence of desire. This is not to say that intellect is not a necessary component of the 
moral process which results in motion. In fact, as the practical syllogism makes clear, 
action requires theoretical knowledge. What Averroes means is that knowledge on its own 
is not enough to spur us to action and so our actions are, in a sense, motivated not by 
knowledge but by desire. Averroes goes on to note that the location in the soul of this 
desiring is what differentiates will from appetite. Will is accompanied by cogitation, a 
kind of reason, and appetite is not.271
Cogitation, unlike imagination, exists only in rational animals (i.e. human beings); 
since willing is appetite/desire accompanied by cogitation, it follows that willing is 
something that only humans can do. Cogitation is further linked to the ideas of ‘choice’ 
and ‘judgment’ which seem to be related to Aristotle’s notions of decision and 
deliberation, respectively. These are likewise only human functions as it is only through 
the use of reason that one may apprehend what among many particulars (‘imaginings’) is 
most pleasurable and choose that thing over another.272
From what has been said so far we can begin to see how the will, an aspect of the 
cogitative power, is responsible for the human being’s ability to identify various ‘goods,’ 
consider their present and future implications, choose that which seems best, and initiate 
271 He says that “the part of the soul which desires is what causes motion universally. If, therefore, it 
desires in virtue of cogitation, it will be called will and if it is without cogitation, it will be called 
appetite” (LCDA, Bk. 3, comment. 50, p. 416). “idest quod pars anime desiderans est movens universaliter; 
si igitur desideraverit per cogitation, dicetur voluntas, et si fuerit sine cogitatione, dicetur appetitus” (p. 
519)
272 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 57, pp. 427-429; Latin pp., 529-531
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action towards that good; this set of activities is often explained as the work of the 
practical intellect, which, as seen above, is associated with the cogitative power and, thus, 
the will. We can already see a sketch of how the practical and the theoretical sciences, 
discussed in more general terms in the Commentary on the Republic, are linked in the 
particular instance of moral action. The deliberative process from willing to choosing to 
acting is undertaken by the cogitative faculty which has a link both to the practical (being 
the corporeal power responsible for this process), and to the theoretical (being the part 
which links the individual to the theoretical part of the soul—the separate Intellects). It is 
this connection to theoretical or speculative knowledge which we have left to explore.
As with the discussion of the will and the cogitative power, the picture of the 
Intellects and their relationship to the individual is examined carefully in Averroes’ Long 
Commentary. In this text Averroes explains, as he did in the Middle Commentary, that the 
Agent Intellect is called an intellect “insofar as it makes every intelligible in potency to 
be an intelligible in act,”273 and the Material Intellect is that which “is made everything,” 
receiving the intelligibles in act, which are the objects of knowledge. When the human 
being has the thoughts or images which represent the intelligibles in act in the Material 
Intellect, he is said to have intellect in a positive disposition (intellectus in habitu) and to 
know.274 Both the Agent and Material Intellects must be separate substances, shared by all 
human beings, one abstracting and the other receiving the abstraction.275
273 Ibid., Bk 3, comment 18, p. 350. “et quod in ea etiam sit tertia pars que dicitur intellectus secundum 
quod facit omne intellectum in potentia esse intellectum in actu.” (p. 437)
274 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 18, pp. 350-352; Latin pp. 437-440 
275 As was explained earlier, this must be the case because (1) they must be immaterial, that is separate 
from and unmixed with matter, in order to be able to know universal immaterial intelligibles; and (2) they 
must be separate from individual human beings because there can only be one set of intelligibles, shared by 
all knowers, and thus one intellect to know them. See the Introduction to Taylor’s translation of the Long 
Commentary for a discussion of the tradition Averroes encountered and used (Taylor, “Introduction,” pp. 
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The account of the cogitative power as it relates to will is combined with the 
account of the Intellects and their relationship to the individual (through the cogitative 
power) to provide a more comprehensive view of the individual’s ability to know, to will, 
and to act. Averroes says that “it is necessary to ascribe these two activities to the soul in 
us, namely, to receive the intelligible and to make it, although the agent and the recipient 
are eternal substances, on account of the fact that these two activities are reduced to our 
will, namely to abstract intelligibles and to understand them.”276 This makes it clear that 
the human being is personally responsible for the actions which lead to knowledge and it 
is the human being who is said to understand once the process is complete. This is easier 
to grasp once we remember that knowledge attainment begins with the external senses 
and moves from these to the internal senses of the passible intellect. The passible intellect 
(called intellect only analogously) contains the three passible, material powers of 
imagination, cogitation, and memory.277 These powers are “in human beings”278 (they are 
xv-lxxvi). 
276 Averroes, LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 18 p. 351, emphasis added. “Et fuit necesse attribuere has duas 
actiones anime in nobis, scilicet recipere intellectum et facere eum, quamvis agens et recipiens sint 
substantie eterne, propter hoc quia hee actiones reducte sunt ad nostram voluntatem, scilicet abstrahere 
intellecta et intelligere ea. Abstrahere enim nichil est aliud quam facere intentiones ymaginatas intellectus 
in actu postquam erant in potentia intelligere autem nichil aliud est quam recipere has intentiones. Cum 
enim invenimus idem transferri in suo esse de ordine in ordinem, scilicet intentiones ymaginatas, diximus 
quod necesse est ut hoc sit a causa agenti et recipienti. Recipiens igitur est materialis, et agens est 
efficiens.” (p. 439; emphasis added).
This claim that intellectual powers must be in the individual is made in several other places as 
well, where Averroes uses phrases such as “form for us,” “final form for us,” and “united with us” to 
describe the relationship the human being must have to the Agent Intellect; he also makes it clear that the 
resulting knowledge of universals is ‘in us.’ See Bk 2, comment 60, p.172, Bk. 3, comment 5, p. 306-307, 
Bk 3, comment 18, p. 352, Bk. 3, comment 20, pp. 355-356, Bk. 3, comment 36, pp. 383, 387, 391, 395-6, 
and 399 for places where these phrases are used. In all of these discussion Averroes makes it clear that in 
order for us to be able to say that intellect is an essential attribute of the human being it must be the case 
that the intellectual faculties are in the human being in some real (though not necessarily ontological) sense. 
Taylor points out in “The Agent Intellect as ”form for us” and Averroes’s Critique of al-Farabi,” p. 20-21 
and 23-24, that there are similar passages in the Short Commentary and the Middle Commentary despite the 
different view of the intellects which Averroes holds in these texts.
277 LCDA, Bk. 3 comment 20 p. 359; Latin p. 449
278 Ibid, p. 359; “in homine” (p. 449)
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what we may call brain powers rather than intellectual powers279). These powers, 
particularly cogitation, are critical to linking the individual person to the Material and 
Agent Intellects and thus to knowledge. The cogitative power plays the dual role of (1) 
extracting the potentially intelligible individual intentions from the image and storing 
them in memory, thereby making them available to the Agent Intellect,280 and (2) of 
housing the representative images of the actual intelligibles used in thinking, allowing the 
person to have intellect in a positive disposition (intellectus in habitu).281 The cogitative 
power provides a link between the individual and the Material Intellect such that the 
individual may be easily conjoined with the Intellect whenever she wills.282 
When we combine the role the cogitative power plays in conjoining the individual 
to the Intellects with what has previously been said about its role in relation to will and 
choice, we can enumerate the four functions the cogitative power has for the human 
being, all of which are essential to explaining knowledge and moral action. First, the 
cogitative power takes the individual intentions of the individual person’s images and 
279 Averroes notes elsewhere that the cogitative power, specifically, is “a particular material power” (virtus 
particularis materialis) and that it differs from the intellect both in terms of its activity and because it is 
“generable and corruptible [...having] a determinate organ, namely, the middle chamber of the 
brain” (generabilem et corruptibilem […] cum habit instrumentum terminatum, scilicet medium ventricular 
cerebri.) (LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 33, p. 379; Latin p. 476). 
280 Ibid., Bk. 3 comment 20 p. 359; Latin p. 449. Averroes also offers an extended discussion of the role of 
the cogitative power in presenting particular information to the intellect at Bk 3, comment 33, pp. 378-379; 
Latin pp. 476-477; he takes special care to note, again, that the cogitative power is not intellect, despite the 
“custom” of ascribing cogitation to the intellect.
281 Richard Taylor provides a detailed account of how this happens and the role the cogitative power plays 
in allowing intelligibles in act to be operationally present in the individual human being (i.e. how the 
individual comes to have intellect in a positive disposition) in his article “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and 
Cogitare: Remarks on the Cogitative Power in Averroes,” in L’elaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au 
Moyen Age, edited by J. Hamesse and C. Steel, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000). The entire article is relevant and 
useful for this discussion but see especially pp. 120-124 and pp. 133-137. Also see Richard C. Taylor, 
“Remarks on Cogitatio in Averroes’ Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros,” in Averroes 
and the Aristotelian Tradition: Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd 
(1126-1198), edited by Jan A. Aertsen and Gerhard Endress, pp.217-255 (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
282 Averroes, LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 36, p. 399; Latin p. 500. Also see Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and 
Cogitare: Remarks on the Cogitative Power in Averroes,” for a detailed discussion of how these Intellects 
and the cogitative power relate.
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prepares them for the work of the Agent Intellect. Second, it holds and uses the 
representative images which make the individual able to readily understand the 
intelligibles in act in the Material Intellect; it has a role in making the link between the 
individual human being, and the separate Intellects. In so far as this link is essential for 
all thought, it also allows for the practical intellectual work necessary for deliberation and 
decision making. These first two uses of the cogitative power make individual human 
knowledge possible. Third, the will is a function of the cogitative power and so it is 
cogitation which makes it possible for one to have ends. Fourth, the will allows one to 
make choices regarding how best to achieve those ends through a process of deliberation 
as it is the power which considers the means to the ends.283 Thus, cogitation is key to the 
entire process of moral action from wishing for something to choosing a course of action 
to willing oneself to take that action. In so far as cogitation is a brain power and is the 
focal point of this process, it is clear that the individual human being is a moral agent 
who can be held responsible for her actions.
Now that we have examined in detail what the Long Commentary says about the 
cogitative power and its relation to both the Intellects and the will, something should be 
said about the practical syllogism, as an example of how the moral decision making 
process works and makes use of the various cognitive powers of the soul. He discusses 
the elements of the practical syllogisms in several sections, following Aristotle’s text. 
First, he explains the role of the cogitative power. Averroes explains that the cogitative 
power is responsible for choosing or judging among ‘imagined things’ and for reviewing 
283 In his discussion of the beacon of fire example Averroes notes several times that what is going on in 
this example of deliberation or practical intellect is cogitation. See LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 33, pp. 
376-379; Latin pp. 474-477.
112
those ‘imaginings.’ What he seems to be suggesting here is that it is the work of the 
cogitative power to deliberate about what possibility is best in a given situation; this 
involves imagining/thinking up various possibilities, reviewing them to judge their 
merits, and finally choosing one over the others; all of this is the work of the cogitative 
power. It is this process of reviewing and comparing the possibilities until one is 
“affected” by one of them and takes it up that allows human beings to have opinions and 
which constitutes the process of (moral) deliberation.284
This is not, however, a full account of deliberation. There must be some standard 
one uses when reviewing and judging these ‘imaginings.’ Averroes discusses this next, as 
he explains the role of the cognitive power (the Intellects). He says that the cognitive 
power does not cause motion because human beings are only spurred to movement by 
particulars while cognition is about universals. When the cogitative power judges some 
particular thing to fall under the universal, it initiates the activity associated with that 
universal.285 
Thus, action, including moral action, requires the work of both the Intellects (the 
cognitive power) and the cogitative power because it requires apprehension of both a 
universal and a particular. While action is, principally speaking, the result of the workings 
of the cogitative power, this work requires the intellects in order to be fulfilled. Earlier in 
the text, in the beacons of fire example mentioned above, Averroes highlights the 
closeness of the relationship among the Intellects and the cogitative power when he 
explains the materiality of the cogitative power: 
284 Ibid., Bk 3, comment 57, pp. 427-428; Latin pp. 529-530.
285 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 58 pp 429-430; Latin pp. 531-532.
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When the cogitative power draws aid for itself from the 
informative and memorative [powers] it is naturally 
constituted to present on the basis of the images of things 
something which is never sensed, in the same disposition 
according to which it would exist if it had sensed it, by 
means of assent and conceptualization. Then, the intellect 
will judge those images with a universal judgment […] it 
should not be the case that someone says the cogitative 
power composes the singular intelligibles. It was already 
explained that the material intellect composes them. For 
cogitation is only for discerning individual instances among 
those intelligibles and to present them in act as if they were 
present in sensation.286
Here Averroes is again demonstrating that the cogitative power and the intellectual 
powers must work together. The material intellect composes and contains the “singular 
intelligibles” (the unique intelligibles in act) which the cogitative power is able to recall 
when it is spurred to do so by sensation or through the use of the memorative power. In 
this way the cogitative power allows the individual human being to ‘link up’ to the 
Material Intellect and have access to the intelligibles in act which reside therein. This 
allows the intellect to make a “universal judgment” about whether the particular is indeed 
related to the universal (intelligible) in the appropriate way; this in turn allows the 
cogitative power to “discern” what particular, sensible objects are related to these 
intelligibles and what actions should be undertaken.
286 Ibid., Bk 3, comment 33, p. 378-379. “ Quando iuvabit se cum informativa et rememorativa, innata est 
presentare ex ymaginibus rerum aliquam quam nunquam sensit, in eadem dispositione secundum quam 
esset si sensisset eam, fide et informatione; et tunc intellectus iudicabit illas ymagines iudicio universali 
[…] Et non debet aliquis dicere quod virtus cogitativa componit intelligibilia singularia; et iam declaratum 
est quod intellectus materialis componit ea; cogitatio enim non est nisi in distringuendo individua illorum 
intelligibilium et presentare ea in actu quasi essent apud sensum” (p. 476). The entire section (pp. 377-379; 
Latin pp. 474-477) is relevant; I provide only the most important elements here for the sake of brevity. 
It should be noted, given what was said about the Stoic notion of assent in Chapter 2, that the term 
assent here is not to be taken in the Stoic sense. Rather, it indicates the link between the mind and 
sensation. To assent in this regard is a judgment that what one conceptualizes in the mind “matches up” to 
what one has experienced or sensed from the world. Averroes offers some context for this account in his 
discussion of De Anima 3.6. Thus, his use of assent here is Aristotelian rather than Stoic.
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3.3 Analysis and Interpretation: The Resulting View of Moral Action and 
Responsibility
Having now offered an extensive account of Averroes’ claims regarding the 
psychological mechanism by which individual human beings are able to undertake moral 
actions and be held responsible for those actions, a brief synthesis of what has been 
learned from the primary texts is in order. I will examine the resulting view of the 
knowledge attainment process first and then move on to an examination of the will and 
the deliberative process. 
3.3.1 Knowledge and the Intellects
Averroes holds that there are five faculties or powers of the soul: nutritive, 
sensitive, imaginative, rational, and appetitive. The sensitive faculty consists in the five 
external senses and provides the foundation for knowledge insofar as human beings start 
with sensation and through a process of abstraction attain intellectual understanding. The 
imaginative faculty is an internal sense faculty which is distinct from both the sensitive 
and rational faculties. In human beings the imaginative faculty is replaced by the 
cogitative faculty.287 The objects of imagination/cogitation are particular and material 
(unlike those of the rational faculty) but they need not be actually present or even real (a 
requirement for the sensitive powers). The special power of the cogitative power involves 
combining and separating the images from the imaginative power which are created and 
deposited in the imagination by the common sense as it combines the data obtained by 
287 Although imagination, along with cogitation and memory, is part of the passible intellect, most of the 
functions which the imaginative faculty fulfills for animals are the work of the cogitative faculty in human 
beings.
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the work of the sensitive faculty. It is directly responsible for stimulating the appetitive 
faculty. An animal is moved to seek or shun something according to how the imaginative 
faculty moves the appetitive faculty.288 While the workings of the imaginative faculty in 
moving a non-rational animal are largely instinctual (or experiential), for human beings 
the cogitative faculty controls a more advanced and nuanced process by which an 
individual uses understanding of both particulars and universals to deliberate about and 
choose a course of action, as will be discussed below. Although the cogitative power is a 
material, bodily power it is intimately connected to reason and is sometimes included as 
part of the rational powers.289 As explained above, the cogitative power is responsible (1) 
for extracting relevant intentions from the images provided by sensation, thus providing 
the fodder for the work of the Agent Intellect, and (2) for storing the representative 
images of the intelligibles, thus allowing human beings to access the intelligibles in act in 
the Material Intellect at will.290 The cogitative power, as a “kind of reason [aliqua 
ratio]”291 allows individual human beings to be called intellectual knowers despite the 
fact that both the Material and Agent Intellects are separate substances shared by all 
human beings for Averroes; it is the cogitative power which provides the link between the 
individual human being and the separate Intellects. 
In addition to these faculties human beings have the rational faculty, which can be 
divided into theoretical and practical. The theoretical intellect is responsible for 
apprehending and understanding universal intelligibles. The practical intellect is 
288 See Majid Fakhry, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) His Life, Works, and Influence, (Oxford: One World, 2001) for 
a summary of these faculties and their workings.
289 See Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on the Cogitative Power in Averroes,” pp. 
120-121
290 Ibid., pp. 120-124; pp. 133-137.
291 Averroes, LCDA Bk 3, comment 20. See pp. 105-106 above for a discussion of this idea in context.
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responsible for apprehending the particulars which fall under these universals and 
spurring the human being to practical or moral action. Although we rely on sensation and 
imagination to provide us with the information necessary to allow us to grasp 
intelligibles, the intelligibles themselves are immaterial and universal.292 They exist in the 
separate Material Intellect, the result of intellectual abstraction done by the Agent 
Intellect on the image presented to it by the cogitative power. The disposition to 
apprehend the universals exists in the Material Intellect which is also, in Averroes’ final 
view in the Long Commentary, separate and one for all human beings. When the Material 
Intellect is actualized by the Agent Intellect, the imaginative forms are actualized and the 
state of acquired intellect is achieved. Once this happens the individual achieves the state 
of intellect in a positive disposition (intellectus in habitu) which is “the state of a human 
being who has come to be positively disposed by the reception of knowledge and who 
understands such that this knowledge can be easily recalled at will.”293 This process does 
not happen randomly; rather, it can be initiated by a person, through the use of the 
292 A discussion of the intellects and their role can be found in Fakhry, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) His Life, 
Works, and Influence, pp.67-69.
293 Taylor, “Introduction,” p. xx. Here he provides an account of all of the stages or types of intellect. It is 
important to take note of the phrase “at will” here; this indicates that although the Material and Agent 
Intellects are separate the activity of knowledge attainment is initiated by individual human beings and it is 
individual human beings who come to know. Taylor also points out that all of these “intellects,” including 
the separate Material and Agent Intellects are “in the soul” according to Averroes in the Long Commentary. 
Also see Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on the Cogitative Power in Averroes” for a 
discussion of the the intellectual process.
Fakhry, offers an account of the “rational faculty” and the workings of the Intellects in Averroes 
(Ibn Rushd) His Life, Works, and Influence, pp. 67-73. However, this account is flawed in important 
respects. First, he claims that the intelligibles are stored within the Agent Intellect; in fact, as we see, as 
pure act the Agent Intellect cannot act as a storehouse. Rather, its job is to abstract from the information 
resulting from sensation to allow the Material Intellect to receive the resulting intelligibles in act.
Second, he claims that for Averroes the end result of the intellectual process is conjunction with 
the Agent Intellect, which he calls the acquired intellect. However, while Avicenna does advocate for a kind 
of conjunction this is not the view of Averroes.
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cogitative faculty, and particularly by the will,294 because, despite being separate, it is a 
power “in the soul”295 according to Averroes. The cogitative power provides the necessary 
link between the separate Intellects and the individual human beings which is essential to 
the process of knowledge attainment; the process, starts with sensory information and it is 
the cogitative power296 which takes sensory information and “distills individual 
intentions” and makes these intelligibles in potency available, through memory, to the 
separate Intellects which can actualize and de-particularize them.297 This means that 
Averroes is able to claim that individuals have knowledge of theoretical concepts (such as 
the universal Good) despite sharing both Intellects. This is important for us insofar as 
moral actions must be judged based upon their conformity to the actual good, not just the 
apparent good or the desired end. As Averroes noted in his Commentary on the Republic, 
the theoretical and the practical sciences/arts are linked.
294 Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, pp. 330-335 provides a detailed discussion of 
Averroes’ position (in the Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima) regarding how this conjunction is 
achieved and how determinate individuals can be said to have a role in it given that both intellects are 
separate.
295 As mentioned above, Averroes’ is insistent in several places that the intellectual powers must be “in the 
soul” and “form for us” if the human being is going to be a truly intellectual being. Taylor explains this 
idea, the Principle of Intrinsic Formal Cause, in, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul According 
to Aquinas and Averroes,” pp. 202-211. He explains that the Agent Intellect must be “present in the 
individual human being such that it is intrinsic and essential” (p. 205) in order to account for the fact that 
human beings are essentially (rather than accidentally) rational and able to exercise our rational capacity at 
will. Theoretical intellect is the term used to indicate the intellectual state of the human being who is 
making use of the separate Agent Intellect.
296 Some things should be said regarding the cogitative power, for the sake of clarity. This power has a 
number of functions in Averroes system. In particular, the cogitative power, as the link between the 
individual human beings and the separate Intellects, plays a role in both generating knowledge and making 
use of that knowledge. On the one hand it aids in knowledge attainment by “distilling” the intentions found 
in sensory information and presenting the resulting intelligibles in potency to the Intellects which can then 
actualize them. On the other hand, it makes use of this theoretical or universal knowledge by allowing the 
individual to relate particular experiences or information to the universal knowledge housed in the Material 
Intellect, as when one uses the practical syllogism or considers a particular theoretical problem. Thus, the 
cogitative power plays an important role in all levels of reasoning, from the practical reasoning, important 
to moral decision making, to the inferential reasoning (dianoia) involved in more theoretical matters. 
297 See Taylor, ““Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on the Cogitative Power in Averroes,” pp. 
119-124 for a detailed account of the cogitative power and its role. 
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This provides a summary of the final position of Averroes. Taylor explains the 
development of this position, particularly in reference to Averroes’ three Commentaries 
on De Anima. He points out that the views of Averroes can be broken down into several 
stages, roughly corresponding to the Short, Middle, and Long Commentaries on the De 
Anima. The earliest position holds that the material intellect exists in the individual as an 
“immaterial disposition of the soul having as subject by which it exists in a human being 
the forms of the imagination as receptive intelligibles.”298 This material intellect is 
actualized by the agent intellect, resulting in individual human knowledge.299 Ivry points 
out that it is the view of the Agent Intellect as the means by which human intellect is 
perfected which later allows Averroes to claim that the Agent Intellect is “our ‘final 
form.’”300
The position put forth in the Middle Commentary aims at a less physical view of 
the intellects, following Aristotle’s insistence that the intellect must be unmixed with 
matter if it is to think all things without being held back by physical limitations or 
interferences.301 Thus, here Averroes insists that the material intellect “must not be 
298 Taylor, “Introduction,” p. xxv.
299 Ibid., pp. xxii-xxviii for a detailed discussion of this “initial position” and its sources. Also see Taylor’s 
“The Agent Intellect as ”form for us” and Averroes’s Critique of al-Farabi,” pp. 19-21 for a discussion of 
the material and Agent intellects in the Short Commentary and “Textual and Philosophical Issues in 
Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle,” in The Letter Before the Spirit: The 
Importance of Text Editions for the Study of the Reception of Aristotle, edited by Aafke M.I. van Oppenraay 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 274-278 for a discussion of the development of the notion of the Material 
Intellect.
Davidson also offers an account of the nature of the intellects in Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on 
Intellect, pp. 266-274 providing an extended discussion of changes made to the text and to Averroes’ 
position which I will not address here since I do not discuss the Short Commentary in detail above.
300 Alfred L. Ivry, “Averroes’ Three Commentaries on De Anima” in Averroes and the Aristotelian 
Tradition: Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), edited by Jan 
A. Aertsen and Gerhard Endress, (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 203, 208-209. It should be noted that “our ‘final 
form” is another way of saying that the Agent Intellect is “in our soul.” This claim is intended to make it 
clear that the Agent Intellect are an essential part of the human being and of the intellectual process, despite 
being a separate entity shared by all human beings.
301 Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, p. 276.
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primarily tied to or in some particular power such as the imagination in the individual 
corporeal human being;”302 The activity of the material intellect must be thoroughly 
intellectual and yet still within each distinct person’s capacity as a knowers. Taylor 
explains that Averroes’ solution is to hold that there is a receptive disposition towards 
intelligibles in each human being—the material intellect—which is then actualized by the 
conjoining of the human being with the separate Agent Intellect. This allows Averroes to 
claim that the material intellect is individuated without being material.303 Ivry explains 
this relationship among the human being and the material intellect and Agent Intellect by 
claiming the material intellect is connected “incidentally” to the human soul but 
“essentially” to the Agent Intellect, which is responsible for performing abstraction on the 
immaterial intentions it receives as a result of individual human beings’ experiences; it 
thus serves as “a temporary instantiation of that eternal and always actual intellect, our ‘ 
first perfection’; even as the Agent Intellect is our ultimate perfection or ‘final form.”304 It 
seems, then, that under this view it is the material intellect, not the cogitative power, 
which links the human being to the intellectual powers and which allows for determinate 
human beings to have their own knowledge despite the Agent Intellect’s being a separate 
and shared substance.305 The material intellect is multiplied according to the number of 
302 Taylor, “Introduction,” p. xxxv; Also see Ivry, “Averroes’ Three Commentaries on De Anima,” p. 
204-206.
303 Taylor, “Introduction,” pp. xxxv-xxxvi; Taylor explains: “Averroes is able to hold that the capacity 
called ‘material intellect’ in us is in fact intellectual in its own nature and unmixed insofar as it receives 
immaterial intelligibles in act. He is also able to maintain that it is a disposition belonging to us, since its 
presence comes only from coincidence of a natural albeit inchoate disposition and a relation realized by the 
agent intellect in the twofold way indicated” (p. xxxvi) Taylor notes in “Remarks on Cogitatio in Averroes’ 
Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros” that there is some disagreement about Averroes’s 
view of the material intellect in the Long Commentary (see. pp. 221-222)
304 Ivry, “Averroes’ Three Commentaries on De Anima,” p. 205.
305 Little is said about the cogitative power in the Middle Commentary. It is explained, along with the 
power of discrimination, as a power of the soul. Furthermore, choice is is said to involve the imaginative 
power but to “take place in cogitation or in the cogitative power of the soul” and deliberation is said to 
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human beings and is a “power in the souls of particular human beings,” while also being 
specially connected to the agent intellect as a receptive intellectual disposition which 
must be actualized by the agent intellect.306 Such is the view of the Middle Commentary 
which Averroes’ rejects in favor of a different view in the Long Commentary.
Averroes offers his final position on this issue in the Long Commentary.307 Here 
Averroes further distinguishes the Material Intellect from the imagination and other 
internal sense powers, arriving at the claim that it is, like the Agent Intellect, a separate 
substance shared by all human beings. Averroes concludes that the Material Intellect 
cannot be a determinate particular for each human being because its objects, the 
intelligibles in act, cannot be determinate particulars.308 This does not, of course, mean 
that individual human beings are not knowers—it is experientially evident that human 
beings have their own knowledge. He employs the internal sense powers to explain the 
link between individuals and the intelligibles contained within the separate Material 
Intellect; the imaginative, memorative, and cogitative powers provide the particular 
intentions which the Agent Intellect uses to abstract the intelligibles in act309 which are, in 
occur “on account of the activity of cogitation or the cogitative power” (Taylor, “Remarks on Cogitatio in 
Averroes’ Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros,” pp. 221-222). Ivry also discusses the 
cogitative power in the Middle Commentary, including possible reasons why it is so much less prevalent 
than in the Long Commentary in “Averroes’ Three Commentaries on De Anima,” p. 201-202.
306 Taylor, “Introduction,” p. xxxix. Also see Taylor’s “The Agent Intellect as ”form for us” and Averroes’s 
Critique of al-Farabi,” pp. 21-24 for a discussion of the material intellect and the Agent Intellect in the 
Middle Commentary. Also see Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, pp. 274-282; 
Davidson claims the text contains an excursus in which Averroes changed his views, but I will not address 
this here.
307 Taylor discusses a “transitional position” between the Middle and Long Commentaries (see 
“Introduction,” pp. xlii-l) but I shall leave this out, focusing on the texts which have been covered above.
308 Taylor, “Introduction,” p. lviii
309 For a discussion of the Agent Intellect see Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on 
the Cogitative Power in Averroes,” pp. 126-129 where Taylor explains the view of Averroes as it is 
presented in the Long Commentary, in addition to the “Introduction” to his translation of the Long 
Commentary. Also, Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, pp. 315-317.
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turn, deposited into the receptive Material Intellect which human beings have access to 
by an act of the will (using the cogitative power).310 
The cogitative power is of particular importance, as we saw above, since it is 
responsible for processing the particular intentions which become the subject of 
intellectual activity. It is the cogitative power which grasps these intentions and presents 
them via memory to the Agent Intellect and which connects the individual human being 
to the intelligibles in act existing in the Material Intellect. This connection is such that the 
Agent Intellect can be said to be intrinsic to the human being as “form for us” and as 
subject to our will (in so far as we are able to achieve this conjunction when we will it). It 
is thus the cogitative power which is responsible for allowing individual human beings to 
participate in the intellectual activity and be called knowers.311 The cogitative power and 
its ability to link the human being to the separate Intellects allows the intelligibles to be 
‘in’ the human being at least in a functional sense while remaining, ontologically distinct 
from any individual person. This allows it to remain sufficiently universal to 
accommodate common understanding of universal terms and for communication.312
310 Taylor, “Introduction,” pp. lix-lxii. Also see Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on 
the Cogitative Power in Averroes,” pp. 129-138, Taylor, “The Agent Intellect as ”form for us” and 
Averroes’s Critique of al-Farabi,” pp. 24-31, and Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect 
pp. 289-293; 331-335, for a further discussion of the role of the Material Intellect and its relation to the 
human being in the Long Commentary. Ivry calls the passible intellect, particularly the cogitative power, 
“material intellect surrogates,” emphasizing the need for something to take the place of the material 
intellect in the individual, to show that Averroes has changed his view about its location, although he later 
points out that there is a way in which the Intellect still function “in” the human soul (Ivry, “Averroes’ 
Three Commentaries on De Anima,” p. 212-214)
311 Taylor, “Introduction,” pp. lxix-lxxi. Also see Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on 
the Cogitative Power in Averroes,” pp. 120-124 and137-138, and Taylor, “Remarks on Cogitatio in 
Averroes’ Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros,” pp. 223-231. Also see Davidson, 
Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, p. 319 and Ivry, “Averroes’ Three Commentaries on De 
Anima,” p. 213.
312 Taylor notes that “for the intelligibles to be ‘in’ the individual human being, they must be operationally 
or functionally present there, not ontologically present there” (“Remarks on Cogitatio in Averroes’ 
Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros,” p. 230).
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3.3.2 Willing and the Deliberative Process
Now that we have examined Averroes’ overall account of knowledge and the 
powers of the soul responsible for knowledge attainment, something must said about the 
will and the process of moral action. The cogitative faculty, so essential to the knowledge 
attainment process also plays a crucial role in human activity, including moral activity. 
This is because the cogitative power contains the will and is the location of the 
deliberative process, as have seen. Following Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Averroes 
claims that moral actions occur when one wills or wishes for an end and deliberates about 
and chooses the means to attain that end. This process again involves the cogitative 
power. Furthermore, since the cogitative power is a brain power, this process is 
thoroughly individual.
It might be helpful to look at an example of the kind of practical reasoning which 
results in action. Averroes uses the Aristotelian example of the beacon of fire in both the 
Middle Commentary and the Long Commentary on the De Anima. When a soldier sees 
the beacon of fire he is not only aware of the fire but of war which it signals and he 
chooses a course of action based upon this awareness. Averroes says in the Middle 
Commentary that “he moves to fight and seizes his weapon as if he had seen the war with 
his own sense.”313 Clearly the warrior takes action (the realm of practical science or 
knowledge) as a result of deliberating about how to attain a previously arrived at goal (or 
end) regarding how one ought to approach war. Presumably the warrior has willed the 
313 Averroes, MCDA, p.121. ﻣﺜﺎل ذﻟﻚ أﺑﺼﺮ اﻟﺤﺎرب اﻟﻨﺎرة ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺮب وھﻰ اﻟﻨﺎر اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﻮﻗﺪ ﻋﻼﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺮب اﻷﻋﺪاء ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﺎر  
ﺗﺤﺮك ﻟﻠﺤﺮب و أﺟﺬ ﻟﮭﺎ أھﺒﺘﮫ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻟﻮ أﺑﺼﺮ اﻟﺤﺮب ﻧﻔﺴﮭﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺲ . 
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end of conquering his enemies and thus, when he encounters a signal that the enemy is 
approaching, he need only choose the course of action that represents the means to that 
end—taking up arms. In the Long Commentary the same example is presented slightly 
differently and is given a more extensive treatment. When the soldier imagines a signal 
fire is lit in the city towers, he cogitates about this with “reference to future things” and 
acts accordingly.314 Understanding the fire to be signal he seeks to hinder his enemy by 
putting the signal out and cogitates about a means by which to do so. Again, the soldier 
has willed some end regarding the enemy and now chooses a means to attain that goal 
using the cogitative power (the power suited to deliberation about practical matters). One 
may judge the actions of the soldier not only based upon how well they conform to his 
desired end but also based upon their conformity to whatever universal knowledge one 
may have about war, enemies, the good, etc. 
Both examples can be explained by the system of knowledge attainment and 
deliberation already discussed. Through experience the soldier has come to have some 
universal knowledge about what constitutes an enemy, and what the good is with regard 
to how one should respond to an enemy. This information was arrived at using the 
Intellects and stored in the cogitative power as a representative image315 which would 
allow for easy access of the information whenever the soldier willed it. When a specific 
314 Averroes LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 33, pp. 378-379.
315 Averroes does not offer a discussion of what, exactly, he means by a representative image or what 
content such an image would have. Presumably it is the kind of flexible image, serving as a placeholder, 
which immediately comes to mind when one thinks of a general concept but which can be easily altered at 
needed and which one knows is not truly representative of the universal. For example, when I think of the 
universal ‘dog’ I think of my black Lab mix, but I understand that ‘dog’ includes particulars which are 
drastically different than this image, such as a white Chihuahua. But, it is a potential problem that Averroes 
does not flesh this out in a more robust way since it provides a link between the individual and the 
universals in the separate Intellects which is essential to explaining personal, individual knowledge in the 
Averroist system.
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situation arises in which a particular enemy is seen to be advancing, the solder is able to 
use the image stored in his cogitative power to ‘reconnect’ with the separate Intellects and 
remind himself of the details of that universal knowledge. He is also able to take this 
individual instance and compare it to the universal in order to deliberate about the best 
course of action in this situation. The deliberation and then the willing of some specific 
action is the result of the working of the cogitative power as it takes the particular 
occasion at hand and works to determine whether it corresponds to the universal. Once a 
choice has been made, the soldier is able to take action; because the soldier has gone 
through this process for himself, others are able to praise or blame him for his decision 
and for the resulting action.316
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has offered a close examination of the views of Averroes on the 
issues of intellect, will, and moral decision making. It has used several primary texts in 
order to attain a clear picture of how Averroes’ views developed over time and what his 
final position was on these issues. Part of the reason for this strategy was to ensure a full 
account of Averroes’ ideas without reference to later critics, particularly Aquinas; to that 
end, even those texts not available to Aquinas were used. This will allow us to offer a fair 
critique and analysis of both Averroes’ and Aquinas’ positions in Chapter 5. This 
316 One might say that something should be said about freedom of choice and determinism at this point. 
However, for Averroes this is principally a theological issue, appearing in his theological/dialectical works 
rather than his philosophical works, and so I will not be addressing it. To do so would require a discussion 
of how those theological works should be treated in relation to the philosophical and how Averroes’ related 
to Kalam; that is beyond the scope of this dissertation’s project.
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approach also allows us to see more clearly how Averroes’ ideas relate to those of 
Aristotle.
The chapter offers an account of how Averroes’ views of the intellects developed 
and how these developments impact his view of the cogitative power and the will. We 
saw how Averroes’ view of the intellects changed over the course of his three 
Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima. While the Agent Intellect remained separate and 
one for all human beings throughout, there was a major shift in how Averroes’ viewed the 
material intellect. He went from holding that the material intellect was a power of the 
imagination, and thus individuated, to the view that it was a receptive disposition towards 
intelligibles, and thus individuated, to holding that it was a separate receptive Intellect 
and shared by all human beings. This shift in the view of the Material Intellect was 
accompanied by a shift in the view of the passible intellect and particularly of the 
cogitative power; this shift was necessary since Averroes needed to maintain individual 
human responsibility for both knowledge attainment and moral decision making and 
action.317
With both the Material and Agent Intellects separate and shared by all human 
beings the cogitative power, a brain power, became responsible, in Averroes’ system, for 
key elements of knowledge attainment and decision making. The cogitative power allows 
the individual human being to have access to the Intellects at will by preparing and 
presenting the individual intentions, the result of sensory experience, to the Agent 
317 See Taylor, “Textual and Philosophical Issues in Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De Anima of 
Aristotle,” p. 276-277 for an account of how Averroes’ reading of the work of Themistius influences his 
view of the Material Intellect as it is found in the Long Commentary. Also see Taylor’s “Introduction” to 
the Long Commentary, pp. lxxxiii- lxxxvi.
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Intellect. The cogitative power also houses the representative images necessary to provide 
easy access to the intelligibles in act in the Material Intellect whenever one wills. This 
means that the cogitative power allows the individual human being to participate in the 
process of creating intelligibles in act and provides easy access to these intelligibles 
located in the separate Material Intellect; individual human beings are said to be knowers 
insofar as their sensory experience is essential to the process of bringing about the 
intelligibles in act and insofar as they have access to these intelligibles at will. It should 
also be noted that Averroes provides an additional level of participation with the Intellects 
by insisting that that Agent Intellect is “form for us” and is “in” the human being in a 
special sense; however, even this connection relies on the cogitative power. This position 
is also highlighted in the Commentary on Plato’s Republic, where Averroes makes the 
distinction between theoretical and practical science and explains that it is “by the will” 
that one is able to achieve theoretical knowledge and undertake moral action. 
In addition to the special role the cogitative power plays in knowledge attainment, 
there is also the work it does in moral decision making. With separate Intellects Averroes 
must find a way to make the locus of moral decision making and action in the individual, 
if he is to preserve moral responsibility. He does this by locating the will in the cogitative 
power, following his versions of the Aristotelian texts which indicate that Aristotle had a 
notion of will and that it was “in the cogitative part.”318 Averroes explains that the will, 
along with the related powers of deliberation and choice, are in the cogitative power and, 
318 Averroes saw himself as closely following the views of Aristotle regarding both the Intellects and the 
will. As was explained in Chapter 2, although Aristotle cannot be said to have a notion of will, he was 
interpreted to have one early on, as Arabic philosophers, such as Al-Farabi and Avicenna, conflated 
Aristotelian and Stoic ideas and took the existence of a will for granted. This led to Aristotle’s 
‘wish’ (boulēsis) being translated as irādah (voluntas, in Latin). Averroes’ inherited this tradition and 
expanded on it in his own way. 
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thus, under the control of the individual human being. The individual is able to deliberate, 
choose, and act at will, making use of both particular information and universal 
knowledge, at will319, because of the relationship that exists among the power of will, the 
Intellects, and the cogitative power.
After this close examination of the texts of Averroes we can conclude that he was 
able to develop an understanding of both knowledge attainment and, more importantly 
for our purposes, moral responsibility which is consistent and coherent. We will examine 
the particular criticisms of Aquinas to this theory in Chapter 5 but, for now, it is important 
to note that Averroes’s system allows for moral decision making, and thus responsibility, 
to be located firmly in the individual and to to be “up to us” even while supporting the 
position that the Intellects are separate, shared entities.
319 It is perhaps helpful to note here that this notion of will in Averroes is, in fact, different from the notion 
of wish in Aristotle, despite Averroes’ understanding that they are the same. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
Aristotle’s boulēsis, commonly translated as will but more properly rendered wish, was not a full faculty or 
power of the human being but rather the general ability to desire some end. This is less robust than what 
Averroes has developed here since the will a faculty of the cogitative power by which one directs one’s 
actions and one’s thoughts (in so far as it leads to the conjunction of the individual with the separate 
Intellects).
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CHAPTER 4
 AQUINAS
4.1 Introduction
Aquinas, like Averroes, argues for a particular conception of the human being 
which includes what he believes to be Aristotelian views of the soul, intellects, and will. 
However, Aquinas’ views are quite different from those of Averroes and he includes 
specific critiques of Averroes’ work based upon his understanding of it. This chapter will 
examine Aquinas views of the human being, the intellect, and the will. In particular it will 
explain Aquinas’ unique view of the will and how it fits into his view of the individuation 
of the intellects. Part of this examination will necessarily include Aquinas’ understanding 
of Averroes and his critique of the Averroist position. I will not comment on the accuracy 
or strength of Aquinas’ view of Averroes or of the view in its own right but will simply 
present it as clearly as possible; Chapter 5 will constitute the critical analysis of the 
theories of Aquinas and Averroes presented here and in Chapter 3.
In an effort to provide a penetrating account of Aquinas’ views of moral 
psychology and agency as well as his understanding of Averroes this chapter will be 
divided into two main sections. The first section will present the view of Aquinas 
regarding the nature of the soul and the intellects and their relationship to the body and 
the will. The second section will examine Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes and his 
understanding of the Averroist position. I will draw substantially from Aquinas’ 
Questiones Disputate De Anima as it represents Aquinas’ mature position, but further 
support will be taken from the Summa Contra Gentiles, and Summa Theologiae, among 
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other works.320 This discussion will help to demonstrate that for Aquinas the primary 
focus is the intellect rather than the will; this fact is also heavily addressed in Chapter 5, 
where Aquinas is placed in dialogue with Averroes.
4.2. Aquinas’ view
4.2.1. The soul and its relation to the body
The first issue that must be addressed is whether the soul is a body and, if not, 
what connection it has to the human body. In the Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) Aquinas 
explains that the fact that the intellect is able to understand an infinite number of things, 
including itself and immaterial things, and receive substantial forms without losing its 
own form demonstrates that the soul cannot be a body; bodies can only have one form at 
a time and cannot move beyond the material to grasp the immaterial.321 In the Summa 
Theologiae Aquinas explains that the soul is “the act of a body” and not itself a body; it is 
the “first principle of life in those things in our world which live”322 and such a principle 
320  It is perhaps important to note that most of what Aquinas says about the will and moral responsibility 
is not presented in the context of a discussion and critique of Averroes, with whom his primary 
disagreements concern concepts related to the intellect. However, in so far as the two issues are related it is 
important to understand Aquinas’ view as a complete account, aside from and in addition to his 
understanding of Averroes.
321 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles [SCG] Book Two: Creation, trans. James F. Anderson (Indiana, 
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), Bk. 2, Ch. 49, pp. 146-149; Also see SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 50, 
pp. 149-151 for other arguments for the immateriality of the soul based upon the nature of knowledge and 
the reception of sensible forms. For the Latin text of the SCG see Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra 
Errores Infidelium seu <<Summa Contra Gentiles>>, Vol II, ed. Ceslai Pera, Petro Marc, and Petro 
Caramello (Taurini, Romae: Marietti, 1961), Bk 2, Ch. 49, pp. 169-171, sec. 1247-1258; Ch. 2 Bk 50, sec. 
1259-1267, pp. 171-172. The Latin will be referenced using Book, Chapter, section, and page.
In the Summa Theologiae [ST] Ia Q. 75, A. 2 Aquinas uses a similar argument to demonstrate that the soul 
is both incorporeal and subsistent. He points out that the intellect could only know “all corporeal things” if 
it is incorporeal because it must be devoid of anything which would interfere with this knowledge. Since 
the main operation of the soul is done by the soul itself and not by using a body it must also mean that this 
soul is subsistent; “only that which subsists in itself can have an operation in itself.” (In Basic Writings of 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 1, ed. Anton C. Pegis (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1973) p. 685.)
322 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 75, A. 1, p. 683. “ Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se 
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cannot be a body because this would mean than every body would be alive. Since not all 
bodies are living, the principle of life must be something other than the body; it must be 
what actualizes some bodies. Aquinas comes to the same conclusion in On the Unity of 
the Intellect Against the Averroists.323 Furthermore, Aquinas explains that the soul is that 
by which we live and understand and so it is both the living and understanding 
components which are related to the individual human body. Intellect, the faculty by 
which human beings understand, is a power of the soul; the soul is the act of the body; 
therefore, the intellect is also, indirectly, a power of the body.324 
Although the soul is not a body, it is not simply the form of a body but also a 
subsistent thing (hoc aliquid325). In the first question of the Questiones Disputate De 
Anima Aquinas asks whether the human soul can be both a form and a determinate 
particular (forma et hoc aliquid326). Here he works to determine whether the soul fulfills 
subsistit” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Rome: Editiones Paulinae, 1962) p. 344). Aquinas makes 
a similar point in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, trans. Robert Pasnau (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999), Bk. 3, Ch. 7, p. 345-346. For the Latin see Sentencia Libri De Anima, in Opera 
Omnia, Vol. 46 (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1984), Bk 3, Ch. 1, ln. 130-193, pp. 203-204.
323 Aquinas, deUnitate, Ch. I, sec. 3. p. 23; Latin Ch. 1, ln. 39-52, p. 290.
324 Ibid., Ch. 1, sec. 12-16, pp. 27-29; Latin Ch. 1, ln 218-306, pp. 293-294. In particular, Aquinas states 
that “[Aristotle] means that the intellect is a power of the soul, which is the act of the body” (Ch. 1, sec. 1 
p. 29). “Vult ergo quod intellectus est potentia anime que est actus corporis,” (Ch.1, ln. 229-231, p. 294) 
and that “he meant the intellect to be a part of the soul which is the act of a physical body” (“manifestum 
est quod ipse uoluit intellectum esse partem anime que est actus corporis phisici”)(sec. 16, p. 29; Latin Ch. 
1, ln. 304-306, p. 294). 
325 It should be noted that the term hoc aliquid is used to render Aristotle’s term tode ti (this something). 
While There is controversy around whether this term is applied by Aristotle to form as distinct from matter 
or whether it refers only to composite substances, my focus here is on the psychological rather than 
metaphysical issues. A passage relevant to this discussion can be found in De Anima Bk2, ch. 1 (412a6-11) 
where Aristotle is explaining the three sense of substance. Tode ti in this passage is translated in the Latin of 
the Averroes’ Long Commentary and in Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima using the term hoc 
aliquid. Aquinas addressed the issue of whether the soul is a substance (hoc aliquid; tode ti) in detail in his 
Questions on the Soul and elsewhere, as will be discussed below. See Robert Pasnau, The Treatise on 
Human Nature: Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), p. 225 for a brief 
note regarding this terminology and B. Carlos Bazan, “The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas 
Aquinas’ Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism,” Archives D’Histoire Doctrinale et Literaire du Moyen Age, 
64 (1997) for a more detailed account of the issue.
326 Robb uses “entity” to translate the Latin hoc aliquid in his translation (Thomas Aquinas, Questions on 
the Soul [QDAnima], trans. James H. Robb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005)). Pegis uses 
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the two characteristics of substance: (1) having the ability to subsist per se, and (2) to be 
complete in a given species and genus of substance.327 The human rational soul 
understands universals via intelligible species which it abstracts from matter and from all 
material conditions; furthermore, it performs this essential operation not by the act of 
some bodily organ but by its own act. Since its essential operation does not involve the 
body, the intellective soul must also “possess an independent per se act of existing which 
is not dependent on its body.”328 That is to say, it must be not only the form of a body but 
also a substance in its own right, fulfilling the first characteristic of substance.
The human soul does not, however, fulfill the second characteristic; it is not 
complete in itself with regard to a species and genus. Rather, it is the form of the species 
human being, a composite of body and soul, conferring being on the human body. If this 
were not the case then the body and soul would be only accidentally united.329 So, the 
“this particular thing” in his translation of the ST (see Ia Q. 75, A2, for example). I will use “determinate 
particular,” a term Richard Taylor uses throughout his work on the subject, as I think it clearly indicate the 
particularity and subsistence of the hoc aliquid in ways that these other two options (particularly “entity”) 
do not. 
327  Aquinas, QDAnima , Q1, p. 47. Aquinas also addresses these two senses of hoc aliquid in the first 
reply in ST Ia, Q 75, A2: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo, 
pro quo- cumque subsistente; alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, 
excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis: secundo modo, excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. 
Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit 
pars speciei humanae,a potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo: sic 
enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid” (p. 345)
328 Aquinas, Questions on the Soul, Q1, p. 47. “Oportet quod anima intellectiua habeat esse per se 
absolutum, non dependens a corpore” (Q 1, ln. 246-247, p. 8 in Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima 
[QDAnima] in Opera Omnia, Vol. 24, edited by B-C. Bazan (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1996)). Latin 
references will be made using Chapter, line, and page.
329 Aquinas explains that if this were the case “death, which signifies the separation of soul and body, 
would not be a substantial corruption, and this is obviously false” ( Aquinas, QDAnima , Q1, p. 47). “Mors 
igitur, que significat eorum separationem, non esset corruptio substantialis, quod patet esse falsum” (Q1, ln. 
283-286, p. 9) It should perhaps be noted that is not as obvious as Aquinas suggests. More will need to be 
said about the nature of the relationship between the body and soul, particularly as it relates the immortality 
of the soul and the Resurrection; this is a metaphysical point of disagreement between Aquinas and 
Averroes and, it impacts their disagreement regarding the will and moral agency as well.
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soul is not a species in its own right; rather, the human being is the species and is 
composed of soul and body as its form and matter.330 
The argument that the soul as form of the body is made more strongly in the SCG 
and ST. In the SCG Aquinas explains that the soul is neither a part of the body nor mixed 
with the body, nor physically connected to it.331 Despite this, the soul is still united to the 
body in an important way via a “contact of power” 332 which allows the soul to act upon 
and change the body without being acted upon or change itself. In this relationship the 
body and the soul are “not unqualifiedly one […but rather are] one with respect to acting 
and being acted upon.”333 Aquinas further explains that the body and soul are “one in 
330 It is perhaps worth noting that Aquinas argues in Questions on the Soul, Question 6 (pp. 94-95, Latin 
Q6, ln. 167-226, pp.50-51) that the soul itself cannot be composed of matter and form but, rather is 
immaterial in nature. He explains that the soul cannot be material since (1) this would mean the soul would 
constitutes a species and we already saw this is not the case; (2) it would impossible for the material soul to 
be the formal principle of existence for the body because matter receives existence and does not confer it; 
and (3) it would be necessary to posit a third thing by which the soul and body are connected but this 
cannot be since the soul must be directly united to the body as act is to potency.
331 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 56, pp. 164-165, Latin, Bk 2, Ch. 56, sec. 1313-1314, p. 180.
332 “Hic autem tactus non est quantitatis, sed virtutis.” (Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 56, sec. 1317, pp. 
180-181. Something must be said, briefly, about this notion of “contact of power.” In SCG Bk 2, Ch. 56 
Aquinas is examining how the soul and the body are united. He explains that the union cannot be by way of 
mixture nor physical contact (“contact properly so called;” “contactus proprie sumpti”). Rather, the contact 
between body and soul is one in which the body is touched and affected while the soul is not. This makes 
sense, according to Aquinas, when we focus on the relationship between activity and passivity. Aquinas 
uses the examples of the heavenly and elemental bodies to explain this kind of contact; heavenly bodies 
‘touch’ and influence lower elements without being themselves altered. Elsewhere (ST Ia, Q. 8, A. 3), 
Aquinas uses this same idea, with the example of a king and his kingdom, to explain the relationship 
between God and His creation; for a brief account of this see Edward Wierenga, “Omnipresence,” in The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chad Meister and Paul Copan (New York: Routledge, 
2007), pp. 330-331.
While this account of the body-soul relationship seems to allow Aquinas to explain how a material 
substance, the body, can have contact with an immaterial one, the soul, it is not as successful as Aquinas 
thinks. Particularly important to note is that it is based upon the inadequate science of the time--the heavens 
do not interact with the lower spheres in this way; other things that may seem to be examples of “contact of 
power” such as gravity or magnetic attraction and repulsion (which would be similar to how the heavens 
are supposed to act on the lower spheres) are explainable by modern science in ways that preclude Aquinas’ 
notion of immaterial “contact of power.” Thus, the issue of mind-body contact cannot be solved in the way 
that Aquinas here claims that it can be.
333 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 56, pp. 166-167. “ Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum, non sunt 
unum simpliciter. Sunt enim unum in agendo et patiendo: quod non est esse unum simpliciter” (Bk 2, Ch. 
56, sec. 1319, p. 181)
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reason.”334 This type of union is only possible if the soul is the substantial form of the 
body. In Book 2 Chapter 68 of the SCG Aquinas explains that 
for one thing to be another’s substantial form, two 
requirements must be met. First, the form must be the 
principle of the substantial being of the thing whose form it 
is […] The second requirement then follows from this, 
namely, that the form and the matter be joined together in 
the unity of one act of being […] And this single act of 
being is that in which the composite substance subsists: a 
thing one in being and made up of matter and form.335
Aquinas thinks the human soul fits these requirements and is the substantial form of the 
human body/human being. He notes that although the soul is the form of the body this 
does not mean that its powers are limited by the body. The human soul is the lowest type 
of intellectual substance and the human body is the highest type of body. The special 
connection between the two allows the soul to perform all of the functions the body along 
with some functions, i.e. understanding, which do not use bodily organs at all; this makes 
the soul both the substantial form of the body, allowing it to perform its functions, and an 
incomplete substance (a hoc aliquid, in the lesser sense) in its own right, capable of 
performing its own activity.336
334 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 56, p. 167. “Ratione unum” (Bk. 2, Ch. 56, sec. 1319, p. 181)
335 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 68, p. 204. “Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo 
requiruntur. Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cuius est forma,: 
principium autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, 
scilicet quod forma et materia conveniant in uno esse: quod non contingit de principio effectivo cum eo cui 
dat esse. Et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est uno secundum esse, ex materia et 
forma constans” (Bk 2, Ch. 64, sec. 1450, p. 202).
336 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 68, pp. 205-207, Latin Bk 2, Ch. 64, sec. 1453-1459, pp. 203-204. Although 
it is not the focus of this account, it can be noted that in Ch. 71-73 Aquinas goes on to explain that the 
union of body and soul is without intermediary and that this relationship of body and soul means the 
possible intellect must be individuated. He makes a similar claim in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De 
anima, explaining that the body and the intellect have a formal unity which necessarily precludes the 
intellect’s being a separate substance: “It is impossible for that by which something operates formally to be 
separated from it in existence. That is so because something acts only insofar as it is in actuality. Therefore, 
something operates formally by something as it is made actual by it. But a thing is not made actually 
existent by anything if it is separated from it in existence. That is why it is impossible that that by which 
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Aquinas addresses the issue again in Question 76 of the first part of the ST. Here 
he starts the argument by asserting that “that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of 
the thing to which it is attributed”337 and that the soul is that whereby the body acts 
because it is the life principle and the principle by which we understand. Aquinas 
continues by explaining that without the soul as the form of the body there would be no 
way to explain the fact that each individual has his own act of understanding which is 
essential to him. He writes:
So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is 
clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally, since it 
is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated essentially 
[…] it is one and the same man who is conscious both that 
he understands and that he senses. But one cannot sense 
without a body, and therefore the body must be some part 
something acts formally be separated from it in existence. It is impossible therefore, that the possible 
intellect by which a human being has intellective cognition—sometimes potentially, to be sure, but other 
times actually—be separated from that human being in existence” (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De 
anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 7, p. 349). “Set impossibile est id quo aliquid formaliter operatur separari ab eo 
secundum esse; quod ideo est quia nichil agit nisi secundum quod est actu; sic igitur aliquid formaliter 
aliquo operatur sicut eo fit actu; non autem fit aliquid aliquo ens actu si sit separatum ab eo secundum esse; 
unde inpossibile est quod illud quo aliquid agit formaliter sit separatum ab eo secundum esse; inpossibile 
est igitur quod intelelctus possibilis quo homo intelligit quandoque quidem in potencia quandoque autem in 
actu sit separatus ab eo secundum esse” (Bk. 3, Ch. 1, ln. 290-305, p. 206). Elsewhere, such as De Ente and 
Essentia Ch. 4 (in Opera Omnia, Vol. 43, (Rome: Editori Di San Tommaso), 1976), Aquinas does group 
human souls in the category of separate substances (“substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, intelligentia, et 
causa prima”). However, this can be explained by noting that they are intellectual substances and are, thus, 
separate in the sense that the are free from matter (“immunitas a materia) as the lowest of the intellectual 
substances, but not in the sense that it is a complete and separate spiritual substance.
337 Aquinas, ST, Ia Q. 76, A. 1, p. 696. Here Aquinas explains that it is the intellect which differentiates 
human beings as rational and sets them apart from other animals; as such, this defining characteristic must 
be not only accidentally linked to human being but must exist as its form: “According to the Philosopher in 
Metaph. viii., difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes man is rational, 
which is said of man because of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of 
man.
“I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is 
the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the 
act is attributed” (p. 696). 
“Secundum Philosophum, in VIII Metaphys., differentia sumitur a forma rei. Sed differentia 
constitutiva hominis est rationale; quod dicitur de homine ratione intellectivi principii. Intellectivum ergo 
principium est forma hominis.
“Respondeo, diciendum quod necesse est dicere quod intelelctus, qui est intellectualis operationis 
principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio 
attribuitur” (p. 350).
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of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which 
Socrates understands is part of Socrates, so that it is in 
some way united to the body of Socrates.338
Aquinas is explaining here that it is necessary to maintain that the soul is the form of the 
body if we are to claim, as everyone does, that one’s intellectual understanding—one’s 
thoughts and ideas—are one’s own. He is also pointing out that it is our intellectual 
ability which makes us human and as such it must be an essential part of each 
individual’s being.339
For Aquinas, then, the soul has a dual role to play. It is both a substance and a 
form. The unique role that the body plays in the knowledge attainment process helps us to 
see that the soul must be linked to the body in a special way, while the immaterial nature 
of universals and the intelligible species which help us arrive at knowledge of universals 
demonstrate the soul’s subsistence. Aquinas explains:
the soul is a [determinate particular340 (hoc aliquid)], as 
being able to subsist per se but not as possessing in itself a 
complete specific nature, but rather as completing human 
nature insofar as it is the form of its body and thus as one 
and the same time it is a form and a [determinate 
particular…] For insofar as a soul possesses an operation 
which transcends material things, its very existence is 
raised above and does not depend on its body. But insofar 
as a soul by nature acquires its immaterial knowledge from 
338 Aquinas, ST, Ia Q. 76, A. 1, p. 697. “Cum igitur dicimus Socratem aut Platonem intelligere, 
manifesturn est quod non attribuitur ei per accidens: attribuitur enim ei inquantum est homo, quod 
essentialiter praedicatur de ipso. Aut ergo oportet dicere quod Socrates intelligit secundum se totum, sicut 
Plato posuit, dicens hominem esse animam intellectivam: aut oportet dicere quod intellectus sit aliqua pars 
Socratis. Et primum quidem stare non potest, ut supra ostensum est, propter hoc quod ipse idem homo est 
qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire: sentire autem non est sine corpore: unde oportet corpus aliquam esse 
hominis partem. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectus quo Socrates intelligit, est aliqua pars Socratis; ita quod 
intellectus aliquo modo corpori Socratis uniatur” (p. 351). 
339 Part of Aquinas’ arguments for his position involve a critique of the position of Averroes, as he 
understands it. This argument can be found in several places in Aquinas’ texts, including SCG Bk 2, Ch 59, 
ST Ia Q 76, A1, and Bk 1, Ch 2. of A Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. I mention these only in passing 
here but will offer a detailed analysis of Aquinas arguments in Chapter 5.
340 Here, and throughout Robb’s translation, I have amended the translation by replacing “entity” with 
“determinate particular;” as explained in n. 326, this is my preferred translation of hoc aliquid.
136
what is material, it is clear that the fulfillment of its nature 
cannot be achieved apart from union with a body. For a 
thing is not complete in nature unless it possesses those 
things which are demanded for the proper operation of that 
nature. In this way, therefore, a human soul insofar as it is 
united to its body as its form still possesses an act of 
existence which is elevated above the body and does not 
depend on it; clearly then this soul is constituted on the 
boundary line between corporeal and separate substance.”341
Inhabiting this boundary between corporeal and separate substance means that the 
soul is fittingly connected to the body while also being immortal and capable of surviving 
the death of the body. Aquinas argues that it is fitting that the soul, the lowest of the 
intellectual substances, be united to the human body since it requires such a body to 
fulfill its functions, including its most important function, understanding. Since the soul 
does not possess intelligible species innately it must acquire them from a consideration of 
the material world with the help of the body.342 The human body is, thus, fittingly and 
necessarily connected to the human soul since it is only with body and soul that the 
human being can fulfill its most important function: understanding. This is not to say that 
the body is perfect. The body, as the kind of matter it is, is corruptible. Aquinas explains 
this theology when he explains that God mitigated this defect of the body with original 
justice, whereby the body would remain with the soul as long as the soul remained 
341  Aquinas, QDAnima, Q. 1, p. 47-48. “Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid ut per se potens 
subsistere, no quasi habens in se completam speciem, set quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut est forma 
corporis. Et sic simul est forma et hoc aliquid […] In quantum enim habet operationem materialia 
transcendentum, esse etiam suum est supera corpus eleuatum, non dependens ex ipso. In quantum uero 
immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali nata est acquirere, manifestum est quod complementum sue speciei 
esse non potest absque corporis unione. Non enim aliquid completum est in specie nisi habeat ea que 
requiruntur ad propriam operationem speciei. Sic igitur anima humana in quantum unitur corpori ut forma 
et tamen habet esse eleuatum supera corpus, non dependens ab eo, manifestum est quod ipsa est in confinio 
corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta.” Q 1, ln. 286-290 and 328-341, pp. 9-10.
342 Ibid., Q. 8, pp. 114-115, Latin Q. 8, ln. 177-198, pp. 66-67.
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subject to God. However, Adam’s sin was a turning away from God and allowed the 
defects of the body to reassert themselves.343
While the body is corruptible because of original sin, the soul remains immortal. 
While the soul requires the body for many of its operations, the act of understanding does 
not require a body; “the intellective principle by which a human being understands 
possesses an existence that transcends its body and is not dependent upon its body.”344 
Furthermore, that this intellective principle is an immaterial form and thus incorruptible 
can been seen by the fact that its objects are intelligibles which are abstracted from all 
matter. Since this intellective principle is not a separate substance (as will be explained 
below) but part of the human soul, the soul, too, is incorruptible.345 While the soul is 
immortal and, thus, capable of existing apart from the body, this is not the most natural 
mode of existence for the soul since the soul requires a body for its most natural 
operation, understanding, to proceed in the best way possible; the separated soul will be 
able to understand in an imperfect way through an “influx from the separate 
substances.”346 This mode of understanding is imperfect because of the central role that 
sensation plays in the knowledge attainment process for human beings. According to 
Aquinas human knowledge is always grounded in particulars in so far as intelligibles 
exist in potency as common natures in things, not as separate ontological realities. Thus, 
perfect human knowledge requires the ability to experience particular things and to 
abstract the intelligibles from those particulars. 
343 Ibid., Q. 8, p. 117, Latin Q. 8, ln. 290-313, p. 69.
344 Ibid., Q. 14, p. 177. “Sic igitur patet quod principium intellectuum quo homo intelligit habet esse 
eleuatum supra corpus, non dependens a corpore” (Q. 14, ln. 206-209, p. 126).
345 Ibid., Q. 14, p. 177, Latin Q 14, ln. 210-226, pp. 126-127.
346 Ibid., Q. 15, p. 190; “influxus substantiarum separatarum” (Q 15, ln. 400, p. 136). For a more detailed 
discussion of the nature of the separated soul see Questions 17-21.
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Before moving on to a discussion of the possible and agent intellects and their 
relation to the soul something should be said about how the views of Aquinas regarding 
the body/soul relationship and the nature of the soul should be understood both in their 
own right and in relation to the ideas of Aquinas’ predecessors. Bazan offers a detailed 
and convincing account of these issues in his article “The Human Soul: Form and 
Substance? Thomas Aquinas’ Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism” which focuses on 
Question 1 of Aquinas’ Questions on the Soul. Here Bazan examines the various positions 
available to Aquinas regarding the nature of the soul as form and substance. He points out 
that some, such as Augustine, argued for a kind of dualism which defined the human 
being as body and soul where each element was a substance in its own right, connected 
by the will of God; this allowed for the soul to be a substance, in the strongest sense of 
the term, but not a form.347 Others, notably Avicenna, argued for a more “eclectic” 
approach whereby the human being was essentially the soul and that the body was merely 
a tool which allowed the soul to be individuated and perform its functions. In this view 
the soul is a spiritual substance and the perfectio or motor of the body (though not its 
form in the Aristotelian sense).348 Averroes offered a different approach, arguing that the 
soul was the substantial form of the body. In this view the human being is a hylomorphic 
composite consisting of “the most perfect of sensitive souls”349 and the body; the 
intellects were separate substances (though not hoc aliquid in the sense discussed above), 
347 Bazan, “The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas’ Critique of Eclectic 
Aristotelianism,” p. 102.
348  Ibid., pp. 103-104. Also see the discussion of Avicenna in Ch. 2 above for a more detailed account of 
the position of Avicenna.
349 Ibid., p. 105. According to Bazan the view of Averroes can be summed up as follows: “the human soul 
is only a form and not a substance; the Intellect is a substance but not a form (except equivocally), and its 
substantiality is not that of a hoc aliquid (a term that Averroes reserves for material substances)” (p. 106)
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ontologically distinct from the human being. These three approaches offered the 
background from which further developments were made. Notably, some masters within 
the university faculties of arts and theology who developed the eclectic approach of 
Avicenna into one which argued for a dual ontological status of the soul as both form and 
spiritual substance (hoc aliquid).350 Bazan points to Albert the Great as one such master 
who had particular influence on Aquinas. Albert explained that the soul could be 
understood in both Platonic and Aristotelian ways, depending on whether we were 
considering it in itself (as substance) or in the context of its relation to the body (as 
form).351
Bazan calls this view of Albert and other masters of arts and theology (and, to 
some extent, of Avicenna) eclectic Aristotelianism, and argues that it is this view which 
Aquinas is working against in Question 1 of the Questions on the Soul. As explained 
above Aquinas’ solution in Questions on the Soul, a solution which he supports in other 
texts, is that the soul is a determinate particular and a substantial form: a form and a hoc 
aliquid, in a very particular meaning of the term (since it only meets one of the two 
criteria for per se subsistence352).353 It is important to clarify what this means for the soul 
and the human being. Bazan explains that for Aquinas the soul is not a spiritual 
substance354: 
Undoubtedly, for Thomas the self-subsistence of the soul 
does not mean that the soul is a spiritual substance in the 
350 Ibid., pp. 106-113 for a discussion of several important figures.
351 Ibid., pp. 111-112.
352 See note 325 above for the text of Aquinas which discusses these criteria.
353 Bazan, “The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas’ Critique of Eclectic 
Aristotelianism,” pp. 114-117 for Bazan’s account of Aquinas in Questions on the Soul Q. 1.
354 Ibid., pp.119-121. Bazan notes that it is easy to misread Aquinas as advocating for the position that the 
soul is lowest spiritual substance.
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strict Aristotelian sense of the word accepted by Thomas 
himself. On the contrary, the very essence of the soul is to 
be the substantial form of the human composite […] the 
soul needs the body not only to operate, but to be in 
accordance with its essence […] The soul is a subsistent 
substantial form, a form of matter but not a material form, 
and it must be acknowledged that there is no such form in 
the ontological scale of entities established by Aristotle. For 
Thomas, the only reality that qualifies for the status of 
substance in the strict sense of the word is the human 
composite, which is simultaneously a living, sensitive, and 
intellectual being. That is why the substantial form of the 
human composite is not only the source of the intellectual 
faculties, but also of all inferior faculties. And that is also 
why the human being is the highest of all hylomorphic 
composites, not an incarnate spirit [i.e. embodied spiritual 
substance].355
By holding this view of the soul as substantial form of the human being Aquinas is able 
to hold that the soul is both form and hoc aliquid while rejecting the eclectic 
Aristotelianism of his predecessors. He does this by offering a more nuanced view of 
what constitutes a hoc aliquid, allowing the soul to be called a substance even though it 
fits only one of the criteria for hoc aliquid in the strong sense. This allows Aquinas to 
avoid having to give the soul the dual ontological status which it seems to have in the 
positions of those with the stricter view, such as Albert. The soul for Aquinas is subsistent 
in that it has an essential operation that is immaterial (intellection), but it is not complete 
in itself, requiring a body to fully actualize even its intellectual functions; it is, thus, 
connected to the body in an essential way.356 
355 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
356 The soul/body relationship described here is sometimes characterized as one where the soul is 
characterized by the ability to be united to the body in a substantial way (unibilitas substantialis), such that 
the human being requires both body and soul. This idea may be related to the earlier discussion of “contact 
of power,” which Aquinas used to explain how the incorporeal soul could be united to the material body. 
This essential link between body and soul is one of the ways in which the human soul is differentiated from 
angels. The human soul is not a hoc aliquid in the fullest sense; rather, as discussed above, it is a substantial 
form, satisfying only one of the two criteria for hoc aliquid. For a discussion of unibilitas substantialis in 
Medieval thought see Magdalena Bieniak, The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, CA. 1200-1250: Hugh of St-
141
This unique view of the soul and its relation to the body has important 
consequences for the separated soul. As we saw above, while the soul’s subsistence 
allows it to remain incorruptible and to exist even after the death of the body, its nature as 
a substantial form means that it cannot fulfill its nature in this state. Bazan explains that 
there is an important sense in which the separated soul does not live since “to perform 
those activities [proper to its nature] is for the soul to live [and a] soul without its 
ontological correlate [the body] cannot operate, and consequently does not live.”357 Joseph 
Owens also takes up this issue in his article “Soul as Agent in Aquinas,”358 where he 
examines the issue of agency as it relates to the human being (composite) and the human 
soul; of particular interest for our purposes is what he says about Aquinas’ view of the 
separated soul. Here Owens explains that the “the soul possesses its existence in 
independence of the matter it informs [and that] this means that the human soul, once it 
has received being, exists necessarily and perpetually,”359 while questioning whether this 
existence constitutes immortality or life. Owens argues that Aquinas is unable to 
philosophically demonstrate that the soul lives on after death (i.e. that it is immortal) in 
Cher and His Contemporaries (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010). Here it is pointed out that 
unibilitas represented one of the ways in which the human soul is distinct from angels (pp. 40-46). While I 
do not agree with the author’s suggestion that Aquinas’ position is one where “the human soul is defined as 
a substance and a spirit of its own species” (p. 34), following, instead, Bazan’s line of thinking that the soul 
is not a spiritual substance, the work provides some insight into the history of the theory. Bazan’s argument, 
discussed above, that “the very essence of the soul is to be the substantial form of the human 
composite” (“The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas’ Critique of Eclectic 
Aristotelianism,” p. 121) and that there is no such entity in the work of Aristotle (or Aquinas’ more 
immediate predecessors), and that this means that the soul cannot be a spiritual substance, being a 
subsistent substantial form and a form of matter instead, is compelling. Bieniak’s discussion of Aquinas 
position, on the contrary, does not take into account the uniqueness of the theory to a sufficient extent, 
claiming that the human soul is a “spirit” and claiming that his theory is ‘close to the traditional 
anthropological dualism” (The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, p. 34).
357 Bazan, “The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas’ Critique of Eclectic 
Aristotelianism,” p. 125.
358 Joseph Owens, “Soul as Agent in Aquinas” New Scholasticism, 48.1 (1974).
359 Ibid., p.64
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the sense of being able to perform its vital activity. The vital activity of the soul is 
intellection and for human beings this requires the abilities to sense and imagine, 
provided by the body; understanding for the separated soul cannot take place by natural 
means, but supernatural one’s.360 Aquinas can, however, demonstrate that the soul lives on 
in the weaker sense of “perpetual existence,” relying on the claim that existence does not 
require operation (a claim which comes with its own problems, Owens points out).361
4.2.2. The intellective principle(s) of the human soul
Having demonstrated the unique nature of the human soul and its relation to the 
body according to Aquinas, we must move on to examine the nature of the intellective 
principle(s). He examines both the possible and the agent intellects, arguing for their 
existence as powers of the soul which are multiplied according to the number of 
individuals. The fact that a person can be at one time actually understanding but at 
another time only in potentiality with respect to understanding demonstrates that there 
must exist a potential intellect, the possible intellect, which is “in potency to and able to 
receive all those things which are intelligible to a human being.”362 This intellect does not 
have a bodily organ (since it would then be limited in the scope of its understanding by 
the organs powers), but neither is it a separate substance, totally disconnected from the 
body. The possible intellect is a part or power of the human soul which is the form of the 
body, as demonstrated above. If it were a separate substance, Aquinas explains, it would 
360 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
361 Ibid., pp. 67-69.
362 Aquinas, QDAnima Q. 2, p. 57. “Hunc igitur intellectum possibilem necesse est esse in potentia ad 
amnia que sunt intelligibilia per hominem et receptiuum eorum, et consequens denudatum ab hiis” (Q 2, ln. 
182-185, p. 16).
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not be possible to say that the human being understands by means of the possible 
intellect.363 A substance’s operation must originate in that substance; the act of 
understanding attributed to the human being must originate in that human being. 
Furthermore, since this act of understanding is an act of the possible intellect, the 
possible intellect must be in each individual as her own intellect; that is to say, the 
possible intellect must be multiplied according to the number of human beings.364 
Aquinas explains in ST Question 76 that in order to maintain the individuality of human 
beings as knowers (and as distinct human beings insofar as to be human is to be a 
knower) we must maintain that each person has his or her own intellect. It is impossible 
to explain diversity in understanding and knowledge using other means. Even if we 
recognize that individuals have their own sensory experiences and their own phantasms 
(as Averroes does), this is not enough to explain individual knowledge if the intellect is 
separate and one for all people. It is the intelligible species in the possible intellect, not 
the phantasms, which account for knowledge. A single human being can have many 
phantasms of the same type of thing, but these only create a single intelligible species and 
this leads to a single act of understanding the nature of the thing.365 Aquinas points out, 
contrary to the view of Averroes, that multiplying the number of intellects does not affect 
the universality of the resulting knowledge; since we understand the natures in things and 
363 Ibid., Q. 2, p. 57, Latin Q 2, ln 166-197, p. 16. Aquinas here offers an extended treatment of the view 
of Averroes, as he understands it (see especially Q. 2. ln. 242-309, p. 17-18). This important discussion will 
be examined in detail later in this chapter, after the view of Aquinas has been sufficiently explained.
364 Ibid., Q. 3, responsio.
365 Aquinas, ST, Ia, Q. 76, A. 2: “Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of 
phantasms in this man and in that would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that 
man, as the Commentator imagines” (p. 702); “Si ergo unus intellectus esset omnium hominum, diversitas 
phantasmatum quae sunt in hoc et in illo, non posset causare diversitatem intellectualis operationis huius et 
illius hominis, ut Commentator fingit in III de Anima” (pp. 353-354).
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not separate intelligibles, having multiple intelligibles species in multiple intellects can 
result in multiple understandings of the “universal” common natures.366
In the SCG Aquinas makes similar arguments for the individuation of the possible 
intellect. The overall argument rests on the idea that “it has been proved that the 
substance of the intellect is united to the human body as its form. But one form cannot 
possibly exist in more than one matter […] Therefore, there is not one intellect for all 
men.”367 It makes no sense, according to Aquinas, to assert that the form is simultaneously 
the form of the individual human being, the source of the their humanity (as distinct from 
their animality) and their knowledge, and that it is distinct from the individual and shared 
with all humans. A substantial form must be exclusive to that of which it is the form, 
otherwise all of the individuals with the same form would have the same being; this is 
clearly not the case.368
Having determined that the possible intellect must exist and must be individuated, 
Aquinas moves on to a consideration of the agent intellect, demonstrating that it must 
also be individuated, despite its being “separable,” “unaffectable,” “unmixed,” and “in 
actuality as regards its substance.”369 He explains that there must exist a power which 
366 Aquinas, ST, Ia,Q. 76, A. 2. It should be pointed out that I use universal not in any strong sense here. 
For Aquinas intelligibles do not have ontological reality; rather they exist in potency in particulars as the 
natures in things. Intelligible species do have ontological reality in the minds of individuals; but, for 
Aquinas these are not objects of knowledge.
367 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch, 73, p. 215. “Ostensum est enim quod substantia intellectus unitur corpori 
humano ut forma. Impossibile est autem unam formam esse nisi unius materiae; quia proprius actus in 
propria potentia fit; sunt enim ad invicem proportionata. Non est igitur intellectus unus omnium 
hominum’ (Bk. 2, Ch. 73, sec. 1489, p. 208. 
368 Here (SCG Bk 2, Ch. 73) Aquinas again offers a detailed critique of the Averroist position and why it 
cannot hold. As before, I will forgo an account of it here and present it in some detail in Chapter 5. Also see 
Aquinas, deUnitate, Ch. 3, sec. 63, p. 49, Latin Ch. 3, ln. 41-60, p. 303.
369 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 10, p. 366. “Intellectus agens est nobilior 
possibili; set intellectus possibilis est separatus, inpassibilis et inmixtus, ut supra ostensum est; ergo multo 
magis intellectus agens. Ex quo etiam patet quod sit secundum substanciam suam actu” (Bk 3, Ch. 4, ln. 
79-84, p. 220).
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makes potentially intelligible things actually intelligible and presents them to the possible 
intellect. If this were not the case there would be no way for the intelligible objects 
known by the possible intellect to come into being. The power responsible for producing 
these intelligibles is the agent intellect. It functions by abstracting from matter and all 
material conditions, a process which results in an understanding of universals through the 
use of intelligible species.370 The agent intellect, like the possible intellect, must be 
multiplied according to the number of individuals. It is the principle by which actual 
understanding takes place and this must exist in the individual if we are to say truthfully 
that each person has her own understanding: “there must be in us an essential active 
principle of our own, through which we are made to be actually understanding, and this 
principle is the agent intellect.”371 Furthermore, Aquinas explains each individual 
experiences the act of abstracting from material conditions and the act of understanding 
as “taking place within [herself]” and this can only be attributed to the existence of 
formal principles of abstraction and reception in each person; thus, the possible and agent 
intellects must both be in the soul and multiplied according to the number of 
individuals.372
370 Aquinas, QDAnima , Q. 4, pp. 78-79, Latin Q. 4, ln. 115-125, p. 33.
371 Ibid., Q. 5, p. 86. “Requiritur in nobis principium actiuum proprium, per quod efficiamur intelligentes 
in actu. Et hoc est intellectus agens” (Q. 5, ln. 160-163, p. 41). Also see SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 76, p. 241-242 and 
Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 10, p. 367 (Latin Bk. 3, Ch. 4, ln.122-127, p. 221) . 
Aquinas notes that some people (Averroes) rely upon the cogitative power to regulate the act of 
understanding since it is responsible for presenting the phantasms. However, he argues that the cogitative 
power does not have the necessary control over the dispositions of the possible intellect.
372 “There must be in us a formal principle by which we receive intelligible objects and another formal 
principle by which we abstract them, an we call these principles the possible and the agent intellect. 
Consequently, both of these intellects are something existing within us” (Aquinas, QDAnima , Q5, p. 87). 
“Oportet igitur esse in nobis aliquod principium formale quo recipiamus intelligibilia et aliud quo 
abstrahamus ea. Et huiusmodi principia nominantur intellectus possibilis et agens. Uterque igitur eorum est 
aliquid in nobis” (Q. 5, ln. 202-206, p. 42). It is important to note that this idea of intrinsic formal cause 
does not preclude the possibility of separate intellects as easily as Aquinas suggests; Averroes is able to 
hold a similar notion using the idea that the Intellect are “form for us” despite holding that they are separate 
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Furthermore, if the agent intellect is a separate substance it will be “above man’s 
nature” and so incapable of producing a natural act for the human being; if this were the 
case understanding, the defining activity of the human being, would be a supernatural 
rather than natural activity. Clearly this is not the case; the act of intellect is done by 
individual human beings, and for this to be the case the principle of that action must be 
formally in the human being.373 Finally, Aquinas points out that Aristotle himself 
“expressly says that ‘these (two) different things (agent and possible intellect) are in 
soul,’ by which he expressly lets it be understood that they are parts or powers of soul, 
not separated substances”374 While it may be difficult to see how the same thing (the soul) 
could be both in potentiality and in actuality towards a single thing (the intelligible), this 
problem is easily resolved once we realize that they relate to the intelligibles in distinct 
substances. See Taylor, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul According to Aquinas and 
Averroes,” for an account of this.
See also Aquinas, ST, Ia,Q. 79, A. 4, p. 752-754. Aquinas makes similar arguments from experience and 
formal principles in Article 10 of De Spiritualibus Creaturis and Question 5 of QDAnima. 
373 SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 76, p. 244-245: “Man’s proper operation is understanding, and of this the primary 
principle is the agent intellect, which makes species intelligible, to which species the possible intellect 
having been actualizes, moves the will. Therefore, if the agent intellect is a substance outside man, all 
man’s operation depends on an extrinsic principle. Man, then will not act autonomously, but will be 
activated by another. So he will not be master of his own operations, nor will he merit either praise or 
blame. All moral science and social intercourse thus will perish; which is unfitting. Therefore, the agent 
intellect is not a substance separate from man.” “Operatio autem propria hominis est intelligere: cuius 
primum principium est intellectus agens, qui facit species intelligibiles, a quibus patitur quodammodo 
intellectus possibilis, qui factus in actu, movet voluntatem. Si igitur intellectus agens est quaedam 
substantia extra hominem, tota operatio hominis dependet a principio extrinseco. Non igitur erit homo 
agens seipsum, sed actus ab alio. Et sic non erit dominus suarum operationum; nec merebitur laudem aut 
vituperium; et peribit tota scientia moralis et conversatio politia; quod est inconveniens. Non est igitur 
intellectus agens substantia separata ab homine” (Bk. 2, Ch. 76, sec. 1578, p. 225). Note here also that 
Aquinas points to the will and the lack of moral responsibility which he thinks will result if the intellects 
are separate substances rather than being part of the human soul.
374 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 10, p. 367. “[Aristotelis] espresse dicit has 
duas differencias, scilicet intellectum agentem et intellectum possibilem, esse in anima, ex quo expresse dat 
intelligere quod sint partes vel potencie anime et non alique substancie separate” (Bk. 3, Ch. 4, ln. 122-127, 
p. 221). This issue of intellects being “in the soul” will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 5 since it is a 
main point of difference between Aquinas and Averroes.
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ways since the “possible intellect is in potentiality to intelligible things [while] 
intelligible things are in potentiality with respect to agent intellect.”375
In addition to these arguments, Aquinas’ argument based on will in On the Unity 
of the Intellect Against the Averroists is particularly interesting, given the focus of this 
dissertation. Here he explains that if the intellect were a separate substance, not a faculty 
of the soul of the human being, the will would likewise be separate and so free choice and 
moral responsibility would be destroyed:
Furthermore, according to their position, the principles of 
moral philosophy would be destroyed; for what is in us 
would be taken away. For something is not in us except 
through our will; and this indeed is called voluntary 
because it is in us. But, the will is in the intellect, as is clear 
from the statement of Aristotle in Book III of the De 
Anima376; from the fact that there is intellect and will in 
separate substances; and also from the fact it happens 
through the will that we love or hate something in general, 
just as we hate robbers as a class, as Aristotle says in his 
Rhetoric.
If, therefore, the intellect does not belong to this 
man in such a way that it is truly one with him, but is 
united to him only through phantasms or as a mover, the 
will will not be in this man, but in the separate intellect. 
And so this man will not be the master of his act, nor will 
any act of his be praiseworthy or blameworthy. This is to 
destroy the principles of moral philosophy.
Since this is absurd and is contrary to human life 
(for it would not be necessary to take counsel or make law), 
it follows that the intellect is united to us in such a way that 
375 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 10, p. 367-368. “Intellectus possibilis sit in 
potencia ad intelligibilia et quomodo intelligibilia sunt in potencia respectu intellectus agentis” (Bk. 3, Ch. 
4, ln. 137-1139, p. 221).
376 It should be pointed out that there are issues of translation in regards to the key passage in Aristotle; 
The texts available to Aquinas and Averroes render the text differently when it comes to the location of the 
will. Aquinas’ text as the will “in the intellect” while Averroes’ has it “in the cogitative part” This will be 
addressed in detail in Chapter 5.
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it and we constitute what is truly one being. This surely can 
be only in the way in which it has been explained, that is, 
that the intellect is a power of the soul which is united to us 
as form.377 It remains, therefore, that this must be held 
without any doubt, not on account of the revelation of faith, 
as they say, but because to deny this is to strive against 
what is clearly apparent.378
In order hold that the principles of moral philosophy, from willing an end to deliberating 
about and choosing a means to that end, are within an individual’s control the principle of 
these actions, the will, must be in the human being. Aquinas claims that the will is in the 
intellect and so, if the intellect is not in the individual human soul, the individual human 
being can neither understand nor will. If one cannot be said to will, one cannot logically 
be held morally responsible for one’s actions, subject to praise or blame. However, we do 
in fact hold people responsible for their actions: we make laws, we praise and blame, we 
take counsel when making our own decisions. Thus, the very patterns of human life 
demonstrate that the will and, thus, the intellect, is in the soul.379
377 It should be remembered that Aquinas has a unique view of the soul as substantial form of the body 
and hoc aliquid, as explained above. It should also be remembered that, despite what Aquinas seems to 
suggest, Averroes does not dismiss this idea; he argues, as pointed out in Chapter 3, that the intellectual 
soul is “form for us” while also maintaining the Intellects as separate entities.
378 Aquinas, deUnitate, Ch. III, sec. 81-82, pp. 56-57.”Adhuc, secundum istorum positionem destru- untur 
moralis philosophie principia: subtrahitur enim quod est in nobis. Non enim est aliquid in nobis nisi per 
uoluntatem; unde et hoc ipsum uoluntarium dicitur, quod in nobis est. Voluntas autem in intellectu est, ut 
patet per dictum Aristotilis in 111 De anima, et per hoc quod in substantiis separatis est intellectus et 
uoluntas; et per hoc etiam quod contingit per uoluntatem aliquid in uniuersali amare uel odire, sicut odimus 
latronum genus, ut Aristotiles dicit in sua Rhetorica. Si igitur intellectus non est aliquid huius hominis ut sit 
uere unum cum eo, sed unitur ei solum per fantasmata uel sicut motor, non erit in hoc homine uoluntas, sed 
in intellectu separato. Et ita hic homo non erit dominus sui actus, nec aliquis eius actus erit laudabilis uel 
uituperabilis: quod est diuellere principia moralis philosophie. Quod cum sit absurdum et uite humane 
contrarium, non enim esset necesse consiliari nec leges ferre, sequitur quod intellectus sic uniatur nobis ut 
uere ex eo et nobis fiat unum; quod uere non potest esse nisi eo modo quo dictum est, ut sit scilicet potentia 
anime que unitur nobis ut forma. Relinquitur igitur hoc absque omni dubitatione tenendum, non propter 
reuelationem fidei, ut dicunt, sed quia hoc subtrahere est niti contra manifeste apparentia” (Ch. 3, ln. 
336-363, p. 306). 
379 Of course, much more must be said here about how Aquinas proves these claims about the relationship 
of the intellect and the will in a more substantial way and whether this constitutes a sound rebuttal of 
Averroes claims, but these discussions will be held off until later in this chapter and until Chapter 5, 
respectively.
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From these many arguments we can see that Aquinas concludes that both the 
possible and agent intellects must be multiplied according to the number of human 
beings. If this were not the case, Aquinas argues, we would be unable to adequately 
explain the nature of the human being as essentially rational, individual human 
knowledge, and moral responsibility.
4.2.3 Internal sense powers and their relation to the intellects: the importance of 
cogitation.
So far we have seen how the rational soul relates to the body and how the 
intellect, the rational faculty, relates to the soul. Aquinas insists that human beings are 
composites of body and soul and that this soul must include the intellects if each person is 
said to understand. He argues, contrary to many of his predecessors, that both the agent 
and possible intellects must be multiplied according to the number of souls and must exist 
as faculties of each rational soul. He also notes that the intellect is unique among the 
powers of the soul in that it does not have a particular organ while all of the other powers 
of the soul and their organs are put to use by it. Before moving on to a particular 
consideration of the will, we have to examine this connection more closely; particularly, 
we must identify what Aquinas thinks about the workings of the internal senses which 
offer a point of connection between sensation and intellection.
Aquinas explains that in addition to the five external sense there are four internal 
senses: the common sense, the imagination, the estimative/cogitative power, and the 
memorative power. In discussing these internal senses Aquinas uses Avicenna as a guide, 
although he disagrees with Avicenna’s inclusion of a fifth sense, phantasy as distinct from 
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imagination.380 Animals need to be able to apprehend not only the sensible qualities of 
things but also the intentions381 (“connotational attributes” mentioned in the discussion of 
Avicenna) of things; they must also be able to retain this information even when not 
directly sensing something. This means they requires not only the external senses but 
internal senses capable retaining information and apprehending intentions. This leads 
Aquinas to conclude that the various internal senses are also required:
Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the 
proper sense and the common sense are appointed […] for 
the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy 
or imagination is appointed, being as it were a storehouse 
of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the 
apprehension of intentions which are not received through 
the senses, the estimative power is appointed: and for their 
preservation, the memorative power, which is a storehouse 
of such intentions.382
Aquinas points out that this process is largely the same for human beings as it is for 
animals. The main difference is that the estimative power383 is replaced in human beings 
380 See Deborah Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformation,” 
Topoi 19 (2000), pp. 59-75 for a discussion of how the notion of internal sense powers developed from 
Avicenna through Averroes, Albert the Great, and Aquinas. In particular, Black explains that Aquinas 
rejects the idea of phantasy as a power distinct from “retentive imagination,” reducing the number of 
internal sense powers an animal or human being posses to four (p. 66). Also see Jorg Alejandro Tellkamp 
“Vis Aestimativa and Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences,” The Thomist 76 
(2012), p. 611-612 for an enumeration of the internal sense powers according to Aquinas. This issue of the 
development of the internal senses from Avicenna to Aquinas is also taken up in detail in Carla Di 
Martino’s, Ratio Particularis: Doctrine des sens internes d’Avicenna á Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 2013); see especially Chapter 4.
381 See Tellkamp, “Vis Aestimativa and Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the 
Sentences,” p. 613 for an account of intentions. Also see Di Martino, Ratio Particularis: Doctrine des sens 
internes d’Avicenna á Thomas d’Aquin, p. 91 and Chapter 9 of Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature.
382 Aquinas, ST, Ia, Q.78, A. 4, p. 742. “Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus 
proprius et communis: de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut 
conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt: est enim phantasia sive imaginatio 
quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per 
sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est 
thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum” (p. 374). 
383 Black points out that this inclusion of the estimative power in animals is in keeping with Avicenna’s 
view and is a break from Averroes, who rejected the need for such a power. She explains that the reaction of 
animals to intentions is more that an “aesthetic” reaction, related to feelings of pleasure and pain, thus 
requiring a particular sensitive power. (“Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western 
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with the cogitative power or “particular reason,” (ratio particularis)384 which is located 
in the “middle part of the head.” This cogitative power is able to apprehend intentions in 
a more advanced way than the estimative power because it is able to make some use of 
humans’ more advanced intellectual capabilities to use comparisons rather than relying 
only on “natural instinct.”385 Tellkamp explains: 
the vis cogitativa is ratio particularis means that a given 
state of affairs or experience is seen as pertaining to general 
notions, so that someone can, for instance, see “this human 
being” because he or she possesses the universal concept of 
“human being” (i.e., rational animal), which includes at 
least a vague idea of how human beings are: two legs, 
arms, a head, and so on. Animals, however, only grasp the 
intentional content an experience entails insofar as it 
produces an action or emotional reaction. In this sense 
Aquinas argues that in human beings the vis cogitativa 
replaces the vis aestimativa of higher animals.386 
From this account we can see that the cogitative power acts as a semi-rational power in 
that it makes use of universal knowledge as it examines a particular instance of that 
universal. The estimative power of non-rational animals does not relate the particular to a 
universal in the same way; rather, it elicits an instinctual response to the experienced 
Transformation,” pp. 66-68)
384 See Tellkamp, “Vis Aestimativa and Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences” 
for an a account of the ways in which this distinction between estimative power and cogitative power (i.e. 
ratio particularis) represents a move away from Avicenna and towards a more Averroist framework when it 
comes to human beings (at pp. 621-640 Tellkamp offers a detailed discussion of Aquinas’ theory and its 
relation to earlier views of the internal sense powers). 
385 Aquinas, ST, Ia, Q.78, A. 4, p. 743, Latin p. 374; Also see Aquinas, SCG BK 2, Ch. 60 for a discussion 
of the cogitative power. Although this discussion is set within a context of disproving the claim that the 
cogitative power is enough to account for human understanding and allow for separate intellects Aquinas 
does not seem to be objecting to the general account of the cogitative power he explains here.
386 Tellkamp, “Vis Aestimativa and Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences,” p. 
623.
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particular based upon aspects of the experiences which are extra-sensory (e.g. the 
hostility of the wolf towards the sheep). 
Aquinas further explains the cogitative power in his Commentary on Aristotle’s 
De Anima. Here he also calls it the “particular reason” and explains that it is responsible 
for apprehending individual intentions. He goes on to explain that this power is “in the 
soul’s sensory part” and yet is “united to the intellective power.”387 It is the cogitative 
power which links the highest element of the sensory powers to the intellect in the human 
being, allowing individual human beings to link their universal and particular knowledge. 
Aquinas explains that “the cogitative power apprehends an individual as existing under a 
common nature. It can do this insofar as it is united to the intellective power in the same 
subject.”388 This is different from the estimative power of nonrational animals, which 
“apprehends an individual, not in terms of its being under a common nature, but in terms 
of its being the end point or starting point of some action or affection.”389 We can see 
from this that for Aquinas the cogitative power plays an important role in the human 
ability to sense particulars and understand their relationship to the common natures which 
are the objects of knowledge, the result of the intellective process. The importance of the 
cogitative power is felt in another way, when we consider the state of the soul after death; 
Aquinas points out that the passive intellect, which includes the cogitative power, dies 
387 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Bk. 2, Ch. 13, p. 208. “Dicitur etiam ratio particularis 
eo quod est collatiua intentionum individualium sicut ratio uniuersalis est collatiua rationum uniuersalium, 
nichilominus tamen hec uis est in parte sensitua, quia uis sensitiua in sui suppremo participat aliquid de ui 
intellectiuv in homine, in quo sensus intellectui coniungitur” (Bk. 2, Ch. 13, ln. 195-201, pp. 121-122).
388  Ibid., Bk. 2, Ch. 13, p. 208. “Cogitatiua apprehendit indiuiduum ut existentem sub natura communi, 
quod contingit ei in quantum unitur intellectiue in eodem subiecto” (Bk 2, Ch. 13, ln. 206-20209, p. 122).
389  Ibid., Bk. 2, Ch. 13, p. 209. “Estimatiua autem non apprehendit aliquod indiuiduum secundum quod 
est sub natura communi, set solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis uel 
passionis” (Bk. 2, Ch. 13, ln. 211-214, p. 122).
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with the body because it has a corporeal organ and pertains to the sensory part of the soul. 
Without this faculty the separated human soul or intellect “intellectively cognizes 
nothing.”390 Thus, the cogitative power can be seen to play an important role in the 
process of knowledge attainment and particular in how the intellect understands the 
sensory world and the common natures. 
While this will be discussed in much more detail below in the section on will and 
decision, it should also be pointed out here that Aquinas sees an important role for the 
cogitative power (or particular reason) in the deliberative process. It is the particular 
reason which supplies the particular information which spurs one to action in the 
practical syllogism.391 He notes in the SCG that the cogitative power is a bodily power 
and dies with the death of the body. This death results in a change in or inability to 
understand when the soul becomes a separate, but incomplete substance at death because 
of the key role of the cogitative power when it comes to preparing the phantasms for the 
action of the possible intellect.392393
4.2.4 The view of knowledge attainment which this picture entails—relation to both 
universal and practical knowledge
From what has been said above a picture of Aquinas’s view of the knowledge 
attainment process emerges. For Aquinas, knowledge attainment starts with sensation, as 
it does for Averroes. Sensible species are brought together by the common sense and 
390  Ibid., Bk. 3, Ch. 10, p. 369-370. “Intllectus noster nichil intelligit” (Bk. 3, Ch. 4, ln. 243-244, p. 223).
391 Ibid. Bk. 3, Ch. 16, p. 416, Latin, Bk. 3. Ch. 10, ln 123-145, p. 251.
392 Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 80, p. 261, Latin Bk 2, Ch. 8, sec. 1618, p. 233; he also mentions the need 
for the passible powers in Bk. 3, Ch. 84, pp. 17.
393 It can clearly be seen from what has been said in this section that the cogitative power plays an 
important role in Aquinas’ view of knowledge attainment and that this role is, nonetheless, not as developed 
as it is in Averroes’ system; this will become more clear when we examine Aquinas’ view of the will.
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stored as phantasms. For Aquinas the agent intellect works to abstract the intelligible 
species from the phantasm and places them in the possible intellect. It is by the 
intelligibles species that the the individual is able to understand the common nature in 
sensible object. This process, Aquinas argues, requires both the possible and agent 
intellects to be multiplied according to the number of individuals; if this were not the case 
it would not be possible for each person to have her own knowledge, distinct from that of 
other human beings and distinctly her’s (not the intellect’s).394 
For Aquinas the thing known is not the intelligible species (or the intelligibles in 
act as it is for Averroes) but the common nature which exists in things. He thinks this is 
necessary if we are to be able to accurately claim to know the nature of things, not just 
intentions or species abstracted from the thing. Despite this our intellectual knowledge is 
not of particulars as particulars but rather it is of the universal nature of the particulars—
those aspects which make the particular what it is and which it shares with all other 
instances of its kind. This allows Aquinas to hold simultaneously that knowledge is of 
things in the world and that we all know the same thing (the common nature) even if we 
have different experiences of different particulars.395
The universal knowledge which results from this process is used not only during 
theoretical considerations but also during practical reasoning. When one encounters a 
particular situation, one is able, using the particular reason (i.e. cogitative power), to 
recognize the individual intentions present in the situation and connect them to the 
universal knowledge one already has. As Aquinas explains, this allows the individual to 
394 Dewan, “St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge,” p. 129 for a brief account of this process and Stump, 
Aquinas, pp. 287-294 for a detailed account.
395  Dewan, “St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge,” pp. 129-131.
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relate their particular knowledge to their universal knowledge with a mind towards 
action. This is often accomplished by way of the practical syllogism.
4.3. Will and its relation to the intellect and the human being in general
Now that we have seen how Aquinas explains the knowledge attainment process 
and how he explains the role and location of the intellects and other relevant powers we 
must move on to consider his views of the will and its associated powers of deliberation 
and choice.396 This, along with what has already been seen, will allow us to come to a 
conclusion about how Aquinas views human moral action and agency; it will also provide 
some insight into how Aquinas views these things in light of his understanding and 
criticism of Averroes’ position.
4.3.1 The relationship between the will and the intellect and their objects
In the Book 2 of the SCG Aquinas discusses “intellectual substances” such as 
angels and human beings. Here he establishes that “intellectual substances must be 
capable of willing” and that this willing is a rational appetite (as opposed to the the 
natural or animal appetite present in non-intellectual substances).397 David Gallagher 
396 It should be noted that choice here is to be associated with decision in the earlier accounts of Aristotle 
and others in Chapter 2. For Aquinas the notion of decision took on a much stronger sense which is in line 
with the term choice in a way the earlier accounts were not.
397 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 47, p. 142. “Has autem substantias intellectualies necesse est esse volentes.
Inest enim omnibus appetitus boni: cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, ut philosophi tradunt. Huiusmodi 
autem appetitus in his quidem quae cognitione carent, digitur naturalis appetitus: sicut dicitur quod lapis 
appetit esse deorsum. In his autem quae cognitionem sensitivam habent, dicitur appetitus animalis, qui 
dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem. In his vero quae intelligunt , dicitur appetitus intellectualis seu 
rationalis, qui est voluntas. Substantiae igitur intellectuales creatae habent voluntatem” (Bk. 2, Ch. 47, sec. 
1236-1237, p. 167). Also see ST Ia IIae, Q. 6, A. 2, p. 617, Latin pp. 57-58 and ST Ia IIae, Q. 8, pp. 
626-628, Latin pp. 68-73 (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Vol. 2, translated by the Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros, 1948)); for the Latin see Prima Secundae Summa 
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provides a detailed account of Aquinas’ arguments distinguishing the rational appetite 
from the animal or sense appetite.398 As an appetite the will of the human being is directed 
towards singulars; but, as a rational appetite it is directed in a universal way--the focus is 
on how the particular functions as an instance of a more universal consideration (i.e. the 
good). As Gallagher explains, “what is important, then, is not so much the object willed 
as the formality under which it is willed. Such a formality is always universal, and as 
such is an object of reason.”399 In an important sense the real object of the will is “the 
universal good;” although acts of the will are always of particulars, these are important 
insofar as they relate to the universal good towards which the human being is aiming and 
towards which the faculty of will, as a whole, is directed.400 Pasnau points out that it is 
this capacity of the human being to understand universals which characterizes free 
decision.401 Furthermore, the rational appetite is characterized by the ability to control 
one’s inclinations in a way the sense appetite is not; apprehension of a particular as 
desirable does not necessarily result in pursuit of that particular.402 This ability is further 
Theologiae in Opera Omnia, Vol. 6 (Rome, 1891). In ST I.82.5 Aquinas calls will an “intellectual appetite 
(appetitus intellectivus)” he also makes reference to Aristotle’s “claim” in De Anima Bk. 3, Ch. 2, 432b5 
that “the will is in the reason.” Some issues surrounding this claim will be addressed in Chapter 5, below.
398 See both David Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” in Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 29.4 (1991), pp. 559-584, and “Free Choice and Free Judgment in Thomas Aquinas,” 
Archiv Fur Geschichte Der Philosophie 76 (1994), pp. 247-277. Also, Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human 
Nature, pp. 235-241.
399 Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” p. 563. Also, “The will, he says, tends 
directly and primarily toward the reason for the object’s desirability (ratio appetibilitatis) and only 
secondarily toward this or that particular object” (p. 575)
400 Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” p. 578 for a discussion of “the 
universal good,” but pp. 574-580 for the wider discussion. Also see Gallagher, “Free Choice and Free 
Judgment in Thomas Aquinas,” p. 263.
401 Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, p. 219.
402 Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” pp. 564-565. One might look to 
Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1972), 24.4, where Aquinas 
explains that free choice is “the power of will or reason--one as subordinated to the other,” and to 24.2 
where he addresses the ability of human beings to control their appetites. Also see ST Ia, Q. 83.
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related to the ability to reflect upon one’s judgment and to make free decisions regarding 
what is to be pursued or avoided.403
Thus, it is the will which explains how intellectual substances are able to have 
control over their own actions. He goes on to explain that will is the power by which 
“intellectual substances […] move themselves to act, as having mastery of their own 
action.”404 This occurs in part because of the connection between will and 
understanding.405 Other forms of appetite rely on something external to the substance to 
spur movement, whereas the rational appetite relies on the intellect, something internal to 
the substance. Thus, only substances possessing intellect (human beings and angels) have 
an internal source of motion.406 
The relationship between the will and the intellect is a complicated one for 
Aquinas. They interact in a number of ways as the intellect affects the will and the will 
affects the intellect. In ST Question 82 Aquinas asks which power, will or intellect, is 
superior or higher. He determines that the intellect considered in itself is always superior, 
since its object is more noble; the intellect’s object is the appetible good itself while the 
object of will is the appetible good as it is in the intellect (i.e. as it is apprehended or 
403 Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” pp. 569-571; 580. Importantly, while 
human beings have free will this does not mean they can act contrary to their judgments (as with akrasia); 
for Aquinas we cannot act contrary to our particular judgment, although we can act contrary to our 
universal judgments (p. 571). Also see Gallagher, “Free Choice and Free Judgment in Thomas Aquinas,” 
pp. 252-256; 271-274. Pasnau points out that only human beings are voluntary agents because such agency 
requires the ability to deliberate and make choices in this way (Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, pp. 
213-215); he addresses weakness of will and the related issues of ignorance, passion, and malice at pp. 
241-257.
404 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 47, p.144. “Substantiae igitur intellectualis seipsas agunt ad operandum, ut 
habentes suae operationis dominium” (Bk. 2, Ch. 47, sec. 1239, p. 168).
405. Aquinas argues in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate 24.2 , for example, that brutes are not capable of 
free choice precisely because they lack the knowledge necessary to curb their appetites, which intellect 
provides.
406 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 47, pp. 143-144; Latin Bk. 2, Ch. 47, sec. 1239-1240, p. 168.
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understood).407 However, relatively speaking, the will is a higher power than the intellect 
“when the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the 
object of the intellect.”408 Since the objects of the will (good and evil) are in things while 
the objects of the intellect (truth and error) are in the mind, this occurs when the object of 
the will is something greater than the human soul. This only occurs in relation to God; 
thus, “the love of God is better than the knowledge of God.”409 Despite the usual 
superiority of the intellect over the will, the will acts as an agent, moving the intellect and 
the other powers of the soul towards their proper ends. This is because the will has a 
natural intentionality towards the universal good while the intellect is directed towards a 
particular good (i.e., knowledge of the truth). The intellect, on the other hand, moves the 
will as an end insofar as the end of the will is the understood good, which presupposed 
the working of the intellect.410
In arguing for the superiority of the intellect over the will in the SCG Aquinas 
makes explicit reference to the arguments of both Averroes and Aristotle. He notes that 
Averroes explains that even intellectual consideration is under the control of the will: “the 
will seems to be a higher power than the intellect, for the will moves the intellect to act; 
indeed, the intellect actually considers, whenever it wills to, what it retains habitually.”411 
407 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 82, A. 3
408 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 82, A. 3 p. 781. “Quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re invenitur quam obiectum 
intellectus” (p. 393).
409 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 82, A. 3 p. 781. “Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio” (p. 393).
410 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 82, A. 4 p. 782; Latin p. 394.
411 Aquinas, SCG Bk 3.1, Ch. 26, p. 104. “Voluntas videtur esse altior potentia quam intellectus: nam 
voluntas movet intellectum ad suum actum; intellectus enim actu considerat quae habitu tenet, cum aliquis 
voluerit ”(Bk. 3, Ch. 26, sec. 2076, p. 34). This seems to be related to what Averroes discusses in LCDA Bk 
3, comm. 36 where he asserts that “after we have possessed the intellect in a positive disposition it is in our 
will to understand any intelligible we wish and to extract any form we wish” (p. 395; “Quoniam in 
voluntate nostra est, cum habuerimus intellectum qui est in habitu, intelligere quodcunque intellectum 
voluerimus et extrahere quamcumque formam voluerimus,” p. 495); he also says that we “extract and make 
intelligibles in virtue of our will” (p. 391; extrahimus intellecta et facimus ea per voluntatem nostrum,” p. 
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Aquinas argues that this cannot be the case; human beings are essentially intellectual and 
so their ultimate end must be an intellectual end. What’s more, the intellect is superior to 
the will because, “primarily and directly, the intellect moves the will”412 in that the will is 
moved by the known good and this is the result of intellect.413 The will only moves the 
intellect in an accidental way, insofar as it desires understanding and so moves the 
intellect to understand because understanding is a known good and so an object of will.414
In an argument against the claim that the celestial bodies can cause acts of the will 
and choice Aquinas relies heavily on Aristotle. He explains that “the will belongs to the 
intellectual part of the soul” and that “every choice and act of the will is caused 
immediately in us from an intelligible apprehension, for the intellectual good is the object 
of the will.”415 Thus, the only way for one to err when making a choice is for there to be 
an error in one’s intellectual judgment of a particular object of choice. Such choices are 
not natural but are the result of intellectual apprehension; this accounts for the fact that 
one can resist the pull of one’s body if one is intellectually, and thus morally, superior, as 
when a temperate man is not moved to choose some pleasurable object, such as food or a 
woman.416 From these arguments and the treatment of Averroes and Aristotle it is clear 
490) when the intellects are joined with us as our “final form belonging to us” (p. 391; “forma postremea 
nobis,” p 490) and we acquire intelligibles “voluntarily” (p. 396; “voluntarie,” p. 496).
412 Ibid., p. 110. “Nam primo et per se intellectus movet voluntatem” (Bk. 3, Ch. 26, sec. 2092, p. 37).
413 Aquinas offers a number of arguments for why felicity is an act of the intellect and not of the will in 
SCG Bk. 3.1, Ch. 26. I will not address them here as they are not directly relevant to the larger project. Also 
see ST Ia IIae Q. 3. A. 4, pp. 598-599; Latin pp. 29-30 for a discussion of why happiness is not an act of the 
will.
414 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 3.1, Ch. 26 p. 110.
415 Ibid., Bk. 3.2, Ch. 85, p. 18. “Voluntas enim in parte intellectiva animae est […] Omnis electio et 
actualis voluntas in nobis immediate ex apprehensione intelligibili causatur: bonum enim intellectum est 
obiectum voluntatis ”(Bk. 3, Ch. 85, sec. 2598-2599, p. 121).
416 Ibid. It is interesting to note that Aquinas claims that his view is contrary to that of the Stoics, who 
think, according to Aquinas, “that all our acts, and even our choices, are ordered by the celestial bodies” (p. 
23). “Ponebant omnes actus nostros, et etiam electiones nostras, scundum corpora caelestia disponi” (Bk. 3, 
Ch. 85, sec. 2614, p. 123). We saw in Chapter 2 that the Stoic view is considerably more nuanced than 
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that, although the will can and does move the intellect in some respects, the intellect is 
the superior power and the will could not, in the end, function without the intellect.
The object of the will is the “end and the good”417 since the will is what moves 
intellectual substances towards their proper operations and proper end. While there are 
many acts which seem to belong to the will, such as delight, desire, and hate, the true act 
of the will is love and this is manifest in a desire/love for the good and for one’s proper 
end.418 In the ST Aquinas offer a more extended treatment of the object of will; here he 
explains that “the will must of necessity419 adhere to the last end, which is happiness;”420 
one always wills for what will make one happy—either in the sense of particular things 
that bring happiness or pleasure (which may be confused with happiness) or in the sense 
of the final end of human beings which is God. This does not mean, however, that the 
will desires everything it desires—or even every good thing or everything necessary for 
happiness—of necessity.421 This is because there are some things which are good but not 
necessary for happiness and so are not necessarily desired. Furthermore, there are some 
Aquinas’ account would suggest.
417 Ibid., Bk. 4, Ch. 19, p.117. “Finis enim et bonum” (Bk. 4, Ch. 19, sec. 3559. p. 283). Also see SCG Bk. 
3.1, Ch. 1, p.32, Latin Bk. 1, Ch. 1. sec. 1863, p. 2.
418 AIbid., Bk. 4 Ch. 19, pp. 117-118, Latin Bk. 4, Ch. 19, sec. 3559-3561, pp. 283-284. Aquinas explains 
this in the context of a proof for the existence and nature of the Holy Spirit; however, what he says here 
seems to be general and as such applicable to the human being as well.
419 In ST. Ia IIae Q. 10, A. 1, pp. 633-634; Latin pp. 83-84 Aquinas explains that this willing is also natural 
to the human being, despite the fact that Happiness, the last end, is a supernatural one insofar as it is only to 
be found in God.
420 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 82, A. 1, p. 778. “Voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo” (p. 
392). He explains that necessity in this context refers to “necessity of the end (necessitas finis),” not 
“necessity of coercion (necessitas coactionis),” and this is a natural necessity for the will. Also see ST Ia 
IIae Q. 1, A. 6, pp 587-588; Latin p. 14 where Aquinas argues that it is necessary that everything a human 
being desires is desired because it is seen as the good or tending towards the good. In ST. Ia IIae Q. 10, pp. 
633-636; Latin pp. 83-89 Aquinas again reiterates that the object of the will is absolute or universal 
Happiness. Also see Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics [CNE], trans. C.I.. Litzinger 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,1964), Book 1 (esp. Lec. 4, 9, and 10) for an extended treatment of 
happiness and an argument for its being the ultimate end of the human being.
421 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 10, A. 2, pp. 634-635,;Latin pp. 85-86.
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things which are necessary for happiness—those which relate to our adherence to God—
but are not fully known or understood before one sees God; since they are not fully 
known, the will does not know that it should/must desire them and so it may not.422 Like 
Aristotle, Aquinas thinks that happiness is the ultimate goal of the human being; unlike 
Aristotle he locates this ultimate happiness in knowledge or apprehension of God, our 
final end. If we had perfect knowledge of God, we could not help but will to be near him 
and to conform to his will; since we do not have this knowledge, it is possible for us to 
will only apparent goods rather than the true good which would lead us closer to our final 
end.
Aquinas also recognizes that the failing of the intellect can impact what we will. 
He explains that the object of will can also be explained as that which is “apprehended as 
good;”423 this claim indirectly supports Aquinas’ view of the relationship between the 
intellects and the will while explaining how it is that some people will bad things or 
follow the passions or lower appetites rather than reason. Sometimes reason is not 
functioning properly and the passions stir one towards something that is desirable 
because of passion but not good. Sometimes reason is so totally restrained that one acts 
without will, just motivated by passion. Sometimes the reason is working to some small 
extent and one may will contrary to one’s passions and choose not to engage in the desire. 
These complications regarding the working and strength of reason mean that 
the will is moved not only by the universal good 
apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended 
by sense. Wherefore he can be moved to some particular 
good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. 
422 Ibid., Ia Q. 82, A. 2, p 779; Latin p. 393.
423 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 8, A. 1, p. 626. “Quod apprehendatur in ratione boni” (p. 68). 
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For we will and do many things without passion, and 
through choice alone; as is made evident in those cases 
wherein reason resists passion.424
 Furthermore, the search for the good takes the shape of willing both ends and means. 
Properly speaking the will wills for an end; but, it wills for the means insofar as they lead 
to the end.425 The will is moved towards its object by the intellect insofar as it must rely 
upon the intellects understanding that something is good, and thus an appropriate object 
of the will. However, the will also affects the intellect, and the other powers of the soul, 
insofar as its will for some apprehended good leads them to act in such a way as to attain 
that good.426
4.3.2 The function of the will
Having offered a detailed account of the will in relation to the intellect and to its 
object we must move on to examine the internal functioning of the will. Aquinas explains 
that there are several acts of the will, and the intellect in association with the will, having 
to do with both ends and means. These include enjoyment, intention, choice counsel, 
consent, use, and command. Of principle importance for our discussion are the three 
actions of counsel, choice, and consent;427 these seem to correspond to deliberation, wish, 
424 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 10, A. 3, p. 636. “Quod voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per 
rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum 
volumus et operamur absque passione, per solam electionem: ut maxime patet in his in quibus ratio renititur 
passioni” (p 88).
425 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 8, A. 2-3, pp. 627-628; Latin pp. 70-72.
426 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 9, A. 1, pp. 628-629; Latin pp. 74-75. The rest of Question 9 addresses whether the will 
can be moved by itself or by other internal powers, such as the sensitive appetite, or external powers, such 
as the heavenly bodies and God. Aquinas’ goal here is to explain the complex relationship that exists among 
the will and the various powers of the human soul and external world. But I will leave this aside to focus on 
the relationship between the will and the intellect.
427 Also relevant are intention, command, and use which I will discuss below in my account of the 
deliberative process but which I will not offer a treatment of here. It is perhaps useful to point out here that 
the actions which result from these acts of will and intellect are, for Aquinas, human actions, properly 
speaking. He discusses this idea in ST Ia Iae Q. 1, A. 1, in the context of an account of the end of the 
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and decision in Aristotle. Aquinas offers a substantial account of these concepts in his 
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics and a less developed discussion of them in the 
ST.
According to Aquinas counsel or deliberation (consilium; bouleusis) precedes 
choice and involves a rational consideration of what has to be done to achieve a desired 
or willed for end. 428 One takes counsel about the various possible means by which one 
may achieve one’s end429 and then one decides, or consents430 to, which of those means is 
best and chooses to act accordingly. Aquinas explains that “something is deemed worthy 
of deliberation inasmuch as men with good sense do deliberate about it. Men of this type 
take counsel only about things that of their nature require careful consideration and that 
are properly said to be worthy of deliberation.”431 That is to say, we take counsel about 
things which are in our own power to do.432 Since “counsel is ordered to action”433 we 
human being. Here he argues for a distinction between actions which properly speaking human and actions 
which are simply done by humans. Human actions are those which are “proper to man as man,” (“propriae 
hominis inquatum est homo”) done “through will and reason [...as they] proceed from a deliberate 
will” (“per rationem et voluntatem […] ex voluntate deliberata procedunt”). On the other hand, some 
actions, such as absent-mindedly tapping one’s foot, are done by human beings but are not specifically 
human because they are the result of deliberation. This distinction is important as it highlights the important 
role will and intellect together play in the distinctively human life.
428 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 14, A. 1, p. 647, Latin p. 105. Aquinas claims to be following Aristotle here, 
who he quotes as saying that “choice is the desire of what has been already counseled” (“electio est 
appetitus praeconsiliati”) in Ethics iii.2. Tobias Hoffman argues that this is actually a departure from 
Aristotle, who does not make the distinction between judgment or counsel (a cognitive act/act of the 
intellect) and choice (an appetitive act/act of the will) in “Voluntariness, Choice, and Will in the Ethics 
Commentaries of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas” in Documenti e Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica 
Medievale XVII (2006) Firenze: Edizione Del Galluzzo, p. 89-90.
429 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 14, A. 2, p. 648, Latin p. 106.
430 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 15, pp. 650-653, Latin pp. 110-112.
431 Thomas Aquinas, CNE, Bk. 3, Lec. 7, C. 459, p. 203. “Sed illud vere dicitur conciliabile de quo 
consiliantur homines habentes intellectum recte dispositum. Tales enim non conciliantur nisi de rebus quae 
in natura sua talia sunt ut de eis consilium haberi debeat, quae proprie dicuntur consiliabilia” (Sententia 
Libri Ethicorum Vol 1 in Opera Omnia Vol. 47 (Rome: Fratrum Praedicatorum, 1969), Bk 3, Lec. 3, ln. 
21-26, p. 139).
432 See Aquinas, CNE Bk. 3, Lec. 7, C. 460-464, p. 203-204; Latin Bk. 3, Lec. 7, ln. 29-85, p. 139, for a 
discussion of the various things about which we do not take counsel.
433 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 7, C. 465, p. 204. “Consilium enim ad operationem ordinatur” (Bk. 3, Lec. 7, ln. 90, 
p. 139).
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deliberate about what actions we can take to achieve the ends we have already set for 
ourselves (or the final end in as much as we understand it). These actions include those 
which have their cause in the individual human being by virtue of being caused by “the 
intellect and whatever else is man’s agent, as will, the senses, and other principles of this 
kind;”434 Since each human being has different abilities in this regard, each person 
deliberates about different things. Counsel is taken, then, in some creative arts and 
practical sciences, such as medicine and business, as regards their practice in a given 
situation, and in the speculative sciences, as regards their use. In general “counsel is more 
necessary in the arts (the practicable) than in the sciences (the speculative)” since there is 
more room for individual control and nuance in the arts.435
Having determined what things we take counsel about, Aquinas moves on to 
discuss the methods by which we deliberate. Aquinas reiterates, following Aristotle, that 
deliberation is about means, not ends. Thus, one deliberates about what actions one 
should take to achieve the desired end.436 This deliberation takes place in an analytic 
inquiry where one must first establish the principles, or ends, and then inquire regarding 
the means to those ends, or the conclusion of the inquiry;437 one cannot help notice here 
that this seem to be the language of the practical syllogism where one has certain 
circumstances set before one and must come to a conclusion regarding what action to 
take to achieve one’s goal given these circumstances. Sometimes one concludes that the 
434 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 7, C. 466, p. 204. “Causa intellectus et quicquid est aliud quod producit id quod per 
hominem fit, sicut voluntas et sensus et alia huiusmodi principia” (Bk. 3, Lec. 7, ln. 104-107, p. 140). 
435 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 7, C. 469, p. 205. “Magis necese habemus consiliari circa artes, scilicet operativas, 
quam circa disciplinas, scilicet speculativas” (Bk. 3, Lec. 7, ln. 151-153, p. 140).
436 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 8, C. 475, p. 208; Latin, Bk. 3, Lec.8, ln. 36-58, p. 143.
437 Ibid., BK 3, LEC. 8, C. 476, pp. 208-209; Latin Bk. 3, Lec.8, ln. 59-77, p. 143. Also see CNE Bk. 3, 
Lec. 8, C. 474, p. 208; Latin Bk. 3, Lec. 8, ln. 18-35, p. 143.
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means to achieve the end are not immediately within one’s power; in this case one must 
start the process over by taking the elected means as ends and determining what must be 
done to achieve them; the deliberative inquiry stops once one has reached something 
which it is in one’s power to achieve.438 From this account we can see the immanently 
practical and practicable nature of counsel/deliberation and how it fits into determining 
practical actions, including moral actions.
After one takes counsel and determines the means by which one’s end may be 
achieved the next step is to consent to whichever means are the best.
439
 According to 
Aquinas consent is an act of the appetitive power, particularly the will, since the act of 
consent constitutes a kind of affirmation of or moving towards some particular.
440
 He 
notes that it can be said to be part of reason or part of the higher part of the soul in so far 
as reason includes the will.
441
 It is important to note that Aquinas makes a distinction 
between assent and consent, explaining that 
assentire (to assent) is, to speak, ad aliud sentire (to feel 
towards something); and thus it implies a certain distance 
from that to which assent is given. But consentire (to 
consent) is to feel with, and this implies a certain union to 
the object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to 
tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to consent: 
whereas the intellect, whose act does not consist in a 
movement towards the thing, but rather the reverse, as we 
have stated in the First Part […] is more properly said to 
assent; although one word is wont to be used for the other. 
438 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 8, C. 477-481, p. 209; Latin Bk. 3, Lec. 8, ln. 78-139, pp. 143-144.
439 If there are many possible means we may consent to several and than choose one; if there is only one 
viable option that consent and choice differ only logically (Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 15, A. 3, p. 652; Latin p. 
112) 
440 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 15, A. 1, pp. 650-651; Latin p. 110.
441 See Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 15 A. 1, p. 651; Latin p. 110, and Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 15, A. 4, p. 653; 
Latin p. 112.
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We may also say that the intellect assents, in so far as it is 
moved by the will.
442
It is clear from this passage that Aquinas views consent, the result of deliberation as a 
power of the will which consists in offering a kind of approval to the particular means 
which one has arrived at through the act of deliberation. It is a kind of preparation for 
action. On the other hand, assent, as an intellectual activity, is more remote, being 
removed from particulars.
443
Now that we have examined the powers of counsel and consent in some detail we 
must say something about choice, the next step in the process of practical action. Aquinas 
explains that choice (electio; prohairesis) is a power of the will which involves the 
voluntary act of selecting or choosing some possible means by which one reasons one 
will achieve one’s end. It has the same object, means, as counsel and it takes place after 
the process of taking counsel has concluded; One takes counsel and comes to a decision 
about what action is best given the circumstances; then, one chooses to act upon this 
judgment and take action.444 Aquinas explains that choice “is only a desire (arising by 
reason of counsel) for things in our power. Choice is an act of the rational appetitive 
faculty called will […] it is a deliberating desire inasmuch as, via counsel, a man arrives 
at a judgment regarding the things which were discovered by means of counsel. This 
442 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 15, A. 1, p. 651. “Assentire est quasi ad aliud sentire: et sic importat quandam 
distantiam ad id cui assentitur. Sed consentire est simul sentire: et sic importat quandam coniunctionem ad 
id cui consentitur. Et ideo voluntas, cuius est tendere ad ipsam rem, magis proprie dicitur consentire: 
intellectus autem, cuius operatio non est secundum motum ad rem, sed potius e converso, ut in Primo 
dictum est, magis proprie dicitur assentire: quamvis unum pro alio poni soleat Potest etiam dici quod 
intellectus assentit, inquantum a voluntate movetur” (p. 110)
443  From this account we can see that consent bears some similarity to the Stoic notion of assent, although 
it is only intellectual in so far as the will is related to the intellect. See Tobias Hoffman “Voluntariness, 
Choice, and Will in the Ethics Commentaries of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas,” pp. 79-80 for some 
discussion of Aquinas’ use of the Stoic idea of consent and its relationship to deliberation.
444 Aquinas, CNE Bk. 3, Lec. 9, C. 484, p. 211; Latin Bk. 3, Lec. 9, ln. 19-35, pp. 145-146.
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desire is choice.”445 It is not the same as sensual desire, opinion,446 anger, or even wish. 
First, Aquinas explains that non-rational animals have appetite but not choice. He also 
explains, following Aristotle, that there are times when one’s choices and one’s appetitive 
desires are incongruous: “the incontinent man acts in conformity with sensual desire but 
not in conformity with choice, for he does not reasonably direct his choice because of his 
sensual desire. But the continent man on the contrary acts from choice and not from 
sensual desire, which he resists by choice.”447 This indicates that choice is related not to 
sensual appetite but to “the judgment of reason.”448 
Second, he offers an extended treatment of the relationship between choice and 
wish and between these two and the will. Here he follows Aristotle in arguing that choice 
445 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 9, C. 486, pp. 211-212. “Electio nihil aliud sit quam desiderium eorum quae sunt in 
nostra potestate ex consilio proveniens; est enim electio actus appetitus rationalis qui dicitur voluntas. Ideo 
autem dixit electionem esse desiderium consiliabile, quia ex hoc quod homo consiliatur pervenit ad 
iudicansum ea quae sunt per consilium inventa <...>, quod quidem desiderium est electio” (Bk. 3, Lec.9, ln. 
55-63, p. 146).
446 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 5. Aquinas offers an extended account of choice and opinion in CNE Bk. 3, Lec. 6 
where he explains that choice pertains to the will while opinion pertains to the intellect. We are judged 
morally for our choices but not our opinions; “a man is called good simply because he has a good will. 
However, from the fact that has a good intellect he is not called good simply but relatively” (CNE Bk. 3, 
Lec. 6, c. 451, p. 199). “ Et ideo aliquis dicitur simpliciter bonus homo ex hoc quod habet bonam 
voluntatem, ex hoc autem quod habet bonum intellectum non dicitur bonus homo simpliciter, sed secundum 
quid” (Bk. 3, Lec.6, ln. 53-57, p. 136).
447 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 5, C.439, p. 195. “Incontinens operatur secundum concupiscentiam, non autem 
secundum electionem, quia non immanet propriae electioni propter concupiscentiam; continens autem e 
converso operatur ex electione, non autem ex concupiscentia, cui per electionem resistit” (Bk. 3, Lec. 5, ln. 
94-99, p. 132). This discussion of incontinence is part of the larger issue of weakness of will. Although a 
detailed account is beyond the scope of this project, something should be said about Aquinas’ views in this 
regard. In addition to the discussion of akrasia presented here Aquinas addresses the issue in IIa IIae Q. 
156., where he explains that there are two types of incontinence, impetuosity and weakness, and relates it to 
sin. In ST Ia IIae Q. 77 he discusses sin’s relation to the sensitive appetite. Here he argues that one can act 
against knowledge only in the sense that one can have understanding of the universal but not understand 
that some particular falls under the heading of the universal (article 2); he takes this to be somewhat 
contrary to Aristotle’s claim that one can knowing do wrong. In Article 3 he addresses the idea of weakness 
of soul as a cause of sin, attributing it to a disorder within the soul, such that one’s reason is overtaken by 
one’s irascible or concupiscible powers. Aquinas also presents arguments around this idea of weakness and 
sin in Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo Q3, A. 9-11 (In Opera Omnia, Vol. 23 (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 
1982); for English see Aquinas, On Evil, translated by Richard Regan, edited by Brian Davies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). For a discussion of this issue in Aquinas and some of the scholarship 
around it one may see Michael Barnwell, “Aquinas’s Two Different Accounts of Akrasia” in American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84.1 (2010), pp. 49-67.
448 Aquinas, CNE Bk. 3, Lec. 5, C.441, p. 195. “Iudicio rationis” (Bk. 3, Lec.5, ln 123, p. 133).
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and wish are not the same because wish is about ends and choice is about means and that 
we can wish for things that are impossible or beyond our control but we cannot choose 
them.449 He makes this same claim in the ST where he explains that choice “results from 
the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism”450 
(which would be associated with the means whereas the premises would represent the 
ends) and that choices are always about actions which are within our power (i.e. 
possible).451 Importantly, however, he prefaces these arguments in the CNE by explaining 
that choice and wish are similar and part of the same power, something that is not to be 
found in Aristotle, although Aquinas attributes the view to Aristotle: 
[Aristotle] says first that choice is not even wishing 
although it seems to be closely connected with wishing. 
Both belong to the one power, the rational appetitive 
faculty or the will. Wishing designates an act of this power 
related to good absolutely. But choice designates an act of 
the same power related to the good according as it belongs 
to an act by which we are ordered to some good.452
This account makes it clear that Aquinas thinks he is following Aristotle when he says 
that the will exists, is a rational appetite, and has several acts, including choice and wish 
(which would seem to conform to ‘willing’ or volition). As was indicated in Chapter 2, 
Aristotle’s views are not as developed as Aquinas is making them out to be here. Indeed, 
Aristotle does not have a notion of choice, properly speaking, let alone will.
449 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 5, C.444-447, p. 196; Latin Bk. 3, Lec.5, ln. 155-197, pp. 133-134.
450 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 13, A. 3, p. 644. “Electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut 
conclusio syllogismi operativi” (p. 101).
451 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 13, A. 4-5, pp. 645-646; Latin pp. 101-102.
452 Aquinas, CNE Bk. 3, Lec. 5, C. 443, p. 196. “Dicit ergo primo quod neque etiam electio est voluntas, 
quamvis videatur esse proprinqua voluntati; utrumque enim pertinet ad unam potentiam, scilicet ad 
appetitum rationalem, qui voluntas dicitur, sed voluntas nominat actum huius potentiae secundum quod 
fertur in bonum absolute, electio autem nominat actum eiusdem potentiae relatum in bonum secundum 
quod pertinet ad nostram operationem per quam in aliquod bonum ordinamur” (Bk. 3, Lec.5, ln. 145-154, 
p. 133).
169
Having discussed deliberation and choice, Aquinas moves on to a brief discussion 
of willing (voluntas; boulēsis).453 He explains, following Aristotle on wish, that the object 
of willing is the end (not the means) and that this end is the good (or the apparent good). 
He points out that the ends vary based upon the moral quality of the individual insofar as 
the virtuous person wills what is really good while the vicious person wills what is 
attractive or pleasurable (because it seems good).454 This is because the virtuous person 
has right reason and is able to make appropriate judgments about the good.455 He has 
developed his habits in such away that the true good is also pleasurable to him and he has 
developed his rational capacity to be able to correctly deliberate about how he can 
achieve this good. Will, then, represents the final step before action in the process of 
moral decision making. After one has deliberated about a practical situation and chosen a 
course of action, one wills this course of action into being and acts. It is not until one 
actually wills something that one acts; this is what distinguishes it from choice.
453 It is important to note here that Aquinas is discussing the part of the Nicomachean Ethics in which 
Aristotle discusses wish (NE 3.4, 1113a15-1113b2)
454 Aquinas, CNE Bk 3, Lec. 10, C 493, p. 215; Latin Bk. 3, Lec.10, ln. 57-74, p. 148.
455 Ibid., Bk 3, Lec. 10, C 494. “The virtuous person correctly passes judgment on individual things that 
pertain to human activity. In each case that which is really good seems to him to be good. This happens 
because things seem naturally pleasurable to each habit that are proper to it, that is, agree with it. Those 
things are agreeable to the habit of virtue that are in fact good because the habit of moral virtue is defined 
by what is in accord with right reason. Thus, the things in accord with right reason, things of themselves 
good, seem good to it. Here the good man differs very much indeed from others, for he sees what is truly 
good in individual practicable matters, being as it were the norm and measure of all that is to be done 
because in these cases a thing must be judged good or bad according as it seems to him.” 
“Vituosus singula quae pertinent ad operationes humanas recte diiudicat et in singulis videtur ei esse bonum 
id quod vere est bonum. Et hoc ideo quia unicuique habitui videntur bona et delectabilia ea quae sunt ei 
propria id est quae ei conveniunt; habitui autem virtutis conveniunt ea quae sunt secundum veritatem bona, 
qui habitus virtutis moralis diffinitur ex hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam; et ideo ea quae sunt 
secundum rationem, quae sunt simpliciter bona, videntur ei bona. Et in hoc plurimum differt studiosus ab 
aliis quod in singulis operabilibus videt quid vere sit bonum, quasi existens regula et mensura omnium 
operabilium, qui scilicet in eis iudicandum est aliquid bonum vel malum secundum quod ei videtur” (Bk. 3, 
Lec. 10, ln. 77-91, p. 148).
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Before moving on to an account of the moral process which results from these 
powers of the soul, something should be said about human freedom and the free choice of 
the will which result from this account. From the fact that intellectual substances have an 
internal source of motion, the will, it follows that these substances also possess free 
choice: “That they act by judgment is evident from the fact that through their intellectual 
cognition they judge of things to be done. And they must have freedom, if, as just shown, 
they have control over their own action. Therefore, these substances in acting have 
freedom of choice.”456 Furthermore, if this were not the case, “counsels, exhortations, 
commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain.”457 This means that 
intellectual substances are unique in that they have freedom of judgment in addition to 
the freedom of movement or action which they share with non-rational animals. This 
involves some understanding of the good and the ability to apply one’s universal 
conception to particulars, since action relates to particulars while understanding is of 
universals.458 Thus, free judgment is the result of some act of reason and can incline one 
to act in different, even opposite ways, depending upon the arguments used. Aquinas 
contrasts this with the natural judgment of non-rational animals who can only act in one 
456 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 48, p. 144. “Quod enim arbitrio agant, manifestum est: eo quod per 
cognitionem intellectivam iudicium habent de operandis. Laibertatem autem necesse est eas habere, si 
habent diminium sui actus, ut ostensum est. Sunt igitur praedictae substaniae liberi arbitrii in agendo” (Bk. 
2, Ch. 48, sec. 1242, p. 169).
457 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 83, A. 1, p. 787. “Dicendum quod homo est liberi arbitrii: aliquin frustra essent 
consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae” (p. 396).
458 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 48. Here Aquinas makes use of Avicenna’s account of the sheep and the wolf; 
while the sheep judges the wolf to be dangerous as a result of natural estimation the human being is not as 
constrained in her judgments. The human will is inclined to the good in a universal sense and so it can 
affirm any particular which is presented to it under the aspect of the good (whether the particular actually is 
good or not); this allows for freedom of choice which the sheep does not have. Also see Aquinas, SCG Bk. 
4, Ch. 22, p. 127; Latin Bk. 4, Ch. 22, sec. 3589, p. 289 for a brief account of how it is possible, “by reason 
of passion or bad habit,” for one to will the wrong things or to act “slavishly” (i.e., against one’s will) 
despite the fact that the will “is ordered to do that which is truly good.” 
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set way, given the particular stimuli.459 He goes on to explain that free choice, or election, 
is an appetitive power by which we elect the means to an end (the good) which is the 
object of appetite.460 As a intellectual appetitive power free choice belongs to to the will. 
While willing is for ends, free choice, or election, is for means; in this way they are two 
sides of the same coin, two aspects of the same faculty.461 It is important to point out here 
that this discussion of will and free choice/election is essentially a discussion of willing 
and choosing. Aquinas seems to equate this with the Aristotelian discussion of wish 
(boulesis) and decision (prohairesis); as we saw in Chapter 2 such a connection is 
misplaced as Aristotle did not view wish and decision as faculties or as powers of a single 
faculty of will.
4.3.3 The process of willing from intellectual consideration to action
What we see from the various texts examined above is the development of a 
complex system whereby Aquinas is able to explain how human actions, including moral 
actions are undertaken. This system includes multiple operations of both the intellect and 
the will. Here I will offer an account of this process and discuss how it has been 
categorized by scholars regarding both the role of the will (i.e., voluntarist or 
intellectualist) and free choice (i.e., libertarian or compatibilist).
For Aquinas the term will has several meanings. It is is a “rational appetite” and 
faculty responsible for several acts which are necessary to the workings of the practical 
459 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 83, A. 1, p. 787, Latin, p. 396 Here Aquinas again uses Avicenna’s example of the 
sheep’s response to the wolf. 
460 Ibid., Ia Q. 83, A. 3, pp. 789-790, Latin pp. 397-398.
461 Ibid., Ia Q. 83, A. 4, pp. 791-792, Latin pp. 399
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intellect. These acts include the acts of willing (for an end), intention, consent, choice 
(free choice, liberum arbitrium), and use. These acts of the will are closely related to the 
acts of the intellect, which include: (1) attaining universal knowledge (2) considering 
particulars as they relate to the universal and determining that they are good, (3) taking 
counsel, and (4) commanding. Aquinas offers an account of the process of moral action, 
from the first consideration of a particular to action in the ST I-II.8-17, where he 
examines each of the acts of the will and intellect associated with is theory of action. 
Here I will offer an account of the mechanism of human action which emerges from these 
considerations, using the text of Aquinas along with the accounts of Stump and 
McInerny. I will present Stump’s account first and then explain some areas where 
McInerny provides a different reading.
Human actions are, of course, about particulars. The individual has already done 
the intellectual work of coming to some understanding universal/absolute good/end (God) 
as far as one can. Then, the individual encounters some particular end and determines, 
through an act of intellect, that this end is good under these particular circumstances. This 
leads to the first act of the will—willing. Willing is a simple volitional act whereby one 
comes to desire the end because it is judged to be good “in these particular circumstances 
at this particular time.”462 Once the individual has willed the end the intellect determines 
that the end is indeed within the power of the willer to achieve through some means 
which are within her power in the given circumstances. This is followed by intention, the 
462 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 287. See pp. 287-290 for the complete 
account of human action which I follow here.
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act of the will whereby one intends to achieve the end through some yet to be determined 
means. 
At this point the individual has set a particular end, determined it to be good (in 
line with the absolute end as she understands it), and decided that the means to achieve 
this end are discoverable and within her power. Now she must set out to discover these 
means and act upon them. This requires the act of intellect called counsel. Counsel is the 
process of considering the various means by which one might achieve one’s end. The 
result of counsel is the act of will called consent, where the will accepts the means which 
the intellect has deemed suitable to achieving the end. Depending on the end and on the 
preferences, abilities, etc. of the individual various means will be more or less appealing 
and thus garner stronger or weaker consent. 
When there are several possible means to one’s end, additional rational 
consideration is needed so that one means, or set of means, can be chosen. This is carried 
out by the intellect in the form of the practical syllogism, which allows the person to 
consider both universal knowledge and particular circumstances to arrive at a conclusion 
about what is best. Once this conclusion is reached by the intellect, the will chooses or 
wills this conclusion. Where there is only one way to reach the desired end, this step is 
skipped. Once a particular course of action has been chosen, or willed, the intellect 
commands that this course of action be undertaken and the will uses the powers under its 
control, including the bodily powers, to act, causing the individual to act.
From what has been said we can see that Aquinas’ account of the process of 
human action is complex and that it involves a number of interactions between the will 
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and the intellect. Stump groups these interactions into five pairs of acts of intellect and 
will and I have followed this grouping above.463 However, even the picture presented 
above does not take into account all of the possible complexities since it largely ignores 
the fact that the will can exercise control over the intellect and so can interfere with the 
acts of intellect which occur along this process, directing it one way or another and that 
this process is not always consciously done.464
To a large extent McInerny presents a picture of Aquinas’ view human action 
similar to that presented by Stump.465 However, he interprets Aquinas’ account differently 
in a few respects. McInerny explains that human action “proceeds from deliberate will; it 
is a knowing wanting.”466 Thus, rather than focusing on intellect/will pairs McInerny 
focuses his presentation of Aquinas’ view on the acts of the will, distinguishing two 
categories, acts of will bearing on ends and acts of will bearing on means, with three acts 
of intellect entering into the system at important moments. 
An initial rational act of determining some end to be good is followed, in the 
account, by the three acts of the will related to the end: will, enjoyment, and intention. 
Will and intention have already been explained (although it is important to point out that 
McInerny follows Aquinas more closely in noting that intention focuses on the end and 
not the means467). Enjoyment, on the other hand, was not explained in Stump’s account. 
McInerny explains that enjoyment is part of what helps us through the process of 
463 Ibid., pp. 289-290 for a helpful chart where she enumerates each pair.
464 Ibid., pp. 290-294 for a discussion of these complications.
465 Ralph McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1992), pp. 51-74 presents McInerny’s interpretation of “The Structure of 
Human Action” according to Aquinas.
466 Ibid., p. 53.
467 Ibid., p. 63; compare with Stump, Aquinas, p. 287. 
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screening the various possible ends. It is a kind of pull or pleasant feeling which indicates 
that something is good (or seems good) and offers a hint of what one will feel upon 
attaining that end.468
After one has determined an appropriate end, intending to pursue it, one must 
decide on the best means to achieve that end. This involves taking counsel. As with 
Stump’s account, here taking counsel involves the use of both theoretical and practical 
understanding in the form of the practical syllogism (practical reason).469 Once this act of 
intellect is complete, the will is again engaged as one consents to the means resulting 
from practical reason and chooses the best course of action from among them. McInerny 
sees these two acts of the will as following one after the other, without an act of intellect 
in between.470 After the choice of means has been made, the intellect is again engaged as 
it commands “the external [or internal] acts which execute the choice”471 Command is 
followed by use, the act of the will by which action finally occurs.472 
From what has been said it is clear that Aquinas’ account of human action 
involves a complex relationship between intellect and will, although there is some 
disagreement regarding whether the loci of moral action for Aquinas in intellect, will, or 
both. This disagreement has led some to insist that Aquinas is an intellectualist, locating 
the crux of moral decision making and moral action in the rational faculty, others to insist 
468 McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice, p. 62.
469 Ibid., pp. 64-66.
470 Ibid., p. 66-67.
471 Ibid., p. 69. See pp. 68-72 for McInerny’s entire account of command, where he explains (1) how 
command is one of the many parts of what is, in reality, a single moral action and (2) that acts of reason, 
imagination, etc.,s along with physical actions can be commanded.
472 Ibid., p. 67. McInerney points out that Aquinas states that “command and the commanded act are one 
human act” but that this is simply stressing the fact that all of the acts of will and intellect we have been 
considering are parts one single moral action. While we can distinguish them as separate acts must also 
remember that they are only parts of the single act which is the action the human being undertakes (p. 69).
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that he is a voluntarist, prioritizing the faculty of will, and still others to claim that he is 
neither (since the roles of the intellect and will are so fully integrated in his system); 
related to this debate is the question of whether Aquinas is a libertarian or a 
compatibilist.473 While it is not necessary to go into this issue in great detail here, I think 
that the account of human action we have seen above demonstrates the close connection 
between intellect and will. Even under McInerny’s account, which clearly emphasizes the 
will, intellect plays an essential part in the process of moral action. Thus, I think that 
those who argue that Aquinas’ view of intellect and will are so integrated as to make his 
theory neither fully intellectualist nor voluntarist, neither compatibilist nor libertarian,474 
seem most accurate. As Shanley points out, it is the human being as a whole, not the 
intellect or the will which is the ultimate subject of freedom and the ultimate actor.475
4.4 The emerging view of moral agency and responsibility
473 See Matthias Perkams, “Aquinas on choice, will, and voluntary action,” in Aquinas and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Tobias Hoffman, Jorn Muller, and Matthias Perkhams (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) and Tobias Hoffman, “Intellectualism and Voluntarism,” in The Cambridge History 
of Medieval Philosophy, Vol. 1, ed. Robert Pasnau, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Brain 
J. Shanley, “Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom,” in 
Freedom and the Human Person, ed. Richard Velkley (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2007); Eleonore Stump, Aquinas, pp. 277-306, and Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas’s Account of 
Freedom: Intellect and Will” Monist 80.4 (1997) for discussions of these various opinions and who holds 
them. Also, Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, pp. 221-233 offers a discussion of freedom and the 
ways in which the will and intellects influence one another.
474 While this discussion focuses on the intellectualist/voluntarist debate, something more should be said 
here about how Aquinas could be said to be neither compatibilist nor libertarian. Aquinas’ unique view of 
human freedom is one which is not defined by the ability to do anything one may choose (as a libertarian 
would normally define it), nor is it the idea that freedom means to be free from external constraints, even if 
internal causes still exist (as the compatibilist would have it). Rather, for Aquinas freedom is a matter of 
being able to pursue the true good (understanding God as our end and ultimate happiness) to the best of our 
ability. True freedom is to be free from the enslavement of the lower parts of the soul and to be able to 
pursue our true, higher, nature. At the highest level of realization of this freedom (possible only after death 
or during rapture) one would be completely free but capable of doing one thing since one would finally 
have an understanding of the good and so would only act in accord with that good. The blessed in heaven 
are the most free even though they cannot do other than what they are doing.
475  Shanley, “Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom,” p. 77.
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Having offered an account of the ontological status of the will and its relation to the 
intellect Aquinas moves on in the second part of the ST to examine moral action in some 
detail. In ST I.II.6 Aquinas discusses the notion of voluntary action; he identifies two 
categories of voluntary actions—perfect and imperfect. Human beings act voluntarily 
because they have knowledge of their ends (both particular ends and their end in God) 
and an internal principle of action.476 Perfect voluntary action requires deliberation about 
the end and the means to achieve it.477 Will, the rational appetite, is involved in perfect 
voluntary action through deliberation about a desired end and the means to achieve it. 
This use of deliberation means that human beings can participate in perfect voluntary 
actions. It is the ability to deliberate about one’s actions and to be open to multiple 
possible actions or inactions that makes human action perfectly voluntary and worthy of 
praise and blame.478 Aquinas notes that ”voluntary is what proceeds from the will;”479 this 
can be both action and inaction since in both cases one has deliberated and chosen/willed 
to act/not act. Involuntary actions are those that are “against the will”480 and this does not 
include things done from a bad a character, from vicious passions (e.g., concupiscence), 
fear, etc. because one does will things as a result of these defects.481 Further, he notes that 
476 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 6, A. 1, pp. 616-617; Latin pp. 55-56.
477 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 6, A. 2, pp. 617-618; Latin pp. 57-58.
478 Ibid., ST Ia IIae Q. 6, A. 2, p. 617: “Reply Obj. 2. The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to 
his being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to 
opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational 
animals.
Reply Obj. 3. Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; 
such as is not to be found in irrational animals.”
“Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc contingit quod homo est dominus sui actus, quod habet 
deliberationem de suis actibus: ex hoc enim quod ratio deliberans se habet ad opposita, voluntas in 
utrumque potest. Sed secundum hob voluntarium non est in brutis animalibus, ut dictum est.
Ad tertium decendum quod laus et vituperium consequuntur actum voluntarium secundum 
perfactam voluntarii rationem; qualis non invenitur in brutis” (p. 58).
479 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 6, A. 3, p. 618. “Voluntarium dicitur quod est a voluntate” (p. 58)
480 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 6, A. 5, p. 619. “Quod est contra voluntatem, dicitur esse involuntarium” (p. 60)
481 Ibid., Ia IIae Q. 6, A. 6-8, pp.620-622, Latin pp. 61-63
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acts of the will are two fold: wishing and doing (whereby the will causes/commands an 
act in accord with the wish).482
The moral actions of human beings are directed by the will while the action of the 
will is related to reason. This relation to reason allows for morally bad actions without the 
need for a totally bad will. When one acts based upon mere sense perception or upon a 
misunderstanding regarding the good (i.e. when something is apprehended as a good 
when it is not) this results in a morally bad action. Aquinas explains that such an action is 
voluntary and morally wrong but not evil, since it was done for good ends (as the result 
of a misunderstanding of the good).483
4.5 Conclusion 
Upon examining the views of Aquinas regarding both intellects and the will we 
have developed an understanding of his view of knowledge attainment and willing and 
how these relate to moral action and moral responsibility. Aquinas argues that it is 
necessary for both the possible and agent intellects to be in the individual human soul and 
to be multiplied according to the number of human beings. He sees this as essential to 
properly explain both individual knowledge attainment and practical (moral) action. It is 
only if the intellects are individuated that the intellectual soul could accurately be called 
the form of the human being and that individual knowledge can be preserved, Aquinas 
argues.
482 Ibid., Ia II ae, Q. 6, A. 4, pp. 618-619, Latin pp. 59-60.
483 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 3.1, Ch. 10, pp. 59-61, Latin Bk. 3, Ch. 10, sec. 1946-1951, pp. 13-14.
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Furthermore, since Aquinas sees the will as an rational appetite and thus as an 
intellectual power he holds that separate Intellects would entail a separate will and, as 
result, a lack of moral responsibility. The process of moral decision making and action is 
discussed in detail by Aquinas. He provides a picture in which the faculties of intellect 
and will are intimately connected and acts of both will and intellect are involved in the 
process of moral action. This has led to a great amount of debate about where Aquinas 
within the spectrum of libertarianism and/or compatibilism and whether he is best termed 
an intellectualism or a voluntarist. It is clear, however, that Aquinas’ system is designed 
to explain moral decision in such a way that the individual is morally responsible for 
one’s actions--in fact, one of Aquinas’ claims against Averroes is that his system will 
eliminate moral responsibility; again, this is a claim which must be examined further in 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5 
AN ANALYSIS OF AVERROES VIEW OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
 IN LIGHT OF THE CRITIQUE OF AQUINAS
5.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters have (1) offered a detailed look at the history and 
development of the concept of the will from Aristotle through the Stoics and Peripatetics 
and into the Arabic and Latin speaking worlds of the Middle Ages (Chapter 2); and (2) 
provided a detailed account of the views of both Averroes (Chapter 3) and Aquinas 
(Chapter 4) on the concept of the will and its place within their greater philosophical 
psychologies. 
These studies have highlighted several areas where there is disagreement between 
the views of Averroes and Aquinas both in how one should interpret Aristotle and in what 
constitutes the correct view of human intellect and moral agency. The present chapter will 
make this conflict of ideas explicit by putting the two thinkers into dialogue with one 
another regarding several issues key to the nature of the will. The four issues to be 
addressed will be: (A) the nature of the Intellects as both separate and “in the soul,” (B) 
the notion that the Intellects are “form for us,” (C) the relationship between the individual 
human being and the intelligibles in act, and (D) the location and function of the will. In 
addressing these four issues the chapter will demonstrate that Averroes’ views on each 
can be traced, ultimately, to his understanding of the nature of the intelligibles in act. It 
will also address the efficacy of Aquinas’ particular critiques of Averroes’ views with 
respect to these issues, showing their overall cogency as it relates to the Intellects and 
intelligibles as well as the critiques’ misrepresentation of Averroes as it relates to the will. 
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Part of this assessment will require consideration of how Aquinas’ own views influenced 
his understanding of Averroes; thus, an account and analysis of Aquinas’ views on these 
issues will be presented here as well. In each case, after placing the two thinkers in 
dialogue I will offer my own analysis, arguing that, although Averroes’ views have 
internal consistency and seem to be closer to those of Aristotle in some respects, his 
problematic account of the intelligibles in act leaves his philosophy open to pointed 
criticism. It should be noted that issues A and B will be treated together since they are 
closely related and a separate treatment would entail unnecessary repetition and 
confusion; issues C and D will receive their own treatments.
5.2 Issues A (placement of the separate Intellects/ “in the soul”) and B (separate 
Intellects as “form for us”)
The first issues to be discussed revolve around the relationship between the 
intellect and the individual human being. Both philosophers must explain how the 
intellects are related to the individual human being and to one another. This section will 
examine Averroes’ claim that the Intellects are separate entities shared by all human 
beings yet also intrinsic to the individual as “in the soul” and “form for us.” It will also 
address Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes, influenced by his own position that the intellects 
must be multiple according to the number of individuals, part of the each person’s 
intellectual soul. I will demonstrate that Aquinas raises important and ultimately decisive 
concerns regarding Averroes’ approach.
5.2.1 Averroes’ Coherent Account of the Separate Intellects as “in the soul” and 
“form for us”
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Averroes maintains that the Intellects can be separate entities and also be “in” the 
souls of individual human beings. It was not unique to claim that the Agent Intellect was 
a separate entity, as this was part of the tradition stretching back to Aristotle himself.484 
However, his insistence in the Long Commentary that the Material Intellect is also 
separate and shared was unique. For Averroes both Intellects cannot be ontologically 
present in the individual because this would adversely impact the universal availability of 
the intelligibles in act which reside in the Material Intellect. Yet, holding that both 
intellects are separate would seem to cut off the possibility of individual human 
understanding. How can the individual be said to know when she does not have any 
intellect of her own? 
Averroes addresses this potential problem by insisting that the Intellects are 
separate but also naturally present “in the soul” when the individual is actively thinking. 
He explains that, while the Intellects are separate entities, the individual is essential to the 
process by which intelligibles in act come to be in the Material Intellect. The intelligibles 
484 Aristotle says in the De Anima that both elements must “be found within the soul” in 3.5 (430a 13). 
Owens explains that, although Aristotle does not expand on this point, Aristotelian epistemology requires 
that the agent intellect be “separate and eternal, and accordingly has existence in itself, in a type of actuality 
that is not dependent on the body” (Owens, “The Self in Aristotle,” p. 716); it is “in reality separate, yet in 
its activity it is in the human soul” (p. 719). This is because (1) the nature of thought is not impacted by the 
deterioration and decay of the body, (2) thought has unlimited range, (3) knowledge is of formal nature 
separate from material considerations, and (4) it has the ability to attain “complex reflexive knowledge of 
itself (p. 716).” This indicates that there is a relation between the agent intellect and the individual whereby 
the intellect is separate in nature but “in” the individual in such a way that “the agent […] is still the whole 
man, a composite individual, using the separate mind as an instrument” for knowing (p. 717). Thus, the 
agent intellect is “in” the soul while being “separate in its own nature,” (i.e. ontologically distinct). On the 
other hand, the passive element is perishable and, thus, is not separate from the body in its nature. From this 
we can see that, according to Owens’ interpretation, Aristotle held that the agent intellect was a separate 
entity while also being “in” the human soul in a strong enough sense that it contributed not only to 
individual knowledge but to the very selfhood of the individual. It should, perhaps, be noted that although 
there is disagreement regarding how one should interpret De Anima 3.5 Owens’ view provides an 
interpretation which is quite in line with the view of Averroes, who thought himself to be in agreement with 
The Philosopher.
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in act exist as intelligibles in potency in particular things which are experienced by 
individuals. The cogitative power extracts these potential intelligibles from the image of 
the particular and deposits them in memory, which presents them to the Agent Intellect. 
The Agent Intellect abstracts the intelligibles, actualizing them, and deposits them in the 
Material Intellect. During this process, Averroes claims, the Intellects are “in” the 
individual and subject to her will: “it is necessary to ascribe these two activities to the 
soul in us, namely, to receive the intelligible and to make it, although the agent and the 
recipient are eternal substances, on account of the fact that these two activities are 
reduced to our will, namely to abstract intelligibles and to understand them.”485 
Averroes explains that the human being, as rational animal, must have the 
principle of rationality in it as its form: each thing has its essential feature on account of 
its form; the essential feature of the human being is the ability to reason; therefore, the 
principle of rationality (i.e. the Intellects) must be the form of the human being.486 Yet, as 
noted earlier, the Intellects are also separate entities shared by all human beings. To 
navigate this seeming contradiction Averroes relies on the idea that the Intellects can be 
“in” the soul as explained above on his particular understanding of intelligibles. He 
explains:
We, therefore, have already found the way in which it is 
possible for that intellect to be conjoined with us in the end 
and the reason why it is not united with us in the beginning. 
For when this has been asserted, it will necessarily happen 
that the intellect which is in us in act be composed of 
485 Averroes, LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 18 p. 351, emphasis added. “Et fuit necesse attribuere has duas 
actiones anime in nobis, scilicet recipere intellectum et facere eum, quamvis agens et recipiens sint 
substantie eterne, propter hoc quia hee actiones reducte sunt ad nostram voluntatem, scilicet abstrahere 
intellecta et intelligere ea” (p. 439).
486 Averroes says repeatedly that the Intellects, and the Agent Intellect in particular, must be “form for [or 
‘in’] us” or “final form for us” (LCDA Bk 3, comments 20 and 36).
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theoretical intelligibles and the agent intellect in such a way 
that the agent intellect is as it were the form of the 
theoretical intelligibles and the theoretical intelligibles are 
as it were matter. In this way we will be able to generate 
intelligibles when we wish. For because that in virtue of 
which something carries out its proper activity is the form 
while we carry out our proper activity in virtue of the agent 
intellect, it is necessary that the agent intellect be form in us 
[…W]hen all the theoretical intelligibles exist in us in 
potency, it [the agent intellect] will be united with us in 
potency. When all the theoretical intelligibles exist in us in 
act, it will then be united with us in act.487
Elsewhere he notes that the agent intellect is “united with us only in virtue of the 
mediation of the material intellect.”488 Here we can see how Averroes understands the 
interaction between the individual and the Intellects as focused around the issue of 
intelligibles. Intelligibles in potency are abstracted from sensory objects by the internal 
senses (particularly the cogitative power) and prepared for actualization. It is in this 
activity that the Agent Intellect is conjoined with the individual and the potentially 
intelligible becomes actually intelligible. These intelligibles in act (i.e. theoretical 
intelligibles) are in the individual in so far as they are also in the Material Intellect. It is 
the connection with the Material Intellect which allows the individual to easily reconnect 
with the Agent Intellect and regain access to the intelligibles at will. The actualization of 
these intelligibles takes place through the Agent Intellect which is also “in” the human 
487 LCDA Bk 3, comment 36, pp. 398-399. Iam igitur invenimus modum secundum quem possibile est ut 
iste intellectus continuetur nobiscum in postremo, et causam quare non copulatur nobiscum in principio. 
Quoniam hoc posito, continget necessario ut intellectus qui est in nobis in actu sit compositus ex intellectis 
speculativis et intellectu agenti ita quod intellectus agens sit quasi forma intellectorum speculativorum et 
intellecta speculativa sint quasi materia. Et per hunc modum poterimus generare intellecta cum voluerimus. 
Quoniam, quia illud per quod agit aliquid suam propriam actionem est forma, nos autem agimus per 
intellectum agentem nostram actionem propriam, necesse est ut intellectus agens sit forma in nobis […] Et 
manifestum est quod, cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in potentia, quod ipse erit 
copulatus nobiscum in potentia. Et cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, erit 
ipse tunc copulatus nobis in actu” (pp.499-500).
488 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 20, p. 355. “Iste intellectus non copulatur nobis nisi mediante esse intellectus 
materialis generabilis et corruptibilis in nobis” (p. 444).
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being during this process.489 The Agent Intellect is united to the individual, via the 
cogitative power, in some way (in potency) even when we are not actively thinking as 
intellecus in habitu. Thus, it is “in” us or “form for us” potentially all of the time even 
though it is only active in us some of the time (when the potential intelligibles are 
actualized).490 The Material and Agent Intellects are extrinsically linked to the human 
being by virtue of the fact that the conjunction of human being and Intellects through the 
cogitative power is a part of human nature; the individual must supply the intelligibles in 
potency through sensory experience. The connection is intrinsic when one is actively 
thinking; intelligibles in potency provided by the cogitative power become intelligibles in 
act in the Material Intellect by the work of the Agent Intellect. This constant link allows 
Averroes to claim that thought is up to us, a matter of our will. After the initial effort of 
abstraction we are able to recollect the intelligibles by reconnecting with the Intellects at 
will using the cogitative power. In this way one is able to reconnect to the Intellects and 
recall the intelligibles which exist therein. This understanding of the relationship between 
individual human beings and Intellects allows Averroes to hold that the individual is a 
knower without positing that the single set of intelligibles in act exist in any individual in 
a way which would require the multiplication of intellects.491
489 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 36, p. 398, Latin p. 499 offers an account of how the Material and Agent 
Intellects interact in the creation of the theoretical intelligibles. Here he explains that the Material Intellect 
is the subject of both the theoretical intelligibles and of the Agent Intellect. See also the discussion of 
double subject below.
490 See Taylor, “Introduction,” pp. lxx-lxxiii for an account of the Intellect as “form for us”
491. It is perhaps useful to say something, briefly, about the perishability of the human being in Averroes’ 
account. Averroes holds that the individual human being, including the soul, is perishable. There is no part 
of the individual which can function without a bodily organ; therefore, there is no part of the individual 
which can continue to exist after death. Averroes does hold like Aristotle before him and Aquinas after, that 
intellectual activity is at least in some respects incorporeal; however, since his commitments regarding the 
intelligibles in act and the unity of science require both the Material and Agent Intellects to be separate 
entities this does not result in the continued existence of the individual human being who merely makes use 
of these separate Intellects.
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It has been hinted at above but it is useful to make explicit the role the cogitative 
power plays here. For Averroes the cogitative power is a brain power which is “a kind of 
reason.”492 It fulfills a vast number of roles in Averroes’ account of human nature. First, it 
is that by which human beings begin to make sense of their sensory experiences, 
developing phantasms and bringing the myriad experiences of similar things together to 
abstract the intelligible in potency. It is also the cogitative power which presents these 
phantasms to the Agent Intellect so that it can abstract the intelligible in act. It is the 
cogitative power which links the individual to the Material Intellect which has received 
the intelligible in act from the Agent Intellect, thus granting the individual access to the 
intelligible when they are thinking. What’s more, it is the cogitative power which has, as 
a result of this process, become primed for a speedy reconnection with the Intellects 
when the individual must think about and use the intelligible again. It is also the 
cogitative power which is responsible for will and the deliberative process, but more on 
this will be said later.
It would seem from this account that Averroes holds to one interpretation of the 
Principle of Intrinsic Formal Cause.493 For Averroes the formal and intrinsic presence of 
rationality does not require the permanent presence of individuated intellects in an 
individual knower. All that is required for Averroes is that the Intellects are present in the 
492. Averroes, LCDA Bk. 3, comment 20, p. 259. “Aliqua ratio” (p. 349).
493 See Taylor, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul According to Aquinas and Averroes,” pp. 
202-211 for a discussion of the Principle in Averroes. Of course, Aquinas works with a different 
interpretation of this principle. For Aquinas the intellects are “in” the individual as part of the “formal 
nature of each individual” (p. 191). That is, since intellection is the defining characteristic of the human 
being, and since it is an act of individual human beings, it must exist in each as part of their substance or 
form. It is impossible for something to meet this criterion and, at the same time, to be extrinsic to the 
individual in its own nature. See Taylor pp. 191-202 for an account of Aquinas’ understanding of the 
Principle.
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soul as its form when thinking occurs. Under this view the Agent and Material Intellects 
are intrinsically present in the human being despite being ontologically distinct and 
extrinsic entities.494 Taylor explains that “the very nature and actuality of the transcendent 
Agent Intellect must be shared or participated by us essentially in the fullness of its 
intellectual power for abstraction and understanding”495 to take place. Thus, Averroes is 
able to assert that, although the intelligibles in act only remain in the individual while she 
is conjoined to the Material Intellect during the act of thinking, the activity is intrinsic to 
her during this time and the disposition towards this state of being (intellectus in habitu) 
is retained even when she is not conjoined to the Intellects.496 Taylor explains that, when 
the individual is actually joined with the Intellects, there arrives the acquired intellect in 
the individual’s soul;497 he equates this with the theoretical intellect which is, in some 
494 Ibid., p. 208; 210. This view of the relationship between the Intellects and the individual human being 
calls into question the notion of substance Averroes is using. Under Averroes’ view it would seem to hold 
that a being’s essential characteristic does not have to be in it in a substantial way. The essential 
characteristic of the human being is intellect; yet, intellect is not part of the substance of the human being 
since the Intellects are both ontologically distinct from the individual; the highest faculty that is part of the 
of the individual human being in a substantial way is the cogitative faculty (which is akin to the animal 
estimative faculty). As we will see later, this is problematic not only in that it is not Aristotelian but also, 
and more importantly, in its own right.
495 Ibid., p. 211.
496 B-C Bazan explains that this is possible given that the the “truth content” (“Intellectum Speculativum: 
Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant on the Intelligible Object,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 19:4 (1981), p. 427) of intelligibles is provided by images (i.e. by the experience of individual 
human beings) which are derived from sensation by the cogitative power (passible intellect) while “their 
reality as objects known”(p. 428) is provided by their being abstracted from matter by the agent intellect 
and known by the material intellect. This view allows Averroes to claim that individuals are responsible for 
the formal content of knowledge while the agent intellect acts as efficient cause, making that information 
knowable. The intelligibles in act (intellectum speculativum) are, thus, “the result of two principles: the 
one, generable, corruptible, and multiple (the image); the other, eternal and unique (the material 
intellect)” (p. 428). ( See pp. 425-431 for Bazan’s account of Averroes’ position). Bazan is giving an 
account here of Averroes’ doctrine of double subject (also see Taylor, “Introduction” p. lxi or a discussion 
of this theory) which Aquinas argues against in detail in the Summa Contra Gentiles.
497 Taylor “Introduction” p. lix. The acquired intellect is defined as “the intellect as realized in the 
immediate moment of the actualizing reception of intelligibles in act” (p. xx).
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fashion, retained by the individual human being.498 According to Averroes, this allows for 
the individual to be called a knower despite the complicated relationship between the 
individual human being and the separate Intellects. By (1) providing a strong role for the 
cogitative power as a means by which the individual is connected to both particulars in 
the world and the separate Agent and Material Intellects, and (2) by emphasizing the fact 
that the Intellects are “in” the soul when actual thinking is occurring, Averroes has argued 
that the individual human being is the knower.499
5.2.2 Aquinas’ view on the intellects as “in the soul” and “form for us”
5.2.2.1 Aquinas’ position
Aquinas argues that both the possible and agent intellects are powers of the 
human soul which are multiplied according to the number of individuals. The fact that a 
person can be at one time actually understanding but at another time only in potentiality 
with respect to understanding demonstrates that there must exist a potential intellect, the 
possible intellect, which is “in potency to and able to receive all those things which are 
498 Ibid., p. lix. Theoretical intellect is “the intellect containing the intelligibles in act. For the mature 
Averroes this intellect and its intelligibles exist as eternal in the separate material intellect and also as 
perishable in their individual perishable human subject” (p. xx).
499 It should be noted here that, even when we put aside a Thomistic critique of Averroes, the notion that 
an individual can be an essentially intellectual being, a knower, even when not connected to the intellect is 
problematic. Averroes clearly wants to hold that it is the individual who knows and that individuals can 
know different things, since they supply different experiences from which intelligibles in act are abstracted. 
Yet, in so far as the Intellects (particularly the Material Intellect, responsible for retaining these 
intelligibles) is distinct in its nature from the individual and sometimes even fully extrinsic (when the 
individual is not actively engaged in thought), it cannot, it seems, be said that the individual retains 
knowledge (in the memory, for example) in such a way that it can truly be said to be her knowledge. This 
problem will be addressed in more detail below.
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intelligible to a human being.”500 This intellect does not have a bodily organ (since it 
would then be limited in the scope of its understanding by the organ’s powers), but 
neither is it a separate substance, totally disconnected from the body. The possible 
intellect is a part or power of the human soul which is the substantial form of the body. If 
it were a separate substance, Aquinas explains, it would not be possible to say that the 
human being understands by means of the possible intellect.501 A substance’s operation 
must originate in that substance; the act of understanding attributed to the human being 
must originate in that human being. 
Furthermore, since this act of understanding is an act of the possible intellect, the 
possible intellect must be in each individual as her own intellect; that is to say, the 
possible intellect must be multiplied according to the number of human beings.502 
Aquinas explains that in order to maintain the individuality of human beings as knowers 
(and as distinct human beings insofar as to be human is to be a knower) we must maintain 
that each person has her own intellect. It is impossible to explain diversity in 
understanding and knowledge using other means. Aquinas holds that multiplying the 
number of intellects does not affect the universality of the resulting knowledge; since we 
understand the natures in things and not separate intelligibles, having multiple intelligible 
species in multiple intellects can result in multiple understandings of the “universal” 
common natures.503 The overall argument rests on the idea that “it has been proved that 
the substance of the intellect is united to the human body as its form. But one form cannot 
500 Aquinas, QDAnima, Q. 2, p. 57. “Hunc igitur intellectum possibilem necesse est esse in potentia ad 
omnia que sunt intelligibilia per hominem et receptiuum eorum, et consequens denudatum ab hiis” (Q 2, ln. 
182-1854, p. 16).
501 Ibid., Q. 2, responsio.
502 Ibid., Q. 3, responsio.
503 Aquinas, ST, Ia,Q. 76, A. 2. 
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possibly exist in more than one matter […] Therefore, there is not one intellect for all 
men.”504 It makes no sense, according to Aquinas, to assert that the form is simultaneously 
the form of the individual human being, the source of the their humanity (as distinct from 
their animality) and their knowledge, and that it is distinct from the individual and shared 
with all humans. That is to say, the intellectual soul is the substantial form of the human 
being. A substantial form must be exclusive to that of which it is the form since it 
accounts for the substance, the essence, of that thing. If it were separate and shared by all 
human beings this would mean that human beings are essentially animals with an 
advanced estimative power505 and the ability to ‘connect’ with and use the rational 
faculties; reason would not be an intrinsic part of the human being.506
Aquinas argues that the agent intellect must also be a power belonging to the 
individual human soul, despite its being “separable,” “unaffectable,” “unmixed,” and “in 
actuality as regards its substance.”507 He explains that there must exist a power which 
504 Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch, 73, p. 215. “Ostensum est enim quod substantia intellectus unitur corpori 
humano ut forma. Impossibile est autem unam formam esse nisi unius materiae; quia proprius actus in 
propria potentia fit; sunt enim ad invicem proportionata. Non est igitur intellectus unus omnium 
hominum’ (Bk. 2, Ch. 73, sec. 1489, p. 208).
505. Aquinas is referring here to the cogitative faculty, the estimative power as it exists in human beings. 
While Aquinas agrees with Averroes that the cogitative power is a brain power, one of the internal senses, 
he does think it can be responsible for the many tasks it performs in Averroes’ system. The primary tasks of 
the cogitative power for Aquinas is to create the phantasms and to note the particular intentions of 
individuals. In this way the cogitative power is important in helping the individual use the more universal 
knowledge gained through intellectual apprehension in practical ways, relating it to the particular, material 
world. However, it is not fundamentally involved in the working of the intellects; this is because there is no 
need in Aquinas’ philosophy to bridge a connection between separate Intellects and individuals since the 
intellects are not separate.
506 It should be noted that part of the reason for Aquinas’ critique of Averroes’ view of substantial form 
come from his understanding of Aristotle. Aquinas’ understanding of what it means to be a substance and a 
substantial form is, generally, in line with the view of Aristotle. On the other hand, Averroes’ understanding 
is rather unAristotelian and falls into a kind of Platonism, despite Averroes’ claims to be be fully in keeping 
with Aristotle’s views. A detailed account of this issue will be provided later in this chapter.
507 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 10, p. 366. “Intellectus agens est nobilior 
possibili; set intellectus possibilis est separatus, inpassibilis et inmixtus, ut supra ostensum est; ergo multo 
magis intellectus agens. Ex quo etiam patet quod sit secundum substanciam suam actu” (Bk 3, Ch. 4, ln. 
79-84, p. 220).
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makes potentially intelligible things actually intelligible and presents them to the possible 
intellect. If this were not the case there would be no way for the intelligible objects 
known by the possible intellect to come into being. The power responsible for producing 
these intelligibles is the agent intellect. It functions by abstracting from matter and all 
material conditions, a process which results in an understanding of universals through the 
use of intelligible species.508 The agent intellect, like the possible intellect, must be 
multiplied according to the number of individuals. It is the principle by which actual 
understanding takes place and this must exist in the individual if we are to say truthfully 
that each person has her own understanding: “there must be in us an essential active 
principle of our own, through which we are made to be actually understanding, and this 
principle is the agent intellect.”509 Furthermore, Aquinas explains each individual 
experiences the act of abstracting from material conditions and the act of understanding 
as “taking place within [herself]” and this can only be attributed to the existence of 
formal principles of abstraction and reception in each person; thus, the possible and agent 
intellects must both be in the soul and multiplied according to the number of individuals. 
The act of intellect is done by individual human beings, and for this to be the case the 
principle of that action must be formally in the human being.510
In addition to addressing the issue of how the intellects can be in the soul Aquinas 
also examines the notion that the intellects are the form of the human being. He explains 
in several places that the soul cannot be a body. It must be the act of a body, a principle of 
508 Aquinas, QDAnima , Q. 4, pp. 78-79; Latin Q. 4, ln. 115-125, p. 33.
509 Ibid., Q. 5, p. 86. “Requiritur in nobis principium actiuum proprium, per quod efficiamur intelligentes 
in actu. Et hoc est intellectus agens” (Q. 5, ln. 160-163, p. 41). Also see SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 76, p. 241-242 and 
Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 10, p. 367; Latin Bk. 3, Ch. 4, ln. 122-127, p. 221.
510 SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 76.
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life; furthermore, it is that which gives the human being her essential characteristics.511 
Although the soul is not a body, it is not simply the form of a body but also a subsistent 
thing (hoc aliquid). In the first question of the Questiones Disputate De Anima Aquinas 
asks whether the human soul can be both a form and a determinate particular (forma et 
hoc aliquid). Here he works to determine whether the soul fulfills the two characteristics 
of substance: (1) having the ability to subsist per se, and (2) to be complete in a given 
species and genus of substance.512 The human rational soul understands universals via 
intelligible species which it abstracts from matter and from all material conditions; 
furthermore, it performs this essential operation not by the act of some bodily organ but 
by its own act. Since its essential operation does not involve the body, the intellective 
soul must also “possess an independent per se act of existing which is not dependent on 
its body.”513 That is to say, it must be not only the form of a body but also a substance in 
its own right, fulfilling the first characteristic of substance.
The human soul does not, however, fulfill the second characteristic; it is not 
complete in itself with regard to a species and genus. Rather, it is the form of the species 
human being, a composite of body and soul, conferring being on the human body. If this 
were not the case then the body and soul would be only accidentally united.514 So, the 
soul is not a species in its own right; rather, the human being is the species and is 
511 See, for example, Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 49 and 50, ST, Ia Q. 75, A. 1 and 2, and deUnitate Ch. I, 
sec. 3.
512  Aquinas, QDAnima , Q1, responsio. Aquinas also addresses these two senses of hoc aliquid in the first 
reply in ST Ia, Q 75, A2.
513 Aquinas,QDAnima, Q1, p. 47. “Oportet quod anima intellectiua habeat esse per se absolutum, non 
dependens a corpore” (Q 1, ln. 246-247, p. 8). 
514 Aquinas explains that if this were the case “death, which signifies the separation of soul and body, 
would not be a substantial corruption, and this is obviously false” ( Aquinas, QDAnima, Q1, p. 47). “Mors 
igitur, que significat eorum separationem, non esset corruptio substantialis, quod patet esse falsum” (Q1, ln. 
283-286, p. 9)
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composed of soul and body as its form and matter. This argument that the soul is form of 
the body is made more strongly in the SCG and ST. In the SCG Aquinas explains that the 
soul is neither a part of the body nor mixed with the body, nor physically connected to 
it.515 Despite this, the soul is still united to the body in an important way via a “contact of 
power”516 which allows the soul to act upon and change the body without being acted 
upon or changed itself. In this relationship the body and the soul are “not unqualifiedly 
one […but rather are] one with respect to acting and being acted upon.”517 Aquinas further 
explains that the body and soul are “one in reason.”518 This type of union is only possible 
if the soul is the substantial form of the body.519
Aquinas addresses the issue again in Question 76 of the first part of the ST. Here 
he starts the argument by asserting that “that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of 
the thing to which it is attributed”520 and that the soul is that whereby the body acts 
because it is the life principle and the principle by which we understand. Aquinas 
continues by explaining that without the soul as the form of the body there would be no 
way to explain the fact that each individual has his own act of understanding which is 
essential to him.521 For Aquinas, then, the soul has a dual role to play. It is both a 
substance and a form. The unique role that the body plays in the knowledge attainment 
515 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 56, pp. 164-165; Latin, Bk 2, Ch. 56, sec. 1313-1314, p. 180.
516 “Hic autem tactus non est quantitatis, sed virtutis.” (SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 56, sec. 1317, pp. 180-181)
517 Ibid., Bk. 2, Ch. 56, pp. 166-167. “ Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum, non sunt unum 
simpliciter. Sunt enim unum in agendo et patiendo: quod non est esse unum simpliciter” (Bk 2, Ch. 56, sec. 
1319, p. 181).
518 Ibid., Bk. 2, Ch. 56, p. 167. “Ratione unum” (Bk. 2, Ch. 56, sec. 1319, p. 181).
519 Ibid., Bk. 2, Ch. 68.
520 Aquinas, ST, Ia Q. 76, A. 1, p. 696. “Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui ope ratio 
attribuitur (p. 448a, ln. 44-45 in Summa Theologiae. Cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium 
Ottaviensis ad textum S. Pii Pp. V iussu confectum recognita. Tomus primus complectens. 
Ottawa: Commissio Piana, 1941).
521 Aquinas, ST, Ia Q. 76, A. 1. 
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process helps us to see that the soul must be linked to the body in a special way, while the 
immaterial nature of universals and the intelligible species which help us arrive at 
knowledge of universals demonstrate the soul’s subsistence.522
Inhabiting this boundary between corporeal and separate substance means that the 
soul is fittingly connected to the body while also being immortal and capable of surviving 
the death of the body. Aquinas argues that it is fitting that the soul, the lowest of the 
intellectual substances, be united to the human body since it requires such a body to 
fulfill its functions, including its most important function, understanding.523 Thus, while 
the soul, including the will can exist apart from the body that is not its most natural type 
of existence and it cannot fulfill all of its functions. For Aquinas this serves not only the 
theological purpose of explaining personal immortality and supernatural reward and 
punishment, but also, is a necessary feature of his view that the intellectual soul has a 
power (i.e. intellection) which is not tied to a bodily organ and so can continue to 
function without the body.
5.2.2.2 Aquinas’ particular critiques of Averroes 
Given this understanding of the relationship between the Intellects and the 
individual, Aquinas argues that the individual would not be per se rational under 
Averroes’ view since the intellectual powers are not part of the individual’s substance. 
Aquinas sees Averroes’ view as a kind of Platonism524 and as no longer Aristotelian. An 
522  Aquinas, QDAnima , Q. 1.
523 Ibid., Q. 8, pp. 114-115, Latin Q. 8, ln. 177-198, pp. 66-67.
524 This is because Plato held that the soul/intellect was separate from the body and also, more 
importantly, that knowledge was of a separate immaterial entity with ontological reality (which might here 
be equated with the intelligibles in act, objects of knowledge existing in the separate Material Intellect) and 
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early and detailed account of Aquinas on the need for the intellects to be intrinsic to the 
human being and multiplied according to the number of individuals can be found in his 
Commentary on the Sentences. Detailed arguments are also provided by Aquinas in his 
Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae. Here I will use the Commentary on the 
Sentences as the foundation for the discussion and bring other texts as needed for 
additional clarification and to strengthen Aquinas’ argument.
In In 2 Sent., D 17, Q2, A1, “Whether there is one soul or intellect for all human 
beings,” Aquinas offers an account of the tradition, as he understands it, along with his 
own arguments against that tradition. He explains that although “nearly all philosophers 
after Aristotle are in agreement that the agent intellect and the possible [intellect] differ in 
substance and that the agent intellect is a certain separate substance,”525 this position 
cannot be accepted as it is contrary to the faith. He notes that there is much more 
diversity of opinion regarding the possible intellect, citing the views of Alexander, Ibn 
Bajjah, Avicenna, Themistius, and Averroes.526 While he quickly rejects the views of 
not of things in the world (as Aristotle and Aquinas would have it); see deUnitate, especially #109, for 
some discussion of Averroes’ Platonism.
525 Taylor “Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’: Aquinas’ First Critical Encounter with the Doctrines of Avicenna and 
Averroes on the Intellect, In 2 Sent. D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1” in Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and 
the Latin Aristotelianism of the 13th Century, ed. Luis Xavier Lopez-Farjeat and Jorg Alejandro Tellkamp 
(Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2013), p. 283. “Sciendum est quod in hoc fere omnes philosophi 
concordant post Aristotelem, III De anima […[ quod intellectus agens et possibilis differunt secundum 
substratiam, et quod intellectus agens sit substantia quaedam separata” (pp. 422-423 in Scriptum Super 
Libros Sententiarum magistri petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis [Sent.], Vol2, edited by R.P. Mandonnet, 
(Paris: P. Lethielleux) 1929). 
It is important to point out that, with the exception of Avicenna, the information Aquinas has regarding the 
philosophers he mentions is derived from his reading of Averroes’ LCDA and not from primary texts. One 
can look to Taylor, “Introduction” pp. lxxvi-lcvi for a detailed discussion of how these and other 
philosophers’ influenced Averroes and feature in the LCDA.
526 It is of some interest to point out that the positions of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Ibn Bajjah are 
similar to the positions which Averroes held in his Middle and Short Commentaries on the De Anima, 
although Aquinas would not have known this, having access only to the Long Commentary. He rejects both 
of these views: the intellect could not be a disposition, as Alexander says, because it would then be a the 
power of a body and a body cannot be receptive of all intelligibles; nor could the intellect be a power of the 
imagination, as Ibn Bajjah would have it, because then both the phantasms, which move the possible 
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Alexander and Ibn Bajjah, Aquinas asserts his agreement with Avicenna’s view that the 
possible intellect is multiplied according to the number of individuals since it is part of 
the “essence of the rational soul and not […] a bodily power,” while disagreeing with his 
views of a separate Agent Intellect.527 He goes on to reflect on the views of Theophrasus 
and Themistius, explaining that they assert that all of the intelligibles are in one separate 
intellect (the Agent/Productive Intellect) rather than being in each individual human 
being. The separate Agent Intellect guides the human intellect (intellect in a positive 
disposition) in this process for Themistius; this must be the case because “to abstract 
species from phantasms is in our power.”528 An important element of Themistius’ thought 
which Averroes adopts is this idea that there is one set of intelligibles in act, contained in 
the separate Intellect; however, Averroes does not accept the notion that these intelligibles 
are eternal.
Having quickly refuted these earlier philosophers Aquinas moves on to a detailed 
refutation of Averroes’ views. He states that Averroes holds the position that 
the agent intellect as well as the possible [intellect] is 
eternal and is one in all [human beings], but the intelligible 
species are not eternal. He also holds that the agent intellect 
is not related to the possible [intellect] as its form but as a 
craftsman to matter and [that] the understood species 
abstracted from phantasms are as form of the possible 
intellect, and the intellect itself would both be located in the imagination and it is impossible for one thing 
to be both mover and moved (In 2 Sent., D 17, Q2, A1, p. 284-288; Latin pp. 423-425). Also the article to 
which Taylor’s translation is attached, pp. 147-152, for his explanation of Aquinas’ account of Ibn Bajjah 
and Alexander
527 In 2 Sent., D 17, Q2, A1, p. 286. “In essentia animae rationalis, et non esse virtutem corporalem” (p. 
424). At pp.152-160 Taylor gives an extended treatment of Aquinas’ view of Avicenna. Particularly 
noteworthy is how Aquinas adopts and uses the views of Avicenna in his critique of Averroes. First, 
Aquinas’ adopts Avicenna’s view of the possible intellect “as an individual and immaterial power of the 
rational soul” (p. 153). Second, he uses the Avicennian conception of the intelligibles in act as likeness of 
the natures of things to argue against Averroes’ position regarding the need to keep intelligibles in act as the 
objects of knowledge (pp. 155-156; 293-294)
528 Ibid., p. 287. “Abstrahere species a phantasmatibus sit in potestate notras” (p. 425).
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intellect [and that] from the two of these there comes to be 
the intellect in a positive disposition.529
Aquinas notes that this position of Averroes is meant to solve several problems inherent 
in the position of Themistius. Particularly, it is supposed to show that the Intellects can be 
eternal while still allowing for human participation in the creation of intelligible species 
(i.e. intelligibles in act). However, he points out that there are a number of problems with 
Averroes’ position that make it both incompatible with the views of Aristotle and 
generally untenable. 
Aquinas starts by pointing to the problem of the twofold subject of the intelligible 
species. According to Averroes, the intelligible species have their material being and their 
“newness” by virtue of having the phantasms in individual human being’s imagination as 
their subject; this allows for the intelligibles in act to be generable rather than eternal, the 
result of human experience and brain activity. Second, the intelligible species have 
immaterial being through the possible intellect; this allows them to avoid corruptibility 
and to maintain the stability necessary for the unity of science and human 
communication.530 
529 Ibid., p. 288. “Quod tam intellectus agens quam possibilis est aeternus et unus in omnibus; sed species 
intelligiblies non sunt aeternae; et ponit quod intellectus agens non se habet ad possibiliem ut forma ejus, 
sed ut artifex ad materiam, et species intellectae abstractae a phantasmatibus sunt sicut forma intellectus 
possibilis, ex quibus duobus efficitur intellectus in habitu” (p. 425) 
530 Ibid., D 17, Q3, A1. p. 288; Latin, p. 425. In SCG BK 2, Ch 73, p. 226 Aquinas’ explains that, for 
Averroes, “the intelligible species have a twofold subject: the possible intellect, wherein they have eternal 
being; the phantasm, as ground of their newness.” “Species intelligibiles habent duplex subiectum: ex uno 
quorum habent aeternitatem, scilicet ab intellectus possibili; ab alio autem habent novitatem, scilicet a 
phantasmate” (Bk. 2, Ch. 73, sec. 1515, p. 212). Also see Taylor “Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’: Aquinas’ First 
Critical Encounter with the Doctrines of Avicenna and Averroes on the Intellect, In 2 Sent. D. 17, Q. 2, A. 
1,” pp. 165-167 and Taylor “Introduction,” pp. lix-lxi for a discussion of Averroes’ account of the twofold 
subject of intelligibles species (i.e., intelligibles in act).
In the SCG Aquinas offers a detailed account of these ideas, explaining Averroes’ view that the 
Intellects are connected to the individual through the phantasms in the cogitative power. At SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 
59, pp. 178-179 Aquinas explains that “Averroes determines how it [the possible intellect] is brought into 
contact with us, saying that the species understood in act is the form of the possible intellect, just as the 
visible in act is the form of the power of sight. Thus, there arises one thing from the possible intellect and 
the form understood in act. The possible intellect, then, is united to anyone to whom that form is united. 
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This view is easily dismissed, in Aquinas’ view, since it hinges on the erroneous 
view that the intelligibles in the possible intellect and in the imagination could be one in 
Now, it is united to us by means of the phantasm, which is a kind of subject of that understood form; and in 
this way the possible intellect also is brought into connection with us.” “Determinat etiam modum quo 
continuatur nobiscum, dicens quod species intellecta in actu est forma intellectus possibilis, sicut visibile in 
actu est forma potentiae visivae. Unde, ex intellectu possibili ex forma intellecta in actu fit unum. 
Cuicumque igitur coniungitur forma intellectua praedicta, coniungitur intellectus, possibilis. Coniungitur 
autem nobis mediante phantasmate, quod est subiectum quoddam illius formae intellectae. Per hunc igitur 
modum etiam intellectus possibilis nobiscum continuatur” (Bk 2, Ch. 59, sec. 1360, p. 187). He continues 
this discussion in the SCG in Ch 60, and Ch. SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 73. 
Also see ST, Ia Q. 76, A. 1, p. 697 where Aquinas explains that, for Averroes, the union of body 
and soul “is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, namely the possible intellect and 
the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus, through the intelligible species, the possible 
intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man;” the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Bk. 
III, Ch. 7, pp. 348-349, where Aquinas writes that “some people have been so deceived by this passage 
[429b5], however, that they have posited a possible intellect separated in existence from the body, like one 
of the separated substances […T]hose who came up with this position have tried to find some means by 
which the separated substance that they call possible intellect is continuous and united with us, so that its 
engaging in intellective cognition might be our engaging in intellective cognition. For they say that an 
intelligible species is the form of possible intellect (since it becomes actualized by means of a species), but 
that the phantasm, which is in us, is a kind of subject for this species. In this way, therefore, they say that 
possible intellect is linked with us through its form [...they argued] in some such fashion as this: phantasms 
are in some way one with an intelligible species, but an intelligible species is one with possible intellect; 
therefore, possible intellect is united with the phantasms;” “Set horum occasione uerborum quidam in 
tantum decepti sunt ut ponerent intellectum possibiliem secundum esse a corpore separatum, sicut una de 
substancii separatis […H]uius positionis conati sunt adinuenire aliquem modum quo illa substencia 
separata quam intellectum possibiliem dicunt continuetur et uniatur nobiscum, ut sic eius intelligere sit 
nostrum intelligere. Dicunt enim quod species intelligibilis est forma intellectus possibilis (per eam enim fit 
actu), huius autem speciei subiectum quoddam est fantasma, quod est in nobis; sic igitur dicunt intellectum 
possibilem copulari nobiscum per formam suam […] quasi sic arguens: fantasmata sunt quodam modo 
unum cum specie intelligibili; species autem intelligibilis est unum cum intellectu possibili; ergo intellectus 
possibilis unitur fantasmatibus” (Bk 3, Ch. 1, ln. 275-328, pp. 205-206). And, deUnitate Ch.3, sec. 63, p. 49 
where he says that “Averroes, held that the principle of this kind of understanding, a principle that is called 
the possible intellect, is not the soul nor a part of the soul, except equivocally, but rather that it is a separate 
substance. He said that the understanding of that separate substance is my understanding or that person’s 
understanding, in so far as that possible intellect is joined to me or to you through phantasms which are in 
me and in you. He said that this is accomplished in the following way. Now the intelligible species, which 
becomes one with the possible intellect since it is its form and act, has two subjects: one, the phantasms 
themselves; the other, the possible intellect. So therefore the possible intellect is in contact with us through 
its form by means of the phantasms; and thus, as long as the possible intellect understands, this man 
understands;” “Auerroys, ponens huiusmodi principium intelligendi quod dicitur intellectus possibilies non 
esse animam nec partem anime nisi equiuoce, sed potius quod sit substantia quedam separata, dixit quod 
intelligere illius substantie separate est intelligere mei uel illius, in quantum intellectus ille possibilis 
copulatur michi uel tibi per fantasmata que sunt in me et in te. Quod sic fieri dicebat: species enim 
intelligibilis que fit unum cum intellectu possibili, cum sit forma et actus eius, habet duo subiecta, unum 
ipsa fantasmata, aliud intellectum possibilem. Sic ergo intellectus possibilis continuatur nobiscum per 
formam suam mediantibus fantasmatibus; et sic dum intellectus possibilis intelligit, hic homo 
intelligit” (Chapter 3, ln 46-60, p. 303).
Of particular importance is the emphasis which Aquinas places, on behalf of Averroes, on the 
passive intellect (cogitation, memory, and imagination) as responsible for preparing the phantasms for the 
action of the Agent Intellect (SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 60).
199
number. Rather, he explains, they must be distinct with the subject of the possible 
intellect being eternal and the subject of the phantasms being generable and corruptible. 
If this is the case the human being could not be a producer of knowledge through 
abstraction from phantasms but rather could only be said to discover the intelligibles 
which preexist in the possible intellect; this would be contrary to Aristotle, according to 
Aquinas.531
Next, Aquinas addresses Averroes’ claim that his view allows for an individual 
human being to understand through its own conjunction with the possible intellect. As we 
know, Averroes’ view is that each individual has her own phantasms by which she 
conjoins to the possible intellect via the intelligible species which has the phantasm an 
the possible intellect as its subject.532 This view, according to Aquinas, leads to the 
conclusion that there is a part of the human being which is eternal (that part which is the 
possible intellect) but that the rest of the human being is not eternal. Thus, there is no 
immortality of the soul for Averroes.533 Aquinas rejects this view for three reasons.534 
First, he reminds us of what was just argued regarding the impossibility of the twofold 
subject of intelligibles species and notes that this must lead us to conclude that there is no 
conjoining of possible intellect and individual human being. Second, Aquinas explains 
that under Averroes’ view the “human being would not be a human being in a determinate 
species insofar as [the human being] has intellect.”535 That is, since the entire locus of 
531 In 2 Sent., D 17, Q3, A1. p. 289; Latin p. 426.
532 Aquinas provides a more detailed account of this view of Averroes in SCG Bk 2, Ch. 59.
533 In 2 Sent., D 17, Q3, A1. pp. 289-290; Latin pp. 426-427.
534 See Taylor, “Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’: Aquinas’ First Critical Encounter with the Doctrines of Avicenna 
and Averroes on the Intellect, In 2 Sent. D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1” pp. 168-172 for Taylor’s account of these three 
arguments of Aquinas, which Taylor breaks down into 4 problems raised by Aquinas against Averroes.
535 In 2 Sent., D 17, Q3, A1. p. 290. “Homo non esset homo in specie determinata per hoc quod est habens 
intellectum” (p. 427).
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intellectual operations would be outside of the individual human being, it would not be 
proper to call the individual a rational being. This is because the connection between 
individual and intellect is accidental rather than substantial. The Intellects in Averroes’ 
view, according to Aquinas, are not intrinsically or substantially connected to the 
individual human being; instead they have an accidental connection at the time thought is 
occurring as they use the images presented by the individual cogitative power in the 
process of abstraction. What’s more, this is contrary to Aristotle’s view that “the soul is 
united to the body without anything intermediate and also without any mediating 
knowledge”536 Third, he points out that Averroes’ view would result not in a particular 
human being understanding but, rather, in her being understood.537 This is the case since 
the possible intellect would be understanding the phantasms which the individual human 
being imagines. This issues results from the fact that, according to Aquinas, the intellects 
are not intrinsic to the human being.
Aquinas makes similar arguments in the SCG, where he calls the position of 
Averroes “worthless and impossible.” Here he explains that the possible intellect must be 
a form of the body in order to properly connect a particular human being with the 
intellect and, thus, with knowledge.538 According to Aquinas, to understand is to have 
536 In 2 Sent., D 17, Q3, A1. p. 290. “Animam corpori nullo mediante uniri, nec etiam mediante 
scientia” (p. 427).
537 Alain de Libera offers a detailed discussion of this issue in his commentary on Aquinas’ de Unitate 
Intellectus. Here he explains that, according to Aquinas, thought is an immanent action rather than a 
transitive one. As such, thought can only exist in an agent, as Aristotle contends; if thought is in a separate 
Intellect, as Averroes holds, than the agent, the knower, is that Intellect, not the individual human being. 
But, if this intellect is part of the soul which is, in turn, form of the body, as Aquinas holds, the individual 
can be said to be the knower (Alain de Libera, L’Unitaté de L’intellect: Commentaire du De unitate 
intellectus contra averroistas de Thomas d’Aquin, pp. 276-280). One should also see Ralph McInerny’ 
commentary on the same text of Aquinas in Aquinas Against the Averroists: On There Being Only One 
Intellect, pp. 147, 150-152, and 205-2011.
538 SCG Bk 2, Ch. 59.
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intellect and to employ it such that the object of understanding is the “thing whose 
intelligible species is united to the intellect,”539 not the intelligible species itself. That is to 
say, for Aquinas the intelligible in act is not the object of knowledge but rather a means 
by which the object of knowledge, the natures existing in things, is known. This is an 
important distinction since it allows Aquinas to be free from the need to explain how 
there can be one set of intelligibles in act which all people share; it is this need for a 
single set of intelligibles, which, in part, leads Averroes to posit a shared Material 
Intellect which can store these intelligibles and provide access to them for all human 
beings.540
According to Aquinas, while it is the case that the phantasm is the representation 
of a thing in the mind and that the possible intellect is “in touch with” that phantasm 
through the intelligible species,541 this can only result in knowledge for the human being 
if the possible intellect is a form of the body of the individual human being. Since it is the 
proper operation of the human being to understand, the faculty by which this occurs—the 
539 SCG Bk. 2, Ch, 59, p. 179. “Intelligitur autem id cuius species intelligibilis intellectui unitur” (Bk 2, 
Ch. 59, sec. 1361, pp. 187-188).
540 It is important to remember that this does not mean that the intelligibles are in the Material Intellect 
from the start and human beings merely access them. It is essential to Averroes’ system that the intelligibles 
in act are generated by individual human beings through the intellective process which begins with 
sensation and ends with the creation of intelligibles in act. Of course, this system also brings with it 
important questions which Averroes did not address. For example, since there must be only one set of 
intelligibles, it is unclear how the intellective process concludes with the creation of an intelligible for each 
person since the one intelligible would be in the Material Intellect after the first human being formed it 
through the process of intellectual abstraction done in conjunction with the Agent and Material Intellects. 
For example, each individual arrives at the intelligible ‘horse’ after her own experiences of horses; but, is 
the intelligible abstracted anew each time this happens, or is the one intelligible simply re-certified and 
made accessible to a new individual each time the knowledge attainment process takes place?
541 Aquinas points out in A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima (Bk. 3, Ch. 7, p. 349; Latin Bk 3, Ch. 1, 
p. 206), and deUnitate (Ch. 3, sec. 65, p. 50; Latin Ch. 3, ln. 76-96, p. 303) that the phantasms do not 
actually provide a connection to the possible intellect through intelligible species because the intelligibles 
species must be abstracted from the phantasm in order to be actually intelligible (and exist in the possible 
intellect). Thus, intelligible species cannot be connected to both the intellect and the individual (through the 
phantasm) at the same time.
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intellect—must be in the human being.542 Aquinas equates the relationship between the 
phantasm and the intellect to that of color and the sense of sight. Color exists on a wall 
and it is apprehended by sight; in this case the wall does not see but is seen. Similarly, if 
phantasms exist in the human brain (in the cogitative power) and they are apprehended by 
the separate possible intellect, the brain (or the individual) does not understand but is 
understood.543 This is not a satisfactory account of the real phenomena of the personal 
experience of understanding that individuals have. It is part of the nature of the human 
being to understand and this is incommensurate with the position of Averroes as Aquinas 
understands it. Aquinas argues that in order to hold that the human being is, in her 
essence, a rational animal we must hold that the rational principle be intrinsic to the 
individual as part of her form. 
This notion that the intellects must be formally united to the individual is found in 
several of Aquinas’ works and reflects what Taylor calls the Principle of Intrinsic Formal 
Cause.544 The main thrust of the argument is that the source of an activity, particularly if 
that activity defines the species, must be power which is formally existing in the 
individuals of that species. Since human beings are defined as rational animals, the 
rational or intellectual power must exist formally in the the individual as a part of her 
nature.545 If the intellectual powers are not intrinsic to the individual, the individual would 
542 SCG Bk. 2, Ch, 59, p. 179-181; Latin Bk 2, Ch. 59, sec. 1367-1368, pp. 188-189). 
543 ST. Ia Q. 76, A. 1, p. 697; Latin p. 450. Aquinas makes this same comparison in A Commentary on 
Aristotle’s De anima, Bk. I, Ch. 2, p. 15; Latin Bk I, Ch. 2, ln. 46-69, pp. 9-10, and deUnitate, Ch. 3, sec. 
66, p. 50; Latin Ch. 3, ln. 97-118, pp. 303-304.
544 Taylor, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul According to Aquinas and Averroes.” In 
particular, see pp. 190-202 for Taylor’s discussion of the various places Aquinas uses arguments based upon 
the Principle of Intrinsic Formal Cause.
545 Ibid., pp. 201-202, “The very definitional difference distinguishing human beings from other animals 
lies in the intrinsic presence to each member of the species of the form which bears the essential and proper 
operations of intellectual understanding by the agent intellect and the possible intellect in each soul. A view 
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be only accidentally, not essentially, a knower; the knower, properly speaking, would be 
the separate Intellects.546 It is not enough, according to Aquinas, that the intellectual 
power to linked to the individual via some object, such as the phantasms. In such a case 
the human being would be known objects rather than knowing subjects.547
Aquinas points out, as we see above, that Averroes thinks he can solve this 
problem using the cogitative power and the phantasms. Averroes, according to Aquinas, 
thinks the cogitative power, as the power which houses the phantasms (i.e. the images 
which represent the intelligible species in the possible intellect), is enough to explain 
individual human cognition. Averroes claims that the passible intellect (particularly the 
cogitative power), rather than the possible intellect, is the “subject of the habit of 
science”548 and difference in phantasms among individuals is enough to explain the 
difference in knowledge, despite the sharing of the possible intellect.549 But, Aquinas 
explains that the passive intellect is not enough to explain how individual human beings 
can be said to have universal knowledge (i.e. full scientific knowledge, knowledge 
properly speaking) because universal species cannot be in a bodily power.550 It is not 
possible to sufficiently explain the distinction between humans and animals or differences 
in knowledge using the system of Averroes, as Aquinas explains it. Aquinas explains that 
that locates the power of understanding properly outside the individual human being denies to that human 
being something essential and intrinsic to human nature.”
546 Ibid., p. 202. “If human beings are properly understood as rational animals essentially distinguished by 
their rational or intellectual operations, those operations must be intrinsic as essentially contained within 
the very substance of the human beings, [Aquinas] argues. Otherwise human beings would be knowers only 
accidentally, not essentially, and the operation of intellect would belong essentially to the separate intellects 
and only non-essentially in human beings.”
547 Ibid., p. 191.
548 SCG Bk 2, Ch 73, p. 221. “Subiectum habitus scientiae non est intellectus possibilis, sed intellectus 
passivus et virtus cogitativia” (Ch. 73, sec. 1509, p. 211).
549 Ibid. Also see deUnitate, Ch. 3, sec. 63, p. 49; Latin Ch. 3, ln. 41-60, p. 303.
550 SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 60, p. 187; Latin Bk 2, Ch. 60, sec. 1382, p. 192. In ST Ia Q. 76 A.1 Aquinas argues 
that in Averroes’ system the individual would be the object of understanding, not the subject.
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“man has a proper operation higher than the other animals, namely, understanding and 
reasoning, which is the operation of man as man.”551 In order for this operation to 
properly be said to be part of the “specific nature” of the human being its principle must 
be in the individual human being. This can only be accomplished if the possible (and 
agent) intellect is multiplied according to the number of individuals. Averroes’ attribution 
of the the passible intellect (i.e. the cogitative power) to the human being as the locus of 
human nature in the way Aquinas describes it above is not enough to account for human 
understanding because “the principle of man’s proper operation must be impassible and 
not mixed with the body.”552 He notes further that if the intellect is not individuated, 
humans must get their nature as human from the cogitative power with phantasms as the 
source of understanding in the determinate human being. This, he argues, is not possible 
under his own understanding of human nature. The cogitative power is a brain power 
associated with the other powers of the passive intellect It is akin to other sensitive 
powers which require an organ; thus, the passive intellect, even given that only human 
beings have the cogitative power, is not enough to account for understanding (which does 
not require an organ) or to designate human beings as distinct from animals possessing 
sensitive souls. 
Furthermore, the phantasms are not enough to provide the “specific nature” to 
human beings because (1) they are potentially intelligible but not actually intelligible and 
ones nature must come from what is actual; and (2) they are many/particularized and 
551 SCG Bk 2, Ch. 60, p. 183. “Homo habet propriam operationem supera alia animalia, scilicet intelligere 
et ratiocinari, quae est operatio hominis inquantum est homo” (Bk. 2, Ch. 60, sec. 1371, p. 190)
552 Ibid. “principlium praedictae operationis oportet esse impassibile et non mixtum corpori” (Bk. 2, Ch. 
60, sec. 1371, p. 190)
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variable whereas a being’s nature must come from something which is one and stable.553 
Aquinas also argues that a multiplicity of phantasms is not enough to multiply the act of 
understanding of the possible intellect; even if there are many phantasms being used by 
the possible intellect, the resulting act of understanding will be numerically one for all of 
them.554 After all, for Averroes there is still but one intelligible in act and this is the real 
object of knowledge; its existence in the Material Intellect means that it does not belong 
to an individual but is shared by all, like the Intellect itself. All of this proves, according 
to Aquinas, that the possible intellect must be in each individual human being in a real, 
ontological sense, and thus it must be multiplied according to the number of human 
beings.555
Additionally, Aquinas insists that Averroes’ views are contrary to those of 
Aristotle. He first points to Aristotle’s general definition of soul, noting that every kind of 
soul, under this definition, is “the first act of an organic physical body,”556 pointing out 
that Averroes is wrong to express doubt in this definition (as it applies to the intellectual 
soul of human beings). He goes on to explain that Aristotle explicitly includes intellect 
among the powers of the soul in De Anima 2, thereby rejecting Averroes’ view that it is a 
separate entity, not a power of the soul. Aquinas points out that Aristotle is clear that the 
intellect is “separated” only in the sense that it it not associated with a corporeal organ 
553 Ibid., Bk. 2, Ch. 73, pp. 218-219; Latin Bk 2, Ch. 73, sec. 1498-1501, pp. 209-210.
554 Ibid., , pp. 221; Latin Bk 2, Ch. 73, sec. 1505, p. 210.. Aquinas offers additional arguments throughout 
Ch 73. Also see Bk. 3, Ch. 7 where he makes a similar argument within the context of demonstrating that 
relationship between the body and soul.
555 See Mahoney, “Aquinas’s Critique of Averroes’ Doctrine of the Unity of the Intellect” for a detailed 
discussion of Aquinas’ account of Averroes’ argument regarding phantasms and the possible intellect 
throughout his works. Mahoney notes that Aquinas’ critique remains fairly constant throughout. Also see 
Lawrence Dewan, “St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge,” where Aquinas’ critique of Averroes and the 
resulting view of knowledge is compared with that of Albert the Great, his teacher and predecessor.
556 SCG Bk 2, Ch. 61, p. 191. “Est actus primus physici corporis organici” (Bk 2, Ch, 61, sec. 1397, p. 
195.
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and that this fact does not preclude it from being a part or power of the soul since the 
human soul “surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter and cannot be wholly 
encompassed by it.”557 Finally, Aquinas quotes Aristotle as saying that the intellect is 
“‘that by which the soul judges and understands’ [and claims that] this makes it perfectly 
clear that the intellect is that part of the human soul by which it understands;”558 again, 
this is meant to provide evidence against the view of Averroes that the intellects are 
entities separate from the human soul. He ends his account by once again asserting that 
“the Averroistic position in question is, then, contrary to the opinion of Aristotle and to 
the truth, and is to be rejected therefore as sheer fiction.”559
Aquinas also makes a detailed argument against Averroes’ views in his late work 
De Unitate Intellectus. His primary argument revolved around the idea that the intellect is 
the substantial form of the body and is not one for all.560 According to McInerny’s 
commentary on this work we can break down Aquinas’ critique into three main 
arguments in support of the claim that the intellect is a part of the soul which is, in turn, 
the substantial form of the human being.561
557 A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima Bk.3, Ch. 7, p. 350. “Anima humana propter sui nobilitatem 
supergreditur facultatem materie corporalis et non potest totaliter includi ab ea” (Bk. 3, ch. 1, ln. 377-379, 
p. 207).
558 SCG Ch. 61, p. 192. “Intellectum quo opinatur et intelligit anima. In quo manifeste ostenditur 
intellectum esse aliquid animae humanae, quo anima humana intelligit” (Bk. 2, Ch. 61, sec. 1401, p. 196).
559 Ibid. “Est igitur praedicta positio contra sententiam Aistotelis, et contra veritatem. Unde tanquam 
fictitia repudianda est” (Bk. 2, Ch. 61, sec. 1402, p. 196). It should be remembered that, as we saw in 
Chapter 2 and in the beginning of this chapter, neither Aquinas nor Averroes can reasonably be said to 
follow the Aristotelian position to the extent they each claim.
560 McInerny, Aquinas Against the Averroists: On There Being Only One Intellect, p.147. McInerny notes 
that the other main line of argument Aquinas uses is that Aristotle did not hold that the intellects were 
separate. We have shown above that, although neither he nor Averroes accurately understood Aristotle’s 
notion of will, Averroes’ understanding of Aristotle’s position on the intellects is more accurate than 
Aquinas’.
561 Ibid., p. 150-152; 205-211.
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First is the argument that individual human beings understand as part of their 
natures. This can only be the case if the intellect is a faculty of the soul which is the form 
of the human being. Intellect is not something one comes into contact with or uses as a 
tool; rather, it is an essential part of one’s being. Aquinas argues that we experience 
ourselves thinking, wanting, seeing, and doing other “vital activities”562 which we come 
to associate with the soul. In order for these activities to belong to the individual they 
must originate from within. McInerny lays out Aquinas’ argument that “the first principle 
of our vital acts must be the form of body” using three premises: “1. A thing acts insofar 
as it is actual; 2. A thing is actual thanks to its form; 3. A thing acts thanks to its form.”563 
He goes on to explain that “the force of ‘This human understands’ is that the person who 
thinks is engaged in an activity, the source of which is within, and that source is primarily 
form.”564 McInerny points out that this understanding of the origin of rational activity 
seems to require a conflation of soul and intellect. While this is potentially problematic 
since it would seem to entail that one is always thinking, Aquinas resolves this by 
identifying soul as a first actuality and the activity resulting from the soul’s powers as 
second acts. He then colloquially identifies the soul with its most important power.565 
Aquinas sees Averroes’ dual subject theory of intelligibles as a denial of this 
notion that the source of these activities is the form of the human being. In De Unitate 
Intellectus he explains that such an account: (1) precludes the possibility that “the union 
of intellect and man [...comes] into being when he does,” [i.e.when the human rational 
562 Ibid., p. 206
563 Ibid., p. 206
564 Ibid., p. 206
565 Ibid., p. 206. McInerny also notes that Aquinas is attempting to follow Aristotle’s understanding of first 
and second actuality here.
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soul is created and implanted in the individual by God after birth]566 (2) would require 
that the union of intellect and individual would need not one but several causes, and (3) 
does not sufficiently explain that “this man understands.”567 Aquinas is highlighting here 
that the episodic nature of the connection between the separate Intellects and the human 
individual is not enough to account for the experience of thought as personal. What’s 
more, it is not enough to account for the notion that intellect is vital to the nature of the 
human being (i.e. that the human being is per se rational). 
The second argument Aquinas makes, according to McInerny, counters the notion 
that the soul (or intellect) is the mover rather than the form of the human being.568 Here 
Aquinas argues that Aristotle’s hylomorphism requires that the human being be a 
composite of potency and act, body and soul. He argues that this is contrary to Averroes’ 
system, where the separate Intellects move the individual when thought occurs. Aquinas 
aims to prove that intellectual activity cannot be likened to motion in this way. Central to 
this argument is the claim that thought is not a transitive action, as motion is, but an 
immanent action. This means that it is an intrinsic action of some agent. If thought is an 
immanent action it is immanent to the intellect, not the individual, as Averroes claims. If 
thought is in the intellect and the intellect is separate from the human being, acting as 
mover rather than substantial form, the individual cannot be the one who thinks.569 Even 
566 Ibid., p. 153
567 Ibid., p. 154.
568 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
569 De Libera discusses this issue in some detail in his commentary on De Intellectus, saying: “L'argument 
est implacable : 1 la pensée est une action immanente (selon Aristote) 72 ; 2 Toute action immanente est 
dans ce qui agit (selon Aristote) ; 3 Ce qui agit/pense est l'intellect (séparé, selon les averroïstes) ; 4 Donc, 
que l'intellect soit uni à l'homme comme le moteur au mû (selon les averroïstes) ne change rien à l'affaire : 
la pensée est dans l'intellect ; elle n'est donc ni ne peut être en l'homme individuel ; elle ne peut donc 
s'attribuer à l'homme individuel ; donc l'homme individuel ne pense pas.” (p. 277) See pp. 277-280 for the 
larger discussion.
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if thought were transitive, as motion is, the result would still not be that this man 
understands; rather, he would be understood.
The third argument revolves around Aquinas’ and Averroes’ different 
understandings of the form of the human being. Here Aquinas argues that intellect is the 
substantial form of the human being; this means that it is connected to the human body 
while also having operations separate from the body. As Aquinas explains: “the human 
soul exists by its own act of existing, in which matter it some way shares [though] not 
wholly comprising it, since the dignity of this form is greater than the capacity of matter; 
nothing therefore prevents the soul from having some operation or power that matter 
cannot reach.”570 He explains that this view of the intellect solves the problems which 
arise (1) from the view that the human being is identical to intellect and (2) from the view 
that the intellect is merely a material form of the human being. On the one hand, Aquinas 
takes from Aristotle the idea that “no part of the body can be defined without some part 
of the soul.”571 Furthermore, he notes that “man is placed in a species by the intellect” 
which is “the principle of the proper operation”572 of the human being, the distinguishing 
feature which sets human beings apart from animals; since the intellect uses the bodily 
organs for the initial aspects of the intellective process, “it is necessary that it be united to 
the body as form, not indeed so that the intellective power itself would be the act of some 
570  Aquinas, deUnitate, Ch. 3, p. 58, #84. “Anima autem humana, quia secundum suum esse est, cui 
aliqualiter communicat materia non totaliter comprehendens ipsam, eo quod maior est dignitas huius forme 
quam capacitas materie: nichil prohibet quin habeat aliquam operationem uel uirtutem ad quam materia non 
attingit” (Ch. 3, ln. 395-401, p. 307).
571 Ibid., Ch. 3, p. 55, # 78. “Nulla pars coporis potest diffiniri sine parte aliqua anime” (Ch. 3, ln. 
302-303, p. 306).
572  Ibid., Ch. 3, p. 56, #80. “Homo speciem sortitur forma est […] quod est principium proprie operationis 
speciei; propria autem operatio hominis, in quantum est homo, est intelligere […] oportet igitur ipsum uniri 
copori ut formam” (Ch. 3, ln. 323-332, p. 306).
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organ, but because it is a power of the soul which is the act of a physical organic body.”573 
This demonstrates the necessary link between the body and the soul of the individual 
human being. On the other hand, one cannot hold that the intellect is merely the material 
form of the body, having no power distinct from the bodily organs. If this were the case, 
Aquinas notes, universal knowledge would be impossible since “whatever is received in 
the intellect, will be received individually as in matter, and not universally.”574 
One can relate these two positions to those of Avicenna and Averroes. On the one 
hand, Avicenna’s view that the individual human being is the soul and that the soul is 
intellect is incorrect because it does not fully account for the importance of the bodily 
senses to the process of knowledge attainment and it denies the notion that the human 
soul is form of the body. On the other hand, Averroes’ view that the individual human 
being is essentially the body which, through the cogitative power, makes use of the 
separate Intellects at will is wrong because it does not adequately explain the necessary 
connection between the body and higher, non-physical intellectual activities such that the 
573  Ibid., p. 56, #80. “oportet igitur ipsum uniri copori ut formam, non quidem ita quod ipsa intellectiua 
potentia sit alicuius organi actus, sed quia est uirtus anime que est actus corporis physici organici” (Ch. 3, 
ln. 331-335, p. 306). Aquinas discusses and argues for this necessary link between body and intellect even 
in his earliest works, such as his Commentary on the Sentences; for example, in discussing the differences 
between the rational soul and angels Aquinas explains that “from the fact that the soul is form and act of the 
body, from its essence there proceed certain powers affixed to organs, such as sense and the like, from 
which it receives intellectual cognition. [This is] on account of the fact that what rational is something that 
has cognition running from one thing to another and in this way it comes from sensibles to 
intelligibles,” ( Thomas Aquinas, In 2 Sent D. 3, Q. 1, A. 6, http://academic.mu.edu/taylorr/
Aquinas_Fall_2012_MU_KUL_UP/
Supplementary_Translations__Aquinas_In_2_Sent._D._3,_q.1._A.6.html). “Ex hoc enim quod anima 
corporis forma et actus est, procedunt ab essentia ejus quaedam potentiae organis affixae, ut sensu, et 
hujusmodi, ex quibus cognitionem intellectulem accipit, propter hoc quod rationalis est habens cognitinem 
decurrentem ab uno in aliud; et sec a sensibilibus in intelligibilia venit” (D. 3, q.1, a. 6, p. 104).
574 deUnitate, p. 56, #83. “Quicquid recipitur in intellectu, recipietur sicut in materia indiuidualiter, et non 
uniuersaliter” (Ch. 3, ln. 369-370, p. 306).
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human being can be called knower per se. Aquinas provides a middle ground575 between 
these two positions by holding that the soul is the substantial form of the human body, 
having some powers which requires bodily organs and others (i.e. intellect) which do not. 
That is to say, he holds that it is both a form and a determinate particular (forma et hoc 
aliquid).576 He thinks this view of the body/soul relationship allows for truly individuated 
knowledge without sacrificing the universality of knowledge or the immortality of the 
soul, as Averroes’ views must.
We can see that all three of these arguments come together to make the larger 
point that a successful theory of human intellectual agency must proved for individual 
intellectual ability as part of the very nature of the human being. This can only be done if 
intellect is in the individual in a substantial way, as part of the human soul, while also 
remaining somewhat separate from the body. 
5.2.3 My critical analysis and assessment
In the Categories Aristotle provides a negative definition of substance as “that 
which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the 
individual horse” and explains that the species and genus of these individuals, e.g. man 
and animal, are secondary substances.577 In De Anima Aristotle discusses substance as it 
relates to form and matter, explaining that, while they are both substances in a sense it is 
575 Averroes too might be seen as attempting to provide a kind of middle position, emphasizing the 
distinctness of the Intellect and the necessity of the body. However, whereas Aquinas is able to effectively 
integrate the two elements of the human being Averroes is not, falling instead too far towards the side 
which denies the notion of the body as will be discussed below.
576 For the extensive account of how Aquinas argues for this throughout his works see section 4.2.1, “The 
soul and its relation to the body” in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
577 Aristotle, Categories 5, 2a13-19. Jonathan Barnes The Complete Works of Aristotle vol 2.
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the form which “is called a this” (tode ti) and brings actuality to the form/matter 
composite.578 Later, when discussing thought or intellect he explains that “the soul which 
is called thought [nous…] cannot reasonably be blended with the body” because it must 
have the ability to receive the form of any object it is to know.579 As we have seen, 
Averroes takes from this that the Intellects are ontologically separate substance from the 
individual human being; if the intellects are a different kind of soul from that which is the 
form of the body they must be separate. He insists that the connection between the 
separate Intellects and the individual is strong enough when activated to make the 
Intellects intrinsic to the individual as form. The Intellects’ use phantasms, provided by 
the individual human being’s cogitative faculty and based upon her sensory experience, is 
enough to make the Intellects part of that individual when they are in use. He combines 
this with the notion, taken from Themistius,580 that the Material Intellect houses the 
intelligibles in act, and that these intelligibles constitute the objects of knowledge and, 
thus, must be shared by all human beings. Aquinas, on the other hand, insists that the 
Intellect can be receptive while still being part of the individual; it is both a substantial 
form, capable of existing apart from the body, and form of the body, ontologically united 
to the individual; the intelligibles in act are not the objects of knowledge and so are not 
shared by all. In this way Aquinas is trying to draw together two ideas which he sees as 
present but not fully or adequately explained in Aristotle’s text. On the one hand the 
578 Aristotle, De Anima 2.1, 412a6-11.
579 Ibid., 3.4, 429a15-25.
580  For discussions of the influence of Themistius’ work on Averroes see Taylor, “Introduction,” pp. 
lxxxiii-lxxxvi; Taylor, “Themistius and the Development of Averroes’ Noetics” in Medieval Perspectives on 
Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Friedman and Counet, 2013; and Michael Blaustein Averroes on the Imagination 
and the Intellect, PhD dissertation, Harvard University (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms 
International, 1984), pp.136-149.
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intellect is a power which is capable of existing on its own apart from the body, since it 
does not require any bodily organ to function, according to Aristotle; on the other hand, 
sense perception, provided by the individual human being’s physical sense organs, is 
necessary for knowledge attainment and, in this way, the intellect forms knowledge on 
the part of the individual whose sense perceptions are used in the process. This leads to 
Aquinas’ notion that the intellect is the substantial form of the human being, capable of 
being both form of the body and separate from the body (after death).
 Although it might be said that Averroes’ understanding of these issues follows 
Aristotle more closely and that he may provide a satisfactory response to some of 
Aquinas’ critiques, in the end Averroes’ theory regarding Issues A and B is untenable. It is 
not possible to hold both (1) that individual human beings are distinct knowers for whom 
the principle of intellectual understanding is intrinsic and formal, and (2) that the faculties 
by which intellectual understanding takes place are separate substances.
Despite Averroes’ insistence that the Intellects are form for us and in the soul 
while thinking occurs, it is not the case that Averroes’ system provides a strong enough 
connection between the individual and the Intellects (especially the Material Intellect). 
Under Averroes’ system the individual cannot be called a knower in the fullest sense 
because the intellects are not “in” the soul in a strong enough sense (i.e., permanently in 
the individual as her particular intellects). Even when the individual is “conjoined” to the 
Intellects, the connection is not strong enough to allow us to call the resulting knowledge 
that individual’s knowledge. In Averroes’ system the term “in” has a relatively shallow 
meaning of being loosely connected by way of the cogitative power, while what is 
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required is a strong conception of “in” whereby the Intellects (or, at least the Material 
Intellect) are an essential feature of this individual’s soul such that they are part of the 
substance or form of the individual. This type of relationship would necessitate the 
multiplication of intellects according to the number of individuals. Instead, with 
Averroes’ system we have a Material Intellect which “certifies” the phantasm/image of a 
particular thing the person encounters and presents to it via the cogitative power without 
providing anything lasting in the individual for future use. But, in order to say that the 
individual is the knower, the process of knowledge attainment must take place in the 
individual as her own activity and the resulting known object must be retained in some 
way. This would fit with our common sense understanding that knowledge, unlike sense 
perception, is lasting, not transitory.
Averroes’ system might be made tenable if it were to include some kind of 
representative image or intelligible which remains in the individual human being and is 
hers. Averroes had something akin to this in his earlier commentaries on De Anima; 
however, his commitments to other ideas, particularly to the idea of the shared set of 
intelligibles, led him to reject this in his later work. In this way his earlier approach to the 
issue was perhaps, in some respects, superior. Such an addition would allow the 
individual to retain some positive content as a result of the process of abstraction which 
might be called her knowledge regardless of her current connection to the separate 
Intellects. However, it seems that there is not room for such an addition in Averroes’ final 
system given the view that the intelligibles must remain separate from individual human 
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beings if they are to retain their status as shared objects of knowledge, forming a common 
thesaurus of information and making scientific and interpersonal discourse possible.581
Furthermore, Averroes’ view does not sufficiently explain how the human being 
could be per se rational when the loci of reason, the passive and active intellectual 
powers, are both separate from the individual. It is true that one might rightly say that his 
view represents an advancement in the tradition. Averroes’ predecessor Avicenna had the 
notion of a rational soul which makes use of the body while remaining distinct from it. 
Averroes accepts this notion of a non-bodily rational power while arguing against 
Avicenna’s claims (1) that the intelligibles in act preexist in that separate Intellect, ready 
to be accessed by one who uses her bodily powers to prepare for the conjunction, and (2) 
that the human being is essentially this rational soul distinct from the body. Rather, 
Averroes holds that the body is an essential part of the human being, necessary for 
knowledge attainment; he arrives at this understanding of the human being in part 
through his view that knowledge is the result of the Agent Intellect’s acting on the 
intelligibles in potency derived from sense perception, creating the intelligibles in act for 
each individual; knowledge, then, is about the world, not some separate preexisting 
intelligibles in the Agent Intellect. The senses, and thus the body, become critical 
elements of the human being as rational.582 
581 See Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes”, especially p. 139.
582 It is perhaps important to note that, despite his rejection of Averroes’ system as a whole Aquinas did 
find inspiration in Averroes. For a model of how abstraction functions see Therese Scarpelli Cory, 
“Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect’s Causation of the Intelligibles” in Recherches de Theologie 
et Philosophie medievales 82.1, (2015), pp. 1-60; Cory argues that there exists such common ground here 
that she calls their view the “Averroean-Thomistic causal approach to abstraction” (p.1) Both have a theory 
of knowledge based on the apprehension of particulars, only difference is the location of the intellects. Also 
see Cory’s “Rethinking Abstractionism:Aquinas’s Intellectual Light and Some Arabic Sources,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 53.4 (October 2015), pp. 607-66.
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However, while this solves some of the problems endemic to Avicenna’s view and 
is perhaps more Aristotelian, it is not unproblematic, as Aquinas pointed out. Aristotle 
does not say enough about how particular and universal knowledge are linked and neither 
does Averroes. Averroes’ problems here are compounded by his insistence on the separate 
nature of both Intellects, as described above. While Averroes thinks the existence of the 
cogitative power and his dual subject account of intelligibles are sufficient to bridge the 
gap between individual human being and Intellects, Aquinas’ critiques of this are 
justified; it is not evident how one could truly call the individual person rational if no 
truly rational faculty is an essential (i.e. substantial) part of the individual. While 
Averroes has succeeded in demonstrating the importance of the body to the human being, 
he has not sufficiently linked it to the rational powers; in a sense he has gone too far in 
the opposite direction of Avicenna. Intellect is not sufficiently connected to the individual 
human being to justify the claim that he is rational by his very nature.
In addition to the problems which arise when the Intellects are not in use and, 
thus, extrinsic to the individual, there are also difficulties with Averroes’ view of the 
relationship between the individual and Intellects during active thinking. Despite 
Averroes’ efforts to say something stronger regarding individual involvement in the 
intellectual achievement, even when these Intellects are “in the soul” and “form for us” 
they are not ontologically part of the individual human being, but instead are only 
operationally present. Since this is the case, it seems that the individual is merely making 
use of a knowing entity rather than actually knowing things herself; as such, she can only 
be equivocally said to be knowing, as one who is in a plane is said to be flying although 
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she is merely making use of an external source of flight. Averroes and Aquinas follow 
Aristotle in defining the human as a rational animal However, since Averroes’ system 
locates all true intellectual capacity outside of the individual, leaving only the cogitative 
power as an individual pseudo-rational power,583 the human being cannot be per se 
rational.584 This problem is inescapable given Averroes’ insistence that the intelligibles in 
act are ontological realities and objects of knowledge existing in one separate Material 
Intellect rather than mere representations of the true objects of knowledge (the natures in 
things), as they are for Aquinas.585
Regarding Aquinas’ arguments that the human being must be a composite of act 
and potency, form and matter, and that the form of the human being, the soul, must 
include intellect, Aquinas’ assessment is again correct. As we have seen, Averroes thinks 
that his theory adequately address these issues by providing for a close connection 
between the body and the separate Intellects such that the individual is able to make use 
of the Intellects at will by using the cogitative power to conjoin with them. A key element 
of Averroes’ theory, one clearly meant to alleviate some of the issues which Aquinas 
points out, is his understanding of how the separate Intellects and the individual human 
being are connected. For Averroes the Intellects are separate and shared but still, as 
Averroes puts it, subject to the will and, perhaps more importantly, still require input from 
583 While Averroes calls the cogitative power a kind of reason it is clear that it cannot be a true intellect 
since the intellects must be immaterial and shared, as explained above.
584 In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Averroes explains that we connect with the Agent 
Intellect, “our principle” only for short periods of time and that this constitutes “the highest state of 
pleasure, happiness and bliss” for us. He seems to be arguing here that this state of connection with the 
principle of rationality is the closest we can come to the type of immortality and happiness often associated 
with heaven and the afterlife. (Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics: A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lam, Charles Genequand (Leiden: Brill, 1986), pp. 156-157.
585 Also see Taylor, “Intelligibles in Act in Averroes”, pp. 112-117, 139 note 75.
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the individual to allow thought to occur.586 Here, as with Averroes’ position in argument 
one, we can see that Averroes’ view is, at least in part, a reaction to problems he rightly 
identified in the theories of his predecessors.587 
However, Aquinas is correct that this is not enough to avoid the issues inherent to 
a system which ontologically disconnects the body and intellect so completely. As 
Aquinas points out, if the human being is to be per se rational it is necessary to locate the 
seat of reason, the intellect, in the individual human being in some substantial way.588 
586 A helpful, though imperfect, analogy for this relationship between he individual and the Intellects 
might be that of an individual and a calculator. A person who uses a calculator to perform a mathematical 
calculation inputs information at will; the calculator performs the desired function and returns an answer; 
the person accepts that answer and is said to know it, although it is easily forgotten and one is likely to have 
to use the calculator again if one needs to remember the answer in the future. Similarly, in Averroes’ system 
the individual provides the basic set of information in the form of the phantasm to the Intellects at will; the 
Intellects to the work of producing the intelligibles in act from this information and displaying it to the 
person; one is said to know the intelligible despite the fact that after a time of inattention one must return to 
the Intellects again to recall the intelligibles. Despite this, we routinely talk about calculator users as doing 
math and knowing the answer to the equations they input into the calculator; it is, then, not unreasonable, to 
talk about a person in Averroes system as thinking and knowing in the same way. Of course, Averroes 
would insist that the relationship between the individual and the Intellects is much stronger than that of the 
person to the calculator; also, the information does not stay in tact in the calculator in the way the 
intelligibles stay in the Material Intellect —instead the calculator is always ready to redo the calculation. 
However, it is a close enough analogy to highlight the broad strokes of Averroes view in that it accurately 
describes the view that the process of intellection requires input from the individual while ultimately 
occurring in an independent entity.
587 It is perhaps helpful to note here that Averroes was clearly aware of the issues which present 
themselves in his system. However, he was trying to avoid the issues already noted in the views of 
Avicenna while maintaining the long tradition of the separate Agent Intellect. He simply could not find a 
convincing way to allow for individuated intellects while ensuring a common set of intelligibles. Aquinas 
was more successful in his endeavors to develop such a system in part because of his theological 
suppositions. He was able to posit multiple intellects created by God to function the same; this divine 
creative element allowed Aquinas to posit that all human beings could think the same (resulting in the same 
knowledge) despite the lack of shared Intellect or, more importantly, shared intelligibles.
588 If we return to our analogy from note 586, we can express Aquinas’ critique in similar terms. One 
might wonder if the calculator user can really be said to know the answer the calculator has given him, let 
alone whether he can be said to know how to do the mathematical equation himself. After all, the work of 
calculating the answer, the ‘reason why’ as Aristotle would say, is not in the individual but in the machine. 
The user of the calculator is simply trusting that the equation went as planned and there was no glitch in the 
system. One is unable to explain the mathematical principles behind the calculation and is likely to not 
even retain the answer in his memory for very long. In such a case, Aquinas would say, we surely cannot 
say that the individual actually has knowledge of the mathematical principle at work or even, in a strong 
sense, of the particular answer; when we say they have such knowledge we can only be speaking 
equivocally. According to Aquinas, real knowledge would requires that the actualization of that knowledge 
happen in the knower.
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Aquinas explains in the SCG that the human soul, the lowest of the intellectual 
substances, fits the two criteria for a substantial form:
First, the form must be the principle of the substantial being 
of the thing whose form it is […] The second requirement 
then follows from this, namely, that the form and the matter 
be joined together in the unity of one act of being […] And 
this single act of being is that in which the composite 
substance subsists: a thing one in being and made up of 
matter and form.589 
Thus, the human being is a composite of body and soul, capable of performing its 
essential functions, including intellectual apprehension, due to this connection. Aquinas 
points out that we attribute understanding to human beings essentially, not accidentally; 
for this reason it must be the case that the intellect is united to the individual in some way 
(as the rational soul is united to the body).590 While the soul is the substantial form of the 
body, it is not limited by the body. Rather, it is also a subsistent thing (hoc aliquid) with 
some faculties, possible and agent intellect, which do not require bodily organs. These 
faculties must be multiplied according to the number of individuals, contrary to Averroes’ 
views, if we are to take seriously the claim that it is the individual human being who is 
the knower. It is the immaterial nature of the soul which allows it to attain universal 
knowledge, making use of particulars without being limited by them.591 
589 Aquinas, SCG, Bk. 2, Ch. 68, p. 204. “Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo 
requiruntur. Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cuius est forma,: 
principium autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, 
scilicet quod forma et materia conveniant in uno esse: quod non contingit de principio effectivo cum eo cui 
dat esse. Et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est uno secundum esse, ex materia et 
forma constans” (Bk 2, Ch. 64, sec. 1450, p. 202).
590 Aquinas, ST, Ia Q. 76, A. 1.
591 Aquinas explains that “the soul is a [determinate particular (hoc aliquid)] as being able to subsist per se 
but not as possessing in itself a complete specific nature, but rather as completing human nature insofar as 
it is the form of its body and thus as one and the same time it is a form and a [determinate particular…] For 
insofar as a soul possesses an operation which transcends material things, its very existence is raised above 
and does not depend on its body. But insofar as a soul by nature acquires its immaterial knowledge from 
what is material, it is clear that the fulfillment of its nature cannot be achieved apart from union with a 
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As we have seen, Averroes’ theory is motivated by the work of both Aristotle and 
Themistius and is, in some ways, a reaction against Avicenna. It brings together 
Aristotle’s view of the intellect as a substance which cannot be mixed with the body and 
Themistius’ more detailed account of the Intellects (itself an expansion on Aristotle’s De 
Anima 3.5) and intelligibles. We have seen that Averroes’ understanding of the nature and 
location of the Intellects and their relation to the individual human being is not tenable in 
its own right; we have also indicated that the problem is, in large part, the result of his 
understanding of intelligibles in act. To gain greater insight into this we must now 
examine the nature of these intelligibles in act and their relationship to individual human 
beings; this is Issue C.
5.3 Issue C. The relationship between the individual human being and the 
intelligibles in act
5.3.1 Averroes’ understanding of intelligibles in act
As explained above, Averroes maintains that the Agent and Material Intellects 
body. For a thing is not complete in nature unless it possesses those things which are demanded for the 
proper operation of that nature. In this way, therefore, a human soul insofar as it is united to its body as its 
form still possesses an act of existence which is elevated above the body and does not depend on it; clearly 
then this soul is constituted on the boundary line between corporeal and separate substance” (QDAnima Q. 
1, p. 47-48). “Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid ut per se potens subsistere, no quasi habens in 
se completam speciem, set quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut est forma corporis. Et sic simul est forma 
et hoc aliquid […] In quantum enim habet operationem materialia transcendentum, esse etiam suum est 
supera corpus eleuatum, non dependens ex ipso. In quantum uero immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali 
nata est acquirere, manifestum est quod complementum sue speciei esse non potest absque corporis unione. 
Non enim aliquid completum est in specie nisi habeat ea que requiruntur ad propriam operationem speciei. 
Sic igitur anima humana in quantum unitur corpori ut forma et tamen habet esse eleuatum supera corpus, 
non dependens ab eo, manifestum est quod ipsa est in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum 
constituta” (Q 1, ln. 286-290 and 328-341, pp. 9-10).
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must be immaterial entities, unmixed with matter, if they are to be responsible for 
abstracting and then housing the unique set of intelligibles in act. This means that they 
must be separate entities shared by all human beings. This must be the case if the objects 
of knowledge, the intelligibles in act, are to be universal and knowable by all human 
beings. It is only in such a system, according to Averroes, that the intelligibles in act can 
be freed from the particularity associated not only with the individual things of which 
they are the intelligibles but also with individual, particularizing human beings. If this 
were not the case, the unity of science and the basis for human communication would not 
be preserved, as Averroes holds from Themistius. However, Averroes explains that even 
though the Intellects are separate entities the individual is essential to the process by 
which intelligibles in act come to be in the Material Intellect. The intelligibles in act exist 
as intelligibles in potency in particular things which are experienced by individuals. The 
cogitative power extracts these potential intelligibles from the image of the particular and 
deposits them in memory, which presents them to the Agent Intellect. The Agent Intellect 
abstracts the intelligibles, actualizing them, and deposits them in the Material Intellect. 
During this process Averroes claims that the Intellects are “in” the individual and subject 
to her will: “it is necessary to ascribe these two activities to the soul in us, namely, to 
receive the intelligible and to make it, although the agent and the recipient are eternal 
substances, on account of the fact that these two activities are reduced to our will, namely 
to abstract intelligibles and to understand them.”592 Furthermore, after this process is 
592 Averroes, LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 18 p. 351, emphasis added. “Et fuit necesse attribuere has duas 
actiones anime in nobis, scilicet recipere intellectum et facere eum, quamvis agens et recipiens sint 
substantie eterne, propter hoc quia hee actiones reducte sunt ad nostram voluntatem, scilicet abstrahere 
intellecta et intelligere ea.” (p. 439).
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complete there remains in the individual human being the ability to conjoin to the 
intellects and access the intelligibles in act at will. When this occurs the individual has 
reached the level of intellectus in habitu, allowing her to easily conjoin to the Material 
Intellect and access the intelligibles in act in the future.593 Thus, as discussed above, 
Averroes holds to the Principle of Intrinsic Formal Cause,594 albeit in a fashion quite 
different from that of Aquinas.
Thus, Averroes is able to assert that, although the intelligibles in act only remain 
in the individual while she is conjoined to the Material Intellect during the act of 
thinking, the activity is intrinsic to her during this time and the disposition towards this 
state of being (intellectus in habitu) is retained even when she is not conjoined to the 
Intellects. Taylor explains that when the individual is actually joined with the Intellects 
there arrives the acquired intellect in the individual’s soul;595 he equates this with the 
theoretical intellect which is, in some fashion, retained by the individual human being.596 
593 It is worth mentioning here that Averroes has somewhat of a predecessor in this line of thinking in 
Avicenna, who held that the human being only had knowledge when it was conjoined with the separate 
Agent Intellect (One might look to Gutas, Demitri, “Ibn Sina [Avicenna],” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed), URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall 2016/
entries/ibn-sina/> for a brief dicussion of Avicenna on this issue. A major difference, however, is that 
Avicenna did not think that individuals possessed intellectual memory which Averroes provides as a power 
of the cogitative faculty. Rather, knowledge existed only in the Agent Intellect (in the form of intelligibles 
in act) and the individual only had access to them when conjoined with the Intellect. One might, then, see 
Averroes’ approach as a step beyond that of Avicenna in terms of explaining individual human beings as 
knowers.
594 See Taylor, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul According to Aquinas and Averroes,” pp. 
202-211 for a discussion of the Principle in Averroes.
595 Taylor “Introduction” p. lix. The acquired intellect is defined as “the intellect as realized in the 
immediate moment of the actualizing reception of intelligibles in act” (p. xx).
596 Ibid., p. lix. Theoretical intellect is “the intellect containing the intelligibles I act. For the mature 
Averroes this intellect and its intelligibles exist as eternal in the separate material intellect and also as 
perishable in their individual perishable human subject” (p. xx).
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According to Averroes, this allows for the individual to be called a knower despite the 
complicated relationship between the individual human being and the separate Intellects.
In explaining the nature of the intelligibles in act and their relationship to the 
human being Averroes explains that they have a dual subject—the possible/Material 
Intellect and the phantasms. He uses the sensible forms as a point of comparison for his 
dual subject theory.597 On the one hand, you have “the subject in virtue of which 
[intelligibles in act] are true, namely, the forms which are true images.”598 These “true 
images” are produced by each human being as the result of their interaction with some 
determinate particular and the working of the internal sense powers of common sense, 
imagination, cogitation, and memory. This image is presented by the memory to the 
Agent Intellect which abstracts the intelligible in act and deposits it in the Material 
Intellect. The intelligible in act is true insofar as it can be traced back to some actually 
597 Ibid., note 107, p. lix; Taylor points out that this dual subject theory is likely inspired by Averroes’ 
predecessor Ibn Bajjah who thought that intelligibles existed as “spiritual forms, or images” in the human 
being but as “intelligibles forms” in themselves. One can also look to pp. lxxxix-xciii for a more detailed 
account of how Averroes was influenced by Ibn Bajjah’s work, particular regarding the nature of the 
intellects. Blaustein examines Ibn Bajjah’s position in “Aspects of Ibn Bajja’s Theory of Apprehension” in 
Maimonides and Philosophy, ed. Shlomo Pines and Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1986) pp 
202-212, and his influence on Averroes’ position in the Short Commentary and Averroes’ later rejection of 
this view in Averroes on the Imagination and Intellect, pp.162-173. A detailed analysis of the theory itself 
(and Aquinas’ objections to it) can be found in Carlos Bernardo Bazan’s “Intellectum Speculativum: 
Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant on Intelligible Object.” 
598 LCDA, BK 3, comment 5, p. 316. “Unum est subiectum per quod sunt vera, scilicet forme que sunt 
ymagines vere” (Bk 3, comment 5, ln 386-387, p. 400). 
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existing thing which contains599 the intelligible in potency.600 These ‘true images’ are 
analogous to the external sense objects in the comparison with sensation.601
On the other hand, he writes, you have “that in virtue of which the intelligibles are 
among the beings in the world, and this is the material intellect.”602 The intelligible in act, 
as a universal, immaterial, object of knowledge, cannot exist in determinate particulars, 
but only in something which is equally immaterial—the Material Intellect. Thus, it is 
only once the intelligible has been abstracted by the Agent Intellect, converted from 
intelligibles in potency to intelligible in act, and deposited into the Material Intellect that 
it can actually be said to exist. What existed only potentially in the particular thing and in 
the human being’s image exists in actuality in the Material Intellect.603 The Material 
Intellect is comparable to the actuality of the sense organ in the analogy with sensation.604
 Thus, the Material intellect is the subject of existence while the particular object 
is the subject of truth, guaranteeing that the intelligible is correct and corresponds to 
reality. This dual subject of intelligibles is necessary if Averroes is going to maintain that 
the intelligibles, as the objects of knowledge, are shared by all human beings via the 
separate Material Intellect, while also maintaining that it is possible for each person to 
599 It should be noted that, strictly speaking, the intelligible is only present in the particular object when 
the object is directly related to a knower. Intelligibility is a relational characteristic such that a thing is not 
intelligible in itself but only when it is being apprehended by an individual who can, through the use of the 
external and internal senses, produce from it the intelligible in potency.
600 Taylor, “Introduction” p. lx.
601 LCDA, BK 3, comment 5, p. 316; Latin pp. 400-401.
602 Ibid., “Secundum autem est illud per quod intellecta sunt unum entium in mundo, et istud est 
intellectus materialis” (Bk 3, comment 5, ln. 387-389, p. 400).
603 Taylor, “Introduction” p. lx.
604 LCDA, BK 3, comment 5, p. 316; Latin pp. 400-401.
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have her own knowledge distinct from that of other people. It also allows Averroes to 
conclude that the intelligibles do not preexist in the Intellect as some of his predecessors 
suggested.
5.3.2 Aquinas’ position and critique of Averroes regarding the nature of the 
intelligibles and their relation to the human individual
5.3.2.1 Aquinas’ position
Aquinas held a different view of the nature and function of intelligibles in act. 
This is most evidently displayed in his account of knowledge attainment. For Aquinas, 
knowledge attainment starts with sensation. Sensible species are brought together by the 
common sense. The imagination produces phantasms or images of these sensible species 
and stores them in memory. The cogitative power takes these phantasms and presents 
them to the agent intellect, a power of the human soul, which works to abstract the 
intelligibles in act (called intelligible species by Aquinas) from the phantasm. The 
intelligibles are received in to the possible intellect and stored in the intellectual memory 
when not in use. It is by the intelligibles species that the the individual is able to 
understand the common natures in sensible objects. This process, Aquinas argues, 
requires both the possible and agent intellects to be multiplied according to the number of 
individuals; if this were not the case it would not be possible for each person to have her 
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own knowledge, distinct from that of other human beings and distinctly her’s (not the 
intellect’s).605 
For Aquinas the thing known is not the intelligible species but the common nature 
which exists in things; the intelligibles in act are “that by which [the intellect] 
understands,” the means by which “the soul knows the things which are outside it.”606 
Thus, according to Aquinas we know material things, “by a knowledge which is 
immaterial, universal, and necessary”607 via a process which starts with sensation and 
ends with understanding via the mediation of immaterial intelligible species. Aquinas 
thinks this is necessary if we are to be able to accurately claim to know the nature of 
things, not just intentions or species abstracted from things. Despite this our intellectual 
knowledge is not of particulars as particulars but rather it is of the universal nature of the 
particulars608—those aspects which make the particular what it is and which it shares with 
all other instances of its kind. This allows Aquinas to hold simultaneously that knowledge 
605 Dewan, “St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge,” p. 129 for a brief account of this process. For 
detailed discussion of the knowledge attainment process see Stump, Aquinas, pp. 244-276. Taylor explains 
that Aquinas’ theory can be seen as “a form of representationalism” where the ratio of sensible things is 
represented in the possible intellect by the intelligible species after the process of abstraction (Taylor 
“Intelligibles in Act in Averroes.” p. 114).
606 ST Ia, Q. 85, A. 2 p. 817. “Species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus […] 
sequetur quod anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra animam” (p. 527a, ln. 23-25; 
527b, ln.4-6). Also, see I.84.7 p. 809: “the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to the body, 
is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter;” “intellectus autem humani, qui est quidditas sive 
natura in materia corporali existens” (p. 521b, ln. 44-47)
607 Ibid.,  Ia, Q. 84, A. 1, p. 795. “Anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, 
universali et necessaria” (p. 512b, ln. 7-9).
608 It is important to point out here that by “universal nature” I do not mean “universals” in the sense of 
some really existing thing. For Aquinas universals, as such, do not exist; rather, particulars exist and these 
particulars share characteristics which can be abstracted from them to form the intelligible species/
intelligibles in act, which forms the basis for intellectual propositions. In this way Aquinas is able to 
preserve communication and the unity of science without positing the existence of ontologically distinct 
universals or separate Intellects.
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is of things in the world and that we all know the same thing (the common nature) even if 
we have different experiences of different particulars.609
The universal knowledge which results from this process is used not only during 
theoretical considerations but also during practical reasoning. When one encounters a 
particular situation, one is able, using the particular reason (i.e. cogitative power), to 
recognize the individual intentions present in the situation and connect them to the 
universal knowledge one already has. As Aquinas explains, this allows the individual to 
relate their particular knowledge to their universal knowledge with a mind towards 
action. This is often accomplished by way of the practical syllogism.
5.3.2.2 Aquinas’ critique
From careful consideration of what has been said above we can see that there are 
fundamental differences among the views of Aquinas and those of his predecessors. 
While the most relevant area of difference for this project is that between Aquinas and 
Averroes, it is also important to take note of how Aquinas’ view differs from some other 
thinkers.
As noted earlier, an element of prime importance to Aquinas’ view is that the 
intelligibles in act/intelligible species are the means by which we understand the world, 
rather than objects of understanding.610 In this view our knowledge in our individual 
609  Dewan, “St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge,” pp. 129-131.
610 As explained in more detail in Chapter 4, Aquinas hold that we have sense perception and we have 
imagination and cogitation (brain powers) which we use to aid in the knowledge attainment process. The 
intelligibles in act (i.e. intelligible species), however, are in the human intellect, not in a power of the brain. 
They are the means for having intellectual apprehension of the natures of things in the world; it is these 
natures, not the intelligible species, which are the objects of knowledge. Thus, the intelligibles do not have 
to be shared by all, as everyone has access to the nature through their sense perception of particulars.
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intellects is, directly and naturally, of the material world, not of separate forms or 
ontologically distinct universals/intelligibles. Aquinas points out that this is contrary to 
earlier theories which posit separate forms as objects of knowledge and mentions the 
views of Avicenna and Plato611 as examples of such theories. He sees these theories as 
motivated by a desire to “save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the 
intellect.”612 Instead, he argues that it is not necessary to posit separate forms or 
intelligibles in order to achieve such certainty and that these theories fail to account for 
other important aspects of philosophical psychology.
Aquinas sees his view of intelligible species as accomplishing several things. 
First, he argues that it alone provides sufficient reason for the union of body and soul. 
Theories which hold that knowledge is of some separate forms, as is the case with 
Avicenna and Plato, do not sufficiently account for the necessity of the body since the 
object of knowledge is never a material object (known in an immaterial way).613 Plato 
holds that the Forms exist as real, immaterial, perfect entities distinct from all matter and 
from human beings and human intellects. The body provides more constraints to 
understanding these intelligibles than it does aid; an individual is better off as a soul by 
611 The theories of Plato and Avicenna can be understood as similar in that both posit the existence of 
separately existing intelligibles which serve as the objects of knowledge and which are in no way 
dependent upon human beings for their existence. For Plato, this entails the existence of intelligibles in act 
in the form of separate Forms or Ideas which exist on their own and which all human beings can come to 
know through a process of recollection. While individual knowledge of these Forms involves interaction 
with the material world (Plato, Republic, 596a-597d) the Forms themselves exist apart from such 
interaction; the human being contributes nothing to the Forms. For Avicenna, this means the existence of 
intelligibles in act existing in a primary way in the separate Agent Intellect. These intelligibles are the 
objects of knowledge and are known by individual human beings when they are conjoined to the separate 
Intellect after suitable preparation through experience of the sensible world. Still, while human sensory 
experiences can help to prepare a person for this conjoining they do not add anything to the experience of 
knowledge itself.
612 ST. Ia, Q. 84, A. 1, p. 794. “Salvare certam cognitionem veritatis a nobis per intellectum haberi” (p. 
512a, ln. 1-3).
613 Ibid., A.4, p. 802; Latin pp. 516-517.
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itself. For Avicenna, the body is more important in that sensory experiences help to 
prepare the human soul to conjoin with the separate Agent Intellect which contains the 
intelligibles in act. However, even here the conjunction is an activity of the soul and the 
body contributes little, only preparing the soul for that conjunction. 
Averroes, like Aquinas, thinks that more must be done to integrate the body into 
the knowledge attainment process and the understanding of the human being. As we saw 
above, Averroes thinks he is able to provide more of a role for the body since the 
individual human being is responsible for the generation of the intelligibles in act through 
a process which begins with sensation. However, the intelligibles in act ultimately exist in 
separate Intellects and it is these, not the sensible objects, which are the ultimate referents 
of knowledge. It is this insistence on a common referent which leads Aquinas to argue 
that Averroes’ view is, in the end, a kind of Platonism. This is neither the strict Platonism 
of Plato himself, where the material world is a kind of illusion based upon the Forms, nor 
the Platonism of Avicenna, where the material world serves as a preparatory aid for the 
human soul’s ultimate conjunction with the Agent Intellect where the intelligible in act 
pre-exist. The view of Averroes is a Platonism of sorts, according to Aquinas, because of 
its reliance on a single, separate, set of intelligibles shared by all human beings. This set 
of intelligibles in act is created by the abstractive work of the Agent Intellect on the 
intelligibles in potency derived from the sensory experience of individual human beings; 
however, this process results in a single shared set of intelligibles in act, rather than a set 
for each individual based upon her experiences. While one might argue that the fact that 
these intelligibles in act do not pre-exist the way they do for for Avicenna or Plato is an 
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improvement over the stronger Platonisms, the fact that they exist at all is enough, 
according to Aquinas, to move Averroes’ view towards Plato and away from Aristotle. 
Furthermore, Aquinas notes that all of these Platonisms share as a flaw that the individual 
is not in possession of the knowable object.
In contrast to these sorts of Platonisms, all of which must be dismissed, Aquinas’ 
theory demonstrates that the body is neither a hinderance to knowledge, as it is for Plato, 
nor a mere tool, as Avicenna would have it; neither is it useful for the initial stages of 
knowledge attainment, but ultimately unconnected with the known object, as it is for 
Averroes. Rather, the body is an essential component in the process of knowledge 
attainment and knowledge use. Furthermore, Aquinas’ view preserves science by 
ensuring that the objects of understanding, like the objects of science, exist in the nature 
of particular things outside of the mind. This means that science is not about mere Ideas, 
as Plato says, nor preexisting intelligibles in a separate Agent Intellect, as Avicenna has it, 
nor a single set of intelligibles created by the individual and existing in the separate 
Intellect, as Averroes says, but about actually existing things in the world.614
Finally, regarding the teaching of Averroes in the LCDA, Aquinas insists that 
having intelligibles exist in separate intellects does not allow for individual knowers since 
knowledge is located in the shared intellects. Participation in the process of creating the 
intelligibles is not enough to fully explain differences in individual knowledge and, more 
importantly how an individual is able to retain her knowledge when not actively engaging 
in intellectual activity. In particular, he claims that Averroes’ view of the dual subject of 
intelligibles in act, meant to preserve individual knowledge while maintaining separate 
614 Ibid., Ia, Q. 85, A. 2.
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intellects, is not able to accomplish that task. As we have already seen, Aquinas explains 
this in a number of places within the context of examining the relationship between body 
and soul/intellect. He explains that it is “through the intelligible species [that] the possible 
intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man.”615 He goes on to explain that 
this position is untenable because it does not account for the fact that thought itself must 
be ontologically (not merely operationally) present in the individual if the resulting 
knowledge is to belong to that individual.616 Thus, these issues with the intelligibles 
species contribute to the issues with the nature of the Intellects discussed earlier.
5.3.3 A critical analysis and assessment of the teaching of Averroes
While it is clear from what has been said above and in Chapter 3 that Averroes is 
attempting to devise a system which accounts for both the unity of science and the role of 
the individual human being in the process of knowledge attainment, there are several 
issues he is unable to resolve successfully. Intelligibles cannot be the result of individual 
experience and yet exist as a single shared set in the separate Intellects; this simply 
destroys the unity of human individual experience and individual knowledge. Despite 
Averroes’ best attempts to argue for his view, it is not clear how something can be both 
615 Ibid., Ia, Q. 76, A. 1, p. 697. “ Et sic per speciem intelligibilem continuatur intellectus possibilis 
corpori huius vel illius hominis” (p. 448b, ln. 50-449a, ln 2). For a detailed account of this notion across 
numerous works of Aquinas refer to note 530 above.
616 Alain de Libera offers a detailed discussion of this issue in his commentary on Aquinas’ de Unitate 
Intellectus. Here he explains that, according to Aquinas, thought is an immanent action rather than a 
transitive one. As such, thought can only exist in an agent, as Aristotle contends; if thought is in a separate 
Intellect, as Averroes holds, than the agent, the knower, is that Intellect, not the individual human being. 
But, if this intellect is part of the soul which is, in turn, form of the body, as Aquinas holds, the individual 
can be said to be the knower. (Alain de Libera, L’Unitaté de L’intellect: Commentaire du De unitate 
intellectus contra averroistas de Thomas d’Aquin, pp. 276-280). One should also see Ralph McInerny’ 
commentary on the same text of Aquinas in Aquinas Against the Averroists: On There Being Only One 
Intellect, pp. 147, 150-152, and 205-2011.
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generated by each individual and also one for all individuals. Averroes claims that each 
person’s particular sensory experience results in an image in their individual cogitative 
power; this image is then subjected to the abstractive efforts of the separate Agent 
Intellect; and this results in the intelligible in act which is realized in the Material 
Intellect, where it serves as the object of knowledge for the individual human being. The 
individual is a knower not because he has the intelligible in his own mind (since it 
remains, ontologically, in the Material Intellect), but because he participated in its 
generation and has access to it at will. However, he does not provide a clear account of 
how they can be the shared objects of knowledge for all human beings, while also being 
the result of each person’s interaction with the Intellects based upon their unique 
experience of the sensible world. It would seem that once the first human being has made 
the connection and the Intellects have abstracted and received the intelligibles, they 
would persist in the Intellects for the rest of time, perhaps available to future human 
beings but no longer created by their experiences. That is to say, it does not seem possible 
that there exist a single set of intelligibles which somehow do not preexist (at least for 
most human beings) in the Intellects; Averroes does not address this problem. 
Furthermore, Aquinas’ argument that Averroes’ insistence on a single set of 
intelligibles in act existing apart from individual human beings brings his views closer to 
those of Plato than to Aristotle is accurate. It is true that Averroes does not hold, as did 
Plato and, later, Avicenna, that the intelligible in act preexists the individual human being; 
he saw that this results in a view where the individual contributes nothing to knowledge. 
However, his commitment to the need for a shared set of intelligibles and to the need for 
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a separate Material Intellect, taken from Themistius, led Averroes to the unsupportable 
claims that intelligibles are generated as a result of individual sense perception and the 
working of the cogitative power (in partnership with the separate Intellects) and yet not 
present in the individual in any lasting or ontologically real way. 
Additionally, Averroes is not able to provide a clear explanation of how one can 
be said to have knowledge in a substantial way if there is no mechanism for intellectual 
memory in his system. There is a distinction between physical memory (of particulars, 
phantasms, etc.) and intellectual memory (of intelligibles).617 While Averroes is easily 
able to explain how individuals can have physical memory as a power of the brain he is 
incapable of providing a convincing account of how individual human beings can have 
intellectual memory. It would seem that the intellectual memory would have to be 
situated in the Material Intellect since this is the power which is responsible for receiving 
the intelligibles in act. However, since the Material Intellect is separate and shared this 
does not allow for individuals to have intellectual memory or access to intelligibles aside 
from when they are actively using them during thought. The best we can hope for in 
Averroes’ system is some sort of disposition to reconnect at will to the Possible Intellect, 
where the intelligibles in act would be stored; but, this does not provide enough of an 
account to justify the claim, which even Averroes wants to make, that the individual has 
knowledge even when she is not making use of it.618
617  For discussion of these issues see Taylor’s “Remarks on Cogitatio in Averroes’ Commentarium 
Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros”and “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on the 
Cogitative Power in Averroes.”
618 An illustrative example may be in order here. One may ask: how does it happen in Averroes’ system, 
that one can remember what a dog is, such that one can identify a never before seen dog as belonging to the 
the category Dog, if one does not retain some intellectual memory of that universal after having abstracted 
it the first time. Yet, Averroes does not provide a location for such an intellectual memory. Does there exist 
in the brain (in the cogitative faculty, presumably) some representative image of Dog which one is spurred 
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Here, again, Aquinas is able to provide some solutions. For Aquinas, as for 
Averroes, knowledge attainments starts with sensation. Sensible species are brought 
together by the common sense and stored as phantasms. For Aquinas the agent intellect 
works to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm and places them in the 
possible intellect. It is by the intelligibles species that the the individual is able to 
understand the common nature in sensible objects.619 Thus, for Aquinas the thing known 
is not the intelligible species (or the intelligibles in act as it is for Averroes) but the 
common nature which exists in things. He thinks this is necessary if we are to be able to 
accurately claim to know the natures of things in the world, not just intentions or species 
abstracted from the thing. 
Despite this, our intellectual knowledge is not of particulars as particulars but 
rather it is of the universal nature of the particulars—those aspects which make the 
particular what it is and which it shares with all other instances of its kind. This allows 
Aquinas to hold simultaneously that knowledge is of things in the world and that we all 
know the same thing (the universal common nature) even if we have different 
experiences of different particulars.620 In this was Aquinas is able to maintain the unity of 
science, the major concern of Averroes, without having to posit shared intelligibles in 
shared Intellects. This allows Aquinas to provide an account where the objects of 
understanding are available to all while also maintaining that the individual human being 
to use as a mechanism of quick connection to the Intellects when one encounters a dog? It is not clear how 
this would work.
619 Dewan, “St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge,” p. 129 for a brief account of this process and Stump, 
Aquinas, pp. 287-294 for a detailed account.
620  Dewan, “St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge,” pp. 129-131.
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has her own intellectual faculties and so can be said, unequivocally, to be a knower and 
per se rational.
5.4 Summary of these issues regarding the nature of the Intellects and intelligibles 
and their relation to the human being
We have seen in the above discussions of issues A, B, and C how the views of 
Averroes and Aquinas differ regarding the nature of the intellects and the intelligibles in 
act and their relationship to individual human beings. Most importantly, it has been 
demonstrated that Averroes’ view of the intelligibles in act as the ontologically real 
objects of knowledge necessitate separate active and potential Intellects. It is only by 
developing such a system that Averroes was able to explain the unity of science and 
human communication. While Averroes thought that he was able to maintain this system 
of separate Intellects and still argue for individual human beings as knowers, it was 
demonstrated that this was not the case. Aquinas provided several pointed arguments for 
why Averroes’ system failed to provide a successful argument for the human being as per 
se rational or for human individuals as knowers in their own right. His position is, 
Aquinas points out, a kind of Platonism which is ultimately untenable, providing a flawed 
understanding of both the human being and knowledge attainment.
Aquinas’ own position on these issues does not suffer from the same problems 
because he does not rely on the intelligibles in act to be that which we know. But arguing 
that they are, instead, that by which we know the natures of things in the world Aquinas 
is able to argue that each individual has her own intelligible species, the product of her 
own experience. This alternate account of intelligibles in act does not necessitate separate 
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Intellects; each individual is able to have her own intellects as an internal part of the 
individual human soul. While Aquinas’ account is not free from all problems it is more 
coherent than Averroes’.
5.5 Issue D (the location and function of the will)
Now that we have seen how the issues associated with the intellects are to be 
worked out between Averroes and Aquinas we can shift the discussion back to the central 
issue of this dissertation–the will and moral responsibility. We saw above that there are 
several compelling reasons for rejecting Averroes’ views regarding the intelligibles in act 
and the understanding of the Intellects which these views necessitate. Here we will 
examine his understanding of the location and function of the will and the impact that has 
on moral responsibility. As with Issues A-C, this will involve an examination of both 
Averroes’ and Aquinas’ views as well the critiques Aquinas levels at Averroes. It will be 
evident from this discussion that, although Aquinas’ critiques on this front are less 
compelling than his critiques regarding the intellects, there are still reasons to ultimately 
reject Averroes’ understanding of the will.
5.5.1 Averroes’ view
Averroes holds that the will is a power of the cogitative faculty. While the 
Intellects are separate and shared, the cogitative power, and thus the will, is multiplied 
according to the number of individuals and is associated with a particular bodily organ, 
the brain. Averroes explains that, according to his reading of Aristotle’s De Anima 3.9, it 
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is the cogitative power that is responsible for willing. He quotes Aristotle as saying, 
“what governs exists in the cogitative part”621 and that this “governing power” is the 
desiderative power which “exists only in the rational soul (he meant this when he said in 
the cogitative part).”622 The desiderative power, the power that is responsible for wishing, 
desiring, or willing, is thus related to the rational part of the human being but is not in the 
separate Intellects. Since the cogitative power is the part of the human being which is 
closest to the Intellects and is “a kind of reason,”623 it makes sense to conclude that the 
will is in the cogitative power.
Furthermore, Averroes explains that regarding action it is desire and the activity of 
the cogitative power or imagination which causes one to move towards a desired object. 
He notes that “the intellect in virtue of which there is activity [...] is the cogitative 
practical [intellect]”624 and this intellect is focused upon action. Here Averroes is using the 
term intellect analogously to denote that part of the human soul responsible for the 
deliberative process which spurs one to action—the cogitative power. The will, an aspect 
621 Averroes, LCDA Bk. 3, comment 42, p. 408. “Principale enim exisit in parte cogitativa” (p. 510). In the 
corresponding passage in the Middle Commentary Averroes specifically mentions choice (ikhtiyar) at this 
point “The principle expression of this part [the faculty concerned with desire], which is called choice 
[ikhtiyar], occurs in the cogitative faculty” (MCDA, p. 124) but here there is mention of neither choice or 
will (irādah). It is worth noting that there are important issues regarding this passage of Aristotle as it was 
translated in the texts available to Averroes and Aquinas. The degree to which this is blame for their 
differing views of the location of the will and their claims to be following Aristotle in their respective 
understandings of the will shall be addressed in some detail below in section 5.5.3.
622 Averroes, LCDA, Bk. 3, comment 42, p. 408. “Virtus enim principalis non existit nisi in anima rationali 
(et hoc intendebat cum dixit in parte cogitativa)” (p. 510).
623 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 20, p. 359. “Ista enim virtus est aliqua ratio” (p. 449). He also notes here that 
without the cogitative and imaginative powers the Material Intellect “understands nothing,” making the 
connection between knowledge and cogitation even more clear. In so far as the will is part of the cogitative 
power its relationship to the Intellects and so to knowledge is, thus, also established.
624 Ibid., Bk. 3, comment 49, p. 414. “intellectus per quem agitur [..] est cogitativus operativus” (p. 517).
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of this cogitative power,625 is responsible for the human being’s ability to identify various 
‘goods,’ consider their present and future implications, choose that which seems best, and 
initiate action towards that good; this set of activities is often explained as the work of the 
practical intellect. The deliberative process from willing to choosing to acting is 
undertaken by the cogitative faculty which has a link both to the practical (being the 
corporeal power responsible for this process), and to the theoretical (being the part which 
links the individual to the separate Intellects).
This process is seen most clearly in the practical syllogism which Averroes 
explains using Aristotle’s beacon of fire example.626 We can see in this example how the 
process of moral action integrates theoretical and practical knowledge. The soldier has 
some theoretical knowledge about what an enemy is, what a signal fire means in the 
context of war, etc.. That is to say, he understands the intelligibles in act “enemy,” “signal 
fire,” etc., through a previously completed process of knowledge attainment. When a 
particular instance of a signal fire arises this is noted by the soldier, who has had previous 
experience with such fires via the cogitative power and this prompts the soldier to recall 
the relevant intelligibles through a reconnection with the Material Intellect which houses 
that information. This reconnection with the separate Intellects is done at will.627 Once he 
625. We see here that the cogitative power plays a major role in the deliberative process; it is the location of 
the will and it is responsible for all of the key elements of deliberation and moral decision making. This is 
in addition to the role it plays in the intellective process and the ability of the human being to have 
knowledge. This means that the the cogitative power is the linchpin .
626 Averroes LCDA Bk 3, comment 33. It is worth noting that Averroes address this same example in much 
the same way in his earlier Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. First, he noted earlier that 
“affirmative and negative judgments in the theoretical intellect correspond to judgments of good and bad in 
the practical intellect” (p. 120). Then he goes on to explain that when the soldier sees the beacon “he is 
moved to fight and seizes his weapon as if he had seen the war with his own sense. For, when he sees the 
the fire on the beacon, he imagines the forms of war and prepares something appropriate for each form, his 
view of future events deriving from his view of present ones” (MCDA, p.121).
627 Averroes’ addresses the issue of will and of what is done by our will in several places in the Long 
Commentary. In some of these areas he is directly addressing selections from Aristotle which include the 
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has done this is he able to use this knowledge to make a determination about how one 
ought to act in a particular situation when one encounters the enemy’s signal fires. He 
deliberates about possible courses of action chooses one, and then acts accordingly. This 
deliberation is informed by the universal knowledge he has and by the particulars of the 
situation. It takes place in the cogitative power since this is the individual human power 
which is closest to Intellect and which has some access to intelligibles. The fact that this 
is not, strictly speaking, intellectual activity but part of the will allows Averroes to insist 
that individual human beings have their own wills and thus are responsible for their own 
willed/moral actions. He is thus able to maintain, in his mind, that the Intellects are 
separate and shared while also holding that individuals have their own wills and are thus 
responsible for their own actions, moral or otherwise.
5.5.2 Aquinas’ position and his critique of Averroes
5.5.2.1 Aquinas’ position
Aquinas’ account of the will is considerably more complex than that of Averroes. 
For Aquinas the will is a robust faculty of the human intellectual soul with several related 
powers. He argues in Book 2 of the SCG that “intellectual substances must be capable of 
willing” and that this willing is a rational appetite (as opposed to the the natural or animal 
notion of wish or voluntary action; these passages use the voluntas or some conjugation of velle, indicating 
that Averroes was working from a translation of Aristotle which erroneously (as we say in Chapter 2) 
included the notion of will. These passages include: LCDA, Bk. 1, comment 18, p. 22, Bk. 1, comment 89, 
p. 99 (p. 120 in latin text includes the world velle), Bk. 2, comment 28, pp. 134-5, Bk. 2, comment 153, pp. 
277-8 (p. 363 in the Latin text, where we find voluerimus in the reference to Aristotle), Bk. 3, comment 18 
pp. 351-2, Bk. 3, comment 5 p. 307, Bk. 3, comment 36 p. 391, Bk. 3, comment 36 pp. 395-6, Bk. 3, 
comment 36, p. 399, Bk. 3, comment 50, pp.415-16 (voluntas appears in the reference to the text of 
Aristotle in Latin, p. 518), Bk. 3, comment 57, pp. 427-8.
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appetite present in non-intellectual substances).628 As an appetite the will is directed 
towards singulars; but, as a rational appetite it is directed in a universal way--the focus is 
on how the particular functions as an instance of a more universal consideration (i.e. the 
good). Furthermore, the rational appetite is characterized by the ability to control one’s 
inclinations; apprehension of a particular as desirable does not necessarily result in 
pursuit of that particular.629 This ability helps to highlight the complex relationship 
between the intellect and the will. Although the will moves the intellect to act, the 
intellect is the superior power, moving the will as the source of the will’s end, the 
understood good.630 Aquinas explains that “the will belongs to the intellectual part of the 
soul” and that “every choice and act of the will is caused immediately in us from an 
intelligible apprehension, for the intellectual good is the object of the will.”631 Thus, the 
intellect provides an understanding of the good, which is the object of the will; based 
upon this understanding the will moves the intellect towards action which will be in line 
with that understood good and leads to happiness, the ultimate end of the will and the 
human being.632
628 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 2, Ch. 47, p. 142. “Has autem substantias intellectualies necesse est esse volentes. 
Inest enim omnibus appetitus boni: cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, ut philosophi tradunt. Huiusmodi 
autem appetitus in his quidem quae cognitione carent, digitur naturalis appetitus: sicut dicitur quod lapis 
appetit esse deorsum. In his autem quae cognitionem sensitivam habent, dicitur appetitus animalis, qui 
dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem. In his vero quae intelligunt , dicitur appetitus intellectualis seu 
rationalis, qui est voluntas. Substantiae igitur intellectuales creatae habent voluntatem” (Bk. 2, Ch. 47, sec. 
1236-1237, p. 167). Also see ST Ia IIae, Q. 6, A. 2, p. 617; Latin pp. 57-58 and ST Ia IIae, Q. 8, pp. 
626-628; Latin pp. 68-73. In ST I.82.5 Aquinas calls will an “intellectual appetite (appetitus intellectivus)” 
he also makes reference to Aristotle’s “claim” in De Anima Bk. 3, Ch. 2, 432b5 that “the will is in the 
reason.” Some issues surrounding this claim will be addressed below.
629 Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” pp. 564-565.
630 Aquinas, ST. Ia Q. 82, A 3-4.
631 Aquinas, SCG Bk. 3.2, Ch. 85, p. 18. “Voluntas enim in parte intellectiva animae est […] Omnis electio 
et actualis voluntas in nobis immediate ex apprehensione intelligibili causatur: bonum enim intellectum est 
obiectum voluntatis ”(Bk. 3, Ch. 85, sec. 2598-2599, p. 121).
632 Aquinas, ST Ia Q. 82, A. 1, p. 778. “Voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo” (p. 
392). He explains that necessity in this context refers to “necessity of the end (necessitas finis),” not 
“necessity of coercion (necessitas coactionis),” and this is a natural necessity for the will. Also see ST Ia 
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The will is able to direct us, with the help of the intellect towards the good by 
virtue of its many functions. This is because the will is not only an appetite but a faculty 
in its own right. Aquinas explains that there are several acts of the will and the intellect 
which are necessary for action. These acts of the will include willing (for an end), 
intention, consent, choice (free choice, liberum arbitrium), and use. The acts of the 
intellect include: (1) attaining universal knowledge (2) considering particulars as they 
relate to the universal and determining that they are good, (3) taking counsel, and (4) 
commanding. 
All human actions are about particulars. The individual has already done the 
intellectual work of coming to some understanding of the universal/absolute good/end. 
Then, the individual encounters some particular end and determines that this end is good 
under these particular circumstances. This leads to the first act of the will—willing 
(voluntas). Willing is a simple volitional act whereby one comes to desire the end 
because it is judged to be good “in these particular circumstances at this particular 
time.”633 Willing always has the end as its object; this end is the real or apparent good (i.e. 
the universal good as far as one understands it).634 Once the individual has willed the end 
the intellect determines that the end is indeed within the power of the willer to achieve. 
This is followed by intention, the act of the will whereby one intends to achieve the end 
through some yet to be determined means. 
IIae Q. 1, A. 6, pp 587-588; Latin p. 14 where Aquinas argues that it is necessary that everything a human 
being desires is desired because it is seen as the good or tending towards the good. In ST. Ia IIae Q. 10, pp. 
633-636; Latin pp. 83-89 Aquinas again reiterates that the object of the will is absolute or universal 
Happiness. Also see Book 1 (esp. Lec.4, 9, and 10) of Aquinas’ CNE for an extended treatment of 
happiness and an argument for its being the ultimate end of the human being.
633 Stump, Aquinas, p. 287. See Stump pp. 287-290 for the complete account of human action which I 
follow here.
634 Aquinas, CNE, Bk 3, Lec. 10, C 494.
242
At this point the individual has set a particular end, determined it to be good, and 
decided that the means to achieve this end are discoverable and within her power. Now 
she must set out to discover these means and act upon them. This requires the intellectual 
act of taking counsel (consilium). Counsel is the process of considering the various means 
by which one might achieve one’s end. Counsel or deliberation (consilium) precedes 
choice and involves a rational consideration of what has to be done to achieve a desired 
or willed for end.635 We take counsel about things which are in our own power to do.636 
Since “counsel is ordered to action”637 we deliberate about what actions we can take to 
achieve the ends we have already set for ourselves (or the final end in as much as we 
understand it). It should be clear from this that counsel/deliberation is always about 
means, not ends.638 The result of counsel is consent. Consent is an act of the will, since 
the act of consent constitutes a kind of affirmation of or moving towards some 
particular.
639 
By consenting, the will accepts the means which the intellect has deemed 
suitable to achieving the end. Depending on the end and on the preferences, abilities, etc. 
of the individual various means will be more or less appealing and thus garner stronger or 
weaker consent. 
After one has taken counsel and consented to a means or set of means, one 
chooses to act upon that decision.640 Aquinas explains that choice (electio) “is only a 
635 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 14, A. 1-2, pp. 647-648; Latin pp. 105-106.
636 See Aquinas, CNE, trans. C.I.. Litzinger (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,1964), Bk. 3, Lec. 7, C. 
460-464, p. 203-204, Sententia Libri Ethicorum Vol 1 in Opera Omnia Vol. 47 (Rome: Fratrum 
Praedicatorum, 1969), Bk. 3, Lec. 7, ln. 29-85, p. 139, for a discussion of the various things about which 
we do not take counsel.
637 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 7, C. 465, p. 204. “Consilium enim ad operationem ordinatur” Bk. 3, Lec. 7, ln. 90, p. 
139.
638 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 8, C. 475-481, pp. 208-209, Latin, Bk. 3, Lec.8, ln. 36-139, pp. 143-144.
639 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 15, A. 1, pp. 650-653, Latin p. 110-112.
640 Aquinas, CNE Bk. 3, Lec. 9, C. 484, p. 211, Latin Bk. 3, Lec. 9, ln. 19-35, pp. 145-146.
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desire (arising by reason of counsel) for things in our power. Choice is an act of the 
rational appetitive faculty called will […] it is a deliberating desire inasmuch as, via 
counsel, a man arrives at a judgment regarding the things which were discovered by 
means of counsel. This desire is choice.”641 When there are several possible means to 
achieving the desired end additional rational consideration is needed so that one means, 
or set of means, can be chosen. This is carried out by the intellect in the form of the 
practical syllogism, which allows the person to consider both universal knowledge and 
particular circumstances to arrive at a conclusion about what is best. Once this conclusion 
is reached by the intellect, the will chooses or wills this conclusion. Choice “results from 
the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism.”642 
Where there is only one way to reach the desired end, this step is skipped. Once a 
particular course of action has been chosen, or willed, the intellect commands that this 
course of action be undertaken and the will uses the powers under its control, including 
the bodily powers, to act, causing the individual to act.643
5.5.2.2 Aquinas’ critique
641 Ibid., Bk. 3, Lec. 9, C. 486, pp. 211-212. “Electio nihil aliud sit quam desiderium eorum quae sunt in 
nostra potestate ex consilio proveniens; est enim electio actus appetitus rationalis qui dicitur voluntas. Ideo 
autem dixit electionem esse desiderium consiliabile, quia ex hoc quod homo consiliatur pervenit ad 
iudicansum ea quae sunt per consilium inventa <...>, quod quidem desiderium est electio” (Bk. 3, Lec.9, ln. 
55-63, p. 146).
642 Aquinas, ST Ia IIae Q. 13, A. 3, p. 644. “Electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut 
conclusio syllogismi operativi” (p. 101).
643 It is important to point out, at least in passing, how this view relates to the practical syllogism of 
Aristotle. In some ways Aquinas’ view can be seen as a more complex understanding of Aristotle’s view 
that, when one is confronted with a particular situation where action is required one must use both the 
practical information and one’s universal knowledge to identify form within the image and make a 
determination about whether the sensed object should be pursued or avoided. While Aquinas’ account 
sounds quite similar to Aristotle’s account of moral deliberation in NE 3.3; however, Aquinas provides a 
more detailed account which includes the integration of a number of different powers of the faculties of 
intellect and will.
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Now that we have an understanding of Aquinas’ own position on the nature of 
will, its powers, and its location, we must consider the specific criticisms that Aquinas 
levels at Averroes’ understanding of the will. It should come as no surprise, given was has 
already been said about Issues A, B, and C, that Aquinas considers the notion of the will, 
Issue D, to be intimately connected to the the nature, location, and function of the 
intellects. For this reason, as we will see, he says relatively little about Averroes’ specific 
position on the will itself; instead the problems Aquinas address in the earlier issues have 
ramifications for Averroes’ understanding of the will which Aquinas finds inevitable. 
While it will be necessary to examine how Aquinas’ understanding of Averroes’ views 
regarding the intellect impact his views of the will, first it is important to examine the few 
instances were he directly addresses what he takes to be Averroes’ notion of the will.
The most clear examples of this come in De Unitate Intellectus were Aquinas 
specifically mentions the will as a problematic aspect of the Averroist position. Here 
Aquinas twice argues that Averroes’ position entails the destruction of moral 
responsibility. In the first argument Aquinas states:
[1] According to their position, the principles of moral 
philosophy would be destroyed; for what is in us would be 
taken away. For something is not in us except through our 
will; and this indeed is called voluntary because it is in us. 
But, the will is in the intellect, as is clear from the 
statement of Aristotle in Book III of the De Anima […] If, 
therefore, the intellect does not belong to this man in such a 
way that it is truly one with him, but is united to him only 
through phantasms or as a mover, the will will not be in this 
man, but in the separate intellect. And so this man will not 
be the master of his act, nor will any act of his be 
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praiseworthy or blameworthy. This is to destroy the 
principles of moral philosophy.644
Here Aquinas is explicitly linking what he sees as Averroes’ problematic understanding of 
the intellects with the will. He explains that it is necessary for the intellect to be “in” the 
individual human being in such a way that it is “one with him” in order for intellectual 
activity to be his. Similarly, the will must also be in the individual if his actions are to be 
voluntary. Aquinas declares that, according to Aristotle, the will is in the intellect and 
takes for granted that Averroes accepted this notion. If the the intellects are separate, as 
Averroes indeed claims, than the will would likewise be separate and voluntary action 
and moral responsibility would be lost.
Aquinas makes a similar argument in a second passage from De Unitate 
Intellectus. Here he says:
[2] If, therefore, there is one intellect for all, it follows of 
necessity that there be one who understands and 
consequently one who wills and one who uses according to 
the choice of his will all those things by which men are 
diverse from one another. And from this it further follows 
that there would be no difference among men in respect to 
the free choice of the will, but it [the choice] would be the 
same for all, if the intellect in which alone would reside 
pre-eminence and dominion over the use of all other 
[powers] is one and undivided in all. This is clearly false 
and impossible. For it is opposed to what is evident and 
destroys the whole of moral science and everything which 
644 Aquinas, deUnitate, Ch. III, sec. 81-82, pp. 56-57.”Adhuc, secundum istorum positionem destru- untur 
moralis philosophie principia: subtrahitur enim quod est in nobis. Non enim est aliquid in nobis nisi per 
uoluntatem; unde et hoc ipsum uoluntarium dicitur, quod in nobis est. Voluntas autem in intellectu est, ut 
patet per dictum Aristotilis in 111 De anima […]. Si igitur intellectus non est aliquid huius hominis ut sit 
uere unum cum eo, sed unitur ei solum per fantasmata uel sicut motor, non erit in hoc homine uoluntas, sed 
in intellectu separato. Et ita hic homo non erit dominus sui actus, nec aliquis eius actus erit laudabilis uel 
uituperabilis: quod est diuellere principia moralis philosophie.” (Ch. 3, ln. 336-363, p. 306).
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relates to the civil intercourse which is natural to man, as 
Aristotle says.645
In this passage Aquinas’ argument regarding the role of the intellect and its influence on 
the will is made even more directly. Here he states that one intellect for all would 
necessarily result in one will for all and thus one “free choice of the will.” He argues that 
insofar as the intellect has “dominion over the use of all other” powers, including the 
will, a shared intellect would lead to shared deliberation, choice, and, presumably, action. 
Rather than relying on his view that the intellect is in the will, here Aquinas is pointing to 
the relationship that he sees among the intellect and the other powers or faculties a person 
possesses.
In both of these cases the focus is on the will and its role, together with the 
intellect, in the process resulting in human moral action. It is essential, in Aquinas’ view, 
that all aspects of this process remain in the individual human being if individual moral 
responsibility is to be preserved. If either the intellect or the will are not multiplied 
according to the number of individuals and located in the individual human’s soul, the 
person’s ability to deliberate, choose, and control their actions will be impaired in some 
way. Aquinas sees problems with Averroes’ understanding of the intellect and the will, as 
Aquinas interprets it; thus, he considers Averroes’ position doubly flawed with respect to 
moral decision making and action and the resulting moral responsibility.
645 Ibid., Ch. 4, sec.89, pp. 60-61. “Si igitur sit unus intellectus omnium, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit 
unus intelligens, er per consequens unus uolens et unus utens pro sue uoluntatis arbitrio omnibus illis 
secumdum que homines diuersificantur ad inuicem. Et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod nulla differentia sit 
inter homines quantum ad liberam uoluntatis electionem, sed eadem sit omnium, si intellectus, apud quem 
solum resident principalitas et dominium utendi omnibus aliis, est unus et indiuisus in omibus. Quod est 
manifeste falsum et impossibile: repugnat enim hiis que apparent, et destruit totam scientiam moralem et 
omnia que pertinent ad conuersationem ciuilem, que est hominibus naturalis, ut Aristotiles dicit” (Ch. 4, ln 
81-95, p. 308).
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5.5.3. Critical Analysis of Aquinas’ critique of Averroes’s supposed view of the will
Issues of translation regarding Aristotle’s De Anima have been alluded to in 
several places in this chapter and elsewhere in the dissertation. It is important to make 
these issues explicit now because they provide a jumping off point for the divergence 
between Aquinas and Averroes regarding the location of the will and its connection to the 
individual. They also serve as a partial basis for Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes on this 
issue. 
Aristotle addresses the location of wish —the power which both Averroes and 
Aquinas associate with will —in passing in De Anima 3.9, where he explains that wish 
“is found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational [part of the 
soul].”646 Looking at the passage as it appears in the Latin text of Averroes’ Long 
Commentary on the De Anima we can see that it states that the will (voluntas) is in parte 
cogitativa (in the cogitative part).647 Averroes takes this to mean that will is a power of the 
cogitative faculty, the quasi-rational faculty located in the brain and, thus, multiplied 
according to the number of individuals. According to Averroes, locating the will here 
accomplishes several things. First, it allows Averroes to stay in keeping with Aristotle, as 
he understood him. Second, it maintains individual moral responsibility in a strong sense 
since the faculty of will, by which moral actions are initiated, is located ontologically in 
each individual, giving her complete control over her willing. Third, since Averroes sees 
the cogitative power as the faculty responsible for connecting the individual to the 
646 Aristotle, De Anima 3.9 432b5-6.
647 See Richard Taylor, “Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: Remarks on the Cogitative Power in 
Averroes” for a discussion of this issue and its implications; pp. 140-141 deal with this passage in 
particular. 
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separate Intellects so that thought can happen “at will,” it provides a way for the will to 
be connected to separate Intellect, as is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
practical syllogism. 
Aquinas had a different reading of the De Anima and, as a result, a different 
understanding of the location of the will. In the version of the text Aquinas was working 
from the passage explains that the will is in rationativa--in the rational [part]. Aquinas 
understood this to mean that Aristotle viewed the will as a rational appetite, a power of 
the intellects. This was not a problem for Aquinas, who understood the intellects to be 
powers of the individual human soul. In his understanding, this allowed for the close link 
between reason and will which is necessary for the proper functioning of practical reason. 
This understanding of the Aristotelian text and the philosophy which Aquinas 
subsequently develops around the relationship between the will and the intellects
648
 leads 
Aquinas to make a pointed critique of Averroes. 
As we saw, Aquinas argues that a separate, shared will must result in a lack of 
personal responsibility for actions and the subsequent “destruction” of moral philosophy. 
Since he understands the will to be part of the intellect and he assumes that Averroes 
shares this view (which he thinks they both receive from Aristotle) he thinks that 
Averroes’ separate shared Intellects necessarily result in a separate shared will. It is clear 
that if this were an accurate assessment of Averroes’ position he would, indeed, have a 
648 It is useful to note here that Aquinas’ discussion of will and its relation to intellect is much more 
developed than that of Averroes. Aquinas offers a detailed account of the various powers of the faculty of 
will and how they interconnect with the relevant intellectual powers in the process of moral decision 
making from willing, to taking counsel, etc., and eventually to action. It is therefore much easier to see how 
Aquinas means to explain the process of moral action and the role of the will and intellect in that process 
than it is to see how this process is to work in Averroes’ system.
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severe problem maintaining moral responsibility in his system. Even if we allow for 
Averroes’ claim that the Intellects can be separate and shared and yet still in us as 
intrinsic formal cause, this does not seem to be as plausible when it comes to the will 
which relies more heavily on particular information supplied by the individual and results 
in particular actions of an individual.649
However, as we have seen, Aquinas’ critique regarding the will does not 
accurately reflect Averroes’ position. Averroes does not think that the will is in the 
Intellects. He understands the necessity of connecting the will to cognition and also sees 
that it must be a fully individuated power if he is to provide for a robust understanding of 
personal moral decision making and responsibility for one’s actions. In fact, the location 
of the will in the individual becomes even more critical for Averroes, who must be 
concerned not only with moral decision making on the part of the individual but also with 
individual participation in the intellectual process. According to Averroes the individual 
connects with and uses the Intellects at will; thus, if the will were not individuated a 
person would be incapable of not only acting but also thinking. While Averroes thinks he 
is able to provide a strong enough connection between the individual and the separate 
Intellects by arguing that the individual is connected to the Intellects when thought is 
occurring, the will is a power which must be connected to the individual all the time if he 
is to be fully morally responsible for his actions. This is because action itself is personal 
and particular in a way that thought is not for Averroes.
649 That this is the character of moral actions is evident from what Aristotle says, and Averroes and 
Aquinas accept, regarding the nature of the practical syllogism where universal knowledge is applied to a 
particular circumstance and one’s particular understanding of that circumstance, resulting in a decision 
about what is best to do in that particular situation. 
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In addition to being incorrect regarding how Averroes understood the will’s 
relationship to the Intellects and the individual, Aquinas was also wrong in his assessment 
of Averroes’ view in relation to Aristotle. Of course, as was made clear in Chapter 2, there 
is a sense in which neither Aquinas nor Averroes can be said to be following Aristotle 
regarding the will since Aristotle does not have a developed notion of will, as such. 
However, there is still something to be said about who was closer to Aristotle’s views 
regarding the deliberative process and its relation to the intellective process more 
generally. In this regard Averroes seems to come closer to Aristotle’s view, despite 
Aquinas’ insistence to the contrary. It does seem that Aristotle’s view is that deliberation 
is something separate from intellect; this can be seem from the fact that it is possible to 
choose one thing through deliberation and then think and act contrary to that choice, as 
the incontinent person does. For Aristotle this change in course is the result not of will 
(or, more properly, wish) but of a flawed application of the practical syllogism resulting 
in an act contrary to one’s wish.650 
Perhaps more importantly, Averroes’ understanding of the Agent Intellect seems to 
be closer to that of Aristotle. The Aristotelian scholar Joseph Owens provides a detailed 
account of Aristotle’s position regarding how the human being relates to the intellects in 
his article “The Self in Aristotle.” Here he explains that, although there is no term for 
“self” or “person” in Aristotle, there is still self awareness, achieved concomitantly with 
awareness of the sensible world, in both intellectual and moral terms.651 Owens goes on to 
650. Indeed, this is precisely what incontinence is for Aristotle, as described in NE, 7.4.
651 “In that concomitant cognition, however, there is immediate and unshakable awareness of a single 
agent, namely oneself. This immediate awareness is not of a sense, or of a mind, or of a soul. It is of the 
man or the woman as cognitive agent. It is of the anthropos or, as we would say today, of the person who 
thinks and acts by means of those faculties or parts. In the ethical order one is in consequence immediately 
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explain that this self awareness is present despite the fact that the active faculty of 
intellect is separate because it is also “in” the soul:
What thinks and knows is the mind belonging to the soul 
[…] it is present in the soul as the active as well as the 
passive element […] the separate, immortal and eternal 
mind is somehow in the soul, even though it is separate in 
its own nature […] the passive mind is perishable, while 
the other mind is alone eternal. In the framework of the 
soul as the instrument by which the individual man thinks, 
this can hardly mean anything else than that the cogitative 
agent in question is the man himself, thinking through the 
instrumentality of the twofold mind.652 
This account allows that knowledge requires sensible things as the vehicle by which 
forms/intelligibles are present to human individuals for comprehension;653 it also means 
that it is the human being (i.e. the “agent self”654), as composite of matter and form, who 
is the one knowing, acting, and thinking by making use of the active intellect.655 From this 
we can see that the many thinkers who advocated for an individual passive/possible 
intellect and a separate Agent Intellect are most in line with Aristotle; this includes 
Averroes’ early (Short and Middle Commentaries) position on the Material Intellect. Even 
with respect to the Long Commentary it is certain that Averroes’ position is much closer 
to Aristotle than is Aquinas’. This understanding of the active element in Aristotle sounds 
almost identical to what Averroes says about the Agent Intellect as instrumentally present 
aware of oneself as the moral agent, as the source of one’s free conduct, and one draws the firm conclusion 
that one is responsible for one’s deliberate actions [… T]here is not the least doubt in the Aristotelian text 
regarding the immediate factual awareness of oneself as a unitary cognitive and moral agent.” Joseph 
Owens, “The Self in Aristotle,” pp. 707-708
652 Ibid., p. 717. Taylor discuss Owens account of Aristotle here and how this interpretation of Aristotle, 
supported by the view of Themistius, influenced Averroes in his “Remarks on Cogitatio in Averroes’ 
Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros,” pp. 233-247.
653 Owens, “The Self in Aristotle,” p. 713
654 Ibid., p. 718
655 Ibid., p. 718. One can also look to Rist’s “Aristotle: The Value of Man and the Origin of Morality,” pp. 
1-21 for an account of what it means to be a human being for Aristotle. Rist concludes “that it is primarily 
the degree of intellect which determines human value” (p. 13)
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”in” the soul as “form for us”and thus subject to our will, while also being ontologically 
distinct and shared. Aquinas tries to reconcile his insistence that both the possible and 
agent intellects are faculties of each individual human being’s soul with what he finds in 
Aristotle by developing the notion of the human soul as both form of the body and 
separate substance, but this is not very Aristotelian, especially when compared to the 
view of Averroes.656
5.6 The impact of these critiques on the issue of moral responsibility in Averroes.
Averroes’ problematic solution to the issues of knowledge attainment has 
important ramifications for the understanding of moral responsibility. Principally, if we 
cannot, after all, say that the individual person has knowledge in Averroes’ system, this 
calls into question whether a person can have moral responsibility in a meaningful way. 
We saw from Aristotle’s accounts of the practical syllogism that decision making, 
including moral decision making, requires the application of universal knowledge to a 
particular situation by the individual. This can only happen, properly speaking, if the 
individual knows both the particular information of their present situation and the 
universal information about what simply is the case (i.e. the intelligibles). It is not enough 
to have access to the intelligibles as they exist in the separate Intellects, even if one can 
be said to have had a hand in creating those intelligibles.657 Rather, one must be said to 
know them in a real way such that the knowledge is immediately present within the 
656 In “Aristotle and Aquinas,” pp. 38-59, Owens discusses key metaphysical differences between Aristotle 
and Aquinas which might underly and explain the unAristotelian nature of Aquinas’ thought.
657 And, we have already seen that the claim that each human being has had a hand in the creation of the 
intelligibles in Averroes system is dubious.
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individual.658 What’s more, the intellectual capacity to think through and apply the 
information must belong to the individual for immediate use; it cannot take place in some 
separate shared Intellect if the individual is going to be held responsible for the resulting 
action. The synthesis of particular and universal information through reason which is 
required for moral responsibility must happen not just when the individual wills it. It 
must also be present in a dispositional way, since, as Aristotle claims, moral action is a 
matter of habit and character; thus, it must take place in the individual as a necessary 
feature of their being. 
Averroes’ system does not meet the above criteria. His location of the will in the 
human being and his strong version of the cogitative power are not sufficient to provide 
the level of integration between intellect and individual which this process requires, 
especially given the problems we have seen regarding the connection between the 
individual and the intelligibles in act in the separate Intellects. Aquinas’ theory, on the 
other hand, is more capable of addressing these issues and, thus, allowing for moral 
responsibility both in this life and the next. By arguing that the intellect is both the form 
of the body and a substantial form capable of existing as a separate entity, he is able to 
make the individual the bearer of both universal and particular knowledge.
An example may help to highlight the differences between the two approaches 
and demonstrate the superiority of Aquinas’ account. Let’s use a modified version of 
Aristotle’s beacon of fire. Suppose there is a soldier on lookout and he sees a beacon of 
fire in the distance, moving closer. He recognizes that this signals the approach of the 
658 Again, we have seen that Averroes provides no mechanism for intellectual memory sufficient to explain 
a quick connection with the separate Intellects, let alone the immediate presence of knowledge required 
here.
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enemy. Since he is brave and knows that the brave (and thus moral) thing to do in such a 
case is to engage the enemy, rather than run, he rallies his comrades and moves to engage 
the enemy. This whole scenario takes but a few minutes, but it is highly complex. There 
are many steps, both intellectually and practically, which must take places under both 
Averroes’ and Aquinas’ accounts. First, the soldier must have had previous sensory 
experience of fire beacons so that he can know that this particular light is a fire beacon 
and not something else; he must also know that such beacons signal the enemy. 
Furthermore, he must have previous knowledge and experience with the virtue of bravery 
such that he understands what the brave thing to do in such a situation is (i.e engage the 
enemy rather than flee); then, he must will to act bravely,; then, he must act on this 
knowledge. If he is a moral/virtuous person, he will act habitually, without having to first 
consider what action constitutes bravery first.
Averroes’ system is not well suited to explaining these many intellectual 
interactions which are required for this action to take place. His insistence that the 
individual human being has no intellectual memory means that the soldier will have to 
conjoin with the Intellects, using the cogitative power, to, in a sense, relearn what the 
beacon of fire is and what it means. He will then have to use that connection to deliberate 
and make a decision about what to do (again using the separate Intellects). Finally, he 
will have to will to act upon that information (using the cogitative power) and then act 
accordingly. It is not clear, as has been stated, how the soldier himself can be said to be 
doing all of this thinking, let alone knowing, about the relevant universal information 
when the Intellects are separate entities. Furthermore, the connection between the will, in 
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the cogitative power, and the necessary knowledge, in the Material Intellect, is 
insufficient, as indicated earlier. Given this, it is difficult to say that the soldier is morally 
responsible for the resulting action, since most of the necessary mental activity does not 
take place in the soldier’s own powers.
On the other hand, Aquinas’ insistence that the intellects are powers of the human 
soul, multiplied according to the number of individuals, allows him to locate both 
universal and particular knowledge in the individual human being so that it can be 
remembered and accessed at once. Furthermore, his view that the will is a rational 
appetite allows for a close connection between the knowledge and action. He is able to 
explain the process of moral action as a complex interplay between the various acts of the 
intellect and will659 which takes place entirely within the individual. This means that the 
soldier in the example above is able to move from seeing the beacon fire to taking action 
via a process which is completely his own. For this reason the resulting action can be 
called his action in a way that it cannot be for Averroes, who must rely substantially on 
separate external substances (the Intellects) as sources of information.
It is important to note here that, while Aquinas version clearly provides a level of 
individual involvement and responsibility which is lacking in Averroes’ account, this is 
not because Averroes does not see the individual as a morally responsible agent. Rather, 
Aquinas and Averroes have different views about the nature of moral responsibility, and 
the issue of post mortem reward and punishment. They both agree that there must an 
intellectual element which is unmixed with matter and, thus, immortal. Averroes’ 
understanding of the nature of intelligibles leads him to locate this, the Agent Intellect, 
659 See section 4.3.3 of Chapter 4 of this dissertation for an account of the process.
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outside of the human being; as a result, the individual human soul is not immortal 
according to Averroes.660 Thus, Averroes is not concerned with moral responsibility as 
something with ramifications beyond this life; perhaps this leads him to develop a less 
robust account of moral responsibility in general. On the other hand, Aquinas’ view of 
intelligibles requires him to locate the intellects in the individual human being’s soul. In 
this way, he is able to hold that the soul is not only form of the body but a subsistent 
form, capable of existing on its own because it has a faculty which does not require a 
body. Thus, he holds that the individual human being’s soul is immortal, capable of 
existing without the body, although that is not its ideal state. As a result, his concerns 
regarding moral responsibility are more wide reaching than Averroes’ since they must 
include an account of eternal reward or punishment. It also allows Aquinas to provide a 
more unified overall approach to the human being by incorporating both the intellectual 
and practical faculties into each individual as part of their nature.
5.7 Conclusion 
660 One might clarify this position by saying that it is not immortal in any philosophically demonstrable 
way. Averroes’ observes a strict distinction between his philosophical and theological works and does not 
view the immortality of the soul as something that is provable, demonstratively, in his strictly philosophical 
accounts. Rather it is found in his dialectical works such as the Decisive Treatise. Richard Taylor’s 
“Personal Immortality in Averroes’ Mature Philosophical Psychology,” Documenti e Studi Sulla Tradizione 
Filosofica Medievale 9 (1998), pp. 97-110 offers a detailed account of Averroes on the issue as it can be 
found in the philosophical works.
One can look to Averroes’ Commentary on the Metaphysics for some discussion of the human beings 
relationship to immortality. Here he says that human beings connection to the “principle which is an 
intellect in the highest state of pleasure, happiness and bliss” is only in “contact for a short time [...because] 
that part of us which is united is subject to generation and corruption.” He goes on to say: “It clearly 
appears from that that Aristotle thinks that happiness for men qua men consists in this contact with the 
intellect which has been shown in the de Anima to be principle, mover and agent for us. The separate 
intellects qua separate must be principle of that of which they are principle in both senses, I mean as 
movers and as ends. The active intellect, insofar as it is separate and principle for us, must move us in the 
same way as the beloved moves the lover and if every motion must be in contact with the thing which 
produces it as end, we must ultimately be in contact with this separate intellect, so that we depend on such a 
principle, on which the heaven depends, as Aristotle says, although this happens to us but for a short 
time” (pp.156-157).
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Thus, although Aquinas provided some direct criticism of Averroes’ notion of 
will, most of his criticism of Averroes’ views surrounded the issues of intellect and 
intelligibles. While at first glance one might think that such criticisms would not be 
relevant to the problem of the will and moral responsibility, a closer examination, as 
given here, demonstrated that they are the essential components of Aquinas’ critique. This 
chapter broke Aquinas’ critiques down into four issues: (A) the placement of the separate 
Intellects “in the soul,” (B), the nature of the separate Intellects as “form for us,” (C) the 
relationship between the individual human being and the intelligibles in act, and (D) the 
location and function of the will. Each issue was examined in detail so that an account of 
Averroes’ and Aquinas’ unique views was given as well as an account of Aquinas’ 
critiques of these issue. It was demonstrated that Aquinas had a flawed understanding of 
Averroes’ view the will and that, as a result, his criticisms of Averroes on this issue were 
unsupported. However, it was also discovered that this was a relatively minor part of 
Aquinas’ overall critique of Averroes understanding of the human being as moral agent; 
most of Aquinas’ critiques revolved around Averroes’ problematic understanding of the 
intelligibles in act and the resulting view of the relationship between the Intellects and the 
individual human being. These critiques were more damaging to Averroes, pointing out 
valid flaws in his understanding of the human being as rational. This flawed 
understanding of human rationality meant that Averroes’ understanding of moral 
responsibility was also flawed because of the importance of reason and universal 
knowledge to practical thinking and moral action. On these fronts Aquinas was able to 
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provide a more coherent and plausible account of the intellectual and moral agency of the 
human being.
259
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
Now that we have completed the assessment of Averroes’ views in light of the 
critiques of Aquinas we must return to the questions with which we started the 
dissertation. This will serve as a means of reviewing the main conclusions of the 
dissertation and it will also help highlight areas for future investigation.
6.1 Does Aristotle have a faculty of will in his system? What is his view of the 
intellects?661
Averroes and Aquinas, along with earlier medieval thinkers, attributed to Aristotle a 
strong and evident faculty of will. Both relied on this attribution to support their own 
views, claiming that their own accounts followed that of Aristotle. For this reason, an 
examination into Aristotle’s actual views was necessary. So, in Chapter 2 several relevant 
works of Aristotle, including large sections of the De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics, 
were examined.662 Aristotle’s concepts of deliberation (bouleusis), decision (prohairesis), 
and wish (boulēsis) were analyzed to determine whether they conformed to the concepts 
of deliberation (rū’īah/consilium), choice (ikhtiyar/electio), and will (irādah/voluntas) 
used by Averroes and Aquinas. 
As a result of this examination it was determined that Aristotle’s understanding of 
these concepts, while providing a picture of voluntary action, does not constitute an 
account of a faculty of will, let alone a notion of freedom of the will, as it is traditionally 
661. The questions which comprise the headings for these sections are taken from Chapter 1, where these 
questions were used to highlight important issues to be addressed in the dissertation.
662. See Chapter 2, section 2.2.1.
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conceived by Aquinas and Averroes and their traditions.663 For Aristotle the process of 
voluntary moral action is one in which the individual starts with a “rational desire of what 
is good or beneficial”664 (boulēsis), rationally deliberates about how to achieve the goal of 
that desire (bouleusis), and finally decides upon what course of action would be best 
(prohairesis). While this may at first bear a resemblance to choice and will as it is 
traditionally understood, closer scrutiny determined that was not the case. This is because 
Aristotle does not conceive of decision as the freedom to choose from among various 
equally possible options. Rather, we decide upon what seems to conform to our rational 
desire to achieve the good; then we may either live up to this decision (when we act 
according to our rational desires) or we may not (when we act according to our 
nonrational desires). This differs substantially from the notion that we have the freedom 
to choose from among several options and that whatever action we ultimately take, if it 
was voluntary, was the result of a willed choice.. It is also distinct from theories which 
hold that we will actions since Aristotle’s system holds that we wish for an end but not 
that we wish for (or will) our actions; it is perfectly possible to act in a way that is 
contrary to one’s wish.
Thus, as we have seen, it cannot be said that Aristotle’s moral system includes a 
faculty of will. Rather, it revolves around the notion of voluntary action which can be the 
result of following either one’s rational or irrational desires. However, that is not to say 
that Aristotle’s philosophy is useless in our examination of will and moral agency. For it 
did lay a foundation upon which other thinkers expanded, developing more robust 
663. See Chapter 2, sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
664. Kahn in “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” p. 239.
261
concepts of will and freedom of choice. It was the work of these later thinkers, Stoics,665 
Peripatetics, and Platonists666, that was adopted and adapted by medieval thinkers in the 
Arabic and Latin traditions and attributed to Aristotle.
In so far as the question of moral agency and responsibility relied heavily on the 
relationship among the will, intellect, and individual, it was also necessary to provide 
some account of Aristotle’s view of the Intellect. Here, as with the idea of will, Averroes 
and Aquinas both claim to be following Aristotle, despite their radically different 
understandings of the intellects and their relation to the human being. As we know, 
Averroes held that both the active and passive intellectual elements, the Agent and 
Material Intellects, were immaterial entities existing apart from individual human beings 
and shared by all; Aquinas insisted that both elements had to be faculties of the individual 
human soul, multiplied according to the number of individuals. Of course, both views 
cannot be correct assessments of Aristotle. And, it is difficult to determine what Aristotle 
thought given the little he says on the subject in his works, most notably the infamous 
passage in De Anima 3.5. A reading of the passage suggests that Aristotle does at least 
view the active part of the intellect as separate enough from the individual human being 
that it does not require a bodily organ and may continue to exist after the individual dies 
(whereas all other elements of the human being do require the body and so do not subsist 
after death). It is also the case that the tradition after Aristotle, for example Alexander of 
Aphrodisias and Themistius, held that the active intellectual element was separate and 
shared while the passive element was a faculty of the individual human being’s soul.
665. See Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.
666. See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.
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6.2 Are either Averroes or Aquinas following Aristotle regarding the will or the 
intellects? 
As is well known, both Averroes and Aquinas claim to be Aristotelian in their 
views, claiming support from the texts of Aristotle regarding both the intellects and the 
will. However, it has been determined through the course of our investigation that neither 
Averroes nor Aquinas are particularly in line with Aristotle when it comes to these 
concepts. 
Regarding the will, both thinkers hold (1) that Aristotle had a concept of will 
which was in line with their own understandings of the faculty, and (2) that Aristotle’s 
assessment of the location of the will within the human being was akin to their own. 
Regarding the first proposition, it was made clear by the end of Chapter 2 that Aristotle 
does not, properly speaking, have a faculty of will in his system. Thus, it is impossible for 
either medieval thinker to be following Aristotle in this regard. Rather, Averroes and 
Aquinas were relying on contemporary sources--Al-Farabi,667 Avicenna,668 and 
Augustine,669 among others--in developing their understandings of the faculty of will and 
the concept of choice. Some of these thinkers, Al-Farabi and Avicenna in particular, 
attributed their views to Aristotle; but, in truth, they were developed out of later Greek 
sources who had more robust concepts of choice and freedom. Part of this error has to do 
with how the texts of Aristotle were translated in Arabic.670 Prohairesis and boulēsis were 
translated using the Arabic words ikhtiyar and irādah (or sometimes ḥub or hawan), 
terms already loaded with more robust connotations of choice and will than the Greek of 
667. See Chapter 2, section 2.5.2.
668. See Chapter 2, section 2.5.3.
669. See Chapter 2, section 2.4.
670. See Chapter 2, section 2.5.1.
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Aristotle. This led Arabic thinkers, including Averroes, to attribute these stronger notions 
to Aristotle. When it came to Augustine, a major influence on Aquinas, his influences 
were more clearly Platonist, although he also developed this theory using strong 
theological underpinnings. Aquinas accepted the view of Augustine, taking it to be in line 
with his understanding of Aristotle (received from his own reading of the Philosopher and 
from the Arabic commentators).
The above assessment is contrary to the views of some scholars of Aquinas, 
notably Irwin, who argued in his essay “Who Discovered the Will” that Aristotle had a 
concept of will by working backwards from Aquinas.671 This methodology is, in part, 
responsible for Irwin’s error; one must start with the Aristotle himself if one is to discover 
what Aristotle thinks. By examining the texts of Aristotle and later Greek thinkers in their 
own words we were able to trace the notion of will from its limited foundations in 
Aristotle through to the more robust account found in the Stoics, Peripatetics, and 
Platonists, and from there into the medieval traditions. This allowed us to explain both 
the progression of the notion of will and to account for its erroneous attribution to 
Aristotle by Aquinas and Arabic philosophers. While this demonstrates that Irwin and 
others who argue for will in Aristotle are wrong, it also shows that the many scholars who 
argue that there was absolutely no notion of will until Augustine are also incorrect.
In addition to this problematic transmission of the Aristotelian notion of wish into 
will, there was significant disagreement regarding how Aristotle understood the will (or, 
more correctly, wish) to be related to the intellects. This was, again, the result of 
671. Irwin, in “Who Discovered the Will?” pp. 453-455.
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difficulties in translation. As we saw,672 Averroes’ version of Aristotle had him locating 
wish/will in the cogitative power, whereas the translation Aquinas had located it in the 
rational power; modern translations of Aristotle say wish is in “the calculative part.” This 
issue of translation clearly influenced both philosophers’ understanding of where the will 
should be situated in the human being, providing further evidence to support the positions 
towards which their respective philosophies were already tending. However, it is now 
clear that neither Averroes nor Aquinas can be said to be correct in their assessment of 
Aristotle’s actual view since we have demonstrated that Aristotle did not have a notion of 
will at all.
Regarding the notion of intellects, we can again say that neither thinker is fully 
following Aristotle. It has generally been accepted in the tradition that Aristotle held that 
all human beings shared a single, separate active intellect while possessing their own 
passive intellect.673 This is the understanding gleaned from Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5 
discussion of the active and passive intellects, developed, and adapted by later Greek 
thinkers, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, as well as thinkers in the 
Medieval Arabic and Latin traditions. Averroes reacted against this tradition, developing 
the idea that both intellectual powers must be separate and shared entities; he agreed with 
the conventional understanding of the Agent Intellect as separate and shared by all human 
beings but his understanding of the intelligibles in act as the foundation for the unity of 
science led him to assert that the Material Intellect must likewise be shared. Aquinas, on 
672. Chapter 5, section 5.5.
673. It is perhaps important to remember that the terminology surrounding the active and receptive 
elements of the intellect, and the related passible intellectual powers, differs from philosopher to 
philosopher. Taylor provides a detail discussion of this terminology in “Introduction,” pp. xix-xx, espcially 
n.10.
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the other hand, developed a different understanding of the nature of intelligibles which 
led him to conclude that neither intellectual power could be a separately existing entity 
and shared. In so far as he is following Aristotle regarding the Agent Intellect, Averroes 
may be said to be more Aristotelian, although whether this is a meaningful assertion, 
given the lack of detail in Aristotle’s account, is surely debatable. This is contrary to the 
generally accepted view held by Mahoney and McInerny,674 among others, that Aquinas is 
faithful to Aristotle in general and regarding the intellects in particular. While these 
scholars start with Aquinas and assess his arguments on their own, here again our 
analysis has benefited from a different methodological approach, one where we started 
with the texts of Aristotle and the transmission of key passages into Arabic and Latin to 
pinpoint their influence on the work and understanding of Averroes and Aquinas.
6.3 What is Averroes’ position and what motivates this position? Is it coherent? 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation carefully examined a number of important texts675 of 
Averroes in an effort to determine Averroes’ final views regarding the Intellects and the 
will as well as how this view developed over time. Many of these texts were not available 
to Aquinas, whose source for Averroes was his Long Commentary on the De Anima of 
Aristotle; however, since the objective was to understand Averroes in his own right they 
were important elements to discuss. 
Averroes’ final position on the Intellects is that both the Agent and Material 
Intellects must be separate entities shared by all human beings. Throughout his works 
674. Mahoney, “Aquinas’ Critique of Averroes’ Doctrine of the Unity of the Intellect.”
675. Chapter 3, section 3.2 contains several subsection, each dealing with a text of Averroes.
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Averroes insists that the Agent Intellect is an eternal separate substance shared by all 
human beings as “form for us” and subject to our will. However, there is a shift over time 
regarding his view of the Material Intellect. In the Middle Commentary on the De Anima 
676Averroes calls the material intellect a “disposition only”677 and seems to hold that it is a 
disposition of the individual human being which is activated during thought by 
connection to the separate Agent Intellect. It is immaterial (in that it is not mixed with the 
matter of the body) but it is still individuated. The cogitative power helps to provide a 
means by which the material intellect and Agent Intellect can be linked in thought. This 
view reflects the more traditional account of human intellectual power. 
However, it was not ultimately satisfactory for Averroes because it could not 
adequately address the function of the intelligibles in act. Averroes held that the 
intelligibles in act, created by the Agent Intellect and stored in the Material Intellect, must 
exist as a single set of intelligibles knowable by all human beings if the unity of science 
is to be maintained. While they are created, he claims, through the knowledge attainment 
process of the individual human being (rather than preexisting in the Agent Intellect), 
they must not exist in the individual since this would make communication and science 
impossible. A single set of intelligibles requires a single storehouse; thus, Averroes 
ultimately678 argues that the Material Intellect, like the Agent Intellect, must be a separate 
shared entity, not part of the individual human being’s soul. 
The individual is able to access both Intellects via the cogitative power, a brain 
power which is multiplied according to the number of individuals and is equivocally 
676. See Chapter 3, section 3.2.3.1.
677. Averroes, MCDA p. 111.
678. In the LCDA See Chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2.
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referred to as reason. It is this cogitative power which allows the individual to conjoin 
with the Agent Intellect during thought, using her own sensory experience and the 
resulting phantasms to provide the materials from which the Agent Intellect can abstract 
the intelligibles in act.679 In this way the individual human being has access to those 
intelligibles in the Material Intellect. The individual is able to make these connections to 
the Intellects “at will” and the Intellects are said to be “in the soul” and “form for us” 
during this process. It is also the cogitative power which plays a central roll in moral 
action since it is the location of the will and the associated deliberative powers. Thus, 
Averroes is able to hold simultaneously that the Intellects are shared but the will is not. 
The strength and versatility of the cogitative power allows Averroes to develop an overall 
view which coherently addresses problems endemic to other theories of intellect while 
maintaining individual moral responsibility. However, while he is able to provide 
innovative solutions to weaknesses in his predecessors’ theories, his own system is 
flawed in other ways.
6.4 Does Averroes’ view hold up against the critiques of Aquinas? 
As we saw in Chapter 5, by means of a detailed analysis of Aquinas’ critiques of 
Averroes’ position, there are several issues to be considered. These include: (A) the 
nature of the Intellects as both separate and “in the soul,” (B) the notion that the Intellects 
are “form for us,” (C) the relationship between the individual human being and the 
intelligibles in act, and (D) the location and function of the will. By taking each of these 
679.  It is also the cogitative power which is the locus of the theoretical intelligibles, the intelligibles as 
they exist in the individual during her connection with the separate Intellects.
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issues in turn we determined that there are times when Aquinas’ criticisms of Averroes 
are merited; however, this is not universally the case.
Importantly, we saw that the criticisms Aquinas levels at Averroes’ understanding 
of the will and its relation to the intellects were unwarranted and represented a 
misunderstanding of Averroes’ position. Aquinas erroneously assumes that Averroes 
shares his understanding of the will as a power in the intellect and thus asserts that by 
separating the Intellects from the individual he also separates the will, making moral 
responsibility impossible. It was argued that, despite the tendency to accept Aquinas’ 
understanding of Averroes, a careful examination of Averroes’ own work demonstrates 
that Aquinas misunderstands Averroes. Specifically, he does not take note of Averroes’ 
insistence that the will is a bodily power, located in the cogitative faculty. Rather, 
Aquinas assumes that Averroes is following the same translation of a key passage in 
Aristotle’s De Anima and, as result, coming to the same conclusion about the nature of 
the relationship between the will and the intellect. However, we saw that there were 
issues of translation which led Aquinas and Averroes in two different directions in their 
quest to remain in line with Aristotle on this issue. Further, we saw that Averroes 
recognized the need to maintain individual control over both the intellectual and moral 
processes. These reasons led Averroes to separate the Intellects from the will and to locate 
the will in the individual human being’s brain while the Intellects were separate and 
shared. As a result, Averroes is able to maintain his view of the Intellects without 
automatically sacrificing individual moral responsibility in the way Aquinas claims. The 
problems that this particular critique of Aquinas exhibit are often overlooked by 
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contemporary scholars who frequently read Aquinas without referencing Averroes 
directly; as a result they praise his critiques as “deft” and “formidable.”680
Despite this error in his assessment of the will in Averroes (Issue D), Aquinas’ 
critiques of Averroes regarding the Intellects and the intelligibles in act (Issues A, B, and 
C) are generally warranted and are themselves enough to call into question Averroes’ 
view of moral agency. As we know, Averroes held that both the Material and Agent 
Intellects must be separate entities shared by all human beings; this view was in keeping 
with the tradition about the Agent Intellect, but represented a unique position about the 
Material Intellect. He was pushed to this position by his understanding of the intelligibles 
in act, which he viewed to be the objects of knowledge for all human beings, created for 
each person when her own sensory experience was used by the Agent Intellect to abstract 
the intelligibles. He accounted for individual knowledge by insisting that individual 
sensory experience was necessary for the development of the intelligibles; these 
intelligibles did not pre-exist in the Material Intellect, as they did for philosophers such as 
Avicenna. Furthermore, he held that the Intellects were “in” the individual human being’s 
soul when in use. The cogitative power, a brain power, was fundamental to this process as 
it was the power in the individual human being which brought forth the phantasms, 
presenting them to the Intellects, and linked the individual to the Intellects during 
thought.
Aquinas argued that Averroes’ account was not enough to fully explain individual 
human knowledge and that under Averroes’ system the human being was, at best, the 
object known, not the knower. He argued against Averroes’ understanding of intelligibles 
680. Mahoney, “Aquinas’ Critique of Averroes’ Doctrine of the Unity of the Intellect,” pp. 97; 106.
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and the dual subject theory, by which they are linked to the individual through the 
phantasms and the Intellects through the Material Intellect (the possible intellect in 
Aquinas’ terminology); he explained that the intelligibles in the possible intellect and in 
the imagination could not be one in number since the subject of the possible intellect was 
eternal and the subject of the phantasms was generable and corruptible. He goes on to 
argue against Averroes’ view that the individual knows through conjunction with the 
possible intellect using the phantasms resulting from her own sensory experiences and 
containing the intelligibles in potency. Here Aquinas again points to problems with the 
dual subject theory; he also argues the human being under this view has only an 
accidental connection to the Intellects, not an essential one, and so cannot be per se 
rational. Further, he reasons that it is more proper to say that in Averroes’ system the 
human being is the object of knowledge rather than the knower since the phantasm are in 
the human being but the knowing element, the intellects, are not. Aquinas also argues 
against Averroes’ understanding of intelligibles in act as a single set of intelligibles shared 
by all human beings and acting as the objects of knowledge. He calls the theory more 
Platonic than Aristotelian and explains that it does not leave sufficient room for the 
individual human being to participate in the knowledge attainment process. Furthermore, 
it is not clear how it could be true that each person is responsible for the creation of the 
intelligibles in act they know while also insisting that there is one set known by all. 
Aquinas holds that the thing known is not the intelligibles in act but the common nature 
which exists in things; the intelligibles in act are “that by which [the intellect] 
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understands.”681 This allows him to preserve science, as was Averroes’ goal, by ensuring 
that the objects of understanding, like the objects of science, exist in the nature of 
particular things outside of the mind. In this way he was also able to preserve the notion 
that the individual, not the separate Intellects, are the knowers. 
Developing a proper understanding of not only the will but also the nature of the 
intellect and the intelligibles is essential to the discussion of moral responsibility because, 
as Aristotle notes and Averroes and Aquinas accept, moral action is a matter of both 
intellect and will. This is reflected in the practical syllogism. While both Averroes and 
Aquinas adopt the practical syllogism as their account of the process of moral decision 
making, the problems highlighted by Aquinas with Averroes’ views of knowledge 
attainment make it impossible for Averroes’ system to properly use the syllogism in a 
way that allows for individual moral thinking and, thus, individual moral responsibility. If 
one cannot be said to be truly rational or to truly know, one cannot, properly speaking, be 
said to act on one’s knowledge in matters of practical, moral import. Thus, despite 
Averroes best efforts and the advancements he made beyond his predecessors, and despite 
the problems that exist with some of Aquinas’ critiques Averroes, in the end his theory is 
insufficient to fully account for individual moral responsibility.
6.5 Final Remarks
Several things have been accomplished during the course of this dissertation 
681 Aquinas, ST Ia, Q. 85, A. 2, p. 817. Also, see Q. 84, A. 7, p. 809: “the proper object of the human 
intellect, which is united to the body, is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter.”
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which are important to the study of Medieval philosophical psychology in the Arabic and 
Latin traditions. First, it has closely examined the issue of the will in Aristotle and later 
Greek thinkers with a view towards understanding medieval thought; while much work 
has been done on the Greeks for their own sake, it has not been sufficiently applied to the 
thought of medieval philosophers, particularly in the Arabic tradition. Accomplishing this 
task allows us to move forward with a better understanding of the role that Aristotle did 
and did not play in medieval thought on the issues at hand. Second, the importance of 
Averroes’ view of the intelligibles in act to the question of moral agency had not been 
properly developed up to this point; it became clear through the course of this dissertation 
that Averroes understanding of the intelligibles had bearing not only on his view of the 
Intellects but also on his view of the will. Additionally, while Averroes and Aquinas have 
been studied in their own right (Aquinas extensively so), a close examination of the 
Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes within the context of a full account of Averroes on the 
relevant issues has not been undertaken; too often the works of Aquinas are given 
precedence and accepted as accurate reflections of Averroes. While what has been done 
here is a mere start to this project, it is an important contribution to the question of how 
one should approach the issue methodologically. This new approach allowed us to see 
where Aquinas’ critique were flawed; it also allowed us to more fully appreciate the ways 
in which his criticisms were justified.
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